newspapers and news magazines as well as Richard Gabriel’s *Operation Peace for Galilee*.

The final thirteen pages of the text deal with the relevance of Clausewitz and thus are meant to represent the author’s primary contribution to the study of Lebanese affairs. Some of these generalizations are interesting and could have been usefully expanded upon by the author. Of particular interest is his point that Israel could not defeat the PLO by military means because the PLO’s primary strength is political. This assertion is reinforced by Evron’s argument that the PLO’s military power in southern Lebanon was only of nuisance value and was employed only rarely due to a fear of Israeli retaliation. Both authors therefore refute the public relations and actual justifications for the 1982 war, although Evron does this in a much more thoughtful and comprehensive way.

W. Andrew Terrill
Occidental College


During the Reagan administration civilian policy makers and the military establishment “rediscovered” the importance of having the ability to engage directly and indirectly in unconventional warfare. Anti-Marxist insurgencies in Angola and Afghanistan served to underscore the fact that the so called “Wars in the Shadows” offered both risks and opportunities in the conduct of United States national security objectives.

The reassertion of the importance of unconventional conflict after the trauma of the Vietnamese experience often took the form of a growing body of literature on what is now called low-intensity conflict. Furthermore, the armed services began to look beyond the requirements to be prepared to engage in conventional warfare and reluctantly revitalized their capabilities to employ special operations forces at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Yet, despite these activities, there remained a gap in the understanding of a particular form of low-intensity conflict, namely, revolutionary warfare which “strategy employs ancient military tactics in conjunction with political and psychological techniques to transfer governmental power as a prelude to the transformation of the social system” [p. 2]. This gap has been impressively filled by Professor Richard A. Shultz in *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices and Regional Comparisons*. Furthermore, through very impressive research, the author moves beyond an analysis of the indigenous factors that promote internal conflict in the Third World and systematically discusses how the Soviet Union and its surrogates support internal wars in the transitional area.
Professor Shultz initiates his study by presenting Soviet policy, strategy and organization in promoting fundamental political change and projecting its influence in the lesser developing states. He initially goes over familiar ground discussing the evolution of Moscow's involvement in the colonial and post-colonial era from the early post-revolutionary period. Shultz then sets the stage for the major scope of his study when he notes:

By the early 1970's the USSR's investment in defense had altered the military correlation of forces. As they reached parity with the West in both strategic and conventional terms, the leadership appeared less constrained in proclaiming its right to project power into Third World conflicts. [p. 22]

How this projection has taken place and been refined is the central theme of the book.

In organizing his impressive study, Professor Shultz recognizes the primacy of political measures and objectives in revolutionary warfare. He identifies and elaborates on crucial elements related to "Soviet Policy Instruments and Organizational Apparatus" required in the conduct of protracted conflict [p. 31]. He makes a strong case for the fact that Moscow can mobilize and integrate specific propaganda campaigns, which are characterized by the Soviet technique of kombinatsia, combining and integrating multiple issues in support of specific policy [p. 34]. The author then addresses additional techniques that are employed to promote insurgent movements including the use of international front organizations [p. 33] and political action within the U.N. and other international and regional organizations [p. 35]. Also discussed is the method whereby Moscow employs both paramilitary measures and surrogate assets in the pursuit of its objectives in Third World conflicts.

Having provided the framework for analysis Professor Shultz engages in the very ambitious task of applying it to four case studies of Soviet involvement: Vietnam, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Southern Africa and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and Central America and Soviet-Cuban involvement. Each of the case studies reflects Professor Shultz's long term research in revolutionary warfare and should be of interest not only to the specialist in this form of conflict but to the area scholar. His study of the PLO not only documents Moscow's skillful use of such international organizations as the World Peace Council (WPC) in mobilizing support for its policies, but also evaluates the manner in which the USSR was involved in assisting the PLO in developing its international linkages in regards to logistics, training and support of insurgencies, particularly in Central America. The chapter on Southern Africa has a very insightful discussion on Soviet utilization of international conference diplomacy as one means of developing a favorable climate of opinion for its allies in a highly volatile strategic area. The Central American case study presents a concise historical overview of the current crisis. Professor Shultz ably demonstrates the evolution of Soviet strategy toward promoting
revolutionary warfare through the use of Cuba as a surrogate in spite of the fact that the "seizure of power by Fidel Castro in Cuba appears to have taken the Kremlin by surprise" [p. 150]. His discussion of the way Cuban, East German and Bulgarian intelligence officers helped to strengthen Nicaraguan state security and consolidate Sandinista rule serves to illuminate how Soviet surrogates have developed particular specializations in the complex processes of political subversion, unconventional conflict and establishment of regime control.

In his conclusion, the author restates the case supporting the position that Soviet policy toward revolutionary warfare involved "an integrated political and military strategy . . . augmented by an array of surrogate assets" [p. 188], noting in a postscript on U.S. foreign policy that despite the concern for meeting the threat posed by Soviet involvement in the Third World, and the view that "the United States cannot afford to approach LIC in an ad hoc or disjointed manner . . . it appears that the Reagan administration has not advanced very far" [p. 207]. Given the level of sophistication on the part of the Soviet Union in supporting revolutionary warfare it is a matter of considerable concern whether the United States in the post-Reagan era will move beyond rhetoric and develop the necessary doctrines, policies and strategies to cope with a form of conflict that is likely to intensify in the ensuing years. Consequently, it is particularly important that the next generation of policy makers responsible for meeting the challenges to U.S. security generated by revolutionary change in the Third World take the opportunity to read Professor Shultz's book.

Stephen Sloan
Department of Political Science
The University of Oklahoma