

Soviet Unconventional Conflict Policies and Strategies in the Third World

by
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INTRODUCTION

Since 1960, at least 82 major conflicts have traumatized the global community.¹ Most of these conflicts have occurred in the Third World, and in many cases, they may be described as "unconventional." "Unconventional conflict" is interpreted in this study to include low-intensity conflict (revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare) and certain special operations (namely, terrorism and counter-terrorism).²

Not surprisingly, the United States and the Soviet Union were frequently involved in these conflicts. The United States was involved directly in at least 22 major unconventional conflicts in the Third World between 1960 and 1987, and the Soviet Union participated in at least 25 during the same period.³ In at least eighteen instances, both the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in the same major conflict, almost always supporting different sides.⁴

Many additional "minor" conflicts have also taken place. If U.S. and Soviet involvement in "minor" unconventional conflicts in the Third World, such as U.S. support for the Bolivian government in its eventually successful effort to end Che Guevara's insurgency and Soviet support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in its effort to overthrow Oman's government, are included, the scope of superpower involvement in unconventional conflicts in the Third World far surpasses even those figures presented above.

Given the frequency of superpower involvement in unconventional Third World conflicts, it is understandable that many policy-makers and analysts in the West have sought to dissect and understand the forces that lead to and influence that involvement.⁵ This study follows in that tradition and seeks both to provide an understanding of Soviet conceptions of unconventional conflict in the Third World and to analyze actual Soviet policies and strategies in unconventional Third World conflicts.

SOVIET CONCEPTIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE THIRD WORLD

The Kremlin has been and remains extremely concerned about and interested in both U.S. and Soviet policies in the Third World, and about the role of both superpowers in conventional and unconventional conflict there.⁶ Unfortunately, however, any analysis of Soviet conceptions of unconventional conflict in the Third World is complicated by the simple fact that the Soviets reject "unconventional conflict" as an analytical tool. Further, they decry as unacceptable and misleading both "low-intensity conflict" (LIC) and "counter-terrorism," two of the major subsets of unconventional conflict. The reasons that the Kremlin takes these positions require further clarification.

Unconventional Conflict and "Neoglobalism"

To the Soviets, unconventional conflict, LIC, and counter-terrorism are all manifestations of the American strategy of "neoglobalism" that the U.S. allegedly adopted when the Reagan administration came to power in January 1981. Soviet analysts agree that the purpose of "neoglobalism" was and is straightforward, to foment "global counter-revolution."⁷ One Soviet source asserts that the U.S. effort to foment "global counter-revolution" via "neoglobalism" has three operational components: "classical counter-revolutionary operations," "an active battle against 'terrorism,' " and "prorevolutionary operations." The same source also maintains that "neoglobalism" preaches "military solutions to regional problems on a global scale."⁸

Some Soviet authorities tie "neoglobalism" directly to LIC. One Soviet analyst argues that "neoglobalism" "began its life as the pseudo-scientific theory of low-intensity conflict,"⁹ while another condemned low-intensity conflict as a concept that presupposes U.S. military interference in the Third World, supports counter-revolution, and demands U.S. intervention in and control over local military conflicts.¹⁰

"Neoglobalism" and LIC are not criticized in isolation; counter-terrorism also receives its share of abuse. Soviet spokesmen argue that the purpose of American counter-terrorist activities is to legitimize U.S. intervention into the affairs of others and to serve as a cover for U.S. state-supported terrorism. As part of this effort, Soviet spokesmen maintain that the United States has launched a "massive misinformation" campaign that attempts to link the U.S.S.R. to terrorism. The Kremlin of course asserts that the U.S.S.R. is a resolute foe of terrorism, and that it is the United States that supports terrorism. As evidence for this assertion, Soviet authorities point to U.S. support for the "Somoza bandits" in Nicaragua (the Contras), "dushman" in Afghanistan (the mujahadeen), and other groups that receive overt or covert U.S. assistance.¹¹

Taken together, then, both low-intensity conflict and counter-terrorism as they are practiced by the United States are heavily criticized and condemned by the Soviet Union; by implication, unconventional conflict is similarly derided. Indeed, other Soviet sources link these and other "interconnected and mutually complementary" aspects of contemporary U.S. foreign policy into a single system that has as its objective "to undermine socialism as a system."¹²

How is this American strategy implemented? Soviet analysts claim to perceive three distinct American activities: 1) spreading "falsehoods" about the Soviet Union; 2) bolstering anti-communist regimes with economic and military assistance; and 3) "stoking the fires of regional conflicts" with military, political, and economic pressure and blackmail.

The third activity, "stoking the fires of regional conflicts," in turn has six constituent elements: a) backing openly "anti-popular counter-revolutionary groups"; b) extending American covert actions against national liberation movements; c) re-establishing imperial control in newly-free countries; d) splitting the Non-Aligned Movement and destroying it

from within; e) undermining governments disliked by Washington; and f) preventing people from attaining their inalienable right to choose their own social system, friends, and allies.¹³

“Neoglobalism” is thus seen in the Kremlin as simply the latest rendition of American efforts dating back to the Truman Doctrine to establish American global hegemony. To the Soviets, U.S. foreign policy remains blatantly imperial and neocolonial, with neoglobalism and its constituent elements of unconventional conflict, low-intensity conflict, and counter-terrorism designed to maximize American opportunities for global intervention, minimize chances of conflict with the Soviet Union, and undermine the world socialist system.

As far as the Soviets are concerned, the United States does all this in the pursuit of profit and power. Lenin may have written *Imperialism—the Highest Stage of Capitalism* in 1916, but Soviet analysts of today have not strayed from his interpretation of the motive forces behind American—and other Western—foreign policies. Thus the Kremlin sees the United States as seeking, via neoglobalism and its constituent elements, to obtain a world-wide “military-political guarantee of free movement of capital.” To do this, Lenin’s heirs claim the United States seeks:

. . . attainment of military superiority by the U.S.A. over the U.S.S.R., strengthening of the system of military-political alliances, active use openly and covertly of force against revolutionary movements in the Third World, policies of “economic warfare,” and an ideological offensive against socialist countries under the slogan “democracy against totalitarianism.”¹⁴

Soviet Conceptions of Conflict in the Third World

Since the Soviets reject unconventional conflict, low-intensity conflict, and counter-terrorism as creations of American counter-revolution, how then do they assess and codify conflicts in the Third World?

To begin with, Soviet analysis of military conflict proceeds on two levels. The first level is socio-political; it is multi-dimensional, and includes a variety of political, economic, sociological, ideological, and military factors that are allegedly class-based. It is the more important of the two levels, for without proper and accurate socio-political analysis and policy, success at the second level is rendered more difficult or even impossible.

The second level is military-technical; it is concerned with the military character of given conflicts, with ways to prepare for conflicts, and with specific forms of military engagement.¹⁵ It is a critical level, but clearly subservient to the first.

With the stress that Marxist-Leninists place on class-based analysis of societal relationships, placing primary emphasis on socio-political analysis of conflict is not surprising. Neither is it surprising that Soviet codification systems of conflict have in their various iterations

emphasized the class content of war. For example, one of the most recent Soviet codifications of conflict and war, a 1982 study entitled *Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on War and the Army* identified four major types of war: 1) wars between opposing social systems; 2) wars between capitalist states; 3) wars between proletariat workers and monopoly bourgeois forces of reaction; and 4) wars between peoples struggling for independence and those imperial, colonial, and neocolonial forces seeking to suppress them.¹⁶ A year later, another Soviet analyst, Ye. Rybkin, asserted that a fifth type of war also existed, wars between developing states. (He originally made this assertion in 1968.) Importantly, Rybkin in his 1983 formulation asserted that wars between developing states were caused by traditional imperialist economics and politics, and by "local causes" that depended on the specific nature of the policies adopted by the rulers of developing states.¹⁷

Here, it is important to note that the Soviet Union remains a strong supporter at the declaratory level of the concept of "wars of national liberation" originally put forward by Nikita Khrushchev in 1960, even though such wars do not specifically appear in either the 1982 or 1983 typology.¹⁸ Rather, "wars of national liberation" were subsumed within *Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine's* categories three and four, and in Rybkin's fifth category.

Khrushchev's typology of "wars of national liberation" considered such conflicts "just" wars that pitted colonized peoples against an imperial or neocolonialist power, or against a repressive domestic government that exploited the people that it governed either on its own or at the behest of an external imperial or neocolonial power. Each of these types of "wars of national liberation" appeared in different form in the 1982 and 1983 typologies.

Additionally, Khrushchev visualized that imperial powers and their indigenous class allies in Third World states would seek to prevent national liberation movements from achieving victory by launching "local wars." Sometimes local wars would be launched by imperialists in reaction to national liberation efforts, and sometimes they would be initiated by imperialists to curtail national liberation activities before they began, but they would always be unjust. Local wars were particularly dangerous, the Soviets asserted, because they could escalate into wars between capitalist states and even wars between different social systems. Thus, even though local wars disappeared in the 1982 and 1983 typologies, they were essentially subsumed under category four.

It is evident, then, that the Soviets consider concepts such as unconventional conflict, low-intensity conflict, and counter-terrorism as subterfuges through which the ruling bourgeois class in the United States legitimizes its actions against revolutionary groups, national liberation movements, "progressive" governments, and other forward-thinking forces around the world. Soviet authorities frequently cite U.S. policies toward Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Libya, Nicaragua, Syria, and other Third World states as evidence of this U.S. offensive

against national liberation and social progress.¹⁹ Even General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has joined this Soviet chorus, as shown in his 1986 response to a question asked by a correspondent for the Algerian magazine *Revolution Africaine*:

The American administration has offered its embrace to the Afghan dushmen, bandits from UNITA in Angola, and to the South African racists . . . I do not doubt that if it were not for American interference in the internal affairs of other states regional conflicts would be on the wane and be solved in far simpler and more just ways.²⁰

Gorbachev's *Revolution Africaine* interview was not the only occasion that the Soviet General Secretary expressed this opinion. He offered a similar assessment during his March 30, 1987 dinner speech given during British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to Moscow:

. . . in the West there still are quite a few people with a penchant for talking about the freedom of choice. But they really mean the choice of the capitalist system. However, when this or that people—in Nicaragua, Africa, the Middle East, or Asia—actually reveals a desire to look for a different road of its own, which will suit it better, it finds its way immediately barred with dollars, missiles, or mercenaries. They start with hypocrisy and end with bloodshed.

As a result, the "volcanoes" of regional conflicts are fuming.²¹

According to Soviet arguments, the obverse is equally true: Soviet support for revolutionary groups and national liberation movements as well as all other anti-colonial states and "progressive" groups is completely legitimate because such groups are on the side of "social progress, national liberation, and peace." In some cases the Soviets even feel that it is legitimate to aid and support groups that the West defines as "terrorists" if those groups oppose what the Kremlin defines as imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism. The Soviets therefore decry responses taken against these groups by the U.S. or Western European states as counter-revolutionary reaction, not true and legitimate counter-terrorism. This is exactly how the Soviets responded after the U.S. forced down the Egyptian jet carrying the "Achille Lauro" hijackers and the U.S. raid on Libya in April 1986.²²

Thus, it is evident that U.S. and Soviet terminologies and outlooks frequently differ, that they differ for reasons of ideological and analytical preconception, and that although U.S. and Soviet leaders may sometimes use the same terms, they may mean completely different things and not even realize it.

This is a dangerous but not surprising situation. The misunderstanding that could flow from such confusion could heighten tension and the possibility of conflict between the two superpowers even when neither

side desires heightened tension or conflict. The rest of this study, then, is devoted to analyzing Soviet policies and strategies in unconventional conflicts in the Third World with the full realization that many Soviet analytical and operational constructs are considerably different from American ones.

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL LEVEL OF SOVIET POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

Soviet analysis of military conflict takes place on both socio-political and military-technical levels. The Soviets consider the socio-political level more fundamental than the military-technical level, for without a proper understanding of the "correlation of forces" at the socio-political level, it is more difficult or even impossible to develop correct military-technical policies and strategies.²³ Consequently this analysis of Soviet policies and strategies toward unconventional conflict in the Third World will begin at this level.

Importantly, at the socio-political level Soviet analysts stress the integration and coordination of political, sociological, economic, ideological, and military operations in the conduct of policy. This is true regardless of whether the issue at hand is revolution and national liberation, counter-revolution, or terrorism and counter-terrorism.

While ultimate policy responsibility resides in the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Kremlin's stress on integration and coordination of policy at the socio-political level means that several prominent Soviet agencies play roles in Soviet policy and strategy toward unconventional conflict in the Third World. The most prominent are the International Department of the CPSU, the KGB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense. The Kremlin also frequently relies on and collaborates with foreign communist parties, workers' parties, international front and progressive movements, and cultural societies to help it implement its policies and strategies; in most cases, the CPSU International Department oversees these relationships.²⁴

This integrated and coordinated multi-dimensional approach to the conduct of policy provides Soviet decision-makers with a variety of options from which to choose as they fashion policies and strategies toward Third World (and other) contingencies. In brief, Soviet policies and strategies toward unconventional conflicts are extremely flexible. This flexibility is significant enough to require separate examination of Soviet policies and strategies toward each of the three major manifestations of unconventional conflict examined here—revolution and national liberation, counter-revolution, and terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Revolution and National Liberation

Soviet declaratory positions have always firmly supported revolution and national liberation, and the U.S.S.R. even states in Article 28 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution that one of its foreign policy aims is to support "the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress."²⁵

It should therefore come as no surprise that the U.S.S.R. provided and provides extensive assistance of many types to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements around the world. Nevertheless, throughout its public declarations, the Kremlin argues that it *supports* revolution but does not *export* revolution. The dividing line between the two may be unclear in the West, but to the Kremlin, revolutions are the product of indigenous forces that the U.S.S.R. simply assists.

Soviet assistance to Third World revolution and national liberation comes in a variety of forms with diplomatic support in the international community, propaganda and disinformation (active measures), indirect military assistance via third countries, and direct military assistance being four of the most prominent. Each of these forms of assistance must be examined individually, even though they are most frequently used in combination.

Soviet diplomatic support to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements is often overlooked as a means of Soviet involvement in unconventional conflict because it frequently appears benign. Yet, it is an important part of Soviet strategies and policies because over time such efforts, if played out correctly, can add to the tangible and intangible strengths of revolutionary groups or national liberation movements. The National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLFSV), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the African National Congress (ANC) could all attest to that. All three—and other groups as well—have gained increased international, diplomatic and political credibility as a result of Soviet willingness to provide diplomatic support. On occasion, this greater credibility has also aided their efforts to acquire more concrete forms of aid from sources additional to Soviet and pro-Soviet states.

At the same time, the U.S.S.R. frequently maintains ties with non-ruling communist parties in Third World states. For example, in Central America alone the CPSU maintains close relations with Costa Rica's legal Popular Vanguard Party, Panama's legal People's Party of Panama, the illegal Guatemalan Party of Labor, the illegal Communist Party of El Salvador, and the illegal Honduran Communist Party.²⁶ One measure of the degree of closeness of Soviet relations with these parties could be found in January 1986 when a high-ranking CPSU Central Committee delegation journeyed to Panama to attend the Eighth People's Party of Panama Congress.²⁷ It is clear that the U.S.S.R. provides diplomatic support and ideological guidance to these and other Third World communist parties. Whether Soviet support extends to military and economic assistance is uncertain, but probable.

This does not mean that non-communist groups or movements that receive Soviet diplomatic support are necessarily either friends or allies of the U.S.S.R.; indeed, in many cases they are groups or movements pursuing nationalist or anti-repressive objectives that the Kremlin may, for its own purposes, find it advantageous to support. Chief among those purposes are ongoing Soviet efforts to expand the Kremlin's own

presence and influence in selected locations in the Third World and to reduce U.S. and Western presence and influence in the Third World wherever they may be found.²⁸

Nevertheless, in an operational sense, Soviet extension of diplomatic support is only one of several components of Soviet assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements engaged in unconventional conflict. Another component of Soviet assistance is Soviet propaganda and disinformation efforts on behalf of particular groups and movements.

Soviet global propoganda efforts are carried out primarily by Tass and Novosti, the two principal Soviet news agencies, both of which operate as instruments of the CPSU and the Soviet government. Tass maintains about 100 overseas offices, while Novosti maintains correspondents in 80 countries.

Frequently, Tass and Novosti serve as outlets for Soviet disinformation efforts. Usually Tass and Novosti repeat stories planted in pro-Soviet publications in the developing world and elsewhere in an effort to lend additional credibility to the planted story. These disinformation efforts are one aspect of Soviet "active measures," and are reportedly run by the First Directorate of the KGB and coordinated by the CPSU's International Department. The First Directorate operates a global program of falsified news reports designed to undermine the credibility of "enemies" of the Soviet state and further Soviet foreign policy objectives. Frequently, First Directorate activities are directed toward Third World states where revolutionary activity is taking place or where unrest that could lead to "national liberation"—and not coincidentally anti-Americanism—can be fomented. Thus, in the 1980s alone the First Directorate has issued false stories that the United States would deploy cruise missiles in South Africa (November 1982) and that the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations had delivered a speech highly critical of India (February 1983). It also forged documents that implicated the United States in a plot against the Rawlings government in Ghana (March 1983) and forged U.S. Embassy letters in Nigeria showing that the U.S. ambassador ordered the assassination of a Nigerian presidential candidate (April 1983).²⁹ More recently, in 1985 and 1986 the First Directorate planted stories around the world that AIDS was the result of a Pentagon bacteriological warfare experiment that had run out of control, and that the deadly AIDS virus was spread primarily by American servicemen. In 1988, Soviet media began playing the story that American adoption agencies had bought babies in Central America to be brought to the United States for the express purpose of killing them and using their organs for organ transplants. These Soviet propaganda and disinformation efforts are rendered more effective than they might otherwise be since they are frequently scattered in with easily verifiable stories.

Soviet propaganda and disinformation seeks less to influence the immediate revolutionary or military climate than to prepare the groundwork for future alterations of the "correlation of forces." On occasion, specific groups or movements may have been identified as the hoped-for

beneficiaries of future alterations of the "correlation of forces," but on other occasions the Kremlin is equally content to undermine whatever levels of U.S. or Western influence may exist without a specific beneficiary in mind. The Kremlin's thinking is nevertheless straightforward: a revolutionary climate may not presently exist in a given country, but propaganda and disinformation could over time increase levels of public disenchantment and increase the possibility of revolution. Thus, propaganda and disinformation must be considered a tool of unconventional conflict that the Kremlin uses in support of revolution and national liberation.

Disinformation is only one component of "active measures." "Active measures" also includes sabotage, "wet operations" (assassinations), and related activities. The Kremlin prefers to tender training, intelligence, and limited operational support to those revolutionary groups and national liberation movements that it favors in regard to these activities, but it is assumed that the Kremlin's own agents also participate in "active measures" in Third World states during especially sensitive operations. As is the case with propaganda and disinformation, more violent forms of "active measures" must also be considered a tool of Soviet unconventional conflict policies and strategies.

Indirect Soviet military assistance via third countries is another component of Soviet policies and strategies. Cuba has been and remains a favorite Soviet conduit of assistance whether via transshipment or direct Cuban involvement; it is well-documented that Soviet arms reached El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) via Cuba and Nicaragua,³⁰ and Cuban troops originally arrived in Angola to support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) before the MPLA formed a functioning government. They remain there today. Further, the Kremlin frequently coordinates provision of military assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements with its Eastern European allies.³¹

Of course, whenever military assistance via third countries is considered, the possibility exists that third countries transfer weapons to the end user without approval of the original provider. Thus, some room for uncertainty may be present. Nevertheless, when Soviet arms find their way to the FMLN in El Salvador via Cuba and Nicaragua, to insurgent forces in Chad and the Sudan via Libya, and to rebels in Zaire via Angola, the pattern is pronounced enough to argue that, at a minimum, the Kremlin understands that such transfers will be made even if it does not formally approve them.

However, it is direct Soviet military assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements that is the Kremlin's most effective tool in promoting revolution and national liberation. Unfortunately, no figures are available on the absolute level of Soviet assistance to these groups and movements, but one measure of the level of assistance may be the scope of assistance; in Africa alone, the Kremlin has provided arms directly to national liberation movements as diverse as the FLN in Algeria, the MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique,

PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and to a lesser degree ZAPU in Zimbabwe. All later became ruling parties. It is currently tendering direct assistance to SWAPO in Namibia, the ANC in South Africa, the Somali National Salvation Front and several other groups, and Soviet military assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements is not limited to Africa.³²

Despite this, absolute levels of Soviet military assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements has been small, at least in comparison to the levels of assistance that the U.S.S.R. extends to such groups and movements once they attain power. Thus, while Gorbachev's claim that the U.S.S.R. is "firmly convinced that 'pushing' revolution from outside, especially by military means, is futile and impermissible" is demonstrably an overstatement,³³ neither may it be claimed that the U.S.S.R. frequently provides large-scale military assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements.

It must also be recognized that in true Leninist form, a small hard core of dedicated revolutionaries may be all that is needed to foment unrest, paralyze a government, and precipitate a revolution. Indeed, it was on this basis that Lenin pursued revolution in the Russia of the Provisional Government. Thus, revolutionary groups and national liberation movements may not need many weapons as far as the Soviets are concerned; equally plausible, the Soviets may believe that large-scale military assistance to such groups and movements may precipitate extensive U.S. and other Western responses.

The Soviets also on occasion support negotiations as an adjunct to armed struggle. For example, the Soviets approved of the Geneva Agreements that ended the Franco-Vietminh conflict in 1954,³⁴ and they also supported the 1974 accords that temporarily established a transitional government in Angola.³⁵ Additionally, the Soviets have continually sought an international conference on the Middle East, one task of which would be to address PLO interests,³⁶ and the Kremlin played a major role in negotiations on southern Africa during 1987 and 1988.

However, the Kremlin's support for negotiations in revolutionary situations has not been universal. The Soviets, in the past, did not favor negotiations on southern Africa, undoubtedly because of the perceived "correlation of forces" that exists there. Neither are they enamored of the occasional possibility of negotiations in El Salvador. As well, the Soviets were extremely skeptical about the negotiations that led to independence for Zimbabwe. In the case of Zimbabwe Soviet sources even predicted that "a fierce political struggle" would erupt after independence.³⁷ In sum, then, it is evident that the U.S.S.R. sees negotiations as a tool to be used as individual situations warrant in support of revolutionary groups and national liberation movements.

What, then, is the record of Soviet support to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements in Third World unconventional conflicts? Clearly, the Kremlin hopes that via diplomatic support, propaganda, disinformation, and other "active measures" the groundwork may

be set for future revolutions. At the same time, these policy tools are useful to strengthen ongoing revolutions. Additionally, the Kremlin provides direct and indirect military assistance to established revolutionary groups and movements, though only rarely does the U.S.S.R. provide large quantities of tangible direct or indirect assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements before they seize power. The case of Cuban assistance to the MPLA in Angola before the MPLA obtained power is perhaps the most significant exception. Rather, the Kremlin waits to provide large quantities of tangible direct or indirect assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements until after they have seized power. Even so, it must be stressed that in revolutionary situations provision of small quantities of assistance may be enough to swing the tide of struggle.

Counter-Revolution

The Kremlin does not limit its role in unconventional conflicts to supporting revolutionary groups and national liberation movements. In recent years it has found itself increasingly involved in opposing what it calls "counter-revolution." This is a relatively recent phenomenon, but for understandable reasons. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Kremlin in some respects was in an advantageous position regarding its relations with the Third World. With no allies and few friends in the Third World, the Kremlin could freely criticize Western policies and help breed and support revolution with few threats to its own interests and positions. In several cases where the U.S.S.R. did develop friendships with Third World leaders, those leaders were overthrown. For example, Indonesia's Sukarno, a one-time Soviet friend who drifted toward China, was removed from power in 1965; Ben Bella lost his presidency in Algeria in the same year; Nkrumah was ousted in Ghana in 1966; and Keita was overthrown in Mali in 1968.

This situation changed during the 1970s. By the end of that decade, the U.S.S.R. had developed an extensive network of interests and positions throughout the Third World. These interests and positions were reflected by the system of 10 Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation that the Kremlin by 1980 had concluded with Third World states,³⁸ by the Kremlin's far-flung program of economic assistance,³⁹ by its even more widely-distributed and much more sizeable military aid program,⁴⁰ and by its developing force projection capabilities.⁴¹

This was a categorically new situation for the Soviet Union in the Third World, accompanied by new experiences, most notably the outbreak and continuation of low-intensity conflict against Soviet friends, clients, and allies in the Third World.⁴² By 1982, at least six different unconventional conflicts raged in the Third World states or underdeveloped socialist states closely aligned with the U.S.S.R.: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Nicaragua. To the Soviets, these were all "counter-revolutionary" wars fueled by internal forces of reaction and external counter-revolutionary forces headed by the United States. Nevertheless the U.S.S.R. had to respond.

Respond it did. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union sent in its own military forces to try to stem the "counter-revolutionary" tide. In Angola and Ethiopia, Cuban forces fought and continue to fight against local rebels; the Cubans are aided by East German, Czech, and other Eastern European advisers, and arms are provided by the Soviets. In Ethiopia, at least some military operations have been planned by Soviet generals. In Cambodia, Vietnamese occupation is greatly abetted by Soviet assistance; one Soviet military attache even proclaimed that the Kremlin "controlled every drop of fuel used by the Vietnamese in Cambodia."⁴³ In Nicaragua, after a slow start, the Kremlin pumped in over \$1 billion of military assistance by 1987; Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern European military and paramilitary advisers were also present, but few agreed about how large a presence they maintained.⁴⁴ Only in Mozambique did the Kremlin show hesitancy to come to grips fully with counter-revolutionary" challenges to its friends, allies, and clients in the Third World.⁴⁵

But here, it must be emphatically pointed out that under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union on occasion has evidenced a greater restraint than previously seen in its provision of support to friendly states fighting counter-revolutionary forces. The Kremlin decided to withdraw from Afghanistan; proved instrumental in the movement toward accommodation in southern Africa; and applied pressure on Vietnam to accelerate its withdrawal from Cambodia. Thus, under Gorbachev, the U.S.S.R. in some instances has proved more cautious in the willingness to oppose "counter-revolution."

Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the Soviet Union's willingness to provide military assistance to its friends, allies, and clients in Third World states. One measure of that willingness is the presence of Soviet and Eastern European military advisers and technicians in Third World states. As Table 1 shows, most Soviet and Eastern European military advisers and technicians in the Third World are in "socialist-path" states, that is, those states that the Kremlin believes are most likely eventually to join the communist world.⁴⁶ At the same time, most Soviet and Eastern European military advisers and technicians are concentrated in socialist-path states that are experiencing unconventional conflicts. Thus, 88 percent of all Soviet and Eastern European military advisers in the Third World in 1985 were in socialist-path states, and 37 percent of all Soviet and Eastern European military advisers in the Third World in 1985 were in socialist-path states that were experiencing unconventional conflicts.

Soviet responses to "counter-revolution" go beyond provision of direct and indirect military assistance. In all cases, the Soviets pursue programs of international diplomatic support for the beleaguered regimes, and in all cases, international propaganda and disinformation campaigns are implemented as well. In many cases, these efforts are directed as much at swaying public opinion in the United States and Western Europe to oppose aid to "counter-revolutionary" groups as at building support within threatened Third World states for the "revolutionary" regime.⁴⁷ Other than this broadened focus, Soviet diplomatic

Table 1. Soviet and Eastern European Military Advisers and Technicians in Third World Socialist-Path States and in Third World Socialist-Path States Fighting Unconventional Conflicts—1985

<u>Socialist-Path States¹</u>	<u>Soviet and Eastern European Military Advisers and Technicians in Country, 1985</u>
Afghanistan ^{2,3}	2,025
Algeria	615
Angola ²	1,050
Congo	70
Ethiopia ²	2,600
Guinea-Bissau	85
Iraq	1,300
Libya	3,300
Madagascar	75
Mali	50
Mozambique ²	950
Nicaragua ²	160
North Yemen	310
Sao Tome/Principe	150
South Yemen	1,100
Syria	2,300
Tanzania	90
Total Military Advisers/Technicians Presence in Socialist-Path States	16,230
Total Military Advisers/Technicians Presence in Socialist-Path States Fighting Unconventional Conflicts	6,785
Total Military Advisers/Technicians Presence in Third World	18,375

¹Only those socialist-path states for which figures are available are listed

²Socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts

³Soviet combat troops are not included

SOURCE: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986*, pp. 124-125.

support, propaganda and disinformation, and other "active measures" in opposition to counter-revolution are quite similar to the same Soviet activities supporting revolutionary groups and national liberation movements described earlier.

Additionally, the Kremlin provides economic assistance to its friends, allies, and clients in the Third World as they attempt to create "a society of a new kind." This assistance goes to many Third World states, not just to those threatened by "counter-revolution" or those that the Kremlin chooses to define as "socialist-path."

Nonetheless, the U.S.S.R. clearly targets this assistance at particular states. Fifty percent of all Soviet economic assistance to Third World states in 1984 and 1985 went to socialist-path states; 25 percent of all Soviet economic aid in the same years went to socialist-path states that were embroiled in unconventional conflicts. If Soviet economic aid to Vietnam is included (slightly over \$1 billion per year for 1984 and 1985) as a result of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, these percentages move upward to 65 percent and 47 percent, respectively. (See Table 2.)

Table 2. Soviet Economic Assistance to Socialist-Path States and to Socialist-Path States Fighting Unconventional Conflicts, 1984-85 in Millions of U.S. Dollars

Socialist-Path States ¹	Economic Assistance Extended		
	1984	1985	TOTAL
Afghanistan ²	237	325	562
Algeria	x	340	340
Ethiopia ²	276	x	276
Mali	15	x	15
Nicaragua ²	~200	~200	~400
Syria	820	x	820
Total Economic Assistance to Socialist-Path States	1,548	865	2,413
Total Economic Assistance to Socialist-Path States Fighting Unconventional Conflicts	713	525	1,238
Total Economic Assistance to Third World States	2,482	2,390	4,872

¹Only those socialist-path states for which figures are available are listed

²Socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts

SOURCE: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986*, pp. 112-113.

In part the presence of Soviet and Eastern European economic advisers and technicians in Third World states follows this pattern, as Table 3 shows. Thus, in 1985, 81 percent of all Soviet and Eastern European economic advisers and technicians in the Third World were in socialist-path states. However, only 8 percent of all Soviet and Eastern Europe economic advisers and technicians in the Third World were in socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts. The significant reduction in the percentage of advisers and technicians in socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts as compared to the percentage in socialist-path states may reflect both Soviet emphasis on military solutions in such states and Soviet hesitancy to introduce civilians to locations of conflict.

The Soviets also provide extensive ideological guidance and programmatic direction to their friends, allies, and clients who are fighting "counter-revolution." The CPSU has concluded party-to-party agreements with ruling parties in practically every socialist-path state,⁴⁸ and in at least two cases, in Afghanistan and Ethiopia, evidence suggests that the Kremlin has laid out details for how the "new society" will be structured.⁴⁹ These efforts to provide ideological guidance and programmatic direction are accompanied by a wide range of educational, scientific, cultural, and other contacts.⁵⁰

As in the case of economic assistance, Soviet provision of ideological guidance and programmatic direction does not go only to Third World socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts. It goes to other socialist-path states as well, especially those headed by "vanguard parties" at the forefront of revolutionary change.⁵¹ Both guidance and direction are part of a broader and more comprehensive set of Soviet policies in the Third World.

Even so, their role in the struggle against "counter-revolution" can neither be overlooked nor dismissed. The Kremlin sees efforts to institutionalize revolutionary changes in society not only as tools with which to bring about social progress, but also tools with which to combat "counter-revolution." It is therefore both useful and important to note that at the Twenty Sixth CPSU Congress in 1981, the Soviets laid out the details of how they defined socialist-path states. To the Soviets, socialist-path states are those countries where: 1) imperialist monopolies are gradually being weeded out; 2) feudal lords and "big local bourgeoisie" are being eliminated over time; 3) foreign capital activity (but *not* necessarily foreign capital) is being restricted; 4) the "people's state" is taking over major economic sectors; 5) a transition to planned development is taking place; 6) agricultural cooperatives are being encouraged; 7) the "role of the working people in public affairs" is increasing; 8) the state apparatus is being strengthened with "national cadre loyal to the people" acquiring positions of authority; 9) anti-imperialist foreign policies are being pursued; and 10) revolutionary parties are working for the masses.⁵²

Indeed, in many socialist-path states, a number of these reforms are in fact being institutionalized. Yet one of the supreme ironies of modern

Table 3. Soviet and Eastern European Economic Advisers and Technicians in Third World Socialist-Path States Fighting Unconventional Conflicts, 1985

<u>Socialist-Path States¹</u>	<u>Soviet & Eastern European Economic Advisers & Technicians in Country, 1985</u>
Afghanistan ²	5,225
Algeria	17,150
Angola ²	2,475
Congo	2,350
Guinea-Bissau	210
Iraq	15,626
Libya	44,000
Madagascar	170
Mali	505
Mozambique ²	1,400
Nicaragua ²	695
North Yemen	650
Sao Tome/Principe	150
South Yemen	3,250
Syria	5,500
Tanzania	110
Total Economic Advisers/Technicians Presence in Socialist/Path States	99,465
Total Economic Advisers/Technicians Presence in Socialist-Path States Fighting Unconventional Conflicts	9,795
Total Economic Advisers/Technicians Presence in Third World	122,745

¹Only those socialist-path states for which figures are available

²Socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts

SOURCE: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986*, pp. 124-125.

Marxism-Leninism is that while these efforts to create a "new society" may be applauded by the U.S.S.R. and are seen by the U.S.S.R. as a way to prevent counter-revolution, these efforts to "restructure" society are, in several countries, the major impetus behind "counter-revolution." This is especially true in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.

For the Kremlin, then, ideological guidance and programmatic direction is a two-edged sword that must be used very carefully in the U.S.S.R.'s efforts to combat counter-revolution. On the one hand, it may be an effective tool over time as the control of a "vanguard party" becomes more pervasive in a particular country; on the other hand, to move too quickly with plans to create a socialist-path state and thereby eliminate "counter-revolution" could foment the very "counter-revolution" that the U.S.S.R. and its friend/ally/client seek to avoid.

What, then, is the record of Soviet support for socialist-path states fighting unconventional conflicts against "counter-revolution?" It is evident that the U.S.S.R. approaches "counter-revolution" as part of broader strategies toward the Third World and more particularly socialist-path states in the Third World. At the same time there is evidence that the U.S.S.R. in its military and economic assistance programs places a proportionately larger share of emphasis on programs to those socialist-path states that are fighting unconventional conflicts. The same is true for military adviser and technician presence, but not for economic adviser and technician presence.

Further, the broadly-based nature of Soviet support for "counter-revolutionary" efforts on the part of socialist-path states cannot be separated in any "neat" manner from Soviet support for "restructuring" society in socialist-path states. This is an important point, for it is often argued in the West that Western support for "counter-revolutionary" groups strengthens the ties of socialist-path states with the U.S.S.R.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to that observation. However, on the basis of evidence presented here and elsewhere,³ two other conclusions are more warranted and less debatable. First, the presence of unconventional conflict in a socialist-path state enhances the military content of an already-existing broad range of contacts between the socialist-path state and the U.S.S.R. Second, the presence of unconventional conflict in a socialist-path state accelerates the strengthening of ties between the socialist-path state and the U.S.S.R. across the board, ties that the Kremlin believes would probably strengthen even in the absence of conflict.

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

Little can be added at the socio-political level concerning Soviet support for and opposition to terrorism and counter-terrorism. As discussed earlier, the U.S.S.R. and the United States begin their analyses from significantly different points of departure. As far as the Kremlin is concerned, if the U.S.S.R. identifies a particular body as a revolutionary group or a national liberation movement, then many steps that that body

takes in support of revolution or national liberation are by definition not terrorist. Conversely, steps that the U.S. and other Western states take in opposition to such groups are state-supported terrorist actions.

The Soviet Union's declaratory perspective on terrorism and on many aspects of what the West would describe as counter-terrorism was put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Twenty Seventh Congress of the CPSU in February 1986. "The U.S.S.R. rejects terrorism in principle," the General Secretary declared, "and is willing to cooperate actively with other states to eradicate it."⁵⁴ However, Gorbachev's views on what constituted terrorism were somewhat broader than those generally accepted in the West:

Undeclared wars, the exporting of counterrevolution in all its forms, political assassinations, the taking of hostages, airplane hijacking, explosions in the streets, at airports and railway stations—this is the disgusting face of terrorism, which its sponsors try to cover with various sorts of cynical fabrications.⁵⁵

Gorbachev thus artfully linked "explosions in the streets" and "airplane hijacking," as well as other forms of violence commonly viewed in the West as terrorism, with "exporting of counterrevolution" and "undeclared wars," two terms which the U.S.S.R. uses for U.S. and Western support of rebels in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Obviously, significantly different perspectives on terrorism and counter-terrorism exist in the Kremlin and the U.S.

Disagreement abounds in policy as well. The U.S.S.R. frequently extends diplomatic and propaganda support to groups as varied as the PLO, the IRA, and the ANC. It also offers them training and logistics support, and on occasion may provide limited military assistance and intelligence information as well.⁵⁶ Such support is frequently difficult to trace; nevertheless, it does occur. The Kremlin's reason for rendering support is straightforward: these groups, and others, are seen as national liberation movements—not terrorists.

Soviet opposition to some forms of Western counter-terrorist activity is undertaken on a similar pretext. To the Soviets, much Western counter-terrorist activity is actually opposition to national liberation, a cover for the expansion of Western influence and intrusion of military forces, and counter-revolution.⁵⁷ Despite the U.S.S.R.'s vehement rhetoric, however, the Kremlin has undertaken no publicly known concrete actions to counter activities that the West defines as counter-terrorist.

THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL LEVEL OF SOVIET POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

The Kremlin's insistence on the correctness of a broad socio-political approach to unconventional conflict in the Third World should not overshadow the fact that in all three areas under discussion—support for revolution and national liberation, opposition to counter-revolution,

and a middle-ground approach to terrorism and counter-terrorism—Soviet policies and strategies contain an extensive military-technical component.

This is neither surprising nor new. It is not surprising since it is in keeping with the Soviet Union's two-level approach to conflict; it is not new since the Soviet Union has been extensively involved in all three areas since at least the 1920s. For example, the Soviet Union through the Comintern sent Michael Borodin to Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang forces to give them military advice and training in support of revolution and national liberation during the 1920s. Similarly, the Red Army fought unconventional "counter-revolutionary" conflicts in the Tambov campaign (1920-24) and Basmachi war (mid-1920s-1941).⁵⁴ Finally, the U.S.S.R., again through the Comintern, had extensive links to communist parties around the world during the 1920s, at least several of which actively engaged in terrorist activities during the decade.

Here, however, the emphasis is not on military-technical activities in unconventional conflict during the 1920s, but during the 1980s. If a single word may be used to describe the Soviet military actions across the spectrum of unconventional conflict in the 1980s, that word is "flexibility."

Revolution and National Liberation

The U.S.S.R. is extremely cautious in its provision of military-technical assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements. It rarely if ever introduces its own personnel to the country or region where revolution is taking place, and generally provides only limited quantities of older military equipment to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements.

This caution probably stems from two sources. First, the outcomes of many revolutionary situations are usually in doubt for long periods of time. Thus, the Kremlin probably does not wish to become too closely involved with groups that may not succeed. Second, the U.S.S.R. probably seeks to minimize its own involvement to lessen the chances of U.S. and Western reaction. Even the large-scale Soviet support to the MPLA before it acquired the full reins of government did not imply Soviet abandonment of caution since the U.S. at the time of the Soviet/Cuban effort was in the depths of its "Vietnam hangover."

Nevertheless, Soviet caution does not imply lack of involvement. Fighters from the PLO, SWAPO, ANC, and several Eritrean movements have all received military training in the U.S.S.R., as did guerrillas from the FLN and MPLA before those movements became ruling governments. Other examples also exist. This training included weapons' use and maintenance, rudimentary field tactics, and discipline. It is probable that at least some revolutionary officers receive training in large unit tactics and military strategy, but little definite proof exists of this.⁵⁵

The Kremlin also provides indirect military-technical assistance to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements via third countries. SWAPO and the ANC both train in Angola, and a variety of Latin

American and African groups and movements train in Cuba. Eastern European states have also helped train revolutionary groups and national liberation movements as well.⁶⁰

Two additional key points must be made. First, the vast majority of guerrillas receive no training in the Soviet Union or third countries. They may be equipped with Soviet arms, but they have no direct exposure to Soviet or third country methods and personnel. Second, despite Soviet provision of limited training and equipment, and possibly because of the limited exposure of most guerrilla fighters to Soviet or third country methods and personnel, the Kremlin's emphasis remains on assuring the political reliability of the leadership of the various revolutionary groups and national liberation movements that it assists.

This does not mean that the U.S.S.R. itself is necessarily "loyal" to those groups and movements that it assists. Yassir Arafat could attest to that,⁶¹ as could the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and other Eritrean groups formerly friendly with the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and Eastern European states. The Eritrean case is particularly instructive in that once Mengistu Háile-Mariam's ruling Dergue evidenced pro-Soviet sympathies, the Soviets and their allies reclassified the ELF, moving it from the "revolutionary" to the "counter-revolutionary" category. This of course changed the ELF's attitude toward the U.S.S.R. and Cuba. In the words of one ELF officer who was trained in Cuba, "All my feelings about Cuba have changed. I hate them, and the Russians, too."⁶²

In sum, then, Soviet military-technical assistance to and support of revolutionary groups and national liberation movements may be easily encapsulated. First, it is for the most part limited. On rare occasions, most notably Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA in Angola before the MPLA established a ruling government, exceptions do exist. Generally, however, it is limited. Second, it is cautious, and allows "revolution" and "liberation" to proceed at its own pace. The Kremlin is not known to have urged Third World revolutionaries to move faster than they prefer; on occasion, the Kremlin has urged them to proceed more cautiously. Third, it is flexible, and changes as conditions warrant. The U.S.S.R. follows no apparent set guidelines in its provision of military-technical assistance and support, but responds to situations in a case-by-case manner.

Taken together, limitations, caution, and flexibility allow the Kremlin to claim that the U.S.S.R. supports revolution and national liberation but does not export revolutions and national liberation. Such arguments may be specious in the West, but to Soviet Marxist-Leninists they are probably both legitimate and persuasive.

Counter-Revolution

The degree of Soviet military-technical involvement with unconventional conflict escalates noticeably in those states where "socialist-path" governments are battling "counter-revolution." Soviet military-technical efforts to combat "counter-revolution" are rarely limited. Neither may they in general terms be described as cautious. Seldom they

are demonstrably as flexible as, and possibly even more flexible than, Soviet military-technical efforts to assist and support revolutionary groups and national liberation movements.

The Soviet Union, Cuba, and Eastern European states play major roles in training, equipping, and organizing the armed forces of Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. Training takes place both in the communist countries and the Third World states, and is frequently pervasive. One measure of the pervasiveness of Soviet training is that the Kremlin has seen fit in certain crucial Third World states to attach advisers to military units down to the battalion level.⁶³ The tactics taught are frequently variations of Soviet tactics adapted for local conditions. As demonstrated earlier, the flow of military assistance from the Soviet Union to socialist-path states fighting "counter-revolution" goes up noticeably as well. Further, in Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia, Soviet officers on occasion allegedly have planned military campaigns for indigenous forces against the "counter-revolutionaries."

Soviet commitment to the struggle against "counter-revolution" is thus evident, and the U.S.S.R. correspondingly abandons not only the limited role evident in its support for revolution and national liberation but also a portion of its caution. However, this does not mean that the Kremlin abandons all caution. For example, the Soviet Union provides very carefully selected types and quantities of military support to Nicaragua in an effort to avoid eliciting an American response. Nicaragua has not received MiGs,⁶⁴ nor have high-level Soviet military delegations overtly visited Managua.⁶⁵ The Kremlin also has been careful to keep the number of its military advisers low. Even the quantity of military assistance sent—estimates range as high as \$1 billion—is less imposing once it is realized that that assistance took place over seven years. Commitment is evident, but caution remains.

Even in the case where the Kremlin exhibited the least caution in providing its own forces to oppose "counter-revolution," that is, in Afghanistan, its careful use of rhetoric and terminology allowed it to reverse policies with few adverse consequences. While many Soviet and non-Soviets alike agree that the Kremlin did not achieve its objectives in Afghanistan, the Soviets have officially declared that their "internationalist responsibilities" have been fulfilled and they can withdraw. More skeptical Soviet observers explain the withdrawal as the inevitable result of incorrect analysis by the Brezhnev regime of the "socio-political climate" that prevailed in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Regardless of which explanation is accurate, the end result was the same—the Soviets felt able to begin force reductions.

The Soviet Union's policy reversal in Afghanistan clearly shows that even in its assistance to socialist-path states battling counter-revolution, it retains all the flexibility it exhibits in its assistance to and support of revolutionary groups and national liberation movements. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union for all practical purposes has controlled not only its own forces but also the Afghan military; the Soviet Union's

involvement has been total. In Angola and Ethiopia, the Soviet Union provides almost all the military equipment for the indigenous government, plans some military operations, cooperates extensively with Cuba and Eastern European states in training, and leaves the actual "counter-revolutionary" fighting to Cuban and local armed forces. In Cambodia, the U.S.S.R. again provides almost all the military arms, but planning, training, and fighting are done primarily by the Vietnamese. In Nicaragua, the U.S.S.R. provides much of the equipment, cooperates with Cuba and Eastern Europe in extending training but only at a low-to-moderate level, apparently does little in the planning of operations, and refrains from fighting. In Mozambique, the U.S.S.R. provides little equipment, training, or planning, and again does none of the fighting. From country to country, then, Soviet military-technical attempts to combat "counter-revolution" vary widely. Flexibility appears the order of the day.

Flexibility also is evident in Soviet military-technical efforts to combat "counter-revolution" in individual countries. Afghanistan provides the best example. During its first year of occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union used large formations in its fight against the mujahadeen. This approach failed as the mujahadeen employed hit-and-run tactics against the Soviets. In late 1980 and throughout 1981, the Kremlin turned to a temporary defensive strategy, maintaining control over cities and towns, roads, military facilities communications sites, and other transportation arteries. Control of outlying areas was left to Afghanistan's own ineffective army. The change in Soviet strategy was dictated by: failure of the Kremlin's large formation strategy; major uprisings in Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Sorubi, and Aybak; and mujahadeen attacks on Soviet logistics. In 1982 and 1983 the Soviets increased their use of helicopters and by 1984 had begun to employ high altitude carpet bombing attacks. The U.S.S.R. in 1984 also started to attack civilian targets in areas of strong resistance, and used large conventional units and small special units in guerrilla-style operations. In 1985 and 1986, the Soviets conducted sweeps near the Iranian and Pakistani borders in an effort to close mujahadeen supply routes out of those countries. Collectively, Soviet efforts have been categorized as "intimidation and genocide," "reprisals," "subversion," and "military forays." Soviet military tactics included aerial warfare, sweep-and-destroy missions, encirclement efforts, airborne strikes, increased use of light infantry, convoying techniques, defoliation, and use of the Afghan army.⁶⁶ Throughout these changes, the Kremlin continued to use special purpose forces (SPETSNAZ) to great effect.⁶⁷

Despite its insistence on flexibility, the Soviet Union has had no great success with its efforts to combat "counter-revolution" in socialist-path states. Part of the reason for this is the external support that the U.S. and other states have provided anti-Soviet and anti-"socialist-path" revolutionaries. An even larger part of the reason is the old maxim of guerrilla warfare that guerrillas win by not losing and that those fighting guerrillas lose by not winning. For the present, despite its flexible approach, the Kremlin fits into the latter category, as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan well illustrates.

But the U.S.S.R. does have certain advantages that over time could prove important in its efforts to combat "counter-revolution." First, there is little meaningful domestic opposition in the U.S.S.R. when the Kremlin decides to fight a war against "counter-revolution." Second, the Soviet Union has extensive patience; it remained in Afghanistan for over eight years, and has supported Cuban troops in Angola for over thirteen years and in Ethiopia for more than eleven years. Finally, the Kremlin has exhibited willingness to be extremely brutal against civilian populations, at least in Afghanistan.

All told, then, the Soviet Union is clearly willing to help fight "counter-revolution" and willingly extends supplies, and in some cases, even its own personnel. There is no single Soviet military-technical policy or strategy; flexibility remains the watchword. Whether Soviet flexibility will lead to success is less certain; to date, outside of the U.S.S.R. itself, the Kremlin has no real successes to point to in its record of unconventional conflict against "counter-revolutionary" forces.

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

Little can be said about Soviet military-technical involvement with terrorism or counter-terrorism. That the U.S.S.R. trains, provides equipment for, and supports some terrorist groups appears beyond debate. Just how extensive Soviet involvement is and how much, if any, Soviet military-technical involvement with terrorist groups may have changed in the wake of vehement public Soviet condemnation of hijackings, kidnappings, and assassinations is less clear.

The same is true for Soviet involvement at the military-technical level with counter-terrorism. Soviet protestations of opposition to counter-terrorism to the contrary, the U.S.S.R. has evidenced no great willingness to become involved in meaningful international efforts to combat terrorism.

CONCLUSIONS

Soviet policies and strategies regarding unconventional conflict make it evident that Soviet statements about the reality of systemic confrontation between East and West are more than mere rhetoric. To the Soviets, unconventional conflict in all three of the manifestations examined here—revolution and national liberation, counter-revolution, and terrorism and counter-terrorism—is a critical component of that ongoing confrontation.

In their policies and strategies vis-à-vis unconventional conflict, the Soviets are neither reckless nor impatient. At the socio-political level of analysis, they provide a variety of different forms of assistance and support to their friends and allies engaged in unconventional conflicts. At the military-technical level, this flexibility is even more apparent, especially as illustrated by the Kremlin's willingness and ability to differentiate between policies and strategies applied in one country in opposition to "counter-revolution" and those applied in other countries. Further proof of flexibility is provided by the Soviet Union's willingness

and ability to change policies and strategies when confronted with evidence that previous policies and strategies are not working, or are not working as well as required.

The flexibility of Soviet policies and strategies toward unconventional conflict presents sizeable challenges to the U.S. and the West. The U.S. and the West must at a minimum respond with equally flexible policies and strategies, fashioning them to meet challenges as individual situations warrant. No "cookbook" solution to unconventional conflict appears possible.

Nevertheless, emphasis on flexible policies and strategies should not be permitted to obscure an even more salient point that is central to Soviet policies and strategies and must be central to U.S. and Western policies and strategies as well: the socio-political level of analysis and understanding is more critical than the military-technical, but neither can be ignored.

It is doubly ironic that if this analysis is correct, then the U.S.S.R. is less well positioned than the U.S. and the West to cope with unconventional conflict. The first irony is that the Soviet Union has recognized the primacy of socio-political analysis, but is poorly equipped to deal with it. The Soviet system has proven adept at producing military goods, but it has not yet proven its ability to match Western societies in providing economic benefits and political freedoms. The second irony concerns U.S. and Western policies and strategies. With sizeable advantages in economic capabilities and political systems, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. and the West can fashion political and economic policies wise enough to meet the socio-political challenges that serve as the seedbed for unconventional conflict.

Appendix 1

Conflicts and Wars since 1960

Approximate Location of Conflict/War	Year	Description	Approximate Deaths	Unconventional Conflict	Known U.S. Involvement	Known Soviet Involvement
Latin America						
1. Argentina	1976-79	"Disappearances"	14,000	x		
2. Argentina	1982	Falklands War	1,000		x	
3. Brazil	1980	Terrorism	1,000	x		
4. Chile	1973	Coup	5,000	x	x	
5. Chile	1974	Govt. Executions	20,000	x		
6. Domin. Repub.	1965	US Intervention	3,000	x	x	
7. El Salvador	1979-87	Civil War	65,000	x	x	x
8. Guatemala	1966-85	Anti-Indian	45,000	x		
9. Honduras	1969	El Salv. Invasion	2,000			
10. Jamaica	1980	Election Violence	1,000	x		
11. Nicaragua	1978-79	Anti-Somoza	35,000	x		
12. Nicaragua	1981-87	Anti-Sandinista	18,000	x	x	x
13. Peru	1983-87	Shining Path Maoists	4,000	x		

Conflicts and Wars since 1960

Approximate Location of Conflict/War	Year	Description	Approximate Deaths	Unconventional Conflict	Known U.S. Involvement	Known Soviet Involvement
Middle East						
14. Cyprus	1974	Turkey Invasion	5,000			
15. Egypt	1967	Six Day War	75,000		x	x
16. Iran	1978-83	Shah Overthrow & Aftermath	7,000	x	x	x
17. Iraq	1980-87	Iran-Iraq War	650,000		x	x
18. Israel	1973	Yom Kippur War	16,000		x	x
19. Jordan	1970	Anti-Palestinian	2,000	x		
20. Lebanon	1975-76	Muslim v. Christian	100,000	x		
21. Lebanon	1982	Israeli Invasion	20,000	x		
22. Lebanon	1983-87	Civil War & Unrest	20,000	x	x	x
23. Syria	1982	Sunni Massacre	10,000	x		
24. Turkey	1977-80	Terrorism & Coup	5,000	x		
25. Yemen	1962-69	Civil War	101,000	x		
26. Yemen (South)	1987	Coup	15,000	x		x

Conflicts and Wars since 1960

Approximate Location of Conflict/War	Year	Description	Approximate Deaths	Unconventional Conflict	Known U.S. Involvement	Known Soviet Involvement
South Asia						
27. Afghanistan	1978-79	Insurrection	100,000	x		x
28. Afghanistan	1979-87	Soviets invade	400,000	x	x	x
29. Bangladesh	1971	India invades	1,500,000			
30. India	1962	China border	2,000			
31. India	1965	Pakistan/Kashmir	20,000			
32. India	1971	Pakistan border	11,000		x	x
33. India	1983	Assam election	3,000	x		
34. India	1984	Ethnic violence	3,000	x		
35. India	1986-87	Sikh conflict	3,000	x		
36. Pakistan	1973-77	Baluchi conflict	9,000	x		
37. Sri Lanka	1971	Attempted coup	2,000	x		
38. Sri Lanka	1984-87	Tamil violence	5,000	x		

Conflicts and Wars since 1960

Approximate Location of Conflict/War	Year	Description	Approximate Deaths	Unconventional Conflict	Known U.S. Involvement	Known Soviet Involvement
Far East						
39. Burma	1980	Civil violence	5,000	x		
40. Cambodia	1970-75	U.S. & Viet invade	156,000	x	x	x
41. Cambodia	1975-78	Pol Pot massacres	2,000,000	x		
42. Cambodia	1978-87	Viet invasion	50,000	x	x	x
43. China	1967-68	Cultural revolution	50,000	x		
44. China	1983-84	Govt. executions	5,000	x		
45. Indonesia	1965-66	Abortive coup	100,000	x		
46. Indonesia	1975-80	East Timor	100,000	x		
47. Laos	1960-62	Pathet Lao	5,000	x	x	x
48. Laos	1963-73	Viet invade, U.S. bombs	19,000	x	x	x
49. Philippines	1972-80	Muslim revolt	20,000	x	x	
50. Philippines	1972-87	Communists and others	20,000	x	x	x
51. Vietnam	1959-65	NLF/NVN v. SVN	300,000	x	x	x
52. Vietnam	1965-75	Americanization & NVN invades SVN	2,058,000	x	x	x
53. Vietnam	1979	China invades	30,000			x

Conflicts and Wars since 1960

Approximate Location of Conflict/War	Year	Description	Approximate Deaths	Unconventional Conflict	Known U.S. Involvement	Known Soviet Involvement
Africa						
54. Algeria	1954-62	Anti-France	320,000	x		x
55. Algeria	1962-63	Civil conflict	2,000	x		
56. Angola	1961-75	Anti-Portugal	55,000	x		x
57. Angola	1975-87	Civil war	25,000	x	x	x
58. Burundi	1972	Ethnic massacres	100,000	x		
59. Chad	1980-87	Civil war	10,000	x	x	x
60. Ethiopia	1974-87	Eritrea	600,000	x	x	x
61. Ethiopia	1976-80	Ogaden war	36,000		x	x
62. Ghana	1981	Ethnic conflict	1,000	x		
63. Guinea-Bissau	1962-74	Anti-Portugal	15,000	x		x
64. Kenya	1952-63	Anti-Britain	15,000	x		
65. Mozambique	1965-75	Anti-Portugal	30,000	x		x
66. Mozambique	1981-87	Civil war	100,000	x	x	x
67. Nigeria	1967-70	Biafra	2,000,000	x		x
68. Nigeria	1980-81	Islam Fundamentalists	5,000	x		
69. Nigeria	1984	Islam Fundamentalists	1,000	x		
70. Rwanda	1956-65	Ethnic massacres	108,000	x		

Conflicts and Wars since 1960

Approximate Location of Conflict/War	Year	Description	Approximate Deaths	Unconventional Conflict	Known U.S. Involvement	Known Soviet Involvement
Africa (cont'd)						
71. South Africa	1984-87	Ethnic violence	5,000	x		
72. Sudan	1963-72	Black v. Arab	300,000	x		
73. Sudan	1984-87	Civil war	5,000	x	x	
74. Uganda	1966	Secession attempt	2,000	x		
75. Uganda	1971-78	Civil war & Idi Amin	300,000	x		
76. Uganda	1978-79	Tanzania & Amin	3,000			
77. Uganda	1981-86	Army massacres	102,000	x		
78. West Sahara	1975-87	Polisario war	15,000	x	x	x
79. Zaire	1960-65	Katanga & aftermath	100,000	x	x	x
80. Zambia	1964	Civil strife	1,000	x		
81. Zimbabwe	1972-79	Black v. white govt.	12,000	x		x
82. Zimbabwe	1983	Political violence	2,000	x		

Note: This list includes only those conflicts and wars in which at least 1,000 people per year were killed. Thus, situations as diverse as the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes, the Red Guard terrorist assault in Italy in the early 1980s, the Northern Ireland situation, and the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada do not appear.

SOURCE: Adapted from Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1985* (Washington: World Priorities, 1985), pp. 10-11, and updated by author. Assessments of unconventional conflict and known U.S. and Soviet involvement are by the author, and frequently admittedly qualitative.

Endnotes

1. See Appendix 1.
2. It should be noted that covert para-military operations are a form of unconventional conflict; however, they are not discussed in this study. For additional details about unconventional conflict, see Sam C. Sarkesian, *The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 109-22. Sarkesian points out that "a great deal of disagreement and debate regarding the concepts, definitions and categories" (p. 109) of unconventional conflict exist, and this author fully concurs.
3. See again Appendix 1.
4. Ibid.
5. Western works that examine primarily U.S. policy toward unconventional conflicts include Sarkesian, *The New Battlefield*; Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, eds., *U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981); Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, eds., *Special Operations in US Strategy* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1984); David J. Dean, ed., *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology* (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986); and David J. Dean, *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986). See also Caspar W. Weinberger, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1988/FY 1989 Budget and FY 1988-92 Defense Programs* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), pp. 56-62. For works that examine wholly or partially Soviet policy toward unconventional conflicts, see Joanne S. Gowa and Nils H. Wessell, *Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982); Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983); Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*; Bruce D. Porter, *The U.S.S.R. in Third World Conflicts* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and John M. Collins, *U.S. and Soviet Special Operations*, (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1986).
6. For example, see V.A. Kremenyuk, *SShA: bor'ba protiv natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya. Istoriya i sovremennost* (Moscow: Mysl', 1983), which details the Soviet assessment of the American "fight against the national liberation movement"; and the two-volume work *СССР в бор'бе против колониализма и неоколониализма, 1960-март 1986* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), which presents the Soviet Union's "fight against colonialism and neocolonialism." See also Irina B. Ponomareva and Natalya A. Smirnova, *Geopolitika Imperializma SShA* (Moscow: Mysl', 1986); and A.I. Utkin, *Strategiya Globalnoy Ekspansii: Vneshne politicheskiye Doktriny SShA* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnive Otnosheniya, 1986), for additional Soviet explications of U.S. policy. For a recent detailed Western analysis of Soviet perceptions of the Third World, see Daniel S. Papp, *Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World During the 1980s: The Ideological Basis* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985).
7. V. Pogrebenkov, "Neoglobalism—a Doctrine of Social Revanchism," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* 12 (June 1986), p. 80. See also A.D. Lizichev, "October and Leninist Teaching about the Defense of the Revolution," *Kommunist* 3 (February 1987), pp. 85-96; V. Bushuev, "Anti-Communism in the 'Neoglobalist' Doctrine of the USA," *Kommunist* 6 (April 1986), p. 111-22; and V. Krastyaninov, "Neoglobalism—a Doctrine for Export of Counter-Revolution," *International Affairs* 3 (March 1987), pp. 30-39.
8. Progrebenkov, p. 81.
9. Ibid.
10. I. Zvyagel'skaya, "The Evolution of the American Approach to Conflict Situations in Asia," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mazhdunarodnye Otnosheniya* (February 1987), p. 63.
11. See for example *Pravda*, January 9, 1986, and January 18, 1986; S.L. Zivs, "Ideological Diversion under the Banner of Struggle Against Terrorism," *SShA* 6 (June 1986), pp. 41-51; V. Efremov, "Terrorism in American Global Strategy,"

- Kommunist Vooryzhennykh Sil* 1 (January 1987), pp. 82-86; A. Gorokhov, "State Terrorism: Instrument of U.S. Imperial Policy," *International Affairs* 3 (March 1984), pp. 92-99; N. Larin, "Subversive Activity of U.S. Imperialism," *International Affairs* 11 (November 1985), pp. 97-105; and I. Lukashuk and R. Mullerson, "State Terrorism and International Law," *International Affairs* 2 (February 1987), pp. 74-80.
12. V. Krestyaninov, pp. 30-39. See also B.L. Chernov, "From the 'Truman Doctrine' to Reagan's 'Neoglobalism,'" *SShA* 3 (March 1987), pp. 50-54; V. Linnik, "Reaganism as a Phenomenon in American Imperial Policy," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoseheniya* 10 (October 1983), pp. 23-36; and V. Bushnev, "Anticommunism in the 'Neoglobalist' Doctrine of the USA," *Kommunist* (April 1986), pp. 111-22.
 13. See Krestyaninov for this listing.
 14. S.M. Plekhanov, "American Society and Foreign Policy," *SShA*, p. 11. For a good overview of how the Kremlin sees U.S. policy changing over time to achieve these objectives, see Chernov.
 15. D.A. Volkogonov, *Markisto-leninskoye ucheniye o voyne i armii* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984), p. 24. For a somewhat different Western interpretation, see Julian Lider, *Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Problems* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), especially chapter 9.
 16. V.V. Serebryannikov, *Osnovy Markisto-leninskogo ucheniya o voyne i armii* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982).
 17. Ye. Rybkin, "Modern International Relations in the Light of the Marxist-Leninist Theory on War and Peace," *International Affairs* 5 (May 1983), pp. 32-39. See also Rybkin's review of Serebryannikov's book in *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* 5 (March 1983), pp. 88-90.
 18. See Papp, especially pp. 12, 27-40.
 19. See for example A.V. Nikoforov, "The USA and Developing Countries in the Mid-1980s," *SShA* 10 (October 1980), pp. 15-26.
 20. Mikhail Gorbachev interview in *Revolution Africaine* (March 31, 1986), as quoted in Soviet Embassy Information Department, *News and Views from the USSR* (April 4, 1986), p. 8.
 21. Mikhail Gorbachev speech at dinner for Margaret Thatcher, March 30, 1987, as quoted in Soviet Embassy Information Department, *News and Views from the USSR* (March 31, 1987), p. 4.
 22. For typical Soviet commentary on the April 1986 U.S. raid on Libya, see Tass International Service, 1145 GMT, April 22, 1986, as reported in *FBIS* (Soviet Union), April 23, 1986, p. A1.
 23. The correlation of forces in Soviet thought is broadly defined, and not the narrow concept of military forces that Western analysts sometimes mistakenly identify it as being. The best Western analysis of the Soviet concept of the correlation of forces remains Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Assessment of the 'Correlation of World Forces': Implications for American Foreign Policy," *Orbis* (Fall 1976), pp. 625-636.
 24. For greater details on the International Department, see Leonard Shapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," *International Journal* (Winter 1976-77), pp. 41-55; Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (October 27, 1980); and Robert W. Kitrinov, "International Department of the CPSU," *Problems of Communism* (September-October 1984), pp. 47-67. See also part 2 of Herbert J. Ellison's unpublished paper, "Soviet Support of Third World Revolution: Political and Ideological Instruments," presented at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Conference on the U.S.S.R. and Marxist Revolutions, Washington, D.C., September 25-26, 1986.
 25. The Soviet Constitution, as presented in Aryeh L. Unger, *Constitutional Development in the USSR: A Guide to the Soviet Constitution* (New York: Pica Press, 1982), p. 239.
 26. Richard F. Starr, *1985 Yearbook of International Communist Affairs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), appropriate countries.
 27. *Pravda*, January 24, 1986.

28. See Daniel S. Papp, *Soviet Policies toward the Developing World During the 1980s: The Dilemmas of Power and Presence* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), especially pp. 29-31, 32-33, and 377-389.
29. U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Active Measures* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1983), passim. See also Richard Shultz and Roy Godson, *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey, 1984).
30. U.S. Department of State, *Communist Interference in El Salvador* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1981), pp. 1-8. See also W. Raymond Duncan, "Cuban Military Assistance to the Third World," in John Copper and Daniel S. Papp, eds., *Communist Nations' Military Assistance* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 135-59.
31. See Trond Gilberg, "Eastern European Military Assistance to the Third World," in Copper and Papp, pp. 72-95.
32. The details of the financing of Soviet military assistance to revolutionary groups are not clear. Some authorities claim that the Kremlin provides aid gratis, while others assert that revolutionary clients must pay for the aid. The specifics of Soviet military assistance to revolutionary clients will be examined in the following section.
33. Mikhail Gorbachev, "Gorbachev's Political Report," in *Current Soviet Policies IX: The Documentary Record of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Columbus, Ohio: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1986), p. 10.
34. See Daniel S. Papp, *Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking, Washington* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 1981), p. 10. See also Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, *End of a War: Indochina 1954* (New York: Praeger, 1969), chapters 20 and 21.
35. See for example S. Vydrin, "Angola Greet Its Heroes," *New Times*, Number 10 (March 1975), p. 8; and Radio Moscow, December 13, 1974, January 5, 1975, January 24, 1975, and January 31, 1975.
36. See Papp, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 64-65, and pp. 241-54.
37. *Pravda*, December 23, 1979.
38. Two of these treaties, with Egypt and Somalia, had also been abrogated. Two additional treaties, with the Congo and North Yemen, were signed in the 1980s. See Papp, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 67-71, for details.
39. *Ibid.*, chap. 4.
40. *Ibid.*, chap. 5.
41. *Ibid.*, chap. 6.
42. For an interesting treatment of this phenomenon, see Mark Katz, "Anti-Soviet Insurgencies: Growing Trend or Passing Phase?," *Orbis* (Summer, 1986), pp. 365-91.
43. Nayan Chanda, "Fueling New Hopes," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 3, 1983, p. 10.
44. For discussion of these points, see Papp, *Soviet Policies*, esp. pp. 206-10.
45. See again *Ibid.*, pp. 281-83, and pp. 297-305.
46. Socialist-path states and the vanguard parties that head them will be discussed in greater detail shortly hereafter.
47. See for example the June 4, 1987 Tass report in English on U.S. claims of Soviet disinformation as reported in *FBIS* (Soviet Union), June 5, 1987, p. A1. See also the May 28, 1987 Tass report in English on U.S. involvement in state-supported terrorism as reported in *FBIS* (Soviet Union), June 10, 1987, pp. CC18-CC19.
48. For details, see Papp, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 76-79.
49. For Afghanistan, see J. Bruce Armstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), pp. 283-323. For Ethiopia, see esp. the *Christian Science Monitor*, June 3, 1985.
50. See again Papp, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 71-75.

51. The best detailed treatment of Soviet attitudes toward "vanguard parties" remains David E. Albright, "Vanguard Parties in the Third World," in Walter Laqueur, *The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 208-25.
52. Leonid Brezhnev, "Central Committee Report," in *Current Soviet Policies VIII: The Documentary Record of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Columbus, Ohio: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1981), p. 7. For additional commentary on these points, see L.N. Lebedinskaya, "Peoples of the Former Colonial World and Real Socialism," *Rabochiy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir* 4 (July-August 1982), esp. pp. 16-20; and Radio Moscow 1700 GMT January 30, 1983, as cited in *FBIS* (Soviet Union), February 2, 1983, p. J1.
53. Papp, *Soviet Policies*, passim.
54. "Gorbachev's Political Report," in *Current Soviet Policies IX*, p. 36.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.
56. For one view of Soviet involvement with these and other groups, see Roberta Goren, *The Soviet Union and Terrorism* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984). See also Clare Sterling, *The Terror Network* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981); and Uri Ra'anan, ed., *Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985).
57. See for example *Pravda*, April 22, 1986, and June 9, 1987.
58. One recent Soviet source stated that "the last Basmak group was recorded somewhere in 1941." See Moscow Domestic Service, 0930 GMT, May 15, 1987, as reported in *FBIS* (Soviet Union), May 18, 1987, p. CC3. See also Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism*.
59. See again Goren; Sterling; and Ra'anan.
60. See selected passages in Gilberg, pp. 72-95.
61. See Papp, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 238 and pp. 249-51.
62. "A Raging War on the Horn of Africa," *Time* (July 25, 1977), pp. 344-46.
63. This happened in Somalia and Egypt, and probably elsewhere as well. See Paul Henge, "Getting a Grip on the Horn: The Emergence of the Soviet Presence and Future Prospects," Laqueur, p. 168, for a discussion of the Somali situation.
64. In November 1984 reports circulated that MiGs were on their way to Nicaragua. The United States firmly stated its opposition to MiG delivery, and none ever reached Nicaragua. Nevertheless, Nicaraguan pilots have trained in Cuba and Bulgaria, and at least one military airfield capable of handling high performance aircraft has been built.
65. Within a few weeks of the Sandinista July 1979 victory, five Soviet generals secretly journeyed to Managua to discuss Soviet-Nicaraguan security issues. See Robert S. Leiken, "Fantasies and Facts: The Soviet Union and Nicaragua," *Current History*, October 1984, p. 315. Other senior level visits from the U.S.S.R. to Managua may have occurred since then, but they have not been made public.
66. See Zaimay Khalilzad, "Moscow's Afghan War," *Problems of Communism* (January-February 1986), pp. 1-20, and J. Bruce Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), pp. 143-52, for greater detail.
67. For good discussions of SPETSNAZ, see Robert S. Boyd, "SPETSNAZ: Soviet Innovation in Special Forces," *Air University Review* (November-December 1986), pp. 63-69. See also John M. Collins, *U.S. and Soviet Special Operations* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1986), appropriate pages.