

Since the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon there has been a proliferation of books on Lebanese affairs. Some of these books deal with the military lessons of the invasion, some with decision-making during the invasion, while still others focus on the structural change in the Lebanese political system resulting from that event. Among the most useful of the recent books on Lebanon is Yair Evron's *War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue*. This work provides real insight into one of the most important and complex relationships involving Lebanon, that between Israel and Syria.

Evron’s study is a methodical analysis of Israeli-Syrian interaction over Lebanese events before, during and after the 1982 war. In making this analysis the author makes use of deterrence theory and attempts to illustrate the evolution of the Israeli-Syrian deterrence relationship as it involves Lebanon. In doing so Evron utilizes three concepts central to deterrence and attempts to assess the relative weight of each at key decision points in the Israeli-Syrian relationship. These concepts are the military power of each party, the interests of each party and the resolve and willingness of each party to accept pain and punishment to achieve its goals in Lebanon. It is particularly noteworthy that while the author is comfortable with the theory and jargon of deterrence, he does not allow this to deflect attention from the focus on Lebanon. The discussion of Lebanese affairs through this work is thoughtful and detailed. The work is further enhanced by the author’s continuing ability to balance and critique different interpretations of key Lebanese events in the time frame under study.

Especially important in Evron’s analysis is the concept of “red lines.” This refers to the original Israeli language defining the unacceptability of Syrian troop deployment in certain portions of Lebanon where they would be in a position of geographic advantage to attack Israel. Evron finds both the red line concept and phraseology useful and applies it freely to other Israeli-imposed thresholds. These additional “red lines” involved such factors as flight patterns for Syrian aircraft and the use, emplacement or numbers of certain types of Syrian equipment within Lebanon (most notably SAMs, in some instances tanks, etc.). Violations of the red lines by Syria could have resulted in an Israeli military intervention against that country in Lebanon.

On several occasions Evron also studies the ways in which Syria challenged the red lines and tried to gain Israeli acquiescence for a
redefinition of the scope of its activity in Lebanon. This makes for an extremely interesting study of the bargaining behavior between the two states, which is both tacit (through signals) and explicit (through third parties). The signals involve formal statements to the media and military posturing. The chief third party that Syria and Israel communicate through is the United States, although at one point King Hussein of Jordan performed this function during secret meetings with the Israeli leadership. In analyzing these issues Evron comes to the conclusion that Syria and Israel have been effective in communicating with each other, although he does point out instances where tacit signaling has failed due to misunderstandings. He suggests that in a relatively stable deterrence relationship these misunderstandings can usually be corrected in short order so long as they do not set off a process of escalation.

Also important in Evron's analysis is the 1982 war. This, according to the author, represents an Israeli decision to abandon deterrence to pursue an expanding set of interests in Lebanon by other means. The Israelis therefore invaded Lebanon and then expanded that war to include the Syrians despite the fact that Syria (and the mainstream PLO) did nothing to provoke this. Syria had, in fact, been operating within parameters that had previously been acceptable to the Israelis. Furthermore, the Syrians had shown a great deal of interest in remaining outside of the fighting while Israel dealt a crippling blow to the PLO. Evron suggests that the Israeli decision to attack Syria prompted a massive Syrian build-up and a much more serious commitment by Syria to obtain some kind of conventional weapons parity with the Israelis. What Evron does not mention were the Syrian efforts to expand their deterrent capabilities through the acquisition of more and better surface-to-surface missiles equipped with chemical weapons warheads. This is clearly part of the same trend. It is particularly important since it somewhat neutralizes the almost certain ability of the Israelis to escalate from a conventional to a nuclear confrontation.

Much less detailed and interesting than Evron's study is M. Thomas Davis' monograph 40 Kilometers into Lebanon. This work seeks to critique the Israeli decision-making process that led to the counterproductive war in Lebanon. It purports to do this by comparing the wishful thinking leading to the Lebanon invasion decision with the realist thought and principles of Carl von Clausewitz.

Unfortunately, Davis never really makes his case in a serious way because of a perceived need to provide the reader with certain background information that takes up the balance of the work. Prior to making his comparison with Clausewitz, Davis takes the reader through a long but extremely basic discussion of the historical factors contributing to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is a discussion which all but the most uninformed reader will be able to skip over. He then goes on to a general description of pre-1982 events in Lebanon followed by a description of the 1982 combat. These descriptions contain no theory and are placed in no methodological framework. Additionally, the three background chapters contain no new facts and are based heavily on U.S.
newspapers and news magazines as well as Richard Gabriel’s *Operation Peace for Galilee*.

The final thirteen pages of the text deal with the relevance of Clausewitz and thus are meant to represent the author’s primary contribution to the study of Lebanese affairs. Some of these generalizations are interesting and could have been usefully expanded upon by the author. Of particular interest is his point that Israel could not defeat the PLO by military means because the PLO’s primary strength is political. This assertion is reinforced by Evron’s argument that the PLO’s military power in southern Lebanon was only of nuisance value and was employed only rarely due to a fear of Israeli retaliation. Both authors therefore refute the public relations and actual justifications for the 1982 war, although Evron does this in a much more thoughtful and comprehensive way.

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During the Reagan administration civilian policy makers and the military establishment “rediscovered” the importance of having the ability to engage directly and indirectly in unconventional warfare. Anti-Marxist insurgencies in Angola and Afghanistan served to underscore the fact that the so called “Wars in the Shadows” offered both risks and opportunities in the conduct of United States national security objectives.

The reassertion of the importance of unconventional conflict after the trauma of the Vietnamese experience often took the form of a growing body of literature on what is now called low-intensity conflict. Furthermore, the armed services began to look beyond the requirements to be prepared to engage in conventional warfare and reluctantly revitalized their capabilities to employ special operations forces at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Yet, despite these activities, there remained a gap in the understanding of a particular form of low-intensity conflict, namely, revolutionary warfare which “strategy employs ancient military tactics in conjunction with political and psychological techniques to transfer governmental power as a prelude to the transformation of the social system” [p. 2]. This gap has been impressively filled by Professor Richard A. Shultz in *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices and Regional Comparisons*. Furthermore, through very impressive research, the author moves beyond an analysis of the indigenous factors that promote internal conflict in the Third World and systematically discusses how the Soviet Union and its surrogates support internal wars in the transitional area.