INTRODUCTION

The relationship of armaments and war has long been a topic of debate and research. Nearly all studies of the subject have concentrated on the role of armament in the onset of war, with controversy about balances of military power, deterrence, and arms races. Findings generally have indicated that armaments do not necessarily "cause" war, although rising levels of arms can aggravate existing tensions, thus leading to violence. Most arms races between nations do not end in warfare, but disputes which are accompanied by arms races are far more likely to end in war than those which are not so accompanied.¹

Despite such research, little or no attention has been paid to the effect of armament during warfare on the escalation and de-escalation patterns of wars. Harkavy, for example, has noted "the almost complete absence of any focused, comparative analysis of arms transfer diplomacy after the onset of and during conflict" (original emphasis).² Yet, in view of the increasing military carnage and social dislocation in much of the Third World, restraining or controlling the flow of arms has been suggested as one method of conflict control.

It has been argued that weapons transfers to warring parties, or the withholding of arms resupply can profoundly affect the outcome of a war or prospects for peace, especially where combatants are highly dependent on foreign arms suppliers. Governments which provide arms to combatants frequently claim a desire to influence the outcome of the war, and to hasten peace.³ Indeed a U.S.-UK arms embargo of India and Pakistan in 1965 generally is credited with bringing their South Asian war to a grinding halt, but also with stimulating both the growth of indigenous arms industries in, and the search for alternate arms suppliers by, India and Pakistan, enabling them to fight further wars.

One region of the world which is particularly dependent on the outside supply of arms is Africa. While arms transfers to Africa do not compare with the 45% of global arms imports going to the Middle East, and while arms imports to the region have been declining throughout the 1980s, Africa was still second among Third World regions in 1984 with nearly 14% of world arms imports.⁴ As in other parts of the world, African states increasingly have diversified their arms suppliers, but with the exception of South Africa, generally they remain too new and too poor to have developed much arms self-sufficiency or to pay for the most advanced weapons systems. African states, perhaps more than those in other regions, also have been willing to preserve long-standing client relationships with major powers, even including former colonial patrons,
and the Soviet Union has come to provide upwards of 50% of African arms.\textsuperscript{5}

Critics of the arms trade note that it worsens African economic woes and exacerbates political conflict, while defenders of arms shipments note the need to promote security and balance cold war competition in the region.\textsuperscript{6} There is doubt about the degree of influence over African foreign policies afforded by arms transfers, and therefore, doubt as well about the role of arms supply in fomenting, moderating, or precluding African international warfare and military interventions. Endemic African political turmoil, together with recipients' ability to "shop around" and tendency to pursue independent foreign policies frequently confound influence attempts. Indeed, Africa ranks as highly as it does in arms imports partly because of the existing wars and disputes which have opened the way for Soviet, Chinese, and Western shipments, with suppliers and recipients often rapidly changing partners.\textsuperscript{7} Neither defenders nor critics are yet in a position to specify the pacifying or fortifying effects of arms supplies on the course of these wars.

This study is designed, then, to determine the effects of weapons transfers and resupply, and denial of such supplies, on the escalation or de-escalation of international violence, on third party intervention in warfare, and on the progress of negotiations. It will examine arms shipments by major and/or minor powers to African combatants in the post-independence period.

The basic rival hypotheses being tested are that: (1) the arrival of new arms supplies fortifies the recipient so that violence is averted, the need for third party intervention is precluded, or the end of the war is hastened and violence abated; (2) the arrival of new arms supplies increases the likelihood of crises breaking into warfare, of subsequent third party intervention in the war by the arms donor or others, of violence escalating, or negotiations failing in ongoing warfare; and (3) an arms embargo or limitation of resupply promotes restraint by the state denied arms, thus precluding the outbreak of war or hastening the end of war.\textsuperscript{8} We note as well that the escalation of fighting in the short-run can also lead to a longer term reduction in conflict, if not to conflict resolution, if one side gains clear dominance; therefore, arms transfers which lead to increased fighting can have either stabilizing or destabilizing effects on conflict escalation.

**PRIOR FINDINGS**

Those who have examined the relationships of arms supplies and recent wars have determined that the pre-war supply pattern is likely to change with the onset of hostilities. Superpowers often attach restrictions to their resupplies of weapons during war or try to use such supplies to bring pressure to bear on recipients. Therefore, particularly in relatively long interstate wars, recipients frequently have switched and increased diversity of arms sources; the struggle in the Horn of Africa was a prime example of such arms procurement volatility. On the other hand, during
short wars and civil wars or insurgencies, existing arms supply dependen-
cies have tended to be maintained or reinforced.\textsuperscript{9}

It also appears that countries with large pre-war inventories of
weapons have been more likely to initiate war than countries with smaller
stocks (though this can depend on the definition of large vs. small). The
quality (as opposed to quantity) of both weapons available and troop
morale and training has served defenders well in repelling such attacks
and helped bring wars to a close.\textsuperscript{10}

The type of arms transferred to potential and actual combatants has
varied by region, with larger shipments and more sophisticated and up-
to-date equipment going to the Middle East than to regions such as
Africa. In assessing the impact of arms resupply before or during war-
fare, the importance of regional context must be remembered. Arms sent
to Africa need not be as sophisticated as those sent to the Middle East to
have a profound impact on strategic and political calculations since the
general level of African armament is lower. Also, weapons’ ap-
propriateness for warfare in the regional context will strongly affect con-
flict outcomes; Soviet supplies to Angola have been less sophisticated but
more effective in achieving wartime goals than those sent by Moscow to
Egypt and Syria in 1967 and 1973.\textsuperscript{11} In the Middle East and other regions
as well, superpowers have not achieved great influence over the initiation
of wars through arms supplies, although in some cases refusal or
threatened refusal to resupply needed arms evidently have hastened the
termination of wars. Influence is complicated in that extensive initial
supplies seem necessary for subsequent withholding of, or permission to,
resupply to have much effect on recipients’ policies. Even so, “in no
[Arab-Israeli] cases were any superpower goals achieved against the
perceived interests of its client ... .”\textsuperscript{12} Major powers undergo pressures
to prove their support for clients and allies by resupplying them, so that
even relatively weak and dependent clients achieve considerable reverse
influence on the arms supplier. Arms recipients also can be very resistant
to outside diplomatic pressure when perceiving crucial issues of national
survival at stake in warfare.

As arms have flowed more slowly into Africa than into the Middle
East, patterns of arms resupply also have varied according to supplier.
The Soviet Union has tended to send weapons in “surges” of relatively
less sophisticated equipment, aiming to bail out beleaguered clients
engaged in counterinsurgency or territorial wars against outside in-
vaders—as in Angola and Ethiopia. Western suppliers have been more
deliberate in supplying smaller quantities of more sophisticated weapons
over longer periods, often to cultivate patron-client relations or commer-
cial interests.\textsuperscript{13}

The superpowers have been reluctant to escalate Third World war-
fare by indiscriminately pouring in weapons during the early stages of
fighting. Only when “some obvious political or strategic advantage has
been perceived,” or some grave disadvantage expected with the loss of a
favored client, have the Americans or Soviets opened wide the resupply
pipeline. This has been true of the Ethiopia-Somalia as well as Arab-Israeli wars. The longer a case of Third World fighting goes on, of course, the greater the need for and chance of resupply. In regions with less extensive major power alliance commitments, such as Africa, the equipment finally released has been well below "state of the art" levels and has been "conditioned on significant political or military concessions from the combatants" (such as rights to use bases).\(^{14}\)

A study of eight recent cross-border wars in the Third World has shown that in all but a single case, arms resupply played an important role in providing clear advantages to one side in the fighting. In such cases, which included the Bangladesh war (1971), Arab states vs. Israel (1973 and 1982), China vs. Vietnam, Ethiopia vs. Somalia (late 1970s), Zaire’s Shaba crises (late 1970s), Morocco vs. Polisario, and Iraq vs. Iran, combatants with such advantages generally were able to repel initial attacks, recoup losses, or at least hold their own in the fighting. Such defensive success did not necessarily translate into successful cross-border counter-attacks or long-term settlement of issues, however.\(^{15}\)

These observations mean that arms transfers during warfare could have especially strong impact on the conclusion of African wars. The fact that wars in the Third World appear to start with relatively little major power political input, and that they are carried on with a premium on numbers of weapons, the element of surprise, and human capabilities on the battlefield (as opposed to the sophistication of weapon systems), means that Third World combatants are likely to get in over their heads if wars are allowed to become prolonged. Hence, despite the possibilities of shifting suppliers in prolonged wars, dependence on arms suppliers, and responsiveness to their demands, is likely to be strong during intensive warfare. Whether arms donors choose to attempt influence over the outcomes of wars and whether many Third World wars are sustained for long periods at highly intensive levels, appear to be the key variables moderating hostilities once begun. However, long-term conflict settlement appears unlikely without political accommodation as well.\(^{16}\)

**METHODOLOGY**

A set of six African international wars will be examined in depth to associate the timing of arms shipments with effects on the level of fighting and/or progress of negotiations. These include: Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenyan skirmishes of the 1960s; resumption of Ethiopia-Somalia fighting in the 1970s; Morocco’s campaign in the Western Sahara against Polisario insurgents; the Tanzania-Uganda war which deposed Idi Amin; and the two Shaba province secession struggles involving outside interveners in Zaire in the 1970s. Obviously a number of other border and internationalized civil wars could have been examined, but these have appeared in previous studies cited above and seemed to provide a reasonably good cross-section representing both large and smaller scale warfare, regular combat and insurgency conflicts, and early and late post-colonial periods.
These selections exclude colonial wars (it was decided to examine only independent states able to procure arms from other states) and wars which were predominantly domestic (such as the Zimbabwe, Chad, and Sudan struggles). South African interventions, as in Angola, also are not included in this study because of the significant South African autonomy in arms acquisition. The Moroccan, Shaba, and early Kenyan cases arguably are mainly insurgencies rather than international wars, but there is a significant amount of cross-border combat or foreign military intervention in each case. Thus, this study includes cases of sustained cross-border fighting involving at least one independent state. The set provides examples of wars of varying length and magnitude which generally were long enough to involve some weapons resupply.

Most analysts of international arms transfers are well aware of the inadequacies of the available data. Such inadequacies are compounded for LDCs in Africa and in attempts to specify the month in which arms were received. Where possible we have used the month of delivery specified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), for major weapons, or by other sources such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *Africa Research Bulletin*, *Africa Contemporary Record*, and in scholarly studies of specific wars. Where arms deliveries were reported only by year, we have arbitrarily specified December of that year as the delivery date (or June if delivery took place in "mid-year"). Obviously, this is a less than satisfactory way to test hypotheses about the immediate effects of arms deliveries but at this point it is the only alternative.

The African wars were classified according to duration, regional and historical context, degree of major power involvement and interest, type of issues in dispute, role of regional or international organizations, and type of arms dependencies in order to determine arms supply effects on various types of wars. Conceivably, for example, arms shipments could have had greater impact in the early post-colonial period, when ties to former colonial powers and arms dependencies were greater than in recent times. Similarly, substantial arms supply by major powers could mean greater impact on the outcome of a war than more diversified supplies by major and/or minor powers. It remains, then, to describe arms transfer patterns and the pattern of warfare in the six cases under study.

**CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVES — ARMS TRANSFERS**


In the year prior to the outbreak of war, 1963, the U.S., West Germany and Italy offered Somalia a $10 million program designed to train an army of 6000 men for internal security tasks and civic action. However, the Somalis rejected this offer and instead accepted a $32 million Soviet program to form an army of 10,000 men. In November 1963, the Somalis also broke off arms supply negotiations with the UK, opting again for an agreement with the Soviets. The first fruits of the Somali-Soviet agreement reached Somalia in 1963 in the form of six MiG-15 UTI fighters. Also in 1963, Kenya received six Chipmunk T-21 aircraft from the UK, while Ethiopia took delivery of four landing craft from the U.S.
Kenya significantly expanded its arms procurement program in 1964, reaching full agreement with the Soviets in the summer on the types of arms the Soviets were to supply. In June, the UK announced a $3.5 million military assistance program to Kenya; the gift included arms, vehicles, equipment, aircraft, armored cars and the latest infantry weapons. Kenya also received two Beaver reconnaissance and communication aircraft from Canada in October. Other arms supply events in 1964 included the Italian Cabinet passing a bill granting technical military assistance to the Somalis for the years 1964-66, and Ethiopia receiving two SUD Alouette III helicopters from France.

In 1965 Kenya unilaterally abrogated the arms transfer agreement made with the Soviets in 1964, and in June 1965 the Soviets announced that they considered themselves absolved of future obligations under the treaty. However, Kenya did continue to strengthen its forces through other suppliers; for instance, in 1965 it took possession of 11 Beaver and Caribou aircraft through a joint UK-Canadian agreement. Ethiopia received an additional five SUD Alouette III helicopters from France, two Mi-8 helicopters and one Il-14 aircraft from the USSR. The most significant events in the region for 1965 were the Somali arms acquisitions which included three MiG-15 fighter/trainers, twenty Yak-11 aircraft, and 65 BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, all from the Soviet Union.

The Somalis continued to benefit from their arms supply relationship with the USSR in 1966, receiving a total of fifteen MiG fighters and fighter/trainers, three An-2 aircraft and two Poluchati class patrol boats from their Soviet patrons. Ethiopia added fourteen Northrup F-5 aircraft and twelve T-28D aircraft from the U.S. to their inventory, and Kenya took possession of three patrol boats from the UK. In December 1966, Kenya mounted a diplomatic offensive among Arab countries in an effort to stop the delivery of land mines to Somalia.

In 1967 the Somalis continued to outdistance their rivals in the scope of their arms acquisitions, receiving 150 T-34 tanks and two Il-28 aircraft from the Soviets. In an effort to offset the Somali-Soviet aid agreement, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia visited Washington in February 1967, to lobby for more American assistance. In March, the Kenyan army was equipped with Saladin armored cars from the UK. Later in the year Kenya received three SUD Alouette II aircraft from France, and four Beaver aircraft from Canada, while Ethiopia added four Caroline class harbor defense craft to its forces.

**Ethiopia - Somalia 1977-78**

Prior to the second outbreak of fighting in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78, both protagonists engaged in significant large scale arms acquisition programs. The Somalis' primary supplier at this point was the Soviet Union, while in 1973 the Ethiopians had contracted with the U.S. for their arms needs. However, after the initial Somali attack upon Ethiopia in July-August 1977, both France and the U.S. refused to supply Somalis with more arms.
On the other hand, in September 1977, the Ethiopians concluded a huge $220 million agreement with the USSR. Among the items included in the agreement were 48 MiG-21 fighters, 200 T-54/T-55 tanks, large numbers of armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles, artillery, and a wide assortment of SA-3/-7 SAMs and SAGGER anti-tank missiles.

After losing the support of their Soviet patrons, in September 1977, the Somalis turned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis reportedly promised Somalia $400 million to buy arms from the West, in addition to the $60 million they had already provided. In October, the Soviets publicly announced that they had stopped supplying arms to Somalia.

As the war entered 1978, the U.S. continued its policy of refusing to supply either side in the conflict; in January, it rejected a Somali plea for aid, while in February it blocked delivery of a $5.9 million arms shipment to Ethiopia. The FRG, Egypt, and France each provided Somalia with either small arms or other forms of aid, but nothing on the scale of what Ethiopia received from the Eastern bloc countries. Somalia also received some assistance in the form of SA-7 SAMs and armored personnel carriers from Iran and Italy, respectively.

Morocco - Polisario: 1975-1985

The Morocco-Polisario conflict should provide an excellent example of the effects of arms transfers during warfare and the denial of arms. One factor limiting its usefulness is the lack of reliable information regarding arms available to the Polisario. Nevertheless, fairly extensive information is available on the weapons received by Morocco, and many incidental reports were found on the weapons received and/or captured by the Polisario.

Both sides entered the conflict with minor stocks of weapons: the Polisario relied on light weapons they received from Algeria; in 1974 Morocco had entered into agreements with France for forty Puma helicopters and with the U.S. for 25 M-48 tanks. Once the war began, however, Morocco embarked on an extensive arms procurement program, with the major suppliers being the U.S., France, and to a lesser extent, Italy. By the end of 1975, Morocco had contracted for 100 anti-tank missiles (ATM's), for delivery in 1974-75, and M-48 Patton tanks (1977 delivery) from the U.S. Morocco also signed an agreement with France involving 25 Mirage F-1 fighters (1977 delivery), 29 SA-330 Puma helicopters (1979 delivery), 423 APC's (100 to be delivered in 1979), and an assortment of Crotale SAM missiles (1979 delivery).

In 1976, Morocco continued the pattern of widespread weapons acquisitions. In March, an agreement was reached with the U.S. for delivery of 24 F-5E fighters (1981), and in May another agreement was reached for delivery of six C-130 transports (1978). Another agreement in May authorized the transfer of 5000 M-1 rifles and thirty 30-caliber machine guns from Jordan to Mauritania, the other participant in the war. Similarly, in October Jordan transferred sixteen 155 mm mortars to Morocco. By the end of 1976, the U.S. and Morocco had signed
agreements for the delivery of 504 landmobile SAM's (1980) and 334 M-113 APC's (1979) along with agreements for lesser weapons systems. Italy supplemented the U.S. supplies with helicopters and training aircraft, and France provided Mauritania with an unspecified number of armoured cars.

In January 1977, reports surfaced concerning the transfer of large numbers of AML-90mm troop carriers, manufactured under French license in South Africa, to Morocco. In March, 1977, Morocco ordered 25 more French Mirage F-1C fighters (10/79) and later in the year contracted for delivery of 2000 Dragon ATM's with the U.S. (1978) and 300 Magic AAM's from France (1979). Apparently in response to the high levels of fighting that occurred in the previous month, in November France initiated daily deliveries of arms to Mauritania. In December, Morocco signed an agreement with the U.S. for future delivery of an air-defense system (4/78). In the same month Spain announced a halt in its shipments of arms to both Morocco and Mauritania.

In February 1978, the Carter administration briefly placed some restrictions on U.S. arms sales to Morocco. A planned sale of 24 OV-10 Bronco's and 24 Cobra helicopter gunships was cancelled and the Moroccan government was asked to stop using F-5s in the Western Sahara. In July, Morocco signed an agreement with Italy for future delivery of six CH-47C helicopters (1980). Other major arms agreements included: a contract with the FRG for thirty Cobra-2000 ATM's and thirty UR-416 APC's (1978), an agreement with France for 140 AML-90 AC's (1985), and an assortment of Exocet missiles (1982); an agreement with Austria for delivery of 121 Cuirassier LT/TD's (1979); an agreement with the U.S. for 100 M-48 Patton MBT's (1979) and 1000 BGM-71A TOW ATM's; and an agreement with the USSR for delivery of 100 SA-7 Grail Port SAM's (1978).

In January 1979, Spain ended its moratorium on arms shipments to belligerents in the region and signed an agreement for future delivery of one F-30 class frigate to Morocco (1983). In March 1979, Morocco contracted for delivery of 400 VAB AC's from France. The most significant foreign supply acquisition for Morocco, however, was the signing of an agreement with Northrup Page Communications for a $200 million electronic integrated intrusion detection system which was approved by the U.S. State Department in May 1979. Acquisition of the intrusion detection system played a crucial role in the later successful development of "the wall." In August, Morocco contracted for delivery of 100 AMX-10RC armored cars from France (forty in 1984), and in October the U.S. agreed to provide thirty M-113 APC's and forty M-163 SP AA guns to Morocco (1982). Also in October, the Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council advised President Carter to drop the current restrictions on arms sales to Morocco. In November, France and Morocco signed an agreement for delivery of ten Mirage F-1 fighter aircraft. Sometime in 1979, South Africa agreed to provide Morocco with 330 Eland and Ratel APC's and ICV's (eighty in 1981, 250 in 1984).

In January 1980, Morocco ordered twenty F-5E aircraft from the U.S. (1981 delivery), along with 24 Hughes 500D Defender helicopters
and six OV-10 Bronco COIN aircraft. In March, the Carter administration announced that it was selling 125 Maverick air-to-ground missiles to Morocco for $7 million. In November, Morocco signed a major arms agreement with Italy for the delivery of nineteen Jet Ranger helicopters, six AB-212 helicopters, and five CH-47C transport helicopters (1982). Other arms transfer events for 1980 included: a deal for twelve Exocet missiles (1983) and 100 ATM's (1980) from France; an order for ten Steyr-4K APC's from Austria; a deal for 25 APC's (1980) and twelve 130mm TG's (1981) from Egypt; twenty MICV's from Israel (1981); thirty 105 mm TG's from the UK (1981); ten 122 mm TH's from the USSR (1981). Sometime in 1980, Morocco also received 37 M-54 mobile SAM's from the U.S.

In January 1981, Morocco entered into an agreement with France for future delivery of 24 Gazelle helicopters, 100 AMX-10C ARV's, twelve AMX-13 AAV's (1982), and fifty AMX-155 SPH's. In March, the Moroccans contracted for 108 M-60 tanks from the U.S. Later in 1981, the U.S. and Morocco agreed to the transfer of thirty 105mm TH's (1981). Another transfer between the U.S. and Morocco involved the sale of 24 helicopter gunships (1981).

In January 1982, Muammar Qadhafi visited Rabat, and promised to end Libyan arms shipments to the Polisario. Also in February, however, France interrupted its supply of weapons to Morocco when the Moroccan government fell behind on its debt payments; arms shipments resumed after the two parties reached an agreement on a rescheduling plan. A further agreement in April between the U.S. and Morocco guaranteed the supply of 381 ASM's (1983). Other 1982 agreements included a French-Moroccan deal for sixty ATM's (1982) and a U.S.-Moroccan deal for delivery of twenty APC's (1982). Elsewhere in 1982, Morocco received a shipment of 48 Exocet missiles from France and ten Skyservant transport aircraft from the FRG.

In May 1983, Morocco signed an agreement with the U.S. for a further delivery of 24 Hughes helicopter gunships. At this point in the war, the available evidence shows that Morocco was entering into fewer arms transfer agreements while prior arms supply agreements were being fulfilled. Thus, in 1983 Morocco took possession of 25 Aspide missiles from Italy, fifty SPH's and three ARV's from France, and three transport aircraft from the U.S.

In 1984, Egypt agreed to provide Morocco with 65 Sagger ATM's (in 1984). In March 1985, Moroccan officials reported that in late 1984, Polisario took delivery of large quantities of Soviet-made weapons which included advanced BMP-1 armored vehicles and a number of Soviet made anti-aircraft missiles.

**Tanzania - Uganda: 1977-1979**

In the years before the outbreak of fighting, Uganda engaged in substantial arms dealings, its main supplier being the Soviet Union. Throughout the period 1975-1977, Uganda acquired significant stores of MiG-21 fighters, anti-aircraft missiles and tanks. Iraq provided a further supply of MiG's while Libya provided forty Mirage-5's to replace planes
destroyed in Israel's Entebbe raid. On the other hand, there is little evidence of Tanzanian activity on the arms scene in these years.

After the initial Ugandan invasion in October 1977, a broad range of states rushed to Tanzania's aid: Canada provided four Buffalo transport aircraft (1978); Italy provided two helicopters (1978); the Soviet Union agreed to supply 350 T-54 MBT's (1978); and the PRC delivered twenty APC's to Tanzania (1977).

Tanzania received even greater amounts of aid in 1978. In September the UK and Tanzania reached an agreement for the delivery of 36 Scorpion light tanks (six in 1979). Another large arms deal was concluded with the USSR, including agreements for the delivery of twenty BRDM-2 SC's (1978) and 24 SA-6 SAM's (1979). Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Ethiopia, Algeria, and China all supplied Tanzania with smaller amounts of arms.

In February 1979, Uganda sent delegations to Spain, Portugal, and Iraq in an effort to obtain Soviet arms. However, arms merchants in all three countries demanded cash in advance and twelve months to deliver, terms which were impossible for Uganda to accept. Help for Uganda did arrive in March, when Libya provided 3000 troops, six Mirage fighters and seven MiG-21's. Other reports also cited the presence of Tupolev-22 high altitude bombers.

Zaire: Shaba I

The first Shaba crisis, lasting from March until May 1977, involved the Zairian army's attempt to oust a group of Katangan rebels who had invaded Zaire from Angola. Zaire received the aid of France, Belgian, and Moroccan forces in its efforts.

After the first rebel attack in March 1977, Belgium and France quickly came to Zaire's aid. Belgium airlifted thirty planeloads of infantry weapons, ammunition and other military equipment to the Zairians while France delivered a quantity of AS-30 ASM's and fourteen Mirage aircraft. The PRC contributed thirty tons of military equipment to Zaire and the U.S. provided $1 million worth of "non-lethal" aid: parachutes, medical supplies, communication equipment, and portable fuel containers. At some point during the year the U.S. also provided an unidentified number of M-113-A1 APC's.

Zaire: Shaba II

The second round of fighting in Shaba province broke out in May 1978. Again, European and American forces quickly came to the aid of the Zairian government as did a few communist bloc countries. Furthermore, in this case the weapons buildup from the previous Shaba incident obviously had an influence on the course of events. In May, eighteen U.S. Air Force C-141 transports participated in the French and Belgian airlifts; the airlift included $17.5 million in non-lethal military and medical aid from the U.S. Zaire also received one SA-321 helicopter from France, and 100 M-1938 122mm TG's from North Korea.
Winter 1989

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVES: FIGHTING AND NEGOTIATIONS


Cross border fighting broke out between the Somalis and the Ethiopians in January 1964, in a dispute over Somalia's irredentist claims to sections of the Ogaden. By the middle of February, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to a cease-fire which was followed in March by a series of OAU sponsored peace talks in Khartoum. Both parties agreed to a withdrawal of their forces to a line fifteen km from the border. The fact that Somalia had recently signed a major agreement with the Soviets for procurement of military supplies and training may have played a role in the initial Somali decision to pursue its claims.

Throughout the remainder of this conflict, low-intensity, guerrilla type fighting predominated. The main protagonists in the struggle were a group of Somali tribal raiders, known as *shifta*, who harassed Kenyan and Ethiopian forces along the joint borders of the three states. The degree of official Somali support and/or participation in these activities never has been established; however, it seems certain that the *shifta* were receiving substantial amounts of weaponry and training support from the Somali government.

As outlined in the previous section, the fighting in 1964 led to the beginning of a regional arms race with all sides trying to match the arms deals being made by their neighbors. Perhaps the Somali success in attracting large amounts of aid from the Soviets accounted for their aggressive support of the *shifta*. In any case, it seems clear that the continuing *shifta* guerrilla campaign in the years 1964-1967 played a destabilizing role in the region, contributing to the perceived need of the parties involved to increase their levels of arms purchases.


In May 1977, a group known as the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) launched an attack on several Ethiopian border villages in the Ogaden desert. The WSLF had clear ties to the Somali government so there was never any ambiguity concerning the WSLF's official backing. By July, the Somali government gave up all pretense of being uninvolved and helped the WSLF gain control over most of the southern Ogaden by August. The progress of the fighting escalated rapidly, and by the end of September the Somalis had taken control also of the central Ogaden. The climax of Somali campaign came in November with the capture of the city of Jijiga; however, from this point on the tide shifted decisively in Ethiopia's favor. The changing fortunes of the war can be attributed to three things: (1) the massive Soviet airlift and sealift of supplies to Ethiopia; (2) the arrival of over 12,000 Cuban troops early in 1978 to assist the Ethiopian's war effort; and (3) the Somali failure to obtain the military hardware needed to sustain their offensive.

Many of the proposed effects of arms resupply and arms denial are seen clearly in this conflict. Somalia had engaged in a significant
weapons acquisition program prior to the outbreak of the war but the inability of the Somali forces to deal a death blow to the Ethiopians in the opening stages of the conflict allowed international pressures to play a greater role. As the aggressor, the Somalis gave the Soviets a convenient excuse to dump their clients in favor of the larger prize, Ethiopia. The Somali aggression also foreclosed on the possibility of obtaining arms supplies from other sources. Thus, for instance, the Arab League and the U.S. refused several Somali requests for assistance.

Reinforced by the Cuban troops and Soviet supplies, Ethiopia launched a major counter-attack in February 1978. Together with the depletion of Somalia’s own forces, because of the international arms limitations, the Ethiopian-Cuban-Soviet alliance overwhelmed the Somalis and by the middle of March had recaptured all of the lost Ogaden territory.

Peace initiatives began early in August 1977, when Ethiopia demanded an emergency meeting of the OAU to discuss the Somali invasion; however, the OAU’s attempt failed after Somalia withdrew from the talks. Thereafter, the Somalis showed little enthusiasm for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. On the other hand, although Ethiopia showed some interest in engaging in OAU sponsored talks, it steadfastly refused to accept any extra-regional actors, such as the UN, in the peace process. With the introduction of Cuban troops into the fighting, Ethiopia appears to have stiffened its resolve for a military solution to the dispute and the peace “feelers” declined after January 1978. After the withdrawal of the regular Somali forces from the Ogaden, sporadic guerrilla fighting between the WSLF and Ethiopia continued into the 1980s.

Morocco - Polisario: 1975-1985

The conflict in the Western Sahara began in late 1975, when Spain announced its intention to withdraw from its former colony. King Hassan of Morocco thereupon announced a “peaceful” march of 350,000 civilians into the Spanish Sahara in an attempt to strengthen Morocco’s claim to the region. In October 1975, the International Court of Justice ruled that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had a right to the former Spanish colony, a ruling which led to a ten year struggle for the largely unpopulated desert area.

By the end of 1975, the Polisario included between 4000 and 5000 armed guerrillas supplied mainly by Algeria and operating from bases inside Algeria or from desert hideouts in the Western Sahara. Morocco’s main weapons supplies came from France with the United States assuming a larger share towards the end of the war. Mauritania’s main benefactors included Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, each of which was anxious to halt the spread of the Algerian revolution. Moroccan troops also were stationed in Mauritania at various times through 1978 to aid in the war effort.

Several diplomatic initiatives proceeded apace with the outbreak of the war. In February 1976, the Polisario proclaimed the creation of the
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic in an effort to gain greater international recognition for their cause. In April, Morocco and Mauritania incorporated the area of the Western Sahara into their national borders and in May 1977, Morocco and Mauritania formalized their military assistance and coordination relations by signing a joint defense agreement.

During the war's early years, the fighting consisted mainly of Polisario's hit and run attacks on selected targets, while Morocco and Mauritania tried to engage the Polisario in more conventional set piece battles or tried to ambush Polisario columns in transit. Polisario's favorite targets were the iron ore mines at Zouirate and the phosphate mining facilities at Bu Craa. In the early phase of fighting, the Polisario succeeded in inflicting large losses of material on both Morocco and Mauritania, to the point that it made overtures to Morocco to leave the war while it concentrated its attacks on Mauritania. Although Morocco refused the offer, the Polisario was right in considering Mauritania ripe for defeat for, in July 1978, a coup in Nouackchott toppled the government and knocked Mauritania out of the war. The new Mauritanian leadership initiated peace talks with the Polisario which continued sporadically for over a year; at the same time, Polisario proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire in the war with Morocco.

In January 1979, Polisario launched the "Houari Boumedienne Offensive" involving battalion size units operating in the Western Sahara and in southern Morocco. This was followed in March by a Moroccan-U.S. agreement for resupply of over $5 million worth of ammunition and spare parts. In August, Mauritania signed a peace agreement and agreed to turn over its portion of the Western Sahara to the Polisario; however, Morocco immediately annexed Mauritania's portion of the region, declaring it Morocco's 37th province.

At this stage of the war, Polisario strategy changed and larger forces were fielded in conventional, set piece battles. In August 1979, the guerrillas wiped out a 1500-man Moroccan outpost at Lebouirat. In October, Polisario attacked the 5400-man Moroccan garrison at Smara with a force of between 2000 and 5000 men. Morocco held out, however, while Moroccan Air Force Mirage jet fighters inflicted heavy losses on Polisario vehicles en route to reinforce the attackers.

After the heavy fighting in the last months of 1979, in January 1980, the Pentagon announced a $232.5 million agreement to sell a variety of aircraft to Morocco; this was approved by Congress in March. Another low-point for the Moroccan army occurred in March, when the Polisario inflicted serious losses on a 5000-man Moroccan force attempting to resupply a military outpost at Zaag.

In September 1980, the Moroccans, with U.S. advice, made a major shift in strategy by beginning the construction of "the wall," a massive earthworks project studded with air-defense and electronic detection devices and surrounded by land mines. The goal was to incorporate the important population centers and mineral deposits within the wall, while
leaving the empty desert areas to the Polisario. Until the wall’s completion, however, both parties continued to conduct major raids on opposing forces. In December 1980, the Polisario attacked a Moroccan force at Rous Lekhyalat, killing over 300 troops. Another major battle occurred at Guelta Zemmur in March 1981, in which a 2000-strong Polisario force attacked a Moroccan garrison of equal strength. After a thirteen day battle, the guerrillas were forced to retreat. Also in March, the Reagan administration approved a $182 million agreement with Morocco for delivery of 108 M-60 tanks.

By far the largest battle yet in the war occurred in October 1981, when the Polisario again attacked the Moroccan garrison at Guelta Zemmur with over 3000 troops. The Moroccans claimed that the Polisario had escalated the conflict by introducing sophisticated Soviet weaponry, including SA-6 missiles and T-52 and T-54 tanks. Other sources discredited these reports. The Polisario succeeded in overwhelming the Moroccan garrison and it was only through the intervention of elite units from other sectors that the Moroccans were able to recapture the fort. After the battle, Morocco urgently requested arms resupply from the U.S. government.

The fortunes of the war decisively shifted against Polisario in 1982, when it lost the support of its main benefactor, Algeria. Impatient with the financial and political burden of supporting the guerrillas, Algeria began reducing its assistance, with the result that the Polisario was forced to cut back on its activities and scale down its operations for the remainder of the war. Furthermore, Algeria also appears to have denied the Polisario the use of bases within Algeria, forcing them to move to areas in northern Mauritania which left them vulnerable to Moroccan air attack. Another blow came in January 1982, when Colonel Qadhafi visited Rabat and promised to stop aiding the guerrillas. These developments, together with an initial Polisario confusion over how to deal with the wall, resulted in a lessening of the fighting until July 1983. In that month, the Polisario launched an offensive against several points along the wall, notable for both the number of troops involved and the duration of the fighting which lasted several weeks.

Sporadic fighting continued throughout 1984 and 1985, with Morocco generally content to remain behind its fortifications and to counterattack whenever provoked by the Polisario. In October 1985, in an address before the U.N. General Assembly, the Moroccan Prime Minister declared a unilateral cease-fire in the Western Sahara.

**Tanzania - Uganda: 1978-1979**

The initial Ugandan invasion of Tanzania came in October 1978, when Idi Amin’s forces followed a mutinous band of Ugandan troops in Tanzanian territory. The Ugandans proceeded to rape and pillage throughout the area of the Kagera Salient. The U.S. immediately broke off all trade relations with Uganda. Several African states joined in the condemnation of Uganda.
By the beginning of November, Amin expressed a willingness to submit the dispute for arbitration but President Nyrere of Tanzania appeared determined to depose Amin once and for all. A Tanzanian counterattack began on 12 November, and despite OAU attempts to settle the conflict, Tanzania recaptured its lost territory and pushed into Uganda by the end of the month. Though unable to obtain arms from international sources, the Tanzanians were able to recover large stores of weapons from the retreating Ugandans. The Soviets demanded cash in advance for all weapons purchases and U.S. weapons were not compatible with the Tanzanian arsenal. Other countries refrained from taking sides openly for fear of antagonizing Arab bloc states. In mid-January, unconfirmed reports surfaced that Libya had switched sides and had started supplying arms to Tanzania.

A second Tanzanian offensive into Uganda began in mid-January 1979, though the fighting again was localized to the border area. A more sustained offensive began in February as Ugandan exiles backed by Tanzanian troops advanced along the Masaka-Kampala highway. In March, reliable reports claimed that Muammar Qadhafi had sent 3,000 Libyan troops into Uganda to help prop up the Amin government. Libya also provided large amounts of military hardware to the Ugandans. Even the massive infusion of Libyan troops was not enough to save the Amin regime for the Libyan soldiers showed little enthusiasm for fighting in the mud and brush of the Ugandan jungle. By the end of March, Tanzanian troops were within artillery range of Kampala and on 11 April the capital fell.

Shaba I: 1977

The 1977 Shaba crisis involved a group of Katangan rebels invading Zaire from bases in neighboring Angola. The Katangans were a group of Zairian exiles who fled into Angola in 1965 after Moise Tshombe's attempt to secede from Zaire failed. The brunt of the fighting, however, was borne by a group of troops from Morocco with the assistance of several French and Belgian training personnel. The fighting broke out in March 1977, when the Katangan rebels attacked Shaba province and occupied the towns of Kisenge, Dilolo and Kapanga. Zaire immediately asked for support from several Western countries, which, as outlined in the previous section, responded with military aid and "non-lethal" assistance. At first, the rebels met with considerable success, capturing the town of Mutshasa, and by 1 April were within thirty miles of Kolwesi. By 10 April, Morocco had sent 1500 troops to Zaire; France provided twenty officers and Belgium provided 88 officers for training purposes. A Franco-African summit meeting in Dakar, Senegal on 22 April supported the French intervention and condemned the Katangan invasion. Meanwhile, in Shaba itself, the introduction of the allied forces turned the tide of the war in favor of Zaire. Mutshasa was retaken and on 25 May the last rebel-held town in Shaba was recaptured.

Shaba II: 1978

Fighting in Shaba broke out again in May 1978, when 4000 Katangan rebels re-invaded the province and captured the town of
Kolwezi on 11 May. Because of the threat to Europeans living in the area, Belgium sent 1750 paratroopers to Zaire and France provided another 400. U.S. Air Force C-141 transport planes participated in the French and Belgian airlifts but no U.S. personnel participated in actual combat. With the aid of the European troops, Kolwezi was recaptured on 20 May; by the beginning of June the rebellion was crushed and the European troops were replaced by an inter-African force of troops from Morocco, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo. At the end of June, President Neto of Angola ordered all Katangans in Angola disarmed and on 20 August, Angola and Zaire agreed to the creation of a joint commission to increase security along their border. By August 1979, all foreign troops had been removed from Shaba.

FINDINGS

Despite conventional expectations, it does not appear that arms transfers generally closely precede expanded or escalated fighting in African wars. Instead, the contrary seems true, that is, the bulk of new arms supplies seemed to arrive after fighting was underway and as a result of heavy attrition. For instance, in the later Ethiopia-Somalia war, emergency Soviet supplies arrived once Ethiopia had been attacked and was reeling from the Somali invasion. In African wars, the defending state (the state whose territory was invaded) was especially likely to be resupplied by outside patrons. Naturally, such resupply allowed fighting to continue when it might have ended sooner in surrender, but from the point of view of those opposing aggression, arms transfers tended to slow down the attacker and make conquest more costly. Even unpopular defenders, such as Uganda in its war with Tanzania, found patrons—for example, Libya—willing to ride to the rescue (note that Uganda previously had attacked Tanzania as well).

Resupply of relatively well armed attackers was far less certain. The U.S. delayed quite long before finally shipping major equipment to, and consulting militarily with, Morocco in its Saharan annexation campaigns. A combination of Moroccan assistance in other matters, notably the Middle East and Zairian disputes, and the relatively poor Moroccan showing against Polisario seemed to condition the ultimate American commitment. Similarly, numerous Somalian requests for military assistance were turned down by potential patrons as its Ogaden attacks unfolded and actual resupply during the fighting was kept to a relative minimum in terms of Somali needs. If the attacker is a guerrilla organization, as in Shaba, the level of outside arms required appears considerably lower than that for regular forces since up to 90% of arms are picked up from the harassed enemy.

Looking at the six cases in turn, one finds some differences in arms supply effects between prolonged and short duration wars, and wars in which outside powers did or did not intervene or take a keen interest. In longer wars, the parties need and have the opportunity to obtain resupply which can in turn further lengthen the war. However, even in such cases, resupply tended to occur as a result of heavy losses and seldom clearly
corresponded to an impending offensive. In addition, it does not appear that attackers relied on recent arms transfers, that is, those in the preceding year, in planning for the initiation of warfare; arms generally had been absorbed into the attacker’s forces from two to four years before the war. Finally, it appears that arms resupply often corresponded to major power efforts to control the war or to intervene directly with troops.

In the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya fighting of 1964-67, the parties, two of which were newly independent, had relatively little time to build up armaments prior to the war. Ethiopia and Kenya received some arms in 1963 from the U.S. and UK respectively (landing craft to Ethiopia and light planes to Kenya). The Soviets supplied Somalia with six MiG aircraft and contracted to train a 10,000-man army. This may have given the Somalis the confidence to pursue irredentist claims against both of their neighbors. Despite this, the only major cross border fighting between regular troops occurred on the Ethiopian border in the first quarter of 1964; Ethiopian and Somali forces clashed again along the border in mid-1965. The rest of the prolonged and sporadic conflict involved Somali tribal raiders attempting subversion mainly in Kenya.

The major powers evidently sought to maintain military balance between Ethiopia and Somalia with stepped up arms deliveries in 1965 and 1966, including Soviet MiG and transport deliveries to Somalia and U.S. F-5 aircraft to Ethiopia in 1966. No fighting to speak of occurred during that year, perhaps because of the balance of power. If so, the expectation that in the early post-colonial period major powers could prevent wars by denying arms to African states appears to miss the reality of African conflict wherein arms transfers to African states do not necessarily fuel open international warfare but may kindle other forms of conflict and attempts at subversion.

Smaller arms suppliers played a role as well with France sending helicopters to Ethiopia in 1964 and Kenya in 1967, Canada supplying light aircraft and Britain naval patrol craft to Kenya, and Egypt providing Soviet equipment to Somalia. However, a change in the Somali government, more than any apparent effects of arms transfers, seemed to speed the end of fighting, despite continued irredentist claims, in negotiated settlements in 1967.

In the other extended Ethiopian-Somalian fighting of 1977-79, both combatants appeared to have built up their arsenals well before the outbreak of fighting in 1974-75. Soviet MiG-21 fighters, landing craft and utility helicopters had arrived in Somalia at that time. Most of the major American arms supplies for Ethiopia had been contracted in 1973 and evidently arrived in 1976. Thus, again the immediate outbreak of war did not depend on the dispatch of arms.

Moscow did extend a treaty of cooperation to Ethiopia in mid-1977 but it was Somalia that initiated major fighting in July-September of that year. By September, the USSR had agreed to a major resupply of the beleaguered Ethiopian forces. Meanwhile, Iraq had provided needed
spare parts to the Somalis. The Soviets appeared to promote restraint by their two client states early in the dispute but came to choose the Ethiopian side while denying Somali resupply requests. Somalia’s role as instigator may have played a part in this stance. France promised to resupply Somalia in 1977 but evidently reconsidered this policy and, along with the U.S., held up Somali arms supplies during 1977. The Arab League also refused official support, although Saudi Arabia reportedly promised major financial subsidies for Somali arms purchases.

The Soviet Union stopped sending arms to Somalia in October, having committed to a major Ethiopian resupply the prior month, and the first significant Soviet and East European shipments reached Ethiopia in October. This corresponded with the Cuban intervention and the launching of Cuban-Ethiopian counterattacks in November. The U.S. refused another Somali arms request in January 1978, just prior to the major Ethiopian offensive in February spearheaded and planned by East bloc personnel. Israel also sold arms to Ethiopia during this period while France, Italy, and Egypt supplied Somalia with just enough light arms and ammunition to keep its war effort going. Despite evident sympathies for the Somali side later in the war, the American arms embargo evidently was maintained although Somalia did manage to obtain U.S. made helicopters, left over the Vietnam, through private dealers in Thailand. The Shah of Iran may have aided Somalia with light arms as well in 1978 and threatened to send troops to halt the Ethiopian advances.

Therefore, difficulties in obtaining arms resupply, at least in comparison to the torrent of older vintage arms showered on Ethiopia, may have played some role in the ultimate Somali defeat. Somalia did, however, receive nearly $160 million worth of arms in 1978 alone (compared to over a billion dollars worth for Ethiopia, by U.S. estimates), and when combined with its large initial arms advantage over Ethiopia, it appears that the presence of the Cubans had far more to do with the Somali downfall than a shortage of supplies.

The Saharan war was the longest of the cases reviewed. It involved numerous changes of strategy and diplomatic and military initiatives, outside intervention by the U.S. and France, Arab financing of Morocco, external support of Polisario by Algeria and Libya, and OAU settlement attempts. During this protracted struggle, arms resupply, or refusal to resupply, at times were quite important influences on the pace and extent of fighting but generally such supply decisions were part of larger diplomatic and political commitments entailing intervention, strategic training, or pressure for settlement. These basic political and strategic decisions probably were more crucial than the arms transfers which reflect them.

Prior to its “peaceful” march into the Sahara, Morocco had received relatively little armament, particularly little from the U.S. Polisario, intent on establishing an independent Saharan republic, had received light weapons from Algeria and garnered additional arms in relatively successful attacks on the Moroccan army. France, which came to provide 80% of Morocco’s arms (the U.S. provided the other 20% by the 1980s),
immediately moved to replace lost Moroccan aircraft. A process of gradual arms buildup began as, for example, Jordan transferred U.S. equipment to Morocco, allowing the scale of encounters to increase with considerable Polisario successes against both Morocco and Mauritania. French supplied armored cars helped Mauritania stem the initial tide. The attrition rate on Moroccan equipment and planes remained quite high through 1976.

Foreign powers began to get more interested in the struggle as Morocco, technically the original attacking state, slipped militarily. South Africa was approached for the supply of French personnel carriers and finally French military experts arrived, with arms supplies, to help in October and November of 1977 and evidently took part in bombing campaigns. Meanwhile Spain and then the United States, under President Carter, suspended arms shipments to Morocco. Some U.S. equipment, mainly for air defense, continued to get through, however, and fighting continued with Polisario raids on both Morocco and Mauritania in 1978.

The major powers seemed to grow more concerned with each major Moroccan setback and American support increased as Moroccan diplomacy carved out an important role in the Middle East and Zairian disputes. After a major Polisario offensive in January 1979, U.S. helicopter sales were authorized in February. While the Moroccan armed forces were completely resupplied with modern weapons in 1979, and while the air force had some success attacking Polisario in the desert, Rabat's fortunes were still mixed.

Evidently, Moroccan resolve to resist OAU peace plans in 1980 stemmed from a strategic shift toward construction of the "wall" enclosing the portions of the Western Sahara rich in minerals. By 1981, the Reagan administration, cooperating in this strategy, renewed arms support and released equipment held up by Carter. Morocco also took the diplomatic initiative by raising the possibility of various types of referenda for the Saharan people. Polisario held to the hard liberation line and temporarily lost its impact in the OAU.

It took Polisario some time to adjust to the reality of the wall as it was constructed. It successfully inflicted heavy losses on a Moroccan garrison in October 1981. Libyan supplied Brazilian Cascavel armored vehicles and Soviet made SAMs, evidently from Algeria, had been crucial in the attack. As a result, U.S. instructors began training Moroccan pilots in anti-missile techniques in December. With considerable Arab support for Morocco, Algeria was in a difficult position and in a key turning point began to slacken its support of Polisario in 1982 with Libya following suit later. Polisario victories declined and the Polisario was increasingly confined to Mauritanian bases and campaigns.

Moroccan access to French arms supplies hit a temporary snag due to mounting debts in early 1982 but was renewed under the rescheduling plan. Also, by 1982 a Saudi subsidy was underwriting 80% of Morocco's war effort. Meanwhile, U.S. involvement mounted as Moroccans were instructed in mobile commando operations appropriate to the wall.
Cluster bombs were provided and more arms sales were concluded. This led to Polisario threats to acquire arms directly from the Soviet Union. OAU summits were disrupted over the issue of seating Polisario. The rug was increasingly pulled from under Polisario as both Algeria and Libya began consulting Morocco about more normal relations. Reacting to the American raid and Moroccan intransigence, Polisario broke its one-year self-proclaimed truce and successfully launched a new type of attack against the wall in the summer of 1983, using massive artillery barrages. Morocco was at a disadvantage in terms of artillery. Sporadic incidents continued into 1985 but Polisario could not continue 'broadside' against the wall as Libya and Morocco concluded their "union" and arms supplies dwindled. Finally, with its Saharan claim rather well enclosed, Morocco declare its unilateral ceasefire in October of 1985.

Many of the hypothesized effects of arms transfers were seen more clearly in this prolonged struggle than in other wars, and particularly the effects of arms supply restrictions late in the war on the guerrillas' ability to mount major campaigns in difficult terrain. Willingness to negotiate also seemed eroded at times by the optimism generated by new military assistance. Strategic advice and assistance by major powers enabled Morocco to retain control of disputed territory, albeit at a heavy price. Arms transfers led to major power military intervention, though not full scale combat participation, as the recipients' use of weapons became problematic. While these transfers also hardened the resolve of Morocco's opponents, the opponents could not find sufficient patronage to maintain the struggle against heavy odds. Allowing for uncertainties about exact weapon delivery dates, as in the other wars, arms transfers and arms transfer diplomacy were as likely to follow as to precede combat escalation.

The Tanzania-Uganda struggle was considerably shorter than those in the Horn or the Sahara, stretching from late 1978 to mid-1979. Uganda had acquired substantial military equipment in 1975 and 1976, mostly from the Soviet Union. Older aircraft came from Iraq and Libya. The U.S. also allowed the sale of a Bell helicopter and small transport aircraft in 1976. Relatively fewer items arrived in 1977, the period leading up to the outbreak of fighting. Tanzanian evidently got relatively little equipment during the period prior to war.

Although this war intensified more quickly than the others reviewed, as in the other cases negotiation and settlement attempts began quite quickly. African states were uncomfortable with such open warfare. By holding their own despite Uganda's initial invasion in October, Tanzanian troops reportedly were able to pick up 90% of their small arms needs from the retreating Ugandans. China sped deliveries of previously ordered supplies to Tanzania in November, and Ethiopia, Algeria, and the "frontline" states (Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola) sent either small arms or token shipments in December. The Soviet Union also sent further supplies.
With Uganda's poor showing, arms dealers having access to Soviet equipment began to demand cash payments and could offer only twelve month delivery terms to Uganda. As Tanzanian troops closed to within thirty miles of Kampala, however, Libya attempted to rescue the Amin government. PLO forces arrived as well. Tanzania failed in efforts to acquire Soviet arms at the same time but its advance continued despite the infusion of foreign assistance to Amin. Once again it appears that arms supplied to hard pressed defenders often entail military intervention as well, although such intervention by no means assures ultimate victory.

The two Shaba crises, in 1977 and 1978, were condensed in terms of time and involved very little cross-border fighting between organized regular troops. Instead, most of the action involved the Zairian army trying to oust well-entrenched Katangan rebels invading from neighboring Angola. Finally, a mixed group of outside interveners, spearheaded by France, Belgium, and Morocco, had to come to Zaire's rescue, and it is fighting by these interveners that is considered cross-border warfare in this case. Zaire had acquired three Canadian transport planes in 1976 (ordered in 1974), while Morocco had geared up militarily for its Saharan war by 1976.

Military supplies flowed quickly and in considerable numbers from the U.S. and Belgium to Zaire shortly after the initial rebel attack in March, but Washington relied on its European allies, France and Belgium, for the bulk of heavy equipment supplies and concentrated on transport and “non-lethal” supplies. The Zairians fell back consistently despite the arrival of new and relatively sophisticated equipment, for example, French Mirages. China also sent assistance and South Africa provided fuel. Finally, Morocco intervened with approximately 1500 men in March. In April, Belgian and French officers were training Zairian troops.

With Moroccan troops now in the fight, Zaire launched some offensives and was charged with attacking Angolan border villages. The French withdrew as Morocco spearheaded the fighting. By mid-May, Egypt, concerned about purported Soviet influence, promised military assistance and sent pilots and mechanics to Zaire. The rebel campaign largely was broken by May. After having accused Cuba and the Soviets of training the rebels, the U.S. pumped $36 million of military equipment into Morocco and $11 million into Zaire in 1977. In this case, third party intervention, rather than arms supplies per se or any mediation or conciliation approaches, settled the matter.

Fighting resumed in round two of the Shaba rebellion despite what Fidel Castro claimed were his efforts in April 1978 to dissuade the Katangans from attacking. This time white settlers in Zaire were killed by unruly troops early in the fighting, bringing a swifter and more direct Euro-American intervention. The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division was put on alert in May and Belgium immediately dispatched 1750 paratroopers. U.S. non-lethal military aid and transport flights continued as French paratroops also went to the aid of foreigners in Zaire.
The rebels were soon in retreat and there was little need for much more resupply of Zaire. Kolwezi was recaptured and French troops began a withdrawal in May, to be replaced by Moroccans. Belgian troops stayed on longer to reassure foreigners. African states were persuaded to form a joint peacekeeping force, ultimately composed of two-thirds Moroccan troops, with the rest from the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Togo. The Americans shuttled these troops in as replacements for the French legionnaires in early June. Faced with a clear major power commitment to Zairian integrity, the Angolan government disarmed the Katangans in Angola by the end of June and went on to agree with Zaire on a joint border security commission in August.

CONCLUSIONS

Dealing with this study's original hypotheses, it does not appear that the first set of assumptions about the pacifying effects of arms transfers are entirely accurate. While counter-balancing arms transfers seemed to avert combat escalation in the early Ethiopia-Somalia case, they did not appear to have that effect in other disputes. Certainly arms supplies are no reliable substitute for direct military intervention; they seem to lead (at least in Africa) ultimately to intervention in a disturbingly large proportion of cases. Resupply, and occasionally intervention as well, tended to bolster the defensive side in African wars and lead to the preservation of territorial integrity albeit at a high cost in lives. Arms resupply, along with considerable American and French logistical assistance, also enabled Morocco to carry on a war of territorial expansion in an undefined zone, perhaps an easier task than invading a defined territorial state. No amount of arms resupply seemed to help defensive forces which lacked the discipline, motivation, and training to use them effectively, as in Amin's Uganda and in Zaire prior to outside intervention.

Neither did the arrival of arms seem necessarily to increase the likelihood of crises breaking out in warfare or of warfare escalating in the period immediately following the delivery. Instead, it appears that arms often arrived or were sought during or after major campaigns, to replenish depleted stocks. The time necessary for the absorption of new materials, and the risks of losing it quickly, again may temper commanders' willingness to mount new offensives immediately. The psychological effect of weapons agreements and treaties of support and friendship may be more important than specific weapon deliveries in bolstering recipients' risk taking propensities, as Somalia's timing of attacks on Ethiopia may demonstrate. Morocco also seemed decidedly less interested in negotiations with Polisario after the fortification of American security commitments. While negotiations do not seem intimately related to the arrival of arms, there is this occasional dampening effect.

Finally, the strategically timed arms denial or embargo can have significant dampening effects on African, and presumably other Third World, wars as well. Somalia found it relatively difficult to find arms patrons in prosecuting its later Ethiopian campaigns and was rather
quickly turned back by superior forces, although it is unlikely that a
greater arms supply would have mattered much. Polisario also appeared
to be materially impaired by eventual Algerian and Libyan limitations on
arms patronage and political support.

It appears that arms transfers had their greatest impact on longer
African wars; the shorter wars depended more either on outside interven­
tion or the skill and motivation of the respective forces. Still, even in long
wars, arms alone seldom made the difference for attacker or defender as
outside intervention or strategic consultation bolstered one party over
the long run. In only one of the wars, the first Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya
struggle, was there no outside military intervener and a balance on major
power arms transfers seemed to limit the combat in that case. In one
other, Uganda-Tanzania, the intervener was a regional, Libya, as oppos­
ed to major power and arms supply had little effect in changing the
course of battle. In the other cases, crucial arms transfers accompanied
direct major and regional power intervention.

Arms dependencies affected Somalia in its Ethiopian campaigns as
Soviet arms were a necessity. Tanzania was able to garner its opponents’
weapons on the battlefield to offset its own East bloc dependencies but
outside suppliers were hardly reluctant to support the Tanzanians in any
case. Likewise, Polisario was able to augment supplies received through
Algeria and Libya but could not mount the firepower necessary to
besiege the Moroccan wall without these patrons. Zaire received con­
siderable armament from its West bloc supporters, as did Ethiopia from
the East, but both still required their patrons’ intervention.

In only the Zairian case was an international organization able to
generate a peacekeeping force to supplant such interventions and arms
infusions. The Western Sahara dilemma caused great upheaval in the
OAU but diplomacy leading to a de facto settlement came mostly in
bilateral behind the scenes meetings.

In short, then, the effect of arms transfers on warfare varies with
circumstance. It is impossible to categorize resupply as invariably
destructive or foolhardy, especially when it enables a state to resist ag­
gression. By the same token however, resuppliers should be on notice
concerning the relatively high probability that such transfers will lead to
pressures for direct intervention. At least judging by the African ex­
perience, restrictions on the flow of arms during warfare can have impor­
tant dampening effects on the intensity of fighting and can hasten the
end of combat, even while not necessarily leading to a negotiated settle­
ment.
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3. Reflecting this uncertainty and ambiguity, as well as the temptations of the arms export business, for example, Britain's reformulated policy guidelines for arms supplies in the Persian Gulf war in 1985 included a continued refusal to supply lethal equipment to either side, an attempt to fulfill existing arms supply contracts, and a ban on future orders which would "significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict." Sir Geoffrey Howe, *House of Commons Official Report, Annex C*, Written Answers, 29 October 1985, vol. 84, no. 172, col. 454.


8. During the early 1970s, for example, the "Nixon Doctrine" was premised largely on the former logic in substituting a lucrative trade in American arms for the presence of American troops in foreign disputes, and relying on Third World powers themselves to police trouble-spots. However, critics soon noted that such transfers increase the stakes of the transferring nation in the fate of the recipients, thus promoting military intervention, intensifying combat and adventurist foreign or domestic policies abroad. See for example, Edward C. Luck, "The Arms Trade," *Proceedings, Academy of Political Science* 32, no. 4 (1977), p. 172. Motives either for resupplying or refusing to resupply combatants are discussed in detail by Harkavy, "Arms Resupply," pp. 15-16, and can include factors as diverse as efforts to maintain credibility, to preclude nuclear proliferation, to test new weapons under battlefield conditions, to avoid a "slippery slope" of commitments, to avoid shortages in one's own military stocks, as well as moral, legal, and logistical concerns.


15. Harkavy, “Arms Resupply,” Table 3.


17. See Harkavy’s classification, “Arms Resupply,” Table 3.


19. Arms transfer data and other general information was gathered from the following sources:
   g. Michael Brzoska, “SIPRI Arms Transfer Data” (unpublished, June 4, 1987).

20. Information on the course of the fighting and other particulars in the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict was gathered from the following sources:
21. Information on the Western Sahara conflict was gathered from the following sources:

22. Information on the course of the fighting and other particulars in the Tanzania-Uganda conflict was gathered from the following sources:

23. Information on the course of the fighting and other particulars in the Zaire Shaba Secession I war was gathered from the following sources:

24. Information on the course of the fighting and other particulars in the Zaire Shaba Secession II war was gathered from the following sources:
   b. *Christian Science Monitor*.

h. The Washington Post.


26. As a post-script, Belgium sent 250 more paratroopers to protect whites in Kinshasa in February 1979. By June the Moroccans wanted out of Zaire and the U.S. obliged with transportation.