Soviet relations with South Africa have long been a favorite topic of discussion in strategic and conservative circles, especially in South Africa itself, where the subject has been institutionalized and has a vigorous life of its own. Indeed, in some ways this matter has formed the basic building block of South African foreign policy and military doctrine. Yet the two nations, although antagonists, do not know each other as well as they should, due, in some measure, to the absence of diplomatic relations between them. South African universities are not particularly well equipped to handle Russian language teaching, and the absence of a South African embassy in Moscow means that the South African foreign policy elite are dependent upon the diplomats and intelligence analysts of other Western and Commonwealth nations for first-hand data and impressions.

Kurt M. Campbell, who is currently a Fellow of the Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, has written a careful account of these relations over the past eighty-odd years since the second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. The Russians participated unofficially in that war as volunteers (for the Boers) and as official military observers, while the Tsarist Government was fascinated by any military or diplomatic enterprises which would sap the strength of the British empire. By 1905, however, its relations with Britain became far friendlier. Once the Union of South Africa was formed after the South African War, the Tsarist and Union Governments entered into diplomatic relations, but this ended with the November 1917 revolution. Until 1942 the two states did not exchange diplomatic envoys.

Through the Comintern, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took an interest in the affairs of both white and black South Africans, and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) emerged as the oldest party on the continent of Africa. Yet the Comintern and the CPSA were not as close as one might think, and in 1922 the Party supported the white workers' strike on the Witwatersrand, leaving the African members of the Party in the lurch. Then, six years later, the Comintern favored a Black Republic for South Africa. This zigzag path signified that the Comintern had left the South African Party to its own devices until 1928. Thereafter such laxity would not be permitted. Despite these twists and turns, the CPSA has been closely identified with non-racialism and with class-related concepts and slogans. It has resisted the appeals of the paramouncty of race, as has the Soviet Union, and its current London-based quarterly, *The African Communist*, continues to manipulate global, rather than exclusively majoritarian, symbols and to conduct its discourse in patently ideological language.
In addition to exploring the links between the Comintern and the CPSA, Dr. Campbell recounts in considerable detail the sequence of events from 1942 until 1956 during which the Soviets stationed diplomats in South Africa (but not vice versa). From there, the author goes on to explore the tactical use the U.S.S.R. has made of the United Nations when trying to outdo the African caucus in excoriating South Africa in the General Assembly, while also explaining the over-arching Soviet attitude toward that international organization.

Doubtless one of the most original contributions of the book is its exploration of parallel South African and Soviet marketing strategies for selected minerals, such as gold, diamonds, and platinum, and for karakul pelts from Namibia. Here Dr. Campbell takes issue with those who hold to the mineral denial school of thought, showing how both nations often tacitly bargain to keep their corners on the world markets, especially of diamonds. He sees the U.S.S.R. as a very skilled, yet pragmatic, economic operator which can rise above any ideological fetters and surmount the obstacles of consistency of behavior. Moreover, he provides a fascinating, yet altogether too brief, account of failed Soviet attempts at espionage in South Africa.

This, then, is a remarkably solid work which can rightly be regarded as a model of scholarship by which most other works in this field should be judged. The author is exceptionally qualified, having spent a year as an undergraduate exchange student at the State University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia. Subsequently, he became a Marshall Scholar, and this work is based on his doctoral dissertation at Brasenose College, Oxford, where he had been a student of the late Professor Hedley Bull. Dr. Campbell has been a Fellow at the Russian Research Center at Harvard and has visited both the Soviet Union and South Africa in the course of preparing this book. He has conducted extensive interviews in the U.S.S.R., South Africa, Namibia, and the U.K., and he has drawn upon a wide range of archival materials in South Africa, and a large number of official U.N., U.S., South African, and Comintern documents. Finally, the book contains an outstanding index and bibliography, along with thirty-two pages of carefully crafted endnotes. The organization is really superior, resting upon a cluster of six basic questions (on pp. 2 and 153) which inform the inquiry.

Richard Dale
Department of Political Science
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale


Although there are numerous articles and books that deplore America's unwillingness or inability to use its military forces effectively in