INTRODUCTION

A cursory review of the literature suggests that the word "intelligence" itself is likely to be problematic. Blackstock and Schaf, for example, in the introduction to their annotated bibliography of the field in English note that:

... even the terms used are confused and confusing. Expressions such as "Soviet (or U.S.) intelligence" are used as a kind of shorthand for all the intelligence and security agencies of the state concerned. ... [P]opular usage confused espionage ... with the entire intelligence function. Melodramatic spy novels and motion pictures reinforce this mistaken notion.¹

And apparently, the situation is no better in other languages.²

Four factors lie at the root of the problem. One has been partly alluded to in the observations above. "Intelligence" is a synecdoche in the true sense of the word. It is used to represent both a larger whole and a smaller part. In the former case it is used to mean not only the collection of information and the analysis thereof but also all the activities of organizations forming an intelligence community (i.e. those doing special operations, counterintelligence and security work, etc.). In the latter case it is sometimes used interchangeably with the word "espionage" which constitutes but one small part of an intelligence effort. The second factor concerns the occasional need of intelligence agencies to use euphemisms for what in blunt language might be politically unacceptable. This is particular true where covert operations are concerned. Thirdly, intelligence does not exist in either a verb or gerund form. This makes it difficult to perceive what activities are actually included under this heading.³ This fact is particularly important for historical work. Researchers at some point have to make choices over the boundaries of their subject area. And this means confronting head on the chicken and egg dilemmas that relate to the structure and function of organizations. To these must be added the problem of knowledge, particularly the need for secrecy and obfuscation that form part of the process of security and intelligence work.

Such problems make it necessary to read the security and intelligence literature in ways that other fields might not normally require. Attention must be paid to the national origin and the international focus of the political culture in which material is written. Due regard must be given to the status of the writer and whether or not he or she has access to inside knowledge. And, in particular, the purpose behind the writer’s
endeavors must be evaluated. Only in this way can the trustworthiness of the literature be established.

The discussion which follows only analyses the English language literature on a selective basis. But it does so in such a way as to provide discrete perspectives. The division of labour follows a set path. It begins with a commentary on those who have focussed attention on the literature from some sort of global or multinational perspective. It then looks at the two national literatures that have dominated the field (the American and British). The purpose here is to see whether and how these literatures have defined "intelligence." This is then followed by an analysis of the literature concerning the activities of Soviet and Eastern Bloc security and intelligence organizations. Alternative frames of reference are then sought from other political cultures (from pariah states, from non-western nations). Finally, the Canadian literature is examined with a view to comparing its strengths and weaknesses with those of other political cultures, particularly those which have most influenced Canadian political development.4

I. THE LITERATURE AS A WHOLE:

The literature on intelligence-related matters is now extremely extensive and growing rapidly.4 Books, journal articles, government documents, media reports and documentaries on such diverse topics as active measures (covert operations), codes and signals, crimes against the state, disinformation (deception), defence policy, electronic intercepts, espionage, individual rights, intelligence agencies, national security, nuclear deterrence, peace movements, political violence, policing, propaganda, public order, sabotage, secrecy, subversion, surveillance, terrorism and war now make up complete libraries in their own right.6

This wealth of literature has both positive and negative implications for serious scholars of intelligence. On the positive side, the sheer volume and diversity of data available presents a considerable opportunity for conducting research. Unfortunately, a number of factors militate against this being an easy job. Before assessing these factors it is important to get a feel for the literature as a whole. To do this it is necessary to identify certain categories and to make some qualitative assertions about them.

The literature may be broken down into about seven separate groups. Only one specifically sets out to be fiction, though several of the others include fictive elements. The fiction group includes both feature films and "spy fiction." Both have long histories and represent burgeoning genres in their own right. While, of course, they vary considerably in quality, orientation, and their capacity to entertain, spy writers, as David Stafford has noted:

... are always more than entertainers. They present us with unique orientations about nations and their place in a complex and dangerous world. If we care to look, these commentators of the silent game can inform as well as amuse us.4

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There is good reason for this. Many writers have inside knowledge of the looking-glass world. It is not surprising therefore that novels and films have tended to focus attention on particular organizations and to glamorize certain occupations at the expense of others. But such matters alone do not explain the unquestionable popularity of genres. In Tinker, Taylor, Soldier, Spy, as John Oseth has noted, Le Carré allows one of his characters to muse aloud.

[A] nation's intelligence service is the only real measure of its political health, the one true expression of its collective subconscious. Perhaps as no other national institution, it embodies the societal psyche, reflecting interwoven images of national "self" and "alien" other.

Stafford in his historical analysis of spy fiction from William Le Queux down to the present day confirms not only that British spy writers began to flourish when they could strike a chord of national vulnerability but has argued that the same is currently holding true for those in the Soviet Union and in the United States. Both, he argues, are now perceived to be declining empires. And it is the spy novel which fulfills the need of the public culture for patriotic reassertion and the denial of imperial decline.

A second category may be termed "official documents." The amount of data in these varies from state to state and from period to period. Their value also varies as well. "Official reports" which form one sub-set of documents, generally present "safe" versions of affairs. Readers therefore need to be aware of what is included in such documents and should hypothesize what is left out. By contrast, documents prepared for internal consumption may be much more revealing.

A third category may be classified as "semi-official documents." This group is largely comprised of autobiographic studies which have a degree of official sponsorship. It can be argued that this group should include some of the fictional literature. For example, some have posited that the novels of E. Howard Hunt were intended to encourage support for CIA covert operations.

In counterpoise to this group are the "unsanctioned accounts." These accounts are provided by authors with insider knowledge who for one reason or another want to reveal perceived deficiencies in the system. In both the United Kingdom and the United States such authors have routinely found themselves on the receiving end of court actions to curb publication or to limit disclosure.

A fifth group concerns reports and documentaries in the media. Two categories are normally implicitly presented by members of news organizations. One may be termed reactive reporting. This occurs where news is received in an unsolicited fashion, as it were by accident rather than by design. Such is the case with wire service items for example. The other is frequently referred to as investigative journalism. Such activity
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is perceived to be proactive in the sense that it is initiated by reporters of their own will. As Chibnall has argued, the practice:

gives journalists the sense that they are autonomous actors in touch with the finest traditions of their craft—crusaders in the cause of truth, protectors of the people’s freedoms rather than mere functionaries of a production process which panders to consumer wants.29

Richard Ericson, in a recent major empirical study, has questioned both the authenticity of the practice and the existence of the dichotomy. For him the reporting of news rests upon the provision of knowledge by sources. It differs only in their location and intention. Thus, journalists are not manufacturers: they are rather constructors. They organize and shape the knowledge that comes to them into a discourse.31 This interpretation is important when it comes to understanding the role that journalists and sources play in reporting about security and intelligence affairs. It points to the need for researchers to pay particularly close attention to both the content and manner in which material is released for public consumption.32

It is probably true to say that each of the last three groups has been written for the popular culture rather than a more specific audience. In general terms these versions have also tended to focus on particular organizations and occupations and not on others.23

The literature that comprises the two final groups has been specifically prepared for scholarly audiences. By far the larger of the two groups, and the one with the longer pedigree, is comprised of special interest studies. These tend to be of more interest to one scholarly discipline (or even sub-sections of it), to one country, or to specific types of organizations.24 The other is comprised of studies which have attempted to see the big picture, and to cross disciplinary, organizational and national boundaries.25

II. GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE LITERATURE:

Over the last twenty years two schools—the American and the British—have come to dominate the discussion of intelligence matters at nearly every level. In the last year or so with the shift in focus to theoretical and definitional issues it has become popular to question this dominance on grounds that the perspectives produced are parochial and not capable of holding universal value.26 To date this challenge has not got very far.

Three factors have thwarted the development of a new frame. First, many authors have found themselves psychologically boxed into particular ways of looking at the central issues. This has been caused by their investment in dominant cultural orientations and particular disciplinary approaches. Thus both American and British writers have tended to focus their work within the context of the primary threats (past and present) that have challenged their particular political cultures while
individual authors have found it difficult to avoid the disciplinary perspectives and methodologies immediately available to them. Secondly, the "new wave" of thinkers on intelligence has been headed by academics from either the smaller, less prestigious universities or from the non-traditional disciplines. And finally, authors who have advocated a comparative framework as a necessary next step have not necessarily met with the success they intended or others thought was their intent. In Ken Robertson's case the pinpointing of differences between British and American views of intelligence and the suggestion of how both could be improved has, in fact, focussed attention back on the dominant frame, albeit an improved one. The motives behind Roy Godson's attempt at comparative work, Comparing Foreign Intelligence need to be closely scrutinized as he has a major investment in what has become the established frame for looking at intelligence. Though the individual authors make very valuable contributions, the book as a whole is really neither about foreign intelligence nor about making comparisons. While dialogue between the British and American voices is maintained, those concerning the Soviet Union and the Third World remain muted. This is largely a function of the order of the articles and the positioning of the book and the articles by Godson.

The result is that a "Mercator projection" of intelligence, one that looks at the problem primarily within the context of East-West confrontations centred in Europe, is maintained. All other dimensions remain peripheral.

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE:

The development of the intelligence community in the United States is a modern phenomenon. It is epitomized by the birth and development of the Central Intelligence Agency immediately after the Second World War. Perhaps more than in any other democracy, the American intelligence system has been open to public scrutiny and the public political process. Emphasis in the literature can be seen to waver between periods of concentration on propriety procedures and on organizational efficacy. Harry Ransom, in fact, has argued that intelligence functions have been regulated according to fluctuations in the domestic and international political milieu. Thus, writers have tended to describe the intelligence community according to a variety of discrete periods: the Early Years, the Dulles Era (1953-61), the Kennedy-Johnson Years (1961-69), the End of CIA Immunity and Legitimacy (1970-74), the Reform Era under Ford and Carter (1975-1980), and the subsequent counter-reform period.

There is little doubt that the 1970s saw an unprecedented increase in interest on intelligence matters. Most critical observers of such affairs agree that 1975 was the watershed year. Prior to that time there had been only a limited number of works published about either the structure and functions of the U.S. intelligence community or the theory of intelligence and much of it lacked sound evidence or concrete examples. A number of factors had worked against publication. Of critical
importance was the fact that governments cloaked intelligence activities in official secrecy. This was particular true of domestic matters. At the Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover kept information clamped even within the bureaucracy. Responding in 1971 to an invitation to defend the FBI's role at a conference at Princeton he argued that:

Basically our position is that the FBI need tailor no special "defense" of its own for this occasion. The basic facts on how the FBI is organized and how it discharges its duties have been so well known for so long, and to so many responsible persons, that they are obvious to all except those who are so blind that they do not wish to see.\(^\text{34}\)

Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s it was not the practice for former intelligence professionals to write their memoirs, though as Mark Lowenthal notes a number of writers wrote "from experience, but not of experiences."\(^\text{35}\) It was the amendment to the Freedom of Information Act (1974) which provided a new level of access to knowledge, the Vietnam War, the Watergate Break-in, the change in relationships with the Soviet Union, and one might also add, the death of Hoover, which provided the political environment for change by focussing attention on the role of the Presidency. It was in this context that Victor Marchetti, a former CIA official, and co-author John Marks published *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* in 1974. This was to be a book that changed national attitudes. Hitherto American intelligence agencies had tended to be respected but not well known. Thereafter they dwelt in the public spotlight and imagination. The book indicated that the CIA concentrated its efforts not on intelligence activities against the Soviet Union but on covert actions against the small and weak nations of the Third World. There it conducted dirty tricks and supported factions it favoured with money and arms, not altogether successfully.\(^\text{36}\) In all probability it spurred Seymour Hersh to write a series of articles that appeared in the *New York Times* in December 1974. These revealed that the CIA had violated its congressional charter by spying on Americans.\(^\text{37}\) These articles opened the flood gates of change. With them the era of trust between the intelligence community and Congress, on the one hand, and American citizens, on the other, abruptly ended. In its place "a new season of inquiry" was created on Capital Hill.\(^\text{38}\) Ransom has claimed that it was these articles coupled with the CIA's complicity in the Watergate scandal that started the:

new era in U.S. Intelligence history, initiating a still-continuing avalanche of disclosures about assassination plots, drug testing, mail opening etc. and of published materials on the intelligence system.\(^\text{39}\)

He has broken the post-1974 American literature down into four categories: personal memoirs, whistle-blowing exposés, social science analytical works and congressional and executive branch studies.\(^\text{40}\) Each of these bodies of literature needs to be seen at two levels: for the political purposes they served and for their long-term analytical contribution.
During 1975, the so-called ‘year of intelligence’, four congressional or executive branch studies were completed. Early in January President Ford initiated his own investigation under the chairmanship of his Vice-President, Nelson Rockefeller. This was frequently interpreted to be an attempt to preempt a more hostile investigation by Congress. Nevertheless, both the Senate and the House of Representatives went ahead with the establishment of investigative committees. Of the two the Pike Committee in the House was looked upon with greater suspicion than the Senate’s Church Committee. This had much to do with the attitude of the committees and their chairmen. Pike was confrontational in approach: the Church Committee less so. Both in their own way achieved some success. Each in turn led to permanent select committees which have published a continuous stream of information ever since. As a research tool the work of the Church Committee is more extensive and probably more useful. In addition to these three investigatory bodies the Murphy Commission also provided studies on intelligence matters. Because these were provided without the benefit of either the Pike and Church committee reports or that of the Rockefeller Commission, they tend to be more abstract. They, nevertheless, constitute a useful, long-term source of information.

The committees of inquiry gave sustenance to a number of different types of writers. Though they had different political motives and objectives in mind they may be grouped together because their works are all essentially polemical in style. The group contains works by whistleblowers, axe grinders and activists. The works of Philip Agee, Frank Snepp, John Stockwell and Joseph Smith all provide views of the CIA from the inside. Nevertheless, these whistle-blowing antics themselves differ considerably. At one end of the spectrum the disaffected Agee tries to damage the organization permanently by revealing the names of its operatives. In the middle Snepp and Stockwell provide unauthorized criticism of the operational efficacy of the agency. And at the other Smith’s approved memoir alludes to the organization’s moral decay. The works of the Centre for National Security Studies, Frank Donner of the American Civil Liberties Association, and David Wise are examples of axe-grinders. They each focus on abuses without really placing them in context. The collection of essays in Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe and Uncloaking the CIA are representative of the New-Left abolitionist movement.

Under circumstances where many insiders shared the view that abuses had not been put in a proper context, it is not surprising that many former intelligence officers felt obliged to set the record straight by writing memoirs. Ken Robertson, in fact, has argued that it is difficult, if not impossible to prevent committed employees from responding to such criticism when they believe that their professional conduct and personal integrity are so severely questioned. Thus these memoirs need to be seen as a rebuttal to the extensive criticisms of the mid-1970s. It is to be expected, therefore, that they exhibit a certain commonality of theme. Robertson has identified four points. First, critics had failed to comprehend the international political realities of the Cold War of the 1950s...
and 1960s. Secondly, they had failed to understand that responsibility for the faults and errors lay just as much with the executive as it did with the agencies concerned. Thirdly, there was a general lack of appreciation that the intelligence community was not one big monolith but a group of enterprises that had emerged under a particular institutional and bureaucratic climate. And lastly, the memoirs pointed to the anachronism of the criticism itself by indicating the way the standards of the 1970s were applied to the period before détente.

And finally, the investigations of the mid-1970s acted as a catalyst for more comprehensive and more rounded academic studies. For the first time there was harder data to go on and a lively debate to be enjoined. In this milieu a small number of important academic studies were conducted and published. Lawrence Freedman’s study, *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat*, is significant for a variety of reasons. Most important, perhaps, is his finding that external threats are as much determined by the existing bureaucratic culture as they are by the provision of intelligence estimates. Also of significance are the works by John Elliff, Richard Morgan and Athan Theoharis which deal with the domestic theatre. The weakness, however, in many of the academic studies of this period is that they lack an adequate theory of intelligence, a matter not altogether surprising given the lack of comprehensive knowledge of the intelligence system at the time.

In the period since these early academic studies a continued cleavage may be perceived in how academics have viewed the role of intelligence in the United States. This cleavage has been conceptualized in a variety of ways. Robertson, for example, has seen it in clear-cut terms of Idealists versus Realists. For him neither entertains the interests of the other. His Idealists have concentrated primarily on ethics and democratic theory and have focussed on such issues as accountability and constitutional law and the morality of intervention and covert action. In stark contrast his Realists focus on organizational performance. Perhaps a more useful view is to consider the literature in terms of the orientation of writers towards the Soviet Union. Such is the perspective of Loch Johnson and others who see clear points of demarcation between authors along a continuum. At one end the Soviets are “aggressive expansionists,” at the other more “defensive opportunists.” The perception of the threat in these terms makes only zero-sum activities possible at one end, while at the other shared-sum activities can be entertained.

Johnson suggests that the works of the National Strategy Information Centre and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, which he refers to as the “Georgetown perspective,” epitomize the zero-sum orientation. Furthermore, he argues that their interpretations of and recommendations for intelligence requirements follow from this view. Whether or not one agrees with this view of the Consortium’s work, it has certainly been responsible for shifting the emphasis in the debate over intelligence away from propriety procedures—accountability, charters, legislation, oversight mechanisms, etc.—to issues of efficacy and to concentrate the arguments in the elemental categories. The central
argument which runs through their seven volumes is as follows. The intelligence process needs to be seen conceptually as the integration and coordination of four key elements: analysis, collection, counterintelligence and covert operations. A weakness in any one of the elements threatens the whole. Good intelligence is a prerequisite if America is to maintain its position in the world. Consequently, the United States needs a full-service intelligence capacity. Whether one agrees with the Consortium's view of the world or their political objectives is unimportant; what is significant is that their work has encouraged an important step forward analytically. Hitherto intelligence problems had not been treated at all systematically. Instead, the committees and their critics had examined aspects of the intelligence community's work in isolation and had advocated changes to collection processes without giving due consideration to the activities of foreign intelligence agencies and the range of threats that they posed. Henceforth it would be necessary to view the implications of policy and structural changes on the whole system not just the particular organization or activity under consideration.

Whether one agrees about the influence of the Consortium's work or not the literature of the 1980s has been of a much more sophisticated nature. On the one hand it has been much more conceptually oriented. And on the other it has been much more linked. There are now a whole range of studies which deal with intelligence failures, surprise, deception, and the policy process and regulatory control. Far from failing to enjoin issues of propriety and efficacy, one now finds writers touching on both sides of the original divide.

IV. THE BRITISH SCHOOL:

The British literature on intelligence is dramatically different from that of the United States in many ways. Its espionage fiction, as David Stafford has shown, goes back to the Victorian period. Its scholarly and popular non-fictional work, as with the American literature, is of more recent origin. This delay has not so much been caused by a lack of interest in the subject, but by positive efforts on the part of successive British governments. During the Second World War considerable efforts were made to impress on the British public the need for secrecy and the avoidance of idle chatter which could help the enemy. Such attitudes were not allowed to wane after the war. To the contrary, efforts were made to encourage and enforce enclosure on security and intelligence matters. Where the citizens of other democracies gained access to information legislation, the British government retained and used the punitive powers contained in the Official Secrets Act. Where journalists in North America could publish what they could obtain, the British press muzzled themselves with a "voluntary" system of publication restraint. Where foreign archives were opened, Britain's remained tightly shut under the thirty-year rule.

This official view of security and intelligence matters remains to this day. Governments, regardless of stripe, have avoided inquiries
wherever possible. Where they have been deemed them necessary the hearings have largely been held in private. And where their reports have been made public, they have been short and to the point. Seldom has much information concerning the structures, functions and interrelationships of the organizations making up the British intelligence community been released. The impact of this governmental policy has been to make the study of intelligence matters unattractive for political scientists and only sparingly so for historians.

Despite these adverse conditions four aspects of security and intelligence work have attracted the attention of non-fictional authors. These aspects to some degree may be seen as point and counterpoint and as disparate entities. There has been a never-ending stream of books about the betrayal of British secrets to the Soviets. These have been of two general types: those concerning strategic or defense matters, such as atomic weapons secrets, and those relating to British intelligence itself. This latter group has been by far the most consuming and has created the greatest degree of soul-searching. At least one author has suggested that the search for "moles" has taken on the proportions of a national obsession. Certainly, the continued reiteration of the problem and elaboration of it, has created very severe difficulties for the special Anglo-American intelligence relationship. Studies concerning moles have, in fact, taken two tacks. Initially, there was the unfolding of the story. The purpose in many of these works was to bring about a public enquiry to establish once and for all that British security was no longer vulnerable. More recently, an attempt has been made to concentrate on the subversive nature of the so-called "Cambridge Comintern" and to focus on the moral decay within the establishment. With a few notable exceptions the so-called "mole studies" have been conducted by journalists and popular authors, rather than those with a scholarly audience in mind.

By contrast, the second group of studies has been written by former intelligence experts or by members of the academic community. It is these studies which constitute for Cameron Watt the so-called emerging British school of intelligence studies. They are in counterpart to the "mole studies" in important respects. In large part these studies are historical in nature. Whereas the "mole studies" focus on security failures and security weaknesses, the more academic studies initially concentrated on either intelligence coups or the potential benefits of intelligence. It is not surprising, therefore, that these studies began to be published during the 1970s when criticism of and demands for accountability of the Security Service were extensive.

Prior to the 1970s only a few books had been published by insiders and but one of these had been in any way controversial. A threshold book, however, was The Double Cross System in the War of 1939-1945. Written by Sir John Masterman, a well-known Oxford historian, the book started life as an official MI5 archival record of the XX Committee's successful deception work prior to the D-Day landings. Masterman had tried unsuccessfully to obtain permission to publish the document on at least five occasions over a period of nearly twenty years. Approval
finally came in 1972 after he had threatened to publish abroad. But the publication some two years later of F.W. Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret* was to open the flood-gates of change. This work not only recorded how German codes were broken during the war but catalogued the enormous benefits of signals intelligence that resulted to the Allies.

Subsequent to these insider accounts a broader range of historical studies appeared. These studies had two starting points. First, the new climate, albeit a reluctant one, on Whitehall's part towards intelligence provided incentives for academics to pursue new avenues of access to historical data. These, in turn, allowed for important revisions to be made to certain critical events. Secondly, the American and Israeli experiences with and literatures on surprise and intelligence failures were of considerable import to historians. To these were added Britain's own experience at the hands of the Argentineans in the Falklands. Starting from the general premise that good intelligence was critical to the Allied victory in the Second World War these studies attempted to analyze the state of intelligence, warts and all, immediately prior to and during points of crisis. In the process these historical studies provided the "missing dimension" to much twentieth-century diplomatic, military and political history.

A third group either concerns the "troubles" in Ireland directly or owes much to them. These studies need to be seen on at least two different levels. All too frequently events in Ireland are perceived by authors and readers alike to be a central feature of Irish history or to constitute a rich source of material to satiate the ever present desire for news and views of terrorism. But such interpretations give the political violence there too short a shrift. Studies of Irish terrorism and British responses to it are significant for three other reasons. First, because the "troubles" extend over a very long period of time and span both war and peace, they offer a blunt contrast to studies of intelligence which concentrate on wartime exploits or preparation for war. Secondly, they offer a different way of looking at intelligence from either the "mole" or "war studies." While the "war studies" focussed on the strengths or weaknesses of particular elements of intelligence (signals intelligence, scientific intelligence, special operations, military intelligence, etc.), the "mole studies" concentrated largely on the weaknesses of security and governmental response to penetrations, spying and defections. By contrast, the Irish studies provide an opportunity to identify the linkages between the various elements of the British national security apparatus and to show how they function. Thus we see in several treatments how the army, the police, the Special Branch, the SAS, and both the Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service all work together. And finally, we also see in a number of other studies the lengths to which a democratic government like that of Britain will go in peacetime to solve security problems. In this regard it is also worth recalling that different traditions of policing developed in Ireland than on the mainland and that it was events in Ireland which created the need for the Special Branch in London more than a hundred years ago.
The Irish studies are particularly important insofar as they indicate that “the troubles” have gone through several specific phases in recent years. As the rate of conflict increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s the British government responded with the introduction, on an experimental basis, of counterinsurgency tactics. The strategy for such practices had been laid out in a semi-official book by a future Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom Land Forces, then Brigadier, Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping.* Kitson based this work on his own extensive practical experience in Britain’s Asian and African colonies, on earlier British counter-insurgency campaigns in Palestine and Ireland, and on the works of a number of earlier authors. Later the government decided to follow a policy of “criminalization” or “Ulsterization.” This policy reasserted the premise that terrorist acts should be considered as criminal offenses to be dealt with by the police and prosecuted in the courts. While, criminalization can be construed as a carefully crafted term to avoid acknowledging that a counterinsurgency campaign was being fought within the United Kingdom, the process did have very significant consequences in terms of who should play lead roles and how prosecution should be achieved. In 1977, for example, the army’s hitherto supreme authority in security matters was removed and given over to the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. A further result is that Northern Ireland is now one of the most heavily policed societies in the free world. Another is that criminalization changed the emphasis from broadly based counterinsurgency methods which were frequently perceived to be counterproductive, to more finely tuned initiatives.

All too frequently the police and policing are not included within the rubric of the intelligence community and its functions. This state of affairs stems in large part from the belief that a clear distinction can be drawn in democratic societies, particularly those that owe the mainstays of their political philosophy to England, between criminal and security intelligence. This distinction is normally perceived to be two-edged. On the one hand the objectives of the exercise are said to be different; security intelligence being used to thwart threats while criminal intelligence is thought to be used only for law enforcement purposes. And on the other there is said to be clear points of demarcation on organizational lines between police forces and intelligence agencies. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Irish studies is that they illustrate the importance of the police and policing techniques to internal security procedures and intelligence practices in Britain. In particular, they illustrate the degree to which the police have taken on a counterinsurgency role on both the mainland and in Northern Ireland.

While this fact has largely gone unnoticed by the historical establishment it has not gone unobserved by writers toward the left in Britain. The pioneering work in this regard was provided by Tony Bunyan, Tom Bowden, Carol Ackroyd *et al.*, and the many contributors to *State Research.* Though *State Research* has long since perished, the tradition has been continued in the work of Mike Brogden, Duncan Campbell, Martin Kettle, Sarah Manwaring-White, Peter Hain, Paddy Hillyard and
Phil Scraton, to name but a few, and in the pages of the New Statesman, Time Out, and New Society. A central feature of their argument has been that the police, the Special Branch, MI5, the Secret Intelligence Service, the SAS, the military and private security need to be seen as being structurally all of a piece when it comes to their intelligence function and the maintaining of order in Britain. The implications of this assertion for controlling intelligence are awesome as they imply a need to impose controls functionally as well as structurally.

The literature on the "political police" and the police more generally can be seen to be connected to two important developments: the growth of literature on governmental secrecy and the demand for greater accountability of the coercive arms of the state. Whereas in the United States the demand for greater accountability focussed on the Central Intelligence Agency and its activities at home and abroad, the demand in Britain was channeled towards the police. In this respect it has met with a modicum of success. But efforts to bring the intelligence agencies under firmer and more public control have failed miserably.

V. THE LITERATURE ON SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES:

All too frequently the political, economic and social structures of the Soviet regime are treated as if they are the products of the Bolshevik revolution alone. Little or no consideration is given to the possibility that these structures may owe much to the political culture of Russia under the Tsars. Interestingly, it may be argued that the structure and function of the contemporary Soviet intelligence apparatus owes much to its pre-revolutionary forebears. A clear point of linkage can, in fact, be seen between the modes of policing apparent under the Tsars and those available to the Commissars of the new Soviet State.

The lack of historical perspective so prevalent in much of the literature reflects in many ways dominant Western attitudes toward and perceptions of the Soviet Union since the Second World War. Cold War blinkers have frequently been responsible for excluding from view explanations for Soviet behaviour based on centuries of Russian experience. This lack of historical perspective has been compounded by American attitudes towards their own intelligence and security agencies and the purposes they serve. Intelligence for North American politicians has traditionally been something that was undesirable at best and something they would rather not know about at worst. Gentlemen, in the supposed words of Henry Stimson, simply did not read each other's mail. But such a view has not traditionally been shared by other political cultures whether they be of a democratic stripe or otherwise. The secret police were an important feature of the Hapsburg monarchy under Joseph II (1741-90). Here their surveillance practices were based on the best of motives. The French police also have a tradition of political watching and listening at home and abroad that dates back to the Cabinet Noir of Richelieu and beyond. This system of "high policing" was developed and considerably extended after the 18th Brumaire by Fouché. Policy spying was also a feature of the nineteenth century
Ottoman Empire, though here there were no paternalistic overtones. It is not surprising therefore to find that the secret police in Russia have an equally long tradition and a rich literature.

The contemporary literature concerning the Soviet intelligence system has been grouped in a variety of ways. The American authors of a recent bibliography, for example, have used five main headings: bibliographic and reference works; Russian/Soviet accounts; defector/first hand accounts; secondary accounts; and the U.S. government documents. Such a grouping simplifies the job of constructing a bibliography but is not particular helpful in making sense of the literature as a whole. Texts need to be perceived in terms of their value as primary or secondary sources and in terms of the political perspectives they adopt. Soviet documents—like all official papers—should not be taken at their face value. They need to be seen as carefully scripted official reports which encourage particular perceptions. Likewise, materials produced by defectors must be considered in the same way as hostile witnesses are treated in a court of law until their veracity is proven. Secondary sources, that is accounts provided by non-Russians, also vary considerably in their perspective. They too need to be seen in terms of whether they constitute "zero-sum" (Soviets as aggressive expansionists) or "shared-sum" (Soviets as defensive opportunists) interpretations. Even U.S. Government documents need to be viewed in this manner because American views of the Soviets have changed over time with shifts in congressional majorities and the presidency. Secondary accounts also need to be seen in terms of the type of experience and expertise that the author has had. Thus the sorts of topics touched upon in journalistic approaches may be quite different from those covered by former professional intelligence officers or academics. It should also be stressed that the accounts of defectors need to be considered in this context. In the academic literature the author's discipline should also be considered. Likewise, his or her country of origin may be of considerable significance.

Other types of categorization are equally significant. For example, whether the approach constitutes a structural or functional analysis is extremely important. So too is whether it is more concerned with internal or external matters or whether it focusses only on a specific function or not.

The English language literature on Soviet intelligence matters is clearly dominated by American sources and by defectors who now live in the United States. The bulk of the material focusses on the role and functions of the KGB in its capacity as a foreign intelligence agency. While emphasis has traditionally been placed on human intelligence capacities this has recently been supplemented by writings that focus on support for terrorist organizations, the deception of western intelligence agencies and the governments, active measures generally, and particular types of intelligence gathering such as that which concentrates on scientific and technical information and high technology. Also, other agencies such as the GRU and the International Department have come under
closer scrutiny. This picture is a composite of the changing nature of perceived threats, the preponderance of available data and the application of accepted ways of looking at the intelligence world in the West. But is it accurate or is it just the world we want to see?

It may be argued that analyses of Soviet politics and government have often been flawed in important respects. While the role of the party has correctly been given due prominence, mechanisms for maintaining party power and status have often been dealt with in too summary a fashion. This is particularly true of the state's security police, or to give it its more correct title, state security. This situation may be partly explained by two important and interrelated facts. On the one hand analysts have often examined the problem through the same lenses that have been used in the West to explain Western intelligence and security functions and structures. Such conceptual frameworks, as some authors have noted, may not be at all appropriate. And on the other writers have had to rely on the preponderance of data that is available. Together these factors have encouraged a view of the Soviet apparatus which overemphasizes the foreign intelligence role and underplays the security aspects.

The recent contribution by John Dziak has attempted to redress the balance and to reconceptualize the problem. Rather than positing that the USSR has the world's largest or best intelligence service as other authors have done, he suggests that it has an essentially security-focused system. Furthermore, he argues that it provides the foremost and longest running example of the "counter intelligence tradition." He considers that an "overarching concern" with internal and external enemies of the state and a compulsive desire to rid itself of such threats lie at the root of this tradition. Under such circumstances he concludes that domestic security quite naturally takes pride of place while foreign intelligence activities become largely an external projection of state security. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Dziak considers the essential features of the counter-intelligence tradition—provocation, penetration, fabrication, diversion, agents of influence, clandestine work, disinformation, "wet affairs", direct action and combination activities—to be long established. Seen in this light the security and intelligence apparatus is essentially a policing system designed both to maintain a specific conception of order at home and abroad which has been defined by the party to protect the party itself.

VI. INTELLIGENCE AND PARIAH STATES:

The use of the term "pariah" to describe states which pursue policies about which there is widespread international or regional disapproval had its origins in the 1970s. Though many of the states then so labelled have long since re-entered the mainstream as the result of changing political fortunes and attitudes, South Africa and Israel remain as regional if not international pariahs.

While one may argue about the validity of such a controversial concept for international relations purposes, the notion of pariah states is
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useful for the study of security and intelligence matters. Though initially shaped to be in the Western mold both Israel and South Africa present dramatically different models of intelligence both from each other and from other Western states. This has largely to do with the nature of the threat presented and the need for regional self-reliance. Historically, the threat against Israel has been seen as being primarily external and of a very serious nature. Unlike other states Israel has never enjoyed the luxury of being able to lose a war. In its case such an event has always been unthinkable as it implied not only losing the war but the demise of Israel as a state as well. Of course, the presence of Arabs living within Israel’s boundaries has also constituted a threat in the eyes of some. Until recently, however, this has not been seen as being of major proportions. But Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Intifada are now changing the situation.

It is not surprising that the study of intelligence in and about Israel has focussed until recently on two dimensions—the heroic role and intelligence failures. Perhaps more than any other states’s the Israeli intelligence community epitomizes intelligence as hero. This heroic role has been encouraged by the state in three particular ways. First, it has used deliberate disinformation and propaganda to encourage this perception. Second, as part of this campaign it has gone out of its way to give novelists and film makers official access to senior intelligence personnel. This, it should be noted, has occurred in a state which is arguably more obsessive about secrecy than Britain. And third, and perhaps most important, Israeli intelligence has a truly heroic tradition. Its history is filled with daring exploits. To quote the words of Le Carré: “Israeli intelligence is a sandbox. If it works they do it.”

The result of this heroic tradition is that Israeli intelligence has acquired, rightly or wrongly, a reputation, often shared by public and professionals alike, for excellence. The popular literature documents their exploits and details their successes. And on occasion it even subscribes to the singular importance of intelligence in saving the state.

The surprise attack suffered by Israel in 1973 and the increased academic interest in intelligence generally has encouraged more balanced academic studies. These have focussed on two specific aspects—the efficacy of organizations and the problem of intelligence failures. These studies can be divided into three distinct periods. Recent hebrew studies of the period immediately prior to 1948 have indicated that the level of sophistication achieved by the Jewish Yishuv in the areas of political and military intelligence, special operations and propaganda was, in fact, very substantial. Likewise, recent studies of military intelligence have shown that the aura of infallibility which characterized the period after the 1967, was not present prior to the 1956 Sinai campaign. In fact, Raymond Cohen has shown that a series of intelligence failures in 1953 and 1954 had shaken the confidence of service quite severely. The failure of intelligence to alert Israeli authorities about Arab intentions prior to the Yom Kippur War has been responsible for much more circumspect analyses by both Israelis and Jewish writers of other nationalities. These
have concentrated on how surprise can be avoided, the political realities of intelligence, and on the value of estimates. Much of this work has been completed, published or presented in North America and in this sense has influenced and forms part of American scholarship.

In South Africa the focus of attention is reversed. Support (albeit often covert) of white, Western governments has limited the capacity of South Africa's black neighbors to pose a major external threat. Within South Africa the always potentially violent black majority pose a never ending threat and challenge to the state.

Though much external support for black South Africans has been voiced throughout the English-speaking world and beyond, little academic work has been done either within South Africa or outside to understand how the South African government uses its police, intelligence agencies and military to thwart opposition. This deficiency can only partly be explained. Obviously, the current regime's levels of secrecy, severe restrictions on the media, and harsh levels of treatment for those who break the Apartheid rules or breach public order make working on such issues extremely difficult for those who want to live in South Africa. But the lack of work by foreign scholars, particularly for the early years or in such non-operational areas as accountability and control, is harder to fathom.

Literature on the South African intelligence and security matters is scant indeed. What exists can be broken down into three small groups. By far the largest is that concerning legal matters. Here the emphasis is not just on the propriety of state organizations but more broadly on the legitimacy of the Apartheid regime. A second and connected literature concerns civil violence and policing reforms. And finally there is a limited literature on the workings of the secret police.

VII. INTELLIGENCE IN NON-WESTERN COUNTRIES

While there is a paucity of English-language intelligence literature on non-Western countries, the extant material is of considerable importance from an analytical point of view. Whereas intelligence work is frequently perceived in the West to be a twentieth-century phenomenon, this is not the case in the Orient. There writers acknowledge the influence of the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu who wrote The Strategy on War more than 2450 years ago, and point to the long established tradition and employment of secret societies.

A number of observers have suggested that the Japanese possess particular cultural traits that have had a major influence on the development of their intelligence systems. In his examination of the period from 1894 to 1922 Ian Nish has argued that besides their traditional reputation for analysis and observation the Japanese had become intrepid travellers who were full of curiosity and energy. Their high sense of loyalty to their community and to their nation made them reserved, reticent and secretive. Some have even described the Japanese as having a "genius for secrecy." Yet J.W.M. Chapman has noted, however, that
Japanese traits did not always affect intelligence positively. He suggests that there appears:

to be a cycle in which the Japanese assiduously learn about those aspects of their environment that they deem to be essential to a maintenance of domestic harmony, engage in a hard-headed, rational and painstaking analysis of external conditions, but sacrifice its conclusions on the altar of national sentiment and on judgements of what other, unconsulted parties will tolerate.\textsuperscript{137}

This point is confirmed by Michael Barnhart in his analysis of Japanese intelligence before the Second World War. He has argued that despite high quality information Japanese leaders relied on their own uninformed notions of how potential enemies would respond to Japanese policies.\textsuperscript{138} For the post-war period Richard Deacon has argued that these traits have both encouraged an intense desire for all kinds of knowledge and developed a capacity for turning a current disadvantage into a future advantage. Thus because post-war terms prevented expenditure on offensive military equipment and conventional western types of intelligence gathering, Japanese intelligence developed in different directions. Deacon suggests that these developments reflect a conception of intelligence which is not sinister and which does not incorporate espionage as it is perceived in the West.

Japan, with its passionate emphasis on the acquisition of knowledge, may pave the way to a more peaceful and eminently sensible concept of secret service in the future. All the signs are there for those who wish to read them. Provided the world can avoid global war for another twenty years, it is possible that secret intelligence can become simply the acquisition of information which can help to produce more prosperity, which can show how to overcome food shortages in certain areas of the world, how to harness both science and the behaviour of human being to improve living standard. Tokyo has already pointed the way to this future use of secret service in countless ways which do not seem to have been grasped by many other nations.\textsuperscript{139}

The conception to which he refers is a global probe, one which incorporates not only information on commerce, economic research, markets, technological developments and trade broadly construed but management, organizational and technical knowledge and literally anything which impacts on productive capacity, particularly that which has defence implications.

Chinese intelligence systems are also of particular interest because they can be compared to those of other communist states. Of particular importance is the fact that they operate quite differently from Soviet agencies. Here, as in Japan, the work of Sun Tzu has, and continues to
have, considerable influence. So too do secret societies. These on occasion have become states within the state. As well there has been a marked trend over the last twenty years toward legal forms of foreign intelligence gathering and away from illegal or aggressive methods. In particular, there have been few examples of attempts to suborn or bribe foreign scientists or researchers.

Dale Eickelman’s anthropological research on intelligence in Arab states has posed a particularly interesting question about intelligence in the non-Western World. By focussing on a small, region-oriented intelligence system, that of the Sultanate of Oman, he has been able to add to the process of discerning what impact organizational cultures have on the production and content of political threats. Because Omani intelligence was so long under the British, he is able to examine, by comparing intelligence structures in one state over time, to what degree a “British” intelligence agency (i.e. a western-trained and supervised organization) sees the world differently from an Arab one. His argument is that intelligence officers tend to focus more on declared hostile states than those which are considered to be friendly or peripheral to imminent security or political concerns. Significantly, he suggests that when threats are diffuse their delineation depends more on prevailing conceptions of politics. His warning is clear. Effective intelligence analysis of non-Western states requires a profound understanding of cultural and social circumstances and a long-term perspective of political change.

This message has been stated more strongly by Adda Bozeman on several occasions. While she admits that some progress has been made in developing a better understanding of the Soviet Union and Marxist-Leninist societies, she believes that little has changed in western perceptions of non-communist, non-western peoples. In terms of American relations with such states she believes that the United States has shot itself in the foot. She argues that it has a proven “incompetence to predict, contain, and assess the impact of Marxism-Leninism and totalitarian statecraft on their destinities” and that this failure stems not only from a faulty reading of communist strategies but from a “stubborn disposition to identify non-Western states in terms of their nominal Western appearance rather than in those of their authentic substance.” In short, we continue to see deviations from what we consider to be trans-nationally valid standards of behaviour and reasoning as mindless and irrational acts. As she has so poignantly pointed out it is the authentic substance not the nominal appearance that provides the countervailing force to the intruding and alien power:

and these differ greatly from one case to the next as do the tactics of Leninists principals and surrogates. Since American do not know the basis or substratal configurations of non-Western mind-sets, they are obviously not equipped in intelligence terms either to isolate these “contra” forces or to anticipate, preclude, and actually cope with Communist-controlled insurgencies.
By programmatically dissimulating the true identities of just about all non-Communist non-Western states, the U.S. government has deluded itself so thoroughly that the United States has so far lost the cold war of ideas and nerves, the twentieth-century war that counts.¹⁴⁹

As a result, she has argued for detailed comparative case studies of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the ASEAN nations of South East Asia, India, Black Africa, Latin America, and the Islamic Middle East.¹⁵⁰ Her message is clear. Those who want to define intelligence structures and functions in the non-Western world must do so from the facts of the culture under study. They must not extrapolate them from the implicit or explicit normative theories of the West.¹⁵¹

VIII. THE CANADIAN LITERATURE:

Research conducted by Canadian scholars on security and intelligence matters and by scholars generally into Canada’s security and intelligence community is now beginning to grow.¹⁵² Four important developments have helped encourage this climate of investigation and interest. First, and perhaps foremost, the McDonald Commission of Inquiry into RCMP Wrongdoing initiated a country-wide debate on the issue and created an on-going interest in the subject. Second, funding has encouraged research in this field. An important benefactor in this regard has been the Canadian government.¹⁵³ Third, the establishment of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies in 1985 has provided a vehicle by which interested persons and scholars can meet and communicate with each other. And finally, the last three or four years has seen the development of a conference circuit for this field.¹⁵⁴

The Canadian literature has focussed almost entirely on five specific areas; wartime experiences, post-war espionage, terrorism, the activities of the RCMP, and those of the CIA in Canada.¹⁵⁵ Until very recently little of the literature produced was of a scholarly nature.

A. Wartime Experiences

Canada’s wartime experiences are far from fully documented. Nevertheless, what is available is of considerable importance because it illustrates the developmental choices that were made and those that were avoided. There is but one short essay which attempts to assess the overall part that Canada played in the Allied intelligence effort. That was published under the authorship of Peter St. John.¹⁵⁶ It touches on three important developments: the controversial part played by Sir William Stephenson, the Canadian appointed to head British Security Coordination in New York; the development of a signals intelligence capacity to intercept, decipher and analyze Axis diplomatic traffic and enemy wireless transmissions at sea; and certain post war developments.¹⁵⁷ In the last regard it shows that Canada was ready at war’s end to form a fully-fledged intelligence service.¹⁵⁸ For reasons not yet publicly explained Canada stepped back from developing a foreign HUMINT capacity.¹⁵⁹
Canada's military intelligence capacity underwent significant changes as the result of wartime experiences. These have been documented in a general way by Wesley Wark and at length for the army by S.R. Elliot.\(^1\) Canada's important contribution to naval radio intelligence in the Atlantic has been detailed by W.A.B. Douglas and Jürgen Rohwer.\(^1\) It was, in fact, the success of Canada's independently-run SIGINT capacity in naval "Y" material that provided Canada with an entrée into the Allied intelligence community. According to Wark, it was responsible for breaking old patterns of intelligence sharing irrevocably and establishing new rules for co-operation.\(^2\) Canada would no longer be just a passive recipient of British and American intelligence. It would be a producer and eventually a partner in the UKUSA agreement governing signals intelligence. Another contribution to the allied war effort came surprisingly from prisoners of war. Information presented by Don Page and John Kelly shows how German POWs were turned from being a burden on Canada into useful allied intelligence and propaganda assets.\(^3\)

The war also led to the development of a covert operations capacity in Canada and to the use of Canadian trained spies and saboteurs in Europe.\(^4\) Here a major piece of historical research has recently been conducted by David Stafford.\(^5\) His *Camp X: Canada's School for Secret Agents, 1941-45* is of particular importance because it illustrates some of the ways intelligence ideas were transmitted from Britain to the United States. In this regard the American debt to the British has long been acknowledged.\(^6\) Also significant is the fact that this transmission of ideas occurred partly on Canadian soil. But Stafford's work is also important because of the myths concerning allied co-operation that it destroys. In the final analysis Stafford has concluded:

> The reality is that Camp X played a modest but intriguing part in the story of American-British-Canadian cooperation during the Second World War . . . Camp X provided an example of this alliance in action and a limited foretaste of what was to come . . . But in some ways Camp X was more symbol than substance.\(^7\)

Importantly, no future was found for the covert capacity after the war.

Some details of Canada's wartime counter-espionage and security efforts are to be found in the rare memoirs of senior RCMP officials. Of these C.W. Harvison's *The Horsemen* is perhaps the most valuable.\(^8\) Collectively, these memoirs make two important claims. One is that a well-organized Nazi subversive threat existed before the war and that this and a carefully built German intelligence network were quickly eradicated immediately after the outbreak of war by decisive government action and dedicated police work. The other is that the German spies and saboteurs who did make it to Canada showed a surprising degree of ineptitude. These accounts need to be read in juxtaposition with British criticisms of Canadian security and the numerous recent books and articles that indicate the extent to which the Canadian government clamped down on domestic political activities and interned people on ethnic and
political grounds with little care about the civil liberties of those involved or evidence of planned subversion. In this regard two important articles deserve special mention. Keyserlingk argues that rather than being fully prepared the police and bureaucracy had failed to collect hard information about either German Canadians or Nazism in Canada. As a result, when a frightened and confused Canadian public demanded action against a supposed vast internal Nazi threat, the government responded with hastily instituted, ill-informed programs while those tasked with the job of administering these programs responded by quickly producing Nazi agents. The lack of preparedness may have had much to do with how the police and government perceived the security threat. Whitaker, in his analysis of the repression of communism during the war, has argued that contrary to popular beliefs the ‘enemy within’ remained the same, from Winnipeg through Stalingrad to Yalta.

B. Espionage:

Canada has the unenviable reputation of being the first espionage casualty of the cold war. A month to the day after the Americans dropped the first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima the Canadian Prime Minister learned that the Soviets were spying on Canada. This revelation was not the result of good counterintelligence work. It stemmed from the defection of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy. Surprisingly, there is still no full scholarly assessment of his defection—beyond that of Gouzenko himself and a few more sensational accounts—or of the long-term effect it has had on the Canadian political culture. Nor is there any work on the other defectors that have come Canada’s way.

In the sixties Canada experience a sex scandal involving cabinet ministers which had overtones of espionage. Unlike the Profumo scandal in Britain the Gerda Munsinger affair created little public uproar and minimal academic or jounalistic interest.

The British “mole” studies have, however, found Canadian counterparts. John Sawatsky’s study For Services Rendered, plots the rise and fall of what he claims to be “the most influential officer” in the history of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service; that of Jim Bennett. The RCMP’s case against Bennett, who at the time of his “retirement” in 1972 was head of the Russian desk of the RCMP’s Counterespionage Branch, was that he deliberately caused the counterespionage activities of the RCMP to fail and that he was in the service of the KGB. To this story must be added those concerning Canadian ambassadors to Moscow. The story of John Watkins who was snared in a KGB homosexual sex plot and died during an interrogation under Bennett is partly told in Sawatsky’s book. That of Herbert Norman is the subject of much scholarship. Interestingly, two books by the American academics come to dramatically different conclusions. That by James Barros concludes that Norman was a Soviet agent shielded by Prime Minister Pearson and the Department of External Affairs. According to at least one authority on Norman his work fails to find the
smoking gun and "has to build his case on guilt by association, a dubious technique more suited to witch-hunters than to academic historians."

Roger Bowen’s book, *Innocence is Not Enough: The Life and Death of Herbert Norman*, depicts Norman as the quintessential liberal democrat who committed suicide because he feared that a further interrogation would force him to name names. The story of a known and identified "mole" has been told by Leo Heaps. His subject, his long-time friend, Hugh Hambleton, was arrested by the British, tried in London, and sentenced to an English jail for ten years in 1983. The story is an odd one. It begins with a syndicated article that appeared in several Canadian newspapers in 1980. In it Hambleton admitted passing on open source materials to the Soviets. In the middle were the investigations of a bevy of intelligence agencies (the RCMP, the CIA, MI5, the Mossad and the Yugoslav Police), his arrest while on a visit to the U.K., evidence that he committed no crime on British soil, and the dramatic claim by the defendant that he was a triple agent working for the Canadians, the French and the KGB. Unanswered lie several important questions. Why was Hambleton tried in Britain? Why was he not extradited to Canada? Who in Canada granted him immunity? And why did it take the Canadian intelligence services three years to initiate investigations after it was known that he was working for the Soviets?

One ramification of Gouzenko's defection that has sparked academic interest is the development of administrative security programs. In many respects the system that emerged in the post-war period was the product of that which had been in existence during the war. In shaping its post-war security and intelligence community Canada drew on the British experience and its own political culture. As a result, it responded quite differently from the United States during the McCarthy era. It therefore points to an important point of similarity and differences for those who compare security and intelligence structures and functions. As Aronsen has noted, the Canadian response to internal security was essentially to see it as an administrative problem not, as was the case in the United States, as a political issue.

Government documents and royal commission reports share the common feature of not attempting to put the threat to Canadian security in quantitative and qualitative terms. A major attempt to rectify this deficiency has been attempted by David Charters. Working only from secondary sources on the public record he has amassed a considerable amount of data to clarify Canada's experience as a target for espionage by the Soviet Union during the period from 1945-1986. His analysis shows that during the late seventies and eighties the Soviets placed a high emphasis on high-technology targets.

C. Terrorism:

Domestic terrorism has had an important impact on the development and regulation of Canada's security intelligence capacity. The Canadian terrorist literature focusses largely on two events: The so-called October Crisis of 1970 and the activities of the Canadian Sikh
community. Of the two the former is the more voluminous. It is in this category too that French Canadians have made their greatest contribution towards security and intelligence studies in Canada.\textsuperscript{190} And it is with the proclamation by the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau of the emergency measures to stem the crisis that Canadians begin to focus on the propriety of police and intelligence agencies and the potential diminution of civil liberties in the name of noble causes.\textsuperscript{191} The literature on Canada’s Sikh community is as yet only in its infancy and focusses largely on the crash of an Air India jumbo jet on route from Toronto to London.\textsuperscript{192}

The theoretical literature on terrorism is also underway. One of the earliest articles to explore the relationship between political violence and the Canadian political culture was conducted by Judy Torrance.\textsuperscript{193} This compared the responses of Canadian governments over more than a century. Much work has been done by Ron Crelinsten, Micheal Kelly and Thomas Mitchell regarding the relationship between terrorism and the media.\textsuperscript{194} Maurice Tugwell has examined the relationship between terrorism and propaganda and has attempted to evaluate the utility of terrorism.\textsuperscript{195} An important contribution to the discussion of definitional issues has been provided by Thomas H. Mitchell.\textsuperscript{196} Ron Crelinsten's article on the internal dynamics of the FLQ is insightful.\textsuperscript{197} Tim Smith has done some interesting comparative work of the responses to terrorism in Canada, the U.S. and the Britain.\textsuperscript{198} Tony Kellett has made a particularly valuable contribution with his analysis of the impact of international terrorism on Canada.\textsuperscript{199} And Jeffrey Ross has established Canada's first terrorism data base.\textsuperscript{200} To these must be added the two forthcoming studies of democratic responses to international terrorism, conducted by the Centre of Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick\textsuperscript{201} and the development of two extensive bibliographical sources on international terrorism.\textsuperscript{202}

D. Activities of the RCMP:

The October Crisis of 1970 led eventually to a crisis of a different nature—the re-evaluation of a national symbol, the RCMP. A major failing of the RCMP Security Service during the October Crisis had been its inability to establish the links between FLQ cells and thus to establish the size and nature of the conspiracy. This was responsible in part for the Liberal government's overreaction and the invocation of the War Measures Act. In the aftermath the Liberal government of Prime Minister Trudeau put pressure on the RCMP Security Service to keep it better informed. This the RCMP did partly by illegal means. What eventually resulted was two commissions of inquiry into wrongdoing committed by those charged with protecting the state against domestic terrorism and subversion in Quebec; one established by the Province of Quebec,\textsuperscript{203} the other by the Federal Government. Of the two the McDonald Commission was to have greater impact. Its extensive reports provide the most extensive analysis of Canada's security and intelligence community available to date. Before the Inquiry was finished a number of important books and articles appeared about the RCMP. Keith Walden's \textit{Visions
of Order examined the whole mythology associated with the Force. 204 Others focussed on the Security Service; still others on its wrongdoing. The most detailed analysis about the workings of the RCMP Security Service has been provided by John Sawatsky. 205 He studiously avoided both the McDonald and Keable Commissions and derived his own sources. Others like Jeff Sallot, and Edward Mann and John Alan Lee focussed on the pandora's box that Robert Sampson had opened. 206 Some of those previously involved, like John Starnes, the first civilian director-general, actively lobbied for a new kind of service. 207 Those with French Canadian interests focussed on the Trudeau government and how it stalled the Province of Quebec's Keable Commission. 208 Still others had specific ideological and political axes to grind. 209 Only Richard French and André Beliveau tried to understand from the evidence that was being presented before the McDonald and Keable commissions how the national police force could have come to commit such wrongdoing. 210

Writings in the period between the publication of the McDonald Commission's Second and Third reports and the enactment of legislation to establish a civilian security intelligence services separate from the RCMP may be divided into at least two groups. In the first period some important articles appeared concerning the credibility of the McDonald Commission. Michael Mandel, for example, suggested that the Liberal government had intentionally discredited the commission's work by releasing two opinions concerning the legality of certain police actions. 211 This issue was examined more fully by the Attorney General of Canada 212 and a federal/provincial committee of criminal justice officials under the chairmanship of R.M. McLeod, the Deputy Solicitor General of Ontario. 213 From the time when Bill C-157 was introduced into the Commons and the passage of Bill C-9 in July of 1984 a number of articles were written which specifically criticised the content of the proposed legislation either for not extending propriety controls or for not giving the proposed agency enough rope. 214 Articles supporting extending the propriety controls frequently came from those who had been part of the McDonald Commission or who had appeared before it. 215 In a number of instances they were reprints of evidence that had been presented to committees of Parliament. 216

Following the passage of the CSIS Act a number of scholarly papers have appeared about the legislation itself or about its possible use in other jurisdictions. Of the articles that have been published to date, a significant number have been written by those who were actively involved in the McDonald Commission. Three articles by C.E.S. Franks have discussed the issue of parliamentary or political control of intelligence in a variety of fora. 217 M.L. Friedland has prepared an as yet unpublished study of security offenses for the Law Reform Commission of Canada. 218 And John Edwards has suggested that the British should take a close look at the Canadian system. 219

The issue of the balance between propriety and efficacy has now been looked at by a number of authors. A 1985 paper by this author examined the accountability mechanisms provided by the CSIS Act and the
system of controls recommended by the McDonald Commission to ensure effective and efficient administration. A forthcoming paper by the same author examines the impact of institutional culture on both organizational deviance and administrative efficacy. Murray Rankin has written an important article on the propriety side of the equation. Geoffy Weller, who has presented a number of papers on the topic, has recently published an article which has attempted to assess whether CSIS is working more effectively than its predecessor. And two studies conducted under Canadian Studies Research Awards provided by the Canadian High Commission in London have assessed the performance of the Security and Intelligence Review Committee and Canadian intelligence policy.

To a certain degree the Canadian system has created interest abroad. In the United States the published work has focussed on the legal nature of the statute and on the democratic value of the scheme. In Britain and Australia it has so far been limited to review essays.

As noted earlier, an important issue raised by the McDonald Commission was the lawfulness of certain police actions. An important study was undertaken for the Law Reform Commission of Canada in this regard by Rosemary Cairns Way. She specifically set out to examine the differences between the positions of the McDonald Commission and those of the subsequent McLeod Report by drawing distinctions between duty and authority. Her legal analysis concluded that the approach advocated by the McLeod Report was seriously flawed and that "no authority to infringe on protected rights or liberty or property can be implied simply from the existence of duty."

The McDonald Commission was not singularly responsible for focussing Canadian attention on the powers of state agents. This process was initiated earlier by the Trudeau government’s response to the October Crisis and was sustained by a series of events and royal commission reports. Nevertheless, the Commission did encourage and influence writing on police powers and organizational police deviance. To all these must be added the annual reports of the Security and Intelligence Review Committee.

E. CIA Activities in Canada:

As yet this is a very small body of literature. Before publication James Littleton’s Target Nation was rumoured to reveal CIA covert activities in Canada. The published product has not done that. Rather it has attempted to demonstrate the degree to which Canada’s intelligence community has become dominated by that of the United States and how it has taken on lock-stock-and-barrel the cold-war mentality so prevalent at times below the border. Though the evidence presented barely sustains this view, the potential lesson in Littleton’s book is an important one. Legislative controls may come to naught if the two communities are too tightly knit. American interests may all too easily become Canadian interests, especially as Canada is but a junior partner in the UKUSA agreement, NORAD and has no foreign HUMINT capacity. It is perhaps
because of such views that the Security Intelligence Review Committee has once again taken up the issue of a foreign intelligence agency for Canada and what constitutes a threat to the security of Canada.

More worrying still are the recent books by Anne Collins, Don Gillmor, Gordon Thomas and Harvey Weinstein. These detail how the CIA supported the brainwashing research of Dr. Ewen Cameron in Montreal in the 1960s without the knowledge of patients and Canadian public alike. Gillmor indicates that the funding for Cameron's "psychic driving" work was the second highest of all the forty-nine MKULTRA projects outlined in surviving CIA documents. This is disturbing because the MKULTRA projects were denounced by the CIA's Inspector General and medical personnel as improper as early as the 1950s.

IX. SUMMARY:

While a number of general trends in the literature may be discerned one more than any other sticks out. It concerns the special emphasis that has been given to the clandestine collection of information in foreign theatres of operation at the expense of other activities. This has had five important ramifications. First, it has worked towards an increase in status for foreign intelligence agencies per se. This has resulted not only in the a lower perceived status for departments involved in active measures generally (both at home and abroad) but has also meant that organizations involved in counter measures at home have been seen as poor cousins and have not reached the same status as agencies operating abroad. Second, it has helped to encourage a false home/abroad or foreign/domestic dichotomy. In the intelligence world boundaries are much more artificial than they appear to be on the map. Third, it has led to a false perception of the interrelationships that exist in terms of the roles and activities of the various security and intelligence organizations that make up the intelligence community. Certainly, there have been very few attempts to discern similarities, differences and overlaps between the organizations involved. These false perceptions have contributed towards a failure to observe how the activities of certain organizations, particularly those involved in technical collection, have risen in importance. Concentration on the processes of foreign intelligence has also tended to obscure some of the structures in the system and the functions they perform in the security process. This is particularly true of public police forces, and departments responsible for customs and immigration. Finally, it has tended to distort and obscure important aspects of the policy/operations dichotomy. This has resulted in intelligence gathering being perceived as an end in itself instead of being merely a strategy in a much larger process. This is exemplified in the most extreme case by those who see the security intelligence function more as a policing activity than as an intelligence one.

It is also important to note that the coverage of clandestine collection has normally focussed on high threat threshold scenarios. That is to say the timing of the discussion is placed during particular periods of hostility or when the threat to military confrontation is very high (e.g.
during the cold war). This has had both general and limited effects. On the one hand, it has helped increase the general status of the foreign intelligence gathering, synthesis, and dissemination processes. Yet on the other, it has served to reduce the significance of the need for particular types of intelligence gathering and dissemination in peacetime (particularly economic and political intelligence). And, of course, it has tended to divert attention away from the more mundane aspects of intelligence and security work during peacetime. On the intelligence side the significance of open sources of information is often overlooked. And, on the security side, the role and activities provided by public and private policing organizations are frequently never discussed.

Another general trend that may be observed in the literature is that there have been few attempts to explain how and where the work of security and intelligence organizations overlap. Thus, it is true to say that authors, with a few notable exceptions, have seldom attempted to place the functions and organizations of a security and intelligence community on any form of continuum of activities. The failure to develop theories of interconnection has been an important contributor towards the general omission to observe changes in the significance in some of the actors in the system. In addition, it has been responsible for an incomplete assessment being made of the levels of independence and discretion that have been allotted to key actors in the systems. And it has resulted in particular relationships with governments and interconnections with various consumer and policy producing departments being overlooked, obscured or undeservedly down played.

But perhaps the most important weakness is the fact that the literature does not represent a true picture of western intelligence communities in certain critical aspects. Most notably, it does not reflect the general failure of western intelligence agencies since the Second World War to penetrate Soviet-bloc services using human sources (HUMINT). True, technical services have provided a fairly clear picture of Soviet bloc capacities. But such information is of limited value unless one can establish the likely actions of those who control them. Without some access to Soviet intentions the West will forever be left debating the nature of the Soviet threat. The real danger here is that perceptions of the threat will be dominated by the turn of our own politics, not theirs, and opportunities for a more peaceful world may be lost for a generation or so.

This failure has had wide ramifications on four fronts. First, it led to the extension of capabilities for, and later the formation of new agencies for, conducting technological methods of covert collection on a wide-scale. Second, the failure of covert collection has led the agencies responsible for this function to put their personnel to other uses. This has encouraged organizations to shift emphasis in recent years away from Soviet-bloc penetrations to covert operations in the Third World where successes have helped maintain prestige. Third, it has provided a compelling argument for conducting “mole hunts” in both counterintelligence and foreign intelligence agencies. And finally, the general
lack of attention paid in the literature to this failure has retarded the introduction of effective, broad-mandate oversight mechanisms on efficiency grounds.

The literature review has provided a clear indication that several conceptions of security and intelligence communities exist. Each of the area studies has provided important lessons. The dominant paradigm, that presented by the United States, concerns a model where primacy is given to foreign intelligence gathering against the Soviet bloc. Academically it reflects the perspectives of political scientists and international relations specialists. It often lacks a sense of historical perspective and an urbane understanding of culture. In many respects it is tunnel-visioned. It is constricted by its own political culture and its own ideology. The major debate—that concerning the relationship between intelligence gathering, policy formation and covert action—remains unresolved. This is partly due to internecine struggles within the CIA itself and also within the broader parameters of the large security and intelligence community. But the main impediment to a resolution of the problem appears to lie in a failure to develop a theoretical framework which not only incorporates a strategic planning approach to the problem—one that fully integrates overall goals, immediate objectives and short- and long-term strategies—but integrates domestic and foreign theatres of operation and intelligence, security and policing practices.

The model said to represent intelligence studies in the United Kingdom is historical, but it is, like the American perspective, dominated by twentieth-century vistas. Not integrated into the “intelligence mind-frame” are a wealth of studies on the Irish problem. Were they to be integrated, then relationships between internal and external intelligence gathering and responses to insurgency and terrorism would be brought within the frame. Likewise, the voluminous work on British and Irish policing remains outside the vision. The theoretical and historical work in this area has much to offer the “strictly intelligence school” of thought.

Two Soviet models are perceived. One driven firmly by ideological considerations is dominated by the notion that the USSR constitutes an “evil empire” with the intelligence community as primary instrument for achieving world domination. This view frequently lacks a historical perspective. It fails to incorporate Russian security and intelligence practices before the Bolshevik revolution and it fails to remember the numerous European invasions of Russia that have occurred. And importantly, it fails to consider the significant loss of life and devastation suffered by the Soviets during the Second World War. The other model sees the Soviet Union within the context of Soviet political culture. This view leads to a perception of the USSR as a national security state with the primary responsibility of security and intelligence organizations being security, not intelligence gathering or covert action. This view may have broader lessons when it comes to developing theoretical frameworks for describing security and intelligence communities and their work.

So too will perceptions of security and intelligence work by so-called pariah states. They show that dramatically different threats create
dramatically different types of security and intelligence networks and dramatically different interpretations. Once again they demonstrate the need for scholars to immerse themselves in political culture before coming to conclusions too early.

The study of security and intelligence work in the non-Western world is particularly enlightening because it demonstrates the need for multi-disciplinary perspectives. And more than any other group it reinforces the need for culturally-based approaches.

As yet there is no single Canadian school of intelligence studies. In this regard the academic arena reflects the goals of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies which merely attempts to foster informed debate and promote research. Nevertheless, the Canadian system and structure is both unique and informative. It has as yet no foreign intelligence service with the authority to collect intelligence abroad through covert means or to conduct covert actions. Thus it illustrates clearly that security and intelligence structures of liberal democracies can differ dramatically from those of their “parents”. As such it posses important questions. Is there a uniquely Canadian view of security and intelligence? And can the Canadian case provide important theoretical lessons for broader security and intelligence studies?

Endnotes

* The author is grateful to Dr. David Charters and Professor Wesley Wark for their detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper and to Dr. David Stafford for providing him with a manuscript copy of The Silent Game. The author also wishes to acknowledge the encouragement and help of Ms. Cathy Matthews, Head Librarian, Centre of Criminology, and the financial assistance of the Humanities and Social Sciences Committee of the University of Toronto.

2. Ibid. They specifically note the case for Germany.
3. In this regard it should be noted that many related words: security, covert action, counterespionage, anti-terrorism, etc. suffer from the same problem. The important exception to this rule is police which exists as both a verb and a gerund.
4. The Australian political system, like Canada's, has been heavily influenced by those of Britain and the United States. Both have been dubbed “Washminster” systems. An interesting further point of comparison could have been made between the Canadian literature and the now increasing amount of material coming from Australia and New Zealand. For reasons of time and space it has had to be left for another occasion.
6. The Russell J. Bowen Collection is now on deposit at Georgetown University. At the time of publication of Colonel Bowen's bibliography: Scholars Guide to Intelligence Literature: Bibliography of the Russell J. Bowen Collection in the Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Collection, Georgetown University, (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1983), it ran to more than 5,000 titles.

8. See: David A.T. Stafford, *The Silent Game*, (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1988), p. 229. It is useful to compare the work of John Le Carré with that of Ian Fleming. Stafford notes (p.195) that Fleming's Bond was for Le Carré a "consumer goods hero," the "ultimate prostitute," the worst that Western society had to offer. Smiley, Le Carré's main hero, or more precisely anti-hero, was the antithesis of Bond and the fantasy world in which he operated.

9. For example, Fleming, Le Carré, Deighton, Haggard, Benton, and Allbeury in Britain, and Hunt, Marchetti, Hood, McCurry, Tyler, and Buckley in the US, to name but a few, can all claim insider knowledge of one form or another. Likewise, Semyonov in the Soviet Union is rumoured to be a current KGB employee.


12. For a discussion on these points see the last chapter of *The Silent Game*, pp. 213-229.

13. By far the largest number of official paper on this subject area is produced in the United States. This may be contrasted with the United Kingdom where only a minimal amount is made available for public consumption. Canada provides a middle ground. Reasons for this have much to do with the nature of the different political cultures and the legislation that is in existence. The United States has had a *Freedom of Information Act* (FOIA) since 1967. Canada has had an *Access to Information and Privacy Act* (ATIP) only since 1982. The United Kingdom has no equivalent. For background on the control of government information in the U.S. see: Morton H. Halperin and Daniel Hoffman, *Freedom vs. National Security: Secrecy and Surveillance*, (New York: Chelsea House, 1977). For Canada see: Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General on the Review of the Access to Information and Privacy Act, *Open and Shut: Enhancing the Right to Know*, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, March, 1987). For a comparative treatment of government secrecy covering the U.K., the U.S. and Sweden see Ken Robertson, *Public Secrets: A Study in the Development of Government Secrecy*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1982).

14. In Canada an interesting comparison may be made between Canada's Royal Commission on Security, *Report*, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, June 1969) under the chairmanship of Maxwell Mackenzie, and the McDonald Commission. The former
Conflict Quarterly

held all its hearings in camera; provided no public records; was abridged for publication; and ran to less than two hundred pages. The latter held public hearings; provided official transcripts; and ran to several thousand pages. See: Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Altogether there were three Reports. The First Report, "Security of Information" was a relatively modest affair. The Second Report, "Freedom and Security under the Law" ran to two volumes and more than a thousand pages. The Third Report, "Certain RCMP Activities and the Question of Governmental Knowledge" ran to more than five hundred pages. The First Report was published in 1980; the Second and Third Reports in August 1981. A Supplement to Part VI of the Third Report was made available at a latter date. The commission also contracted for a number of studies by leading academics which were also published. See: John L.J. Edwards, Ministerial Responsibility for National Security as it Relates to the Offices of Prime Minister, Attorney General and Solicitor General of Canada, (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1980); C.E.S. Franks, Parliament and Security Matters, (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada: 1980); M.L. Friedland, National Security: The Legal Dimensions, (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1980) and Philip C. Stenning, Police Commissions and Boards in Canada, (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1981).

15. Includes under this heading are documents that are obtained under FOIA or ATIP. Such legislation is enabling in so far as it provides rules for providing enclosure as well as for disclosure. It is rumoured that The Department of Justice in Canada has issued guidelines for preventing disclosure on technical rather than definitional grounds (e.g. Cabinet Confidences are currently exempt from disclosure. Documents can be exempted as Cabinet Confidences if they . . .)


17. CIA Director Richard Helms gave E. Howard Hunt permission to publish his novels while working for the agency in the 1960s. David Stafford, in The Silent Game, (p. 219) suggests that Helms' purpose was to encourage popular support for CIA covert activities.

18. The British Government has made a dramatic distinction between insiders and outsiders. While it has turned a blind eye to outsiders using insider knowledge, it has taken action against former employees. In the last three years the government has initiated four court actions against former employees of one or other service. The most famous of these is against Peter Wright. As of February 1st, 1988 the government had spent £375,000 in legal costs in its attempt to ban publication of Spycatcher, in the United Kingdom. The Government is also taking action against Joan Miller's One Girl's War, (the author died in 1984), Anthony Cavendish's Inside Intelligence, and a book by Jock Kane concerning GCHQ. In the United States there have also been a number of court actions. Those concerning Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, and Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam, are perhaps the most famous. Security and intelligence agencies have other ways of showing their displeasure. Philip Agee, the author of Inside the Company: CIA Diary, was deported from Britain for unspecified security reasons and had his right to hold an American passport removed. For a chronicle of his troubles after his break with the CIA see his: On the Run, (London: Bloomsbury, 1988).

Sampson's 1976 courtroom statement represents a further case in point. For the visual media see: Stornoway Productions: "Agents of Deception," (Toronto: 1985) and "KGB Connections" (Toronto: 1981).


23. The CIA has been of prime concern in the United States. In Canada CSIS has taken the spotlight. In Britain M15 has traditionally been the central focus. More recently, however, the SAS and the Royal Ulster Constabulary have received their share of attention.


27. Even books which attempt to broaden the frame are not highly successful in this regard and tend to lead us back into the box. Arguably, Walter Laqueur's A World of Secrets, fits within this category.

28. Ken Robertson is well aware of the definitional problems relating to intelligence. Yet his edited text British and American Approaches to Intelligence, (London: Macmillan, 1987) does little to help resolve them other than to suggest improvements that should be made to British and American approaches.

29. Roy Godson, ed., Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1988). Of course, it was not Godson's intention to break the frame. He has been instrumental in developing the "Bowdoin Alumni" view. Nevertheless, the articles in the book, especially those by John Dziak and Adda Bozeman, seriously challenge established ways of looking at intelligence. Readers might like to consider what such a book might have looked like were it put in exactly the reverse order with Godson left to argue the case only on the basis of the evidence presented by the chapters.

30. But see the earlier developments of a federal intelligence function in: United States Senate, 94th Congress, Report No. 94-755, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities "Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities" Book VI, 1976, pp. 7-119.

32. See: Ransom, "Strategic Intelligence and Intermestic Politics," p. 301.


37. See Lowenthal, "The Intelligence Library" at p. 368.


39. The series of articles began on December 22nd, 1974 and ran almost daily until year's end. They accused the CIA of "massive" domestic spying. According to Loch Johnson, A Season of Inquiry, p. 9 and footnote 26, over ten thousand files on American citizens, mainly anti-war activists were opened. The Rockefeller Commission placed the number of files opened at 13000 with some 7200 on American citizens. See: Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, Report to the President, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 23. This domestic activity was in direct contravention of Section 102.(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, July 26, 1947, which specifically noted that the CIA should have no "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."


42. Ibid.


45. See Loch Johnson's conclusions on this point, A Season of Inquiry, p. 30.


54. See: Robertson, "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s," Intelligence and National Security, op. cit.
55. Freedman, *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat*.


57. See Robertson, "Editorial Comment: An Agenda for Intelligence Research," *Defense Analysis*, op.cit.


60. The other volumes in the series are: Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Elements of Intelligence*, (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1979); *Analysis and Estimates* (1980); Counterintelligence (1980); Covert Action (1981); Clandestine Collection, (1982).

61. This is not to suggest that the Consortium's analytical views were themselves altogether new or entirely instrumental. They were not, as the earlier works of Sherman Kent and Roger Hilsman show. Rather, it is to suggest that they were more influential in changing the views of others. This, in many respects, had much to do with the timing of their publication. Of course, the Consortium's views are not without their serious flaws. Of these the most serious is perhaps their failure to deal with the real revolution in American intelligence—the development and extension of technical intelligence—and what this implied.

62. For example, Robertson, "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s," *Intelligence and National Security*, op.cit., has noted that the Church Committee overemphasized covert action and devoted too much time to sensational but untypical issues like assassination.


64. See: Oseith, *Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations*. The need for congressional oversight has also been demonstrated by the capacity of the executive branch to circumvent normally visible (to Congress) intelligence vehicles, as discussed in Steven Emerson, *Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era*, (New York: Putnam, 1988).


Of all prime ministers since the war Labour's Harold Wilson probably met the most hostile reception from the security and intelligence community. See Barrie Penrose and R. Courtiour, *The Pencourt File*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). Even so Wilson maintained the established pattern of governmental silence in his memoirs. In *The Governance of Britain* (London: Sphere Books, 1978) his chapter on security and intelligence matters runs for less than two pages and concludes with the sentence: "There is no further information that can usefully be or properly be added before bringing this chapter to an end." at p. 205.


73. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks claim that nothing has so disturbed the Anglo-

74. See especially Chapman Pincher, *Too Secret Too Long: The Great Betrayal of
Britain's Secrets and the Cover-up* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984). He states at
page 3 that his research "has driven him, reluctantly at first, to the confident belief
that in a free society such as ours there is only one way of bringing about a truly substi-
tional and continuing strengthening of security: the setting up of an independent body
with powers to oversee certain aspects of the work of the secret services and to report
on them in detail to the Prime Minister and, in secure terms, to Parliament." In the
period since November 8th, 1977, when *Private Eye* identified Blunt, several more
books on the subject have been published. See especially: Andrew Boyle, *The Climate
of Treason: Five Who Spied for Russia*, (London: Hutchison, 1979); Chapman Pin-
cher, *Inside Story: A Documentary of the Pursuit of Power*, (London: Sidgwick and
Jackson, 1978); *Their Trade is Treachery* (London: Arrow Books, 1980); West, *Mole Hunt: op.cit.;* and John Costello, *Mask of
For works prior to Blunt's identification see note 69.

75. See, for example, Robert Cecil, "The Cambridge Comintern," in Andrew and Dilks, *The
of Cambridge University's Elite*, (London: R. Royce, 1985); Andrew Sinclair, *The Red
and the Blue: Intelligence, Treason and the Universities*, (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1986). The moral decay of upper class society had also been a major feature of
the Profumo scandal of 1963 and the subsequent trial of Stephen Ward. See: Clive Irving,
Ron Hall and Jeremy Wallington, *Scandal '63* (London: Heinemann, 1963); Ian
Crawford, *The Profumo Affair*, (London: White Lodge Books, 1963); Wayland Young,
*The Profumo Affair: Aspects of Conservatism*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1964); Ludovic Kennedy, *The Trial of Stephen Ward* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964);
Philip Knightley and Caroline Kennedy, *An Affair of State: The Profumo Case and the
Framing of Stephen Ward*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987); and Anthony Summers and
1987).

76. Muggeridge, while known to television audiences, was also a former SIS officer.
Trevor-Roper was in intelligence during the war and returned to academics thereafter.
Cecil was a professional diplomat before becoming an academic. Sinclair was a foun-
ding fellow of Churchill College. Earlier he had been nominated (but rejected) as a
member of the Apostles while at Cambridge.

77. See D. Cameron Watt, "Intelligence Studies: The Emergence of the British School",

78. See, for example, Stephen Watts, *Moonlight on a Lake in Bond Street*, (London:
Bodley Head, 1961); Derek Tangey, *The Way to Minack*, (London: Michael Joseph,
1968). The memoirs of a former Director-General of MI5, Sir Percy Sillitoe, *Cloak
without Dagger* (London: Cassells, 1955) was the only book to cause any official con-
sternation. For a discussion of this point see Nigel West, *Mole Hunt*, p. 95.

79. Sir John Masterman, *The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945* (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). For a discussion of Masterman's trials and

comments on its significance for historical research see: David Syrett, "The Secret War

81. In some respects there was little the British Government could do. Access to many of
the official papers relating to the 1939-45 period now became available under the
thirty-year rule to historians who were prepared to search through the Public Records
Office. For the availability of materials and what remained out of reach see: Wesley R.
Wark, "Intelligence Since 1900" in Gerald Jordan, ed., *British Military History: A
501-523. Wark's essay is also a very useful source for materials published since Winter-
botham's book.
85. F.H. Hinsley, the primary author of the official history of intelligence during World War II opined in an interview with Christopher Andrew that intelligence shortened the war by three years. See Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension, p.2 fn.2.
87. For comments on the "missing dimension" see Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension, pp. 1-16. Ken Robertson has recently claimed that empirical and conceptual work in this field has progressed so much that it no longer constitutes the 'Missing Dimension.' British and American Approaches to Intelligence, p.xii.
88. A point incidentally about which Cameron Watt reminds us in, "Intelligence Studies," at p.339.
90. The measures have included: modified courts (The Diplock Courts), "Supergrasses", internment without trial, house-to-house searches, undercover operations, helicopter monitoring, radar and infra-red detection devices, interrogation in-depth (including food and sleep deprivation, hooding, "white noise" and beatings). See, for example: Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden and Paddy Hillyard, Ten Years on in Northern Ireland: The Legal Control of Political Violence, (London: Cobden Trust, 1980); Tony Gifford, Supergrasses: The Use of Accomplice Evidence in Northern Ireland, (London: Cobden Trust, 1984); Catherine Scorer, Sarah Spencer and Patricia Hewitt, The New Prevention of Terrorism: The Case for Repeal, (London: NCCL, 1985); Dermot P.J.


92. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations. HMSO owns the copyright.


96. This is based on data developed by Paul Wilkinson and reported in Baldy, op. cit., p. 12, fn. 14.


98. See Manwaring-White, op. cit., page 34.


100. See Tony Bunyan, The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain, (London: Julian Friedman, 1976); Tom Bowden, Beyond the Limits of the Law: A Comparative Study of the Police in Crisis Politics, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978); Carol


110. Rocca and Dziak, *op. cit.*


116. But see the important new work by Amy Knight which focuses more on the KGB's internal role, *The KGB, Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, (Boston, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1988) a foretaste of which is presented in "The Party, The KGB and Soviet Policy-Making", *The Washington Quarterly*, 11:2 (Spring, 1988), pp. 121-136. At one point she confirms that: "The KGB's main area of domestic concern is internal security—protecting the regime against political threats or challenges to its rule. This function entails the prevention and suppression of political dissent. The party leadership, which sets the general guidelines that the KGB is to follow in carrying out its task, has numerous policy options at its disposals." (p. 129).

117. For example, Dziak, *Chekisty*.


119. See: Dziak, *Chekisty*.

120. Recent scandals involving the alleged killing of Palestinians while in custody by the Shin Bet has focussed attention on the internal dimension of the threat both in Israel and around the world. Within Israeli internal cleavage has, in fact, focussed attention on both Palestinians as a threat to Israel and on the Shin Bet as a threat to Israeli democracy. See, for example: John D. Brewer *et al*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 6 at page 150-1 and Jeffrey T. Richelson's chapter on Israeli intelligence organizations in *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988) especially at pages 226-229.

121. John Le Carré, for example, was given access to Israeli intelligence during the preparation of his book, *The Little Drummer Girl*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983). See the forward to the book.

122. This is not a quote from one of his books. Rather it reflects his interpretation of the Israeli services based on his own intelligence experience and from talking to Israeli experts. It is taken from a 1986 British interview with Le Carré repeated on Channel 2, Toronto, July 29, 1988.

See, for example, Elaine Davenport, Paul Eddy and Peter Gillman, *The Plumbat Affair*, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1978), at page 23. They make the claim that the "Mossad's efforts enabled Israel to resist the invasion" of 1948.


Raymond Cohen, "Israeli Military Intelligence before the 1956 Sinai Campaign" *Intelligence and National Security*, 3:1 (January, 1988), pp. 100-140. These failures encompassed both data collected and assessments of them.


But see the memoirs of Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981*, (London: John Murray, 1987) for the developments of one of South Africa's close neighbors.


But see Adda Bozeman on the Venetian intelligence system and the development of other European intelligence communities from the 16th century onwards in "Covert Action and Foreign Policy" in Roy Godson, eds., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Covert Action*, (Washington: National Strategy Information Center: 1981),
pp. 15-78, especially pp. 63-70. She has noted elsewhere, "Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies: Suggestions for Research," in Roy Godson, ed., Comparing Foreign Intelligence, pp. 115-155 that an important capacity of these early systems was a core of "erudite, highly disciplined envoys and secret agents who knew how to evaluate the long-range significance of events . . . how to recruit reliable informants; and how to size up the character traits and political dispositions of influential personages, whether in the Papal court in Rome, the Byzantine Christian empire, the capitals of Europe, or the far-flung domains of Moguls, Turks, Persians, and Arabs. The information thus collected was regularly submitted to the Venetian government in the form of official ambassadorial reports . . . These were carefully preserved over the centuries in well-organized, readily accessible archives that had the ultimate function of conditioning successive generations to understand foreign societies realistically on their own terms and to develop unifying time-transcendent perspectives on the republic's national interests in world affairs. (emphasis added).

133. Interestingly, the phenomenon was not new to Europeans on the imperial frontiers. According to Ian Nish, "Japanese Intelligence and the Approach of the Russo-Japanese War," in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., The Missing Dimension, at pages 17-32, European expansion established a tradition in Africa and Asia of "intelligence rides."


136. The observation was made in October, 1941 by the British Ambassador to Japan, Sir Robert Craige and is cited by Ian Nish, "Japanese Intelligence, 1894-1922," at p. 128.


141. See: Bozeman, "Political Intelligence in non-Western Societies", at p. 141.

142. See: Deacon, A History of Japanese Secret Service, p. 4. He discusses the way in which the Chinese developed their nuclear weapons. He notes that this was done entirely by keeping in touch with Chinese students and scientists working abroad and by collecting open source material.

143. Dale F. Eickelman, "Intelligence in an Arab Gulf State," in Godson, ed., Comparing Foreign Intelligence, pp. 89-114.

144. His study is by no means the first to examine this dimension as he readily admits. But is is probably the first by an anthropologist. For analysis by political scientists and

145. In many respects the focus on known threats has been the habit of Western countries and the predilection of its historians. Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), for example, has shown how the United States in the years immediately after World War Two focussed almost entirely on Europe, the Marshall Plan, and a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union at the expense of Central and South America. The edited text by Earnest R. May, *Knowing One's Enemies*, attests to the proclivity of historians. It begins with the words: "The United States and its allies employ thousands of people and spend untold billions gathering and analyzing intelligence about potential enemies. The Soviet Union and its allies do likewise."


147. See: Bozeman, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy," p. 16.

148. See: Bozeman, "Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies", p. 130.


150. See: Bozeman, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy", pp. 15-78.


152. A number of Canadian scholars have developed an international reputation in this field for their work on British and Israeli subjects. See particularly the work of David A. Charters, David A.T. Stafford, Janice Stein and Wesley K. Wark. For details of recent Canadian literature see: R.H. Roy and Rand Flem-Ath, *Canadian Security and Intelligence: A Bibliography*, (Victoria: Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, 1986).

153. Important sources of funding have been the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the Solicitor General of Canada, and the Canadian High Commission in London.

154. SIRC held its first academic seminar at Meech Lake, Ottawa in 1985. Since then it has helped fund conferences at the Centre for Research into Law and Public Policy at Osgoode Hall Law School (1987) and a conference on dissent at Queen's University (1988). CASIS has held a conference in every year since its founding. To these must be added the important contribution of the Centre for Conflict Studies at the University of New Brunswick, Fredericton; the Canadian Human Rights Association; and the law schools at the universities of Ottawa and Western Ontario. The organizers of a number of these conferences are in the process of publishing proceedings.

155. There are, of course, works which are extremely important but which do not fit into these categories. For example, there is considerable historical material dealing with the formation of the security and intelligence role within the RCMP. See, for example, P.A. Campbell, "The Formation and Development of the Security and Intelligence Branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police," MA Thesis, Department of History, Concordia University, 1978; S.W. Horrall, "The Royal North-West Mounted Police and Labour Unrest in Western Canada, 1919," *Canadian Historical Review*, 61:2 (1980) 169-190; "Canada's Security Service: A Brief History," *RCMP Quarterly*, (Summer, 1983) 38-49. There are also books such as J.L. Granatstein's, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-68*, (Ottawa: Deneau, 1981) without which an understanding of Canadian intelligence policy between outbreak of war and the mid-sixties cannot be reached. Reg Whitaker's *Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration*, (Lester & Orpen Dennys,
1987) also spanning several decades is essential reading for those interested in the development of security policy. Likewise, James Eayrs' multi-volume work, *In Defence of Canada*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), also spanning several decades is a useful source on Canadian military intelligence and raises interesting questions about intelligence subordination to U.S. interests during the Vietnam War.


158. The SIGINT capacity was developed and Canada did come to make a full contribution. In 1947 Canada signed the UKUSA signals intelligence treaty. Much of the history from 1945 onwards is yet undocumented. In fact, the first the Canadian public knew of modern developments came in 1974. See CBC, "The Espionage Establishment", *The Fifth Estate*, (January 9th, 1974), transcript. For a comparative study of the players in the UKUSA agreement see Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries*, (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983).

159. Both St. John, *op. cit.*, p. 18 and Wark, "Cryptographic Innocence," p. 660 refer to the possibility of Canada developing a foreign intelligence agency at this time. According to John Starnes, "A Canadian Secret Intelligence Service?", *International Perspectives: The Canadian Journal of World Affairs*, (July/August 1987) pp. 6-9, Canada has reviewed the possibility of developing a foreign HUMINT capacity on at least six occasions since the war, largely at the prompting of her friends and allies.

160. See: S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army, 1903-1963*, (Toronto, Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981); Wesley K. Wark, "From Frontier to Foreign Intelligence: The Evolution of Military Intelligence in Canada", *Armed Forces and Society*, (1989) forthcoming. This traces developments from the days of the Dominion police to NORAD arrangements.


162. Wark, "From Frontier to Foreign Intelligence".


166. See, for example, the comments Ray S. Cline, of a former wartime member of the OSS and a deputy-director of the CIA in *The CIA: Reality vs. Myth*, especially the section "Intelligence Gifts from Britain" at pages 41-50; Anne Karalekas, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," especially Part One, pp. 16-17. Together these indicate the political influence of Churchill and the results of Britain's sharing of tradecraft techniques.


174. In Canada there has been no academic book or article written on the subject. Only a Royal Commission report has been published. See Canada, Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to One Gerda Munsinger, Report, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966). In Britain the Profumo scandal continues to attract interest with two new books being published in 1987 alone. Recently, a film and a play have continued the titillation.


176. For Canada's reaction to homosexuals see: Philip Girard "From Subversion to Liberation: Homosexuals and the Immigration Act 1952-1977", Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 2 (1987) pp. 1-27, especially pages 4 and 5. The author argues that the Canadian evidence suggests that "the American experience was repeated here i.e., that more homosexuals than political dissidents were victimized by the Cold War in Canada."

177. See: Sawatsky, For Services Rendered, especially pages 172-183.

178. See, for example, Roger W. Bowen, ed., E.H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984). See especially the essay by the editor: "Cold War, McCarthyism and Murder by Slander: E.H. Norman's Death in Perspective".


182. Leo Heaps, Hugh Hambleton, Spy: Thirty Years with the KGB, (Toronto: Methuen, 1983).


201. Two workshops were held in connection with these research projects. The first, in November 1987, entitled: "The Democratic Response to International Terrorism: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach" used a functional approach. The second held in August, 1988 entitled: "Meeting the Challenge of International Terrorism" used a comparative approach based on six national case studies. The projects will be completed in 1989-90 and published.


203. The Keable inquiry is unfortunately only available in French. For a discussion of the potential effectiveness of the Keable Commission see: Murray T. Rankin, "Burning Barns and Keable: Can a Provincial Crime Inquiry Probe the RCMP?", Supreme Court Law Review, (1980), pp. 381-400.


208. See, for example, Robert Dion, Crimes of the Secret Police, (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982) This was originally published in French in 1979 as Les crimes de la Police Montée.


214. See the position of then Assistant Crown Attorney Franklin R. Moskoff, “Democracy and National Security: Competing Concepts for Canada,” *The Advocates Society Journal*, (February, 1984), pp. 32-40. He argues that “one must keep in mind that whatever form of legislation ultimately assumes, a great deal of discretion and judgement will necessarily have to be exercised . . . In short, the agency will be defending the sovereignty of Canada. In the future it will be the front line.”


216. See, for example, the article by the former Director of Research for the McDonald Commission, Peter Russell entitled, “The Proposed Charter for a Civilian Intelligence Agency: An Appraisal”, *Canadian Public Policy*, IX:3 (1983), pp. 326-337.


224. See: Peter Gill, "Security Intelligence Review Committee: An Assessment of its Performance." (A shortened version of this paper will be forthcoming in Intelligence and National Security.) See also: K.G. Robertson, "Canadian Intelligence Policy." A version of this report was presented at the Joint Convention of the International Studies Association and the British International Studies Association in London in April, 1989.


236. See: Gillmor, I Swear by Appolo, p. 89.

237. In the case of the United States one might even argue that the predilection for focussing on the CIA long after the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office had started to consume the lion's share of resources, acted to decrease the value government attributed to clandestine HUMINT collection and that this partly underpinned such recent intelligence failures as those that occurred in Iran in 1978-79 and Beirut in 1983.

238. Such a view was expressed by Michael Handel following the presentation of his paper: "The Politics of Intelligence", CASIS Annual Meeting, Learned Societies Conference, University of Manitoba, June, 1986.


241. Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones suggests that things are changing. The normative historiographical pattern—apologies by or on behalf of participants; followed by revisionist (ideological) interpretations; followed by the work of historians using innovative methods—is now firmly in place. See his "American Intelligence: A Spur to Historical Genius?", Intelligence and National Security 3:2 (April, 1988), pp. 332-337. See also his "Historiography of the CIA", The Historical Journal, 23 (June, 1980), pp. 489-96.