U.S. used or threatened to use its armed forces in "combat." This not only omits many occasions in which the U.S. military was utilized as one of the tools of foreign policy but the single-minded focus on constraints also distracts the reader from the situations in which the American military was successful used. Surely, it is as important to understand the ways in which it has been used successfully as to concentrate on the constraints of its employment.

Beyond Hosmer's intent, but nevertheless of value, would be a comparison of the post-World War II constraints on the U.S. military in Third World conflicts with those on the militaries of other democracies of the era. How many of the constraints the author found were accepted by all of the governments? If one (or more) is unique in some way to the U.S., why is this so? How have the other governments dealt with their constraints? If they have been handled in different ways, perhaps the U.S. government can profit from the example of others. In short, the constraints need to be viewed from a more comparative perspective.

Although Hosmer describes the constraints well enough, he does not examine them in any depth; must the constraints always hold, as Hosmer claims they have in the past? As it is, the study for the most part seems to accept that the constraints of the past will continue to hold in the future. Without a far closer examination of the constraints, this reader is not prepared to accept this conclusion.

Finally, although the author's suggestions to deal more effectively with covert and overt aggression appear to be sensible, if not highly original, the question should be asked why so many of them have not already been carried out? How feasible are some of his suggestions? This is neither really analyzed nor evaluated in his study. Moreover, although his advice focuses on the U.S. military, perhaps greater attention should be paid to past problems the U.S. government has encountered in using its military. It may be that one of the more important obstacles to their effective use is that the American government is not entirely motivated and organized to use them well. This then might be another major constraint on the use of the military.

Despite certain limitations, this study does a fine job with an important and interesting subject. It deserves to be widely read and considered.

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Tom Baldy begins Battle for Ulster performing an interesting feat of academic gymnastics by reaching his conclusion in the first paragraph of the introduction. That is, he views "the British operation in the province
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as unique, not as an evolutionary step in Britain's counter-insurgency efforts refined in such areas as Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya and Aden, for it deliberately de-emphasizes, and at times contradicts classic counter-insurgency doctrine.” According to Baldy this contradiction is caused “by a British refusal to characterize the violence in Ireland [we assume he means Northern] as symptomatic of a genuine national liberation movement.” While the reader may be greatly interested how he came to these and other conclusions, the results are disappointing. Baldy does not cite any examples of “classic” counterinsurgency doctrine for comparison’s sake, nor does he examine the “evolutionary” post-1945 British Army experience or provide a definition of what he considers a “genuine national liberation movement”; we are required to take his word for his conclusions.

In the author's examination of the security situation he places great emphasis on the transfer of primacy in security affairs from the Army to the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the late 1970s and the accompanying policy of “criminalization,” under which all terrorist cases are dealt with through criminal courts, as being indicative of a deviance from “classic” counterinsurgency strategy. In addition, he relates that the current strategy of “maintaining law and order through a blending of the military, civil authority, and police, while seeking an accommodation through political initiatives” is somehow out of the mainstream of British practice. This, combined with a tendency to refer to the failure of the British to attain a “military” victory, exhibits what is perhaps a misunderstanding of the problem. Security forces do not ultimately win counterinsurgency campaigns. What they provide is the opportunity, within the structure of the law, for politicians to bring about a lasting solution. This was as true in the campaigns of the 1950s as it is in Northern Ireland. The emergencies in Malaya and Kenya were successfully managed over the long term because the majority of the populations affected decided that their best interests lay in supporting the government’s political plans. The security forces provided the opportunity through protection from, and defeat of, a violent minority. The absence of a workable political solution in Palestine, Cyprus and Aden, despite the military resources expended, resulted ultimately in unsuccessful campaigns. The British Army provided the opportunity in Northern Ireland, especially from August 1969 to early 1971, for progress to be made; the failure was a political one.

After a short venture into the question of internal security the majority of the book is taken up by a journalistic examination of the background to the current “troubles” and the various actors involved. At best, these sections shed a little new light on the situation in Northern Ireland either on a factual or interpretative level. At worst, they reveal the rather shallow nature of the research done by the author. He appears to have relied on newspaper articles and talking to his “street friends” to replace a more careful and critical examination of the flow of events since 1969. While his footnotes are numerous, they are usually without substance. For example, it is difficult to imagine how the rioting of August 1969, widely recognized as a critical event given the decade of
violence that followed, can be examined without even passing reference to the authoritative Scarman Report.

While identifying the important issues, Baldy often offers somewhat superficial answers to complex questions. One of many examples is found in the issue of Roman Catholics serving within the Ulster Defence Regiment. According to Baldy, attempts to increase Catholic representation on the force "are frustrated by peer pressure within the community."3 What he fails to mention is that this "peer pressure" often takes the form of assassination, usually when members are off-duty and therefore unarmed. Such was the case of Joseph Jardine, a Catholic member of the UDR, who was shot 41 times by three Provisional gunmen in 1971.4 It is a fact that many Roman Catholics left the UDR of their own free will, especially in late 1971 in protest to internment without trial, but not to mention as well the intimidation, by the Provisionals, of Catholics serving in the force does damage to the author’s credibility.

Baldy’s strong Republican bias is revealed throughout the book, both in his description of events and of the underlying motivation of the various groups involved. This has led the author to sometimes mistaken Republican myth for fact: for example, his acceptance that Provisional bomb attacks are "preceded by the IRA’s usual 40-minute warning."5 Even a casual examination of the evidence, such as the "Bloody Friday" bombings of 1972 or the recent attack in Enniskillen, would indicate otherwise. Predictably the author concludes that the answers to Northern Ireland’s political and security problems lead inevitably and irresistibly to the panacea of reunification.

In conclusion, although Baldy begins ambitiously, he diverts far too quickly to the well-worn path of reviewing the more obvious underlying problems of the Province and offering solutions. To take a step back from Northern Ireland and to analyze the 1969-87 period from a security perspective or to examine its relationship within the context of the British post-1945 experience is worthy of serious research. It requires, however, a mastery of the subject matter which Battle for Ulster fails to offer.

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Endnotes
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 89.