Terrorist Motivation: Media Coverage
Or Human Social Action?

by
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And when each day's 'reality' is 'dramatically' put together for us by enterprises that comb the entire world for calamities, conflicts, and dire forebodings, such a documentary replica of the arena confuses us as to the actual recipe of motives on which the world is operating.¹

INTRODUCTION

The mass media of communication have been criticized for all things by all people. In particular, they have been accused of causing violent behavior in viewers—particularly terrorists. Many who make this criticism do so with the goal of advocating censorship. The desire to examine the efficacy of censorship as a solution motivates this paper.

This paper challenges the idea that the media "cause" or strongly motivate acts of terrorism. The suggestion of such a causal relationship apparently is made sincerely by government officials, media critics, and the public at large. In a poll of police chiefs of large American cities, 93% said they "believed live tv coverage of terrorist acts encourage terrorism [sic]," and 87% of the police chiefs favored limiting or eliminating coverage of terrorism.² These beliefs underwrite both the prevalence of this perception in government circles and the correlation between belief in a causal relationship and support of limitations on media coverage of terrorism.

Local officials are not alone in these beliefs. Former Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has said, "television simply has to come to grips with the fact that these terrorists do what they do, at least in part, because of the publicity" the media provide.³ Henry Kissinger has suggested that "what the media ought to consider is not to carry anything including the terrorists."⁴

Media critics of every stripe have criticized television in particular for its coverage of terrorism. The Columbia Journalism Review reported that "the most vigorous criticism of the networks was . . . that they played into the hands of the terrorists by giving them a forum for their views and demands."⁵ Michael Novak complained that "television got out the story the terrorists wanted out."⁶ Jonathan Alter questioned whether coverage of the hijacking of TWA flight 847 was "prolonging the ordeal by in effect handing the terrorist a megaphone," so the terrorists "got exactly what they wanted out of the news media: a conduit for their demands."⁷ John Lofton believes "the networks allowed themselves to be used as a platform and a conduit for terrorist propaganda."⁸
Public denunciations of media coverage of terrorism are common. Letters-to-the-editor and public opinion polls reveal a widespread opinion that coverage causes terrorism and ought to be curtailed, either voluntarily or by statute. This is not limited to the United States. A French poll found that 55% of those polled wanted the French media to speak "as little as possible" about French hostages being held in Libya "in order not to give publicity to the hostage-takers." George Gerbner reports that after a political kidnapping 8 out of 10 Germans favored an embargo on news coverage.

In light of these frequent calls for censorship as a panacea for terrorist violence, the underlying assumption that terrorism is caused by desire for media coverage bears close scrutiny before remedial action is taken. It is not necessary to prove that terrorists do not want media coverage in order to show that censorship is ineffective. Rather, one need only prove the existence of another motivation sufficient for committing these actions. This paper uses Kenneth Burke's dramatistic approach to communication to examine whether terrorism might be motivated/"caused" by motives more basic than desire for media coverage.

The paper does not assert that terrorists do not enjoy coverage and respond to it. Rather, it argues that terrorism would occur because of its symbolic value even if no media coverage resulted, and that popular demands for media restraint or censorship are misplaced. In making these arguments it is essential to provide some qualifiers. First, there is no claim to universal application. When terrorism passes into insurgency—that is, when terrorists find themselves capable of holding enemy territory and hence having traditional tactical and strategic objectives, the Burkean analysis may be less useful because communications to parties outside the inner circle of terrorists may serve instrumental objectives, while Burke's analysis is primarily of the consummatory functions of symbolic activity. Second, the study is limited to non-state terrorist groups operating for political purposes. It does not include state actors, the mentally ill, or the criminal performing terrorist acts for profit.

**Terrorism as human social action**

Communication theorist Kenneth Burke's theory of social action is part of the "new rhetoric." The "old" rhetoric was the study of persuasion, tended to be atheoretical, and provided systems that could be taught easily. Aristotle defined rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion." To the ancient Greeks in their burgeoning "democracy," the art of persuasion was an important one that had to be taught quickly to a large number of men. Hence, the early study of rhetoric was pedagogically rather than theoretically oriented and might be called grammatical. The "new rhetoric" is intensely theoretical, uninterested in oratorical pedagogy, and "may best be described as 'social' or 'sociological.'"

The new rhetoric is important because it is inextricably tied to the principles and practices by which human societies are organized—hierarchy. The new rhetoric is interested in how people relate to one
another in society through the use of symbols. Speech communication theorists Frank E.X. Dance and Carl E. Larson have noted that "human communication links people with other people. It is the process through which social bonds are established and maintained, human relationships are defined, and almost all forms of social behavior are manifested."\(^\text{15}\) The study of such pervasive and powerful phenomena is what leads to the definition of rhetoric as the study of "the uniquely human ability to use symbols to communicate with one another."\(^\text{16}\)

Analysis of terrorism should begin with an understanding that it is human action. Action is distinct from motion because humans can act, while things can but move. This realization forces us to examine the entire complex of motives that surround human action because of its symbolic nature. This realization is central to Burke's theories of human social action.\(^\text{17}\) Burke says that human action differs from motion in kind because humans are "symbol-using animal[s]," \textit{homo symbolicum}, and because the use of symbols for identification and communication makes human action unique.

Because humans act, Burke's dramatistic approach is not a metaphor, it literally depicts human life. Burke's dramatism is a method for analyzing human relations and motives in acting. By analyzing human actions—including symbolic actions—we may understand how humans relate to one another and why they act as they do.\(^\text{18}\)

Hugh Dalziel Duncan, a sociologist disciple of Burke, has applied dramatism to the analysis of the formation and operation of human society. The most basic proposition of Duncan's view of society is that "society arises in, and continues to exist through, the communication of significant symbols."\(^\text{19}\) Humankind forms societies as a means of resolving the conflict between individuals' physical estrangement from one another and their innate desire to bridge this estrangement by becoming "consubstantial" with and by "identifying" with others.

The formation of societies produces social orders "expressed through hierarchies which differentiate men into ranks, classes, and status groups."\(^\text{20}\) These hierarchies relate people as equals, superiors, and inferiors and are supported by "principles of order . . . believed 'necessary' to social integration."\(^\text{21}\) The principles upon which the hierarchy is based are necessary in convincing people to accept their assigned roles in society—an exercise in persuasion. However, these principles contain the seeds of their own destruction. Principles of order give rise to commandments—the "thou-shalt-nots" which dictate appropriate and inappropriate behavior. The existence of commandments and the human inability to obey commandments produces a cycle:

\textbf{In sum:}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{In the Iron Law of History}
  \item \textit{That welds Order and Sacrifice:}
  \item \textit{Order leads to Guilt}
  \item (for who can keep commandments)
\end{itemize}
Guilt needs Redemption (for who would not be cleansed)  
Redemption needs Redeemer (which is to say, a Victim!)  

Order  
Through Guilt  
To Victimage (hence: Cult of the Kill).  

Order is a motive for human behavior arising from individuals' "need to find a place" in the world. Order is hierarchial because it identifies these places and their relationships to one another. A hierarchy must persuade those living under it in order to command them how to live. But, since people cannot always obey commandments, guilt arises. Guilt is individuals' realization that they have violated the "sacred" principles necessary to the society which has given them order and a sense of place. 

Guilt becomes a motive as persons seek redemption for their guilt. Redemption, however, requires the sacrifice of a victim. Expiating guilt by doing harm to self Burke calls mortification. Sacrificing of a scapegoat other Burke calls victimage. Burke has noted that "the promoting of social cohesion through victimage is 'normal' and 'natural' " and not restricted to ancient or primitive societies. The use of scapegoats has the "ability to establish social cohesion and . . . consubstantial identification." Hence, "victimage can be viewed . . . as a means of establishing order because it serves to unite a society against a common enemy."  

Victimage, then, is essential for producing, for the individual suffering from guilt, "redemption, rebirth, or a new identity." According to Foss, Foss and Trapp, 

The rhetoric of rebirth . . . involves movement through three steps—pollution, purification, and redemption. Pollution is the initial state of guilt, an unclean condition of sins and burdens; purification is the step of cleansing or catharsis, where the guilt is sloughed off; and redemption is the stage of cleanliness in which a new state—whether physical, spiritual, or psychological—is achieved.  

Rhetorical theorists Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith have noted that, to achieve purification, radicals may "work out the rite of the kill symbolically. Harassing, embarrassing, disarming the enemy may suffice, especially if he is finally led to admit his impotence in the face of the superior will of the revolutionary." Thus victimage provides rebirth for radicals. "By the act of overcoming his enemy, he who supplants demonstrates his own worthiness, effacing the mark, whatever it may be—immaturity, weakness, subhumanity—that his enemy has set upon his brow."  

Radicals and terrorists are parts of societies—rebel societies with
their own symbols, hierarchies, sacred principles, and need for redemption from guilt caused by violating these principles. Hence, Burke’s analysis of society can be applied to terrorist societies to explain the primary reasons terrorists commit violent deeds. 24

Terrorist violence as social action

Societies exist in a state of flux because “social order is always a resolution of acceptance, doubt, or rejection of the principles that are believed to guarantee such order.” 29 Society must provide us with “means to expiate guilt arising from disobedience,” for “no society can survive unless symbolic resources are available for expiating guilt arising out of failures . . . to uphold principles of hierarchy believed necessary to survival of the group.” 30 When people begin to doubt too much the reigning principles of order, “victimage passes into result.” Even society’s use of force “must rest on belief. The victim must believe in his guilt and in the right of his executioners to punish him . . . . The revolutionary is an enemy, not a victim.” 31

Revolutionaries and terrorists, then, are people who can no longer expiate their guilt under the reigning symbols of social order. They form their own societies that allow expiation. “One notable characteristic of the rhetoric of the first stage of a revolution stems from the revolutionary’s need for identification because in the process of divorcing himself from the images of the past, he welcomes new symbols to restore his security.” 32

Seen this way, terrorism and revolution are not aberrations, but simply another ordering of human society. Terror and revolution are only aberrations by the standards provided by the principles upon which mainstream society is built. Viewed as a species of human social action, terrorism and revolution become understandable.

The violent deeds of terrorists are committed to provide the new social order they seek. Burke provides this illustration:

With the evidence of the Crucifixion before us, we cannot deny that consubstantiality is established by common involvement in a killing. But one must not isolate the killing itself as the essence of the exaltation. Rather, one can account for the consubstantiality as arising from common participation in a notable, or solemn experience. Thus, we once saw the history of a human society in miniature, grounded in a rhetoric of primitive magic. Some boys, about ten years of age, had been playing in a vacant lot. They stirred up a rattlesnake, which the father of one boy killed with a hoe. They had their pictures taken, dangling the dead snake. Immediately after, they organized the Rattlesnake Club. Their members were made consubstantial by the sacrifice of this victim, representing dangers and triumphs they had shared in common. The snake was a sacred
offering; by its death it provided the spirit for this magically united band.33

The killing and maiming done by terrorists, and the risks they take together are violent and dramatic attempts to form and maintain their new society by proving their own worth in accordance with their own principles of order. The victimization of members of mainstream society purifies terrorists of guilt. Duncan argues, "For it is only by acting together under great community symbols that men identify and thus rid themselves of loneliness and despair. Men need each other in hate as well as love . . . Men do not want to communicate about love and hate, but to express them in community with other men." 34

Because "social relations are dramatic relations . . . men seek society, brotherhood, and love." But, they do so "through community dramas of guilt, redemption, victimage, and hierarchy." These dramas often involve the symbolic or actual killing of a scapegoat whose killing purifies those involved in the drama. In explaining war as a normal part of mainstream society, Duncan wrote,

All wars are conducted as "holy" wars. The enemy must be defeated not only to gain . . . any of the alleged "rational" reasons for war, but because his defeat and punishment will relieve us of our guilt and fear . . . as we wound and kill . . . our love for each other deepens . . . our hatred of each other is being purged.35

Because "victimage is the basic form of expiation in the communication of social order," we should not be surprised to see terrorist societies using victimage to accomplish this purpose.36 The seemingly senseless killings done by terrorists serve the same function for terrorist society that wars and punishment of criminals and dissidents perform for mainstream society. The repulsive form of victimage taken by terrorists is only repulsive from the perspective of our society's principles of order. Mainstream societies are not immune from such rituals, as Duncan has observed:

This model of victimage is familiar in our time. We turn in horror from Stalin's purges and Hitler's death camps, but we face the terrible revelation that victimage works. Man is a social beast of prey. He does not kill for food, but to achieve "order" in society. Thus before we create models of social order which tell us what happens after or before conflict, . . . we must develop models which tell us something about what goes on during conflict.37

Terrorists sometimes seem conscious of their participation in the creation and maintenance of a new social order. Menahem Begin has written about the use of victimage by the Irgun to remove the negative labels put on them by their enemies, hence allowing for rebirth. "The 'smear' with which our enemies and opponents tried to belittle us was to us a source of pride. People who had been humiliated and degraded became proud fighters in our ranks, free and equal men and women."38
An anonymous writer for the Baader-Meinhof/Red Army Faction wrote that becoming an urban guerrilla, "Presupposes that one is . . . sure that the whole anti-Semite-criminal-subhuman-murderer-arsonist syndrome they use against revolutionaries, all that shit that they alone are able to abstract and articulate and that still influences some comrades' attitude to us, that none of this has any effect on us." 

Begin also wrote of the "order" of Irgun society, writing that "a fighting underground is a veritable state in miniature: a state at war. It has its army, its police, its own courts. It has at its disposal all the executive arms of a state." Begin also described the Irgun as a society operating under new symbols of order.

In the Shock Units and in all the divisions of the Irgun we had members who came from all Jewish communities and of all classes. We had people from Tunis and Harbin, Poland and Persia, France and Yemen, Belgium and Iraq, Czechoslovakia and Syria; we had natives of the United States and Bokhara, of England, Scotland, Argentina and South Africa, and most of all, of Eretz Israel itself. We were the melting-pot of the Jewish nation in miniature. We never asked about origins: we demanded only loyalty and ability. Our comrades from the eastern communities felt happy and at home in the Irgun. Nobody ever displayed any stupid airs of superiority toward them; and they were thus helped to free themselves of any unjustified sense of inferiority they may have harbored. They were fighting comrades and that was enough. They could, and did, attain the highest positions of responsibility.

As opposed to the unity and society found within terrorist society, the enemy is to be regarded as less than human and deserving of death. The killing of others who are like us is never as easy as killing others who are identifiably "them," and not "us." For, as Rand Corporation analyst Brian Jenkins has observed, "As we have seen throughout history, the presumed approval of God for the killing of pagans, heathens, or infidels can permit acts of great destruction and self-destruction."

The killing of innocents outside terrorist societies is but one form of victimage available to terrorists. By risking their own lives in all-out armed confrontations with authorities, terrorists also can practice mortification. As Duncan notes, when "we cannot find easy outgoing relief or cannot project our guilt upon another, we circle back upon ourselves." Terrorists can punish themselves to expiate guilt, but this punishment must be done on the terms of the terrorists' social order. Hence, mortification may take the form of foolhardy risk-taking in a violent encounter with authorities, or the martyrdom of a suicide mission.

Terrorists sometimes seem aware of the dramatic nature of their activities. Yehoshafat Harkabi notes Al Fatah's belief that "Violence has a
therapeutic effect, purifying society of its diseases.” Al Fatah believes “violence will purify the individuals from venom, it will redeem the colonized from inferiority complex, it will return courage to the countryman.” This statement is more than just the stretching of a metaphor to the extreme. Given Burke’s framework and the appeal of this kind of rhetoric to terrorists, it is possible to explain why it works and why terrorists practice violence. Speaking further of the redemption and purification provided by violence, Al Fatah stated in regard to Israel “Blazing our armed revolution inside the occupied territory is a healing medicine for all our people’s diseases.”

Hardman has noted that terrorists inevitably challenge the sacred nature of the existing social order as a prelude to establishing a new one. They do so by showing that the existing social order does not respect sacred principles. Terrorism seeks to portray the “existing government as a usurper of the people’s power or of the historic rights of a certain dynasty or class.”

In the most extreme case, terrorists might construct a new social order around perpetual violence. Such a society would have principles of order alien to any existing society and these principles might require perpetual violence—both victimage and mortification—in order for guilt to be avoided and redeemed. This is the kind of social order found in Miller’s description of the renowned terrorist, Abu Nidal.

In following Abu Nidal’s trail over the past decade, one fact is unmistakable. The violence and terror he sows is not directed at any achievable political goal. While Abu Nidal pursues tactical ends—publicity, intimidation—he does not seek to use terror to achieve Palestinian rights or a state in his lifetime or even in that of his children. For him the struggle against Zionism and all of its supporters is timeless and continues without regard for accommodation, compromise, or negotiation. “The fact that the Zionists have taken my Arab homeland is for me more than a crime,” Abu Nidal asserted last fall. “For me it would be a crime if we permitted the Zionist to leave our homeland alive.” It is here, in a world of grievances that can never be addressed, of injustices that can never be righted and of unending vengeance that Abu Nidal operates—impervious and opposed to all forms of accommodation of moderation.

The leaders of dominant social orders do not doubt that terrorism is an attack on social order. Though not a physical threat, because most terrorists are too weak and unpopular to be a threat, terrorists pose a rhetorical threat—they present an alternative. Government leaders often respond to terrorism in just the way Burke would predict—by gathering together the most powerful symbols and sacred principles of social order to refute the terrorists.

U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz used sacred U.S. principles
including “rule of law,” “morality,” “courage,” “democracy,” “self-confidence,” “individual rights,” and “freedom” in an essay on terrorism. Terrorists must be victimized to redeem the guilt that arises when terrorism is allowed to disrupt or threaten the peace and tranquility promised by the existing social order. Schultz assured readers that “our actions will be governed by the rule of law.” But, “if terrorism is truly a threat to Western moral values, our morality must not paralyze us . . . and if the enemies of these values are united, so too must the democratic countries be united in defending them.” Schultz went on, “if we truly believe in the values of our civilization, we have a duty to defend them. The democracies must have the self-confidence to tackle this menacing problem . . . We must confront the terrorist threat with the same resolve and determination that this nation has shown time and again.” While fighting the battle against terrorism might get messy, “we must always keep in mind the values and way of life we are trying to protect. Clearly, we will not allow ourselves to descend to the level of barbarism that terrorism represents.”

The role of the media in terrorist violence

These motives for terrorist violence do not leave much of a role for the media in “causing” terrorist violence. The terrorist is a social creature seeking his/her own satisfying social symbols, purifying his/her guilt, and removing unsatisfactory identifications put on him/her by the enemy society by striking out at that society. By “killing” the enemy—physically or symbolically—terrorists are enacting “social dramas . . . whose proper enactment is believed necessary to community survival.”

These purposes are served for terrorists by participation in, not by media coverage of, the rituals. The audience reached by this kind of ritual drama is composed of those who already have rejected the reigning symbols of order and who are part of radical/terrorist society. This is not a major segment of the audience attending to Western mass media channels. Rather, these are the “insiders”—people already committed to the cause. “Insiders” share in the rituals by word of mouth and by prior rehearsal with participants—they do not need media channels.

Ultimately, then, terrorism more nearly “causes” media coverage than the reverse. Violent terrorism is merely another form for expressing the victimage and mortification expressed in any society. Hence terrorism is “caused” by the nature of humanity as homo symbolicum, and media coverage results because the dramatic nature of the events is consistent with news organizations’ standards of newsworthiness.

This does not mean that terrorists do not derive satisfaction from manipulating the media or from their sudden fame. Rather, these are serendipitous benefits to actions taken as the result of the most powerful motives known to humanity—the motives Burke calls “Order” and “Kill.” The power of these motives arises from their elemental nature. The need for order necessitates victimage/mortification, and this motivates terrorism. Burke’s explanation is more elegant than the
popular causal view of the terrorism-media relationship, which requires a number of questionable assumptions be made about terrorists or the impact of mediated violence and persuasive messages. Further, this approach provides a clear statement of the motives driving terrorism and offers the hope of remedial action. For, if terrorism is an expressive act, its solution may lie in finding alternative means of expression.

**Media criticism as social action**

The barrage of criticism aimed at media coverage of terrorism is inexplicable in the absence of evidence that coverage causes terrorism or helps terrorists. However, if we look at such criticism as social acts of victimage and/or mortification, it becomes explicable as its primary motivation is revealed.

The news media are part of the larger society, but each journalistic organization is a miniature society within a society. The community of journalists is a society within the larger society just as newspaper reporters are a society within the community of journalists and the staff of a single newspaper is a society within the society of newspaper reporters.

Humans' inability to keep commandments partly results from the fact that the commandments operating in a society conflict with one another, particularly as persons belong to smaller societies within the larger society. For example, one commandment of society is that the families of the recently deceased should not be intruded upon. But this conflicts with the commandment that a newsperson always gets the story no matter what the cost. Another commandment of society is that criminals and lunatics should not be given access to the coveted airwaves or front pages—these are the domain of government leaders and prestigious persons. But this conflicts with the standards of newsworthiness that journalists use in selecting and presenting news (a U.S. television network's recent secret interview with Abu Nidal, for example, led to a great furor when the network refused to disclose his whereabouts to government authorities).

When such conflicts arise, leaders assigned by society will defend and uphold the principles in conflict by victimizing the journalists for their coverage through name-calling, threats of legislative changes, and otherwise disciplining them.

Within the "community of journalists" a great deal of mortification is going on in the form of public breast-beatings over the nature, extent, and form of media news coverage of terrorism. The television networks produce specials debating their own coverage, newspapers attack television reporters' excesses, and public television holds round-table discussions of the excesses of its commercial counterparts.

All of this criticism comes about because the behavior of journalists—while consistent with the principles of order under which journalism is conducted—violates sacred principles deemed essential to the survival of the greater society which surrounds them. A dramatistic
analysis of this endless self-criticism and external media criticism would appear to be warranted at this time.51

The promise of this line of research is that it explains the prevalence of media-bashing despite the absence of evidence that media coverage does any good for terrorists or harm to society. The media are scapegoats for the existing social order's inability to keep the peace—a very important symbol of the social order. The media are also the victims of the need for mortification and victimage which arises from the conflicting commandments governing the larger society and its parts. Finally, the media serve as scapegoats for the guilt the audience feels for attending to media that have violated important commandments of the social order.

Conclusions

Terrorism is not a unique form of behavior. Rather, it is a species of the genus of human social action and explicable as such. We can predict terrorism to the extent that when people reject an existing social order to establish one that replaces the existing symbols and order, we know that they will be motivated to engage in victimage and mortification of the sort found in terrorism. And, we know that this motivation—which may be enhanced by the desire for media coverage—exists independently of any such coverage.

Many states are unable to control terrorism now, but knowledge of the purposes it serves provides hope that governments might learn to avoid the estrangements that necessitate this violence. For example, if victimage is necessitated to remove the negative labels put on terrorists by mainstream society, then a palliative might be to encourage authorities to reduce the intensity and frequency of their labeling of groups outside the mainstream of society. In such denunciations, the symbols that tie society together begin to function at the same time to exaggerate its differences and to reduce the chances that divisions can be resolved peacefully. Perhaps in the future the authorities can help terrorists find alternative, peaceful means to achieve the purification and redemption they so badly need, and which they currently find in violent bloody sacrifices.

Finally, there is now evidence to respond to those who advocate censorship of media journalism on the basis of the argument that media coverage is one of the primary motives for terrorist violence.

Endnotes

11. Thus, I am utilizing the tripartite division of terrorists utilized in Frederick J. Hacker, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time* (New York: Norton, 1976).
18. Ibid.
21. Ibid., pp. 61-66.
24. Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 284; in "Dramatism," p. 451, Burke argues that "the sacrificial principle of victimage (the 'scapegoat') is intrinsic" to human society and that dramatism seeks, therefore, not to see how this might be eliminated in a "scientific" culture, but instead, "what new forms" the sacrificial principle might take. Terrorist violence is just this—another form of socially mandated sacrifice.
28. Burke's dramatistic analysis has been applied to media coverage of terrorist incidents in Jack Lule, "The Myth of My Widow: A Dramatistic Analysis of News Portrayals of

29. Duncan, Symbols, p. 61.
30. Ibid., p. 140; Duncan, Communication, p. xxv.
34. Duncan, Communication, p. 235.
35. Ibid., pp. 246, 131.
36. Duncan, Symbols, p. 144.
40. Begin, pp. 142-43.
43. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "Al Fatah's Doctrine," in The Terrorism Reader, p. 150. This belief in the "therapeutic" value of violence is neither original nor unique to Fatah. It was brilliantly articulated by Frantz Fanon, based on his experience in the Algerian War. See his work, The Wretched of the Earth [1961] (New York: Grove Press, 1968).
47. Duncan, Symbols, p. 60.
50. Moffitt, p. 12.
51. This has been begun in Ralph E. Dowling, "The Media and the Terrorist: Not Innocents, But Both Victims," unpublished paper presented to the Western Speech Communication Association Convention, Spokane, February 1989.