to preserve historical accuracy. Finally, it is distressing to notice that the author does not provide conclusions to her descriptive work. Furthermore, it is surprising that the publisher did not insist on a bibliography and settled for a very short list of suggested reading.

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The problem of anticipating the onset of war provides the focus for this study of surprise. Ephraim Kam, formerly a senior analyst with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, now an instructor in the Israeli National Defense College, argues that this is the most complex instance of strategic surprise. His analysis proceeds at four levels: 1) the individual analyst, 2) the small group, 3) the larger structure of the intelligence community and military organization, and 4) the relationship between the decision-makers and the intelligence community. His central assumption is that mistakes made at the level of the individual analyst determines the failure to anticipate war.

*Surprise Attack* is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the components of a surprise attack. Part II examines the impact of judgmental biases on intelligence analysis. Part III looks at the environment in which the analyst operates. Throughout the book Kam draws selectively from eleven major surprise attacks that have occurred since the outbreak of World War II. Chronologically they begin with the German invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940 and end with the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel on October 6, 1973. Kam concludes that surprise is inevitable and that the failure to prevent surprise does not evolve overnight. It is the accumulation of several factors. Especially important are the quality of information available, the persistence of conceptions in the face of contradictory information, and the inherent interdependence among the various factors producing surprise. After noting that safeguards usually fail, Kam concludes his study by putting forward two policy recommendations of his own: the intelligence community should strive to inculcate a spirit of openness, and the threshold of certainty needed to issue a warning should be reduced.

In presenting his argument, Kam retraces well travelled ground. He provides readers with a solid review of the literature on strategic surprise and the variables that affect an individual analyst's ability to predict future events. The volume's primary weakness is that Kam's work does not extend our knowledge. His work is more in the vein of confirming what others have already established. This is somewhat disappointing because Thomas Schelling in his foreword promises us more. He states that *Surprise Attack* is different from earlier studies of strategic surprise, such as Wohlstetter's study
Conflict Quarterly

of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (which he notes anticipates many of Kam's conclusions), in part because of advances in intelligence collection technologies. However, Kam's case studies do not illustrate the techniques offered by the intelligence collection revolution, and so our raised expectations remain unfulfilled.

Kam never fully utilizes his four levels of analysis in dissecting strategic surprise. Nowhere is a coherent framework put forward in which the four levels are related to one another. The absence is particularly notable in the first chapter, which identifies erroneous assumptions, the failure of warning, and inadequate preparedness as the main elements of surprise attack. These dimensions are not discussed in terms of Kam's four levels of analysis. In fact, much of the chapter is pitched at the state level of analysis, one not employed by Kam.

The author also does not deliver on one of the reasons given by Schelling for reading the book (a point, admittedly, that Schelling and not Kam should be held accountable for). All but three of Kam's case studies occur before 1960 and the impact of technology is not a point developed by Kam in ways different from the standard treatments of information overload and the emphasis on current intelligence. Finally, questions can also be raised about Kam's choice of cases. His concern is with surprise attack that leads to war. Yet not all of his cases seem to fit this category. The Chinese intervention into the Korean War certainly does not qualify as the beginning of a war. It would also seem that Nazi Germany's attack on Denmark and Norway (1940), France (1940), and Russia (1941) are of a different order than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or North Korea's attack on South Korea. The latter two cases involve surprise attacks launched in "peacetime," while the former grouping involves surprise attacks launched by a country already at war. Kam, himself, dates the beginning of World War II as 1939. It is not that the use of these cases cannot be justified, but that Kam feels no need to do so.

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Before the Soviets invaded Iran from the north in August-September 1941, in conjunction with the British from the south, they mapped out a contingency plan for this sometime during 1940. This invasion study was recovered by the Germans during the war, kept in the files of the Wehrmacht Military Intelligence Branch, and then captured by U.S. Army forces. It has since been reproduced on at least three or four occasions in popular journals and military publications in the West. The last time I saw reference to it was in a U.S. Defense magazine only two years ago, with the explanation that