In addition to exploring the links between the Comintern and the CPSA, Dr. Campbell recounts in considerable detail the sequence of events from 1942 until 1956 during which the Soviets stationed diplomats in South Africa (but not vice versa). From there, the author goes on to explore the tactical use the U.S.S.R. has made of the United Nations when trying to outdo the African caucus in excoriating South Africa in the General Assembly, while also explaining the over-arching Soviet attitude toward that international organization.

Doubtless one of the most original contributions of the book is its exploration of parallel South African and Soviet marketing strategies for selected minerals, such as gold, diamonds, and platinum, and for karakul pelts from Namibia. Here Dr. Campbell takes issue with those who hold to the mineral denial school of thought, showing how both nations often tacitly bargain to keep their corners on the world markets, especially of diamonds. He sees the U.S.S.R. as a very skilled, yet pragmatic, economic operator which can rise above any ideological fetters and surmount the obstacles of consistency of behavior. Moreover, he provides a fascinating, yet altogether too brief, account of failed Soviet attempts at espionage in South Africa.

This, then, is a remarkably solid work which can rightly be regarded as a model of scholarship by which most other works in this field should be judged. The author is exceptionally qualified, having spent a year as an undergraduate exchange student at the State University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia. Subsequently, he became a Marshall Scholar, and this work is based on his doctoral dissertation at Brasenose College, Oxford, where he had been a student of the late Professor Hedley Bull. Dr. Campbell has been a Fellow at the Russian Research Center at Harvard and has visited both the Soviet Union and South Africa in the course of preparing this book. He has conducted extensive interviews in the U.S.S.R., South Africa, Namibia, and the U.K., and he has drawn upon a wide range of archival materials in South Africa, and a large number of official U.N., U.S., South African, and Comintern documents. Finally, the book contains an outstanding index and bibliography, along with thirty-two pages of carefully crafted endnotes. The organization is really superior, resting upon a cluster of six basic questions (on pp. 2 and 153) which inform the inquiry.

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Although there are numerous articles and books that deplore America's unwillingness or inability to use its military forces effectively in
Third World conflicts, there are an almost equal number of writings that denounce America’s military interventions in the Third World. Hosmer’s slim volume is distinctively different from these types of writings in that he does not applaud, excoriate, or debate America’s use of its military in the Third World. Instead, he focuses on the types of constraints American decision-makers have accepted on using military power in Third World conflicts since the end of World War II and on the possible future effects of these constraints on the military. The author rightly believes that the American government, military, and public ought to better understand the constraints so greater realism will enter their plans, expectations, and reactions. Moreover, better understanding these constraints in advance, the U.S. government not only will make more effective future use of its military but also be assisted in recognizing those conflict situations where the U.S. military should not be used at all.

The book is divided into two parts. The first two chapters of Part One describe the major constraints: 1) the avoidance of risks of a direct clash with the Soviet Union; 2) the avoidance of civilian casualties; 3) the limitation of American military casualties in order to maintain the support of U.S. public opinion for the continued use of the armed forces; 4) a strong desire to seek and be seen as seeking negotiated settlements to end speedily all conflicts on acceptable terms; and 5) the desire to accommodate the wishes and policies of other states, especially those of allies of America. Many examples of these constraints are given, the majority coming from the Korean and Vietnamese wars and the Cuban missile crisis. The third chapter of Part One discusses the effects of these constraints on the past use of the military and the extremely limited conditions under which they have been relaxed or ignored.

Part Two of the book examines aspects of the continuation of the constraints arising from the desire to avoid a direct clash with the Soviet Union in the Third World and the implications of the constraints for combating overt and covert aggression in the future. The subjects covered in Part Two are given less extensive treatment than those in Part One.

The book is tightly organized. Its chapter titles and sub-headings make it easy to follow the flow of the author’s points, and since the writing is clear and free of jargon, it is suitable for a large audience. This is desirable because the subject is as important as the findings are impressive. However, understandably, the study is far from the last word on the subject. Indeed, many matters that are related to the main subject are either lightly touched on or ignored so the reader both gains and loses by the book’s brevity and narrow focus.

The title itself is deceptive because the book is not about the full use of America’s political, economic, psychological, and moral as well as military resources to achieve its goals in the Third World. Instead, the study deals exclusively with the American armed forces, with no examination either of so-called “grand” strategy or of how the American military has been used with other resources to achieve national goals. In addition, the only conflicts examined at any length are those in which the
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U.S. used or threatened to use its armed forces in "combat." This not only omits many occasions in which the U.S. military was utilized as one of the tools of foreign policy but the single-minded focus on constraints also distracts the reader from the situations in which the American military was successful used. Surely, it is as important to understand the ways in which it has been used successfully as to concentrate on the constraints of its employment.

Beyond Hosmer's intent, but nevertheless of value, would be a comparison of the post-World War II constraints on the U.S. military in Third World conflicts with those on the militaries of other democracies of the era. How many of the constraints the author found were accepted by all of the governments? If one (or more) is unique in some way to the U.S., why is this so? How have the other governments dealt with their constraints? If they have been handled in different ways, perhaps the U.S. government can profit from the example of others. In short, the constraints need to be viewed from a more comparative perspective.

Although Hosmer describes the constraints well enough, he does not examine them in any depth; must the constraints always hold, as Hosmer claims they have in the past? As it is, the study for the most part seems to accept that the constraints of the past will continue to hold in the future. Without a far closer examination of the constraints, this reader is not prepared to accept this conclusion.

Finally, although the author's suggestions to deal more effectively with covert and overt aggression appear to be sensible, if not highly original, the question should be asked why so many of them have not already been carried out? How feasible are some of his suggestions? This is neither really analyzed nor evaluated in his study. Moreover, although his advice focuses on the U.S. military, perhaps greater attention should be paid to past problems the U.S. government has encountered in using its military. It may be that one of the more important obstacles to their effective use is that the American government is not entirely motivated and organized to use them well. This then might be another major constraint on the use of the military.

Despite certain limitations, this study does a fine job with an important and interesting subject. It deserves to be widely read and considered.

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Tom Baldy begins *Battle for Ulster* performing an interesting feat of academic gymnastics by reaching his conclusion in the first paragraph of the introduction. That is, he views "the British operation in the province