of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (which he notes anticipates many of Kam's conclusions), in part because of advances in intelligence collection technologies. However, Kam's case studies do not illustrate the techniques offered by the intelligence collection revolution, and so our raised expectations remain unfulfilled.

Kam never fully utilizes his four levels of analysis in dissecting strategic surprise. Nowhere is a coherent framework put forward in which the four levels are related to one another. The absence is particularly notable in the first chapter, which identifies erroneous assumptions, the failure of warning, and inadequate preparedness as the main elements of surprise attack. These dimensions are not discussed in terms of Kam's four levels of analysis. In fact, much of the chapter is pitched at the state level of analysis, one not employed by Kam.

The author also does not deliver on one of the reasons given by Schelling for reading the book (a point, admittedly, that Schelling and not Kam should be held accountable for). All but three of Kam's case studies occur before 1960 and the impact of technology is not a point developed by Kam in ways different from the standard treatments of information overload and the emphasis on current intelligence. Finally, questions can also be raised about Kam's choice of cases. His concern is with surprise attack that leads to war. Yet not all of his cases seem to fit this category. The Chinese intervention into the Korean War certainly does not qualify as the beginning of a war. It would also seem that Nazi Germany's attack on Denmark and Norway (1940), France (1940), and Russia (1941) are of a different order than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or North Korea's attack on South Korea. The latter two cases involve surprise attacks launched in "peacetime," while the former grouping involves surprise attacks launched by a country already at war. Kam, himself, dates the beginning of World War II as 1939. It is not that the use of these cases cannot be justified, but that Kam feels no need to do so.

Glenn Hastedt
James Madison University


Before the Soviets invaded Iran from the north in August-September 1941, in conjunction with the British from the south, they mapped out a contingency plan for this sometime during 1940. This invasion study was recovered by the Germans during the war, kept in the files of the Wehrmacht Military Intelligence Branch, and then captured by U.S. Army forces. It has since been reproduced on at least three or four occasions in popular journals and military publications in the West. The last time I saw reference to it was in a U.S. Defense magazine only two years ago, with the explanation that
such a contingency was always feasible in view of the ongoing turmoil in Afghanistan and the disturbances in Iran. Perhaps this is what prompted U.S. Marine Corps Major Richard Stewart to write about the events of 1941. It is clearly not—as the author seems to believe—a shadowy and overlooked part of World War II history; Winston Churchill wrote about Iran; some of the story was charted in the immediate post-war period by George Lenczowski. British and Soviet authors have devoted much time to the event and this reviewer has also written about the subject.

However, Major Stewart is absolutely right to suggest that the whole story has become one of the most controversial episodes in the entire history of the war.

What makes this episode so contentious is, of course, whether or not Nazis operating from an Iranian base constituted a real threat to the British and the U.S.S.R., thereby justifying joint Anglo-Soviet intervention. Or was the intervention simply to open up the only supply route available to the British to help the Soviet war effort once the British and Soviets finally became allies?

Having carefully dismissed—in my view, quite correctly—the moral and legal scruples against the invasion, the author embarks on a detailed account of the circumstances under which the invasion of Iran occurred and how the Cold War then started between the Allies at the end of it. Stewart also correctly emphasizes the extent of Nazi activities in Iran: in armaments, construction, communications and the cultural affinity between Iranians (including some of the leaders, though not necessarily Reza Shah) and Germans. But he decidedly creates controversy by stating that we ought to consider what might have happened had Britain and the Soviet Union not occupied Iran. Stewart argues that "Germany might have triumphed over the depleted Red Army, secured the vital Persian Gulf oil fields, outflanked the British position in North Africa [which I think is hardly likely in view of the Italian collapse and ultimate American support], and linked up with the Japanese in India." This whole statement is fraught with controversy. When one considers that there is an array of academic opinion that repudiates any significant German presence in Iran by 1941, Stewart's task of supporting the above view is a daunting one. But he accomplishes that task remarkably well by describing in minute detail successive Anglo-Soviet efforts to oust the Germans by diplomatic means. When these efforts failed, invasion to expel the Germans and secure the Iranian lines of communication became necessary.

The British had good reason to be concerned about the Nazi build-up in Iran. Britain was vulnerable in this region, particularly because of the oil it received from Khuzistan province. Likewise, although the Iranians were more fearful of the Soviets than they were of the British, they were exasperated by the constant and sudden turns of events, and uncertain as to who was winning the war. Meanwhile, Hitler's official envoy to Tehran Erwin Ettel, was advising the Iranian Government to hold out until the conflict in Russia was resolved.

When the British and Soviets delivered their ultimatum to the Shah, there was nothing he could do. "To defiantly reject the Anglo-Soviet demands
could be disastrous," Stewart writes, "... capitulation was unthinkable ... reducing Iran to Allied tutelage." But the author, without first admitting on whose side Iran was, explains Iranian procrastination in these terms "... to meekly submit would only infuriate the Nazis, who were inflicting staggering defeats on both the Soviets and the British. Within weeks, German armies could reach the Iranian border. To anger the expected victor would be suicidal." Then, in a sudden twist halfway down the next page, Stewart acknowledges that "it was largely Hitler on whom the Shah now depended to save him." It was the British, more than the Soviets, who pressed for the invasion.

Sunrise at Abadan is a synthesis of military analyses, published memoirs, former Iranian and British officers' diaries and letters, as well as a vast array of published (and some unpublished) material in archives, primarily in London and Washington, all reflecting the experience of the Iranian and British leadership. It is a well-written and, on the whole, a balanced book. But it is somewhat unevenly argued from the Soviet point of view if one is to accept the title with any degree of credibility. Most of the Soviet invasion effort is gleaned from Western sources, and the use of American Legation reports adds little to our understanding of what the Soviets were up to. Stewart apparently relied on translations of some documents in Russian, but his selection of the material, like Gretchko's *Battle for the Caucasus*, as well as other Soviet military publications, like the *Red Order Banner of the Transcaucasus*, is insignificant. Not knowing Russian, he did not find and read Agaev's works on this subject that appeared as early as the late 1960s. There are also far better documentary sources in the U.S.S.R. Moreover, there are at least three unpublished PhD theses in the United States which he did not consult. In all, the bibliography, despite the remarkably accurate storytelling, is deficient and poorly assembled. Had he consulted a number of other recent works of scholarship he might have arrived at a more detailed analysis of the Soviet perception of the German threat in Iran to the U.S.S.R. and the inception of Soviet-British mistrust that triggered what we later came to know as the Cold War.

Miron Rezun
University of New Brunswick

Endnotes