BAKUNIN

A number of paradoxes emerge when one compares the similarities and dissimilarities, systems and patterns of organization among the individual terror movements arising at the end of the 19th century. While the West adopted and developed individual terror within the anarchist movement which in turn drew its inspiration from the doctrines of Bakunin and Kropotkin and the practical example of terror as practiced in their country of origin, in Russia itself the move towards terror was marked by a rejection of anarchism and a dissociation from the influence of Bakunin as the movement turned towards political struggle and the adoption of the Jacobinism and the Blanquism of the West. As spontaneous anarchist terror spread in the West, whether as the weapon of the individual or as “propaganda by the deed” in Russia, and later in Poland also, “individual terror” became the weapon of a revolutionary party which used it as “the new art of revolutionary warfare.” The slogan “propaganda by the deed,” which derived both in Russia and the West from the same sources, became, in Russia itself, “agitation by the deed,” the sole path to be followed in political struggle. Similarly, the dream of Buonarotti and Blanqui of a revolutionary elitist party and a “general staff” of professional revolutionaries was first realized in Russia by the Narodnaya Volya party and its Executive Committee, with Marx and Engels both applauding them. Apparently, they were also the dreams of Bakunin.

One of the stormy petrels of the age, Bakunin was a man of many facets and contradictions. His revolutionary career stretched over more than thirty years. Brilliantly dazzling and sharply analytical, he was also silly, garrulous, and unsystematic. Despite his commanding presence within the period, nothing that he wrote fits into any defined doctrine, and any attempt to define the “Bakunin doctrine” and reconcile its contradictions must be doomed to failure.

Bakunin is considered to be the father of terrorism despite the fact that the wave of anarchist terror which advocated “propaganda by the deed” burst out only after his death and that it ran counter to his view of the strategy that should be followed by the revolution. The Russian terror movement also developed only after an entire generation of revolutionary intelligentsia had dissociated itself from his influence. Yet, for all that, the Narodnaya Volya’s Executive Committee and its revolutionary strategy were in fact a fulfilment of Bakunin’s vision and principles as regards the path the revolution should take, while the individual terror of the anarchists drew its inspiration from his vision of the “redemptive destruction,” from his hatred of the establishment, of rulers and of
kings, from his preaching of permanent rebellion and the use of all means in achieving it.

Bakunin's character, with all its contradictions, its strength of will, its almost fiendish brilliance, in a sense personifies the conflicts, the weaknesses and the fine qualities of the revolutionary intelligentsia at the close of the nineteenth and the start of the twentieth centuries. In him were combined the tortured conscience, the estrangement and detachment of the intellectual from the Russian nobility, and the struggles of the modern intellectual with the problems posed by doctrine and praxis, philosophy and life, establishment and revolution. Bakunin is cynic and believer, Jesuit and heretic, scoundrel and saint, domineering and martyred, friendly and quarrelsome, a man driven by instinct and yet a man of logic, generous spendthrift, yet always a millstone on the necks of others, brilliant and yet naive, spontaneous, polite and yet cunning, a man of action and of conspiracy—yet a parasite. He was the type of man of whom Caussidière said in 1848 "our friend Bakunin is an invaluable man on the day of revolution but he must needs be shot on the morrow." Herzen, after hearing this, added: "the difference between him and Bakunin is that Caussidière too is a splendid fellow, but it would be better to shoot him the day before the revolution." He was a man who loved the masses, yet scorned them. Isaiah Berlin describes Bakunin as a man "endowed with an exceptional capacity for absorbing other people's doctrines..." who "had a considerable element of cynicism in his character, and cared little what the exact effect of his sermons might be on his friends... To dominate individuals and sway assemblies was his métier." Bakunin, says Berlin, "belonged to that odd... class of persons who contrive to hypnotize others into throwing themselves into causes — if need be killing and dying for them — while themselves remaining coldly, clearly, and ironically aware of the spells which they cast." He concludes somewhat unjustly: "His path was strewn with victims, casualties, and faithful, idealistic converts; he himself remained a gay, easygoing, mendacious, irresistibly agreeable, calmly and coldly destructive, fascinating, generous, undisciplined, eccentric Russian landowner to the end."

His mystique of revolution and deed fed on personal frustration, on alienation and on a search throughout a shifting world for some meaning and content to life. Bakunin's mother was domineering and overbearing, his father "humane, cultured, intelligent, devoted to his home and family, but devoid of imagination, and possessed of that touch of conservative fanaticism proper to the frightened liberal." He hated his mother and loved his father, while it was from them that he inherited both his tendency to dominate and his hatred of domination. Writing to his sister Tatyana, Bakunin recalls and describes the sense of "carrying constantly some dark burden in the soul." Despite all the contradictions of his personality, there is in Bakunin, claims E. Lampert, one continuing and consistent characteristic, an urge to dominate others and an uncontrolled, boundless aggressiveness. In writing his Confession, Bakunin said of himself that he had "an urge to movement and action. I felt oppressed
and nauseated in ordinary tranquil surroundings. People strive habitually for rest and quiet ... as for me they led me to despair; my heart was in a constant turmoil. ... This urge to movement ... remained for ever unsatisfied ... [it] proved my only stimulus ... which drove me on like one possessed into manifest perils." To this spiritual disquiet in the face of peace and tranquility was added a feeling of tremendous loneliness. Thus, in 1842, he wrote to his brother, "solitude lay on my path, and sooner or later I had to enter this desert." His extreme self-love was bound up with an inability to love others. All his romantic associations, including his marriage, were calculated, with the exception of the love he felt for his sister. Bielinski, who was well aware of Bakunin's contradictory character, wrote to him, saying that while he appreciated his extraordinary gifts he knew at the same time of his "monstrous pride," his "baseness in relations with friends, childishness, sloth, lack of human warmth and tenderness ... a desire to subjugate others, to dominate, an eagerness to tell the truth about others and a horror of hearing it told about himself." He could not love and even admits that when he saw people loving each other he had a desire to smash their faces. His relationship with Nechayev, too, was nourished by some profound complex on his part and has not been sufficiently probed, although it has been given literary expression by Dostoevsky in the character of Stavrogin in The Possessed.

Intellectual confusion further heightened Bakunin's spiritual conflicts. In common with others of his generation he was an admirer first of Fichte and Hegel and then of the "young Hegelians." Even in his later conflict with Marx, he was never able to shake off the consciousness of his superiority as a thinker and philosopher. Bakunin's wrestling with philosophy was marked by a desire to derive from it what it could not give—the consolation of the religion and the faith he had lost and some firm ground beneath his feet. He and his friends among Russia's intelligentsia clung with religious faith to any philosophical system and sought in deathly earnest to realize its teachings. Theirs was a search, via tortuous paths, after a God that had been lost, murdered, or in whom they had been disappointed, a search in which they floundered between the "ideal of the Madonna" and the "ideal of Sodom," in which "God and the devil are fighting," with the battlefield being the heart of man. Bakunin's own confrontation with philosophy led him to propound a new Manichaean teaching: the battlefield between the devil and God has been shifted from "internal life" to the external reality and foisted on history in the form of good and evil, the state and revolution, the revolution and the counterrevolution. The chasm between "us" and "them" demands the solution of total annihilation. Revolution is the supreme value. Bakunin thus says that in politics one must "act religiously—religiously in the sense of freedom," and in a letter to a Polish friend he writes, "I seek God in men, in their love; in their freedom; and now I seek God in revolution." Writing a letter of February 7, 1870, Bakunin goes into the force of the Jesuit principle, though his rejection of it, as it were, had led to conflict with Nechayev: "Did you ever ponder over the principal reason for the power and
vitality of the Jesuit order? . . . it consists in the absolute extinction of the individual in the will of the organization and the action of the community. And I am asking you: is this so great a sacrifice for a really strong, passionate and earnest man? It means the sacrifice of the appearance for the sake of Reality, of the empty halo for the sake of Reality, of the empty halo for the sake of real power, of the word for the sake of action. This is the sacrifice which I demand from all our friends, and in which I am always to set the first example. I do not want to be I, I want to be We. For, I repeat it a thousand times, only on this condition will we win, will our idea win. Well this victory is my only passion.”

Bakunin’s own life was marked by a personal failure in action, by an involvement in abortive conspiracies, in conspiratorial intrigues, hopeless insurrections and adventures doomed in failure. He arrived late for the February 1848 revolution in Paris; subsequently he was involved in five uprisings that turned into heroic disasters or farcical failures. He took part in the Dresden uprising merely because he happened to be there, although the purpose of the revolt, to lend support to the Frankfurt parliament against the King of Saxony, was alien to him. Bakunin was unable to resist the temptation of taking part in any fight. His part in the revolt brought him a death sentence and he was handed over the Czar. The secret societies that he led were either totally nonexistent, or dissolved before they could assume any definite form. The “committees” he formed were all pure deception. Small wonder that he should have been so captivated by Nechayev’s consistent, forceful and “practical” personality.

THE VISION OF A REDEMPTIVE DESTRUCTION

Disappointment with philosophy, the attempt to bridge the gulf between theory and deed, revulsion from doctrinaires, self-love and hatred of his fellow man—all these were at the basis of the myth of spontaneous, creative revolution springing from negation and destruction.

“What I preach,” said Bakunin, “is the revolt of life against science.” In an endeavour to overcome loneliness, alienation and sterility, there was born the myth of the “people,” possessed of “character, strength and life.” The people is “socialist in a basic and instinctive manner and because of its situation it is more seriously and really so than all the bourgeoisie and scientific socialists put together. It is socialist because of the material conditions of its life, because of the dictates of its existence, while others are socialists because of the dictates of their logic.” “The driving force is in instincts, in the aspiration to redemptive and fructifying destruction.” “The revolt of the people is, by its very nature, a spontaneous act, and it is characterized by chaos and cruelty . . . which are the rough, wild force that can work heroic deeds and realize goals which are seemingly impossible.” Moreover, the “people” are naturally incorruptible. Bakunin’s words sound a familiar echo of the myth of the people as it emerged in the French Revolution: “The toilers whose property is but meagre or who have no property at all, are therefore uncorrupted by it.” Thus, “when the hour of need dawns,
whether for the purposes of defense or of victory, the masses of the people will not be deterred from destroying their villages or their towns, and, since for the most part property does not belong to the masses, what pulsates in them is the naked desire for acts of destruction.” Further, “there is no revolution without acts of destruction rooted in instincts; but this is redemptive, fructifying destruction, destruction that builds new worlds and breathes into them the breath of life.”

Yet waiting for the people’s uprising was to prove tiring and disappointing. Bakunin’s long letter to Nechayev on June 2, 1870 opens with an admission of failure and defeat, and this on two counts: “for the people, whose uprising we were entitled to build upon, did not rise. Thus it is clear that they have not reached the end of their tether as regards their suffering, nor has their patience yet been exhausted. Clearly their faith in themselves and in their own strength has not yet been kindled,” and additionally because “our organization” has proved to be imperfect.

From here he turned to robbers and bandits, the most energetic agents of the “redemptive destruction”. In the letter quoted above one can see clearly just how Bakunin struggled with this question, but in the Catechism of a Revolutionary his stand is expressed more definitively. Bakunin felt sure that the robbers and bandits were likely to prove to be “the mighty force for the victory of the revolution,” yet it was also clear to him that he, personally, would not be capable of realizing any union with them, for this demanded “strong nerves, the strength of heroism, burning consciousness and an iron will”—qualities he felt to be somewhat lacking in one of his generation and education. Thus he looked to Nechayev to identify suitable persons from within his organization. Nevertheless, uniting with the bandits and robbers did not mean turning into bandits and robbers. It meant, rather, breathing into them “a new spirit and a new goal, embracing all peoples.” “Rough and wild to the point of cruelty, these people have a fresh strong nature that is untrammeled and not used up, and this [is] open to live propaganda, and if the propaganda is life and not doctrinaire, it will succeed in reaching them.” True, when looked at from the point of view of humanity, the world of the run-of-the-mill bandit is far from being a pretty place, but as regards Russia—“What is pretty here? Who is not a robber among us? The government? The men of affairs and the profiteers acting on its behalf or their own? Or maybe the property owners and the merchants?” It is preferable to put up with the people’s corruption, for it has “character, strength and life,” it has “the right that is based on a historic suffering endured by countless generations” and is by way of being “a massive protest against the source of all corruption—the state.”

Thus, “everyone who seeks to be an active revolutionary in Russia must strip off his gloves, for no gloves will save him from the Russian mire . . . the Russian revolution will, of necessity, be an awful revolution. He who is disturbed by horrors and by this mire had better remove himself from this world and this revolution.” Yet Bakunin knew that he could not fulfil this role. He left it to Nechayev and his comrades.
A REVOLUTIONARY ELITE, A GENERAL STAFF FOR THE REVOLUTION AND A HIDDEN DICTATORSHIP

Clearly, Bakunin was full of contradictions as a thinker. While admiring the storminess of popular revolution, he equally foresaw its horrors and trembled before them. In his January 1870 appeal To the Officers of the Russian Army, which dates to the period of his alliance with Nechayev, Bakunin called on the officers to choose the alternative of a coordinated and disciplined revolution rather than elect for the horrors of the anticipated popular revolt.

While he thought that the might of the modern state could only be overthrown by the masses, he nevertheless pointed out that the people was merely an army; the overthrow of the state necessitated a general staff. "The secret organization is a type of staff force in the revolutionary army, and the army is—the entire people." The backbone of the staff force was to be the "Executive Committee." "In my opinion," he continues, "this is the secret organization, already in existence and operation, strong in the might of its discipline, in its fervor, and in the devotion and self-sacrifice of its members who unconditionally accept all the orders and commands of a single committee, all knowing and yet unknown to any man." The moral authority of the members of the "Executive Committee" derived from their self-sacrifice. In essence, they were like Jesuits, yet their aim was not enslavement, but freedom. They were to be the order of the knights of the revolution and its servants.

Writing to Nechayev on June 2, 1870, Bakunin examines the problem posed by the human material from which such a general staff might be recruited in Russia and stresses that in this matter Russia's fate was better than that of the West. "There is in Russia an enormous number of people who are educated, intelligent, and deprived at the same time of any position and career and without a solution to their problem. At least three-quarters of young persons studying at the present time find themselves in this position, theological students, children of peasants and petty bourgeoisie, children of junior officials and ruined gentry . . . ." Yet Bakunin has no illusions about the true quality of this intelligentsia, "There is very little true morality within this world . . . ." One can safely assume that were they to be able to "exploit and oppress the people—one can be sure that they will exploit and oppress it . . . . One must use their poverty-stricken condition which makes them virtuous in spite of themselves . . . ." This being so, he continues, one must develop a firm foundation of values among them, the vision of overall human freedom. (It is doubtful if Bakunin had read de Tocqueville who, in fact, foretold the mighty pent up force of the professional modern revolutionary, combining personal interest with a redemptive universal vision.) "This is the new and only religion which has the power to move souls and create a collective force of salvation," Bakunin wrote to Nechayev. Paying lip-service to the elemental force of the people, Bakunin moves on to discuss another aim of the General Staff which was to be composed exclusively of a revolutionary elite. When the day of revolution should dawn, it would be up to the General Staff to assume control, and yet, "rejecting any power, by what power, or rather by what force shall we
direct the people's revolution? An invisible force—recognized by no one, imposed by no one—through which the collective dictatorship of our organization will be all the mightier, the more it remains invisible and unacknowledged, the more it remains without any official legality and significance."

From here Bakunin proceeds to describe the chaos and anarchy of the revolution, as a war of all against all, as history's awful day of judgment, but in this he sees refuge in "a secret organization which has scattered its members in small groups over the whole territory of the Empire, but is, nevertheless, firmly united: inspired by a common ideal, and a common aim which are applied everywhere, of course modified according to prevailing conditions: an organization which acts everywhere according to a common plan . . . these groups will be able to lead the popular movement without seeking for themselves privileges, honors or power . . . ." The nucleus of such an organization will have to be comprised of people who will burn all their bridges behind them, who will be totally devoted to the revolution, and motivated by one single desire, to set the people free, for which they will be prepared to sacrifice all, even their very lives. Nonetheless, Bakunin warns, such strength of self-sacrifice can only be acquired with the help of the strongest feelings. It cannot be achieved as a result of coercion, under supervision, or as a result of fear. Deeds such as he foresees cannot come about without initiative and great daring. Passion alone is insufficient. "Allied to passion there must be reason, cold, calculating, real and practical . . . .", strengthened by a knowledge of all that was going on in Russia and Europe. As to the question of where such men may be found, he replies, "The point is that according to my system not many are needed. Remember that you do not have to create an army but a revolutionary staff. You might possibly find ten such people who are nearly ready, perhaps fifty or sixty capable of becoming such men and preparing themselves for this role . . . ." In this context Bakunin foresees a type of revolutionary knights' order, drawing up an almost prophetic blueprint of the Narodnaya Volya party. He writes: "Imagine the People's Fraternity for the whole of Russia consisting of forty, at most seventy members. In addition there would be some hundreds of members belonging to the second tier of the organization. Regional Brothers—and you have covered the whole of Russia with a mighty net."

The whole society constitutes one body and a firmly united whole, led by the C.C. and engaged in unceasing underground struggle against the government and against other societies either inimical to it or even those acting independently of it. Where there is war, there is politics, and there inescapably arises the necessity for violence, cunning and deceit.

"Truth, honesty, mutual trust," were to be the watchwords within the organization. But as regards those outside—anything was permitted."
NECHAYEV—DEED AND ORGANIZATION IN TERRORISM

I could not conceive of anyone’s really being attracted to that repulsive Jesuitical system, being loyal to it to such a shockingly inhuman degree as is Nechayev. For with him, consistency has reached the point of a monstrosity. [Natalie Herzen to Bakunin, 16 June 1870]

However, he has one great advantage: he dedicates himself and gives himself utterly, while the others dabble in dilettante fashion. He wears workmen’s overalls, the others white gloves; he acts while the others wag their tongues; he is, the others are not. [Bakunin to Ogarev, Ozerov and Serebrennikov, in a letter of June 20, 1870]

PERSONALITY

As contrasted with Bakunin’s many faceted, often contradictory personality, Nechayev seems to be the complete personification of cynicism, of utter dedication to a goal, of cold, fanatic hatred, the man of revolutionary “deed.” Decisive and confident, uncompromising, unhesitating, a despotic ascetic, bearer of the “holy lie,” he was at one with himself, a “godless believer, a hero sans phrase.” A man with no private life, without allegiances, interests, connections, or feelings of love, he was “a man in whom all else is swallowed up by one, exclusive interest, by one thought—the revolution.” Were one to exemplify all the rules laid down in the Catechism of a Revolutionary for the revolutionary’s view of himself and others, one would merely end up with a portrait of Nechayev. Effectively this is what Bakunin himself does when he writes about the ideal conspirator, the man who is a member of the general staff, who heads “the collective dictatorship of the secret organization.” Thus he writes that such men “have renounced once and for all, for life, or for death itself, all that attracts people, all material comforts and delights, all satisfaction of ambition, status and fame. They must be totally and wholly absorbed by one passion, the people’s liberation. They must be persons who would renounce personal historical importance while they are alive and even a name in history after their death.” But at the same time, the revolutionary must be a man of “reason, cold, calculating, real and practical . . . capable of grasping realities . . . in their true aspect and sense and not arbitrarily.” All these attributes Bakunin admits that Nechayev possessed, even while he lists them in a letter that marked their separation.

Thus, one must take issue with Michael Confino’s statement that Nechayev possessed all of Bakunin’s weaknesses and none of his strengths. In fact, Nechayev had all those qualities which Bakunin saw as adding up to the peak of perfection, qualities which his own weaknesses put beyond the reach of his personality. “If Bakunin was fascinated by him to the point of consenting to entrust him with imaginary authority,” says Camus, “it is because he recognized in that implacable figure the type of human being that he recommended and what
and broad horizons” who never translated their philosophy into deeds carried out with their own hands.

**IDEOLOGICAL SOURCES AND CONNECTIONS**

Nechayev’s revolutionary ideas and system are in direct line with the terror tradition of the French Revolution, as it developed from Robespierre and St. Just, via the secret societies and the concept of the professional revolutionary formulated by Buonarotti and Blanqui. Nechayev's outlook was the product of an autodidactic and imperfect education. He was sceptical of ideologies and doctrines and was almost totally ignorant of Marxist and anarchist thought. He based his entire ideology from the days of his membership in the student circles of 1868 up to the time of his arrest, on what he had learned from Buonarotti’s *Conspiracy of Equals*, the *Confessions* of Rousseau and the *Memoirs* of Robespierre. Zemfir Ralli, who was in close contact with Nechayev, relates how he came to him, a small suitcase in his hand, and in it the two books that were to remain with him up to the time of his arrest. Boris Nikolayevsky and B. Kozmin threw more light on Nechayev’s contacts with the Russian Jacobin circle gathered around the *Nabat*. P. Tkachev, the theoretician of Russian Jacobinism, was one of Nechayev’s close friends and a key member of his organization. A program drawn up by the two of them, apparently some time in 1868-69, laid great stress on the Blanquist thesis according to which “the social revolution was but the final aim, while the political revolution was the sole means for bringing it about.” Concurrently, and without changing his Jacobin outlook, Nechayev made contact with Bakunin. As he saw it, doctrine and the vision of the society of the future were of no great account. His allegiance to the primacy of the revolutionary deed was and remained Blanquist in concept, as his contacts with Russian Jacobinism prove. Thus it was that the *Nabat* group saw itself as continuing Nechayev’s principles. Nechayev’s connections with the Russian Blanquist group were maintained via Kaspar Tursky, the central figure in the Blanquist “Slavic Circle” and in the small group gathered around the *Nabat*. “The connection between Tkachev and Tursky,” so Nicolayevsky writes, “was no mere coincidental contact of emigrées; it bore all the marks of political union.” Further documentation published recently also points to this close connection, including a pamphlet, written by Tursky and published by “The Russian Revolutionary Socialist Group” in 1874-75 and advocating terror, which contains a defense of Nechayev as part of a sharp attack on Bakunin and Marx. The articles in *Nabat*, written in 1874-75 and advocating terror, which were used by Plekhanov to pin responsibility for the swing towards terror onto Tkachev, were in fact the work of Tursky and quite contrary to Tkachev’s attitudes. Through Tursky, attempts were made to contact the Narodnaya Volya members N. Morozov and G. Romanenko, and it was he who aided them in publishing their pamphlets on terrorism. Thus Nechayev’s path joined up with the path of Russian terrorism when, in 1880, contact was renewed between him, the man who had been eight years a prisoner in the Peter-Paul fortress, and the Executive Committee of the Narodnaya Volya, at the very height of the terrorist struggle.
For approximately a decade, the revolutionary intelligentsia had shunned Nechayevism and opposed terror and political struggle. By the close of the 1870's it found itself again embroiled in those Blanquist attitudes and Nechayevian systems of organization from which it had turned in disgust at the outset. When Nechayev's letter to the Executive Committee was received, it sounded like the voice of one speaking from the grave, but Vera Figner relates that he wrote "like a revolutionary only recently removed from the ranks addressing comrades who still enjoy their freedom. The impression created by the letter was fantastic. Gone was the ugly slur attached to Nechayev's personality . . . . when we had read the letter, we all cried as one, with a great and rare uplift of spirit, 'he must be freed!'"

THE BITTER ONES

It was Nechayev's revolutionary practice and not his theories on regimes and society that left their mark on the Russian revolutionary movement and that continue to make their appearance time and again in nightmarish fashion within the revolutionary movements of our own times. Thus there is no really decisive importance to be attached to the recently resurrected and still unresolved controversy as to Bakunin's role in the composition of The Catechism of a Revolutionary. Most of the major ideas expressed in The Catechism of a Revolutionary, even down to its phraseology, can be found in Bakunin's other writings and letters, but while for him they were theories deriving from sophisticated reasoning, for Nechayev they were the guiding principles of his life and actions, and indeed he himself did realize them throughout his life, up to his death. The importance of Nechayev's work lies in its providing the most consistent formulation and application of the modern technique of revolutionary activity and in its shaping of the archetype of the professional revolutionary. Freeing Buonarotti's and Blanqui's thought of all phraseology and romanticism, he crystallized it consistently and mercilessly, with a fanatical severity. Writing in The Bell on October 15, 1860, Herzen describes "the superfluous men and the bilious ones," the latter being those who had lost "the juvenility of their youth" and "faded without ever blossoming."

They know nothing of space and of freedom, nothing of frank speech. They bear on their countenances deep traces of a soul roughly handled and wounded. Every one of them had some special neurosis, and apart from that special neurosis they all had one in common, a sort of devouring, irritable and distorted vanity . . . . All of them were hypochondriacs and physically ill, did not drink wine and were afraid of open windows; all looked with studied despair at the present, and reminded one of monks who from love for their neighbors came to hating all humanity, and cursed everything in the world from a desire to bless something . . . . they mournfully reproach people for dining without
gnashing their teeth and for forgetting the miseries of this world while admiring a picture or listening to music.  

While he pointed the finger at Chernyshevsky, Herzen was prophesying a Nechayev. In 1865, realizing that the age of the "superflous men," the refined gentlemen, had passed, Herzen wrote in his Letter to an Opponent that "you and I were what we were because of our circumstances and out of necessity: pleading our cause, theoreticians, bookish blockheads, secretly wedded to our ideas . . . ." In a letter to Ogarev in 1868 he appears to be reconciled to the disappearance of his general from the stage of history: "You and I belong to the old pioneers, to the 'sowers,' who early in the morning, about forty years ago, went out to plough the land, over which Nicholas indulged in his savage manhunting, trampling down everything—fruit and buds. The seeds which we and our few friends inherited from our great predecessors we threw into new furrows and nothing perished . . . . The new generation is going its way. It does not need our advice. It has come of age, and is aware of that. To others we have nothing to say."  

There was something symbolic, something of historical irony in the demise of Herzen's old Bell and its brief resurrection by Nechayev; it was also a confirmation of the facts of life. The old days of good intentions and fine words had gone, it was now the turn of what Herzen termed "the bilious ones," the men of action.

Bakunin was attacking himself and his own generation, when, in the appendix to his essay, Statism and Revolution, he wrote about "the fanatical doctinaires who call themselves free in thought . . . . most of them very poor revolutionaries, egoists and cowards, seeking only praise." Their background made them members of the educated class, and they were fearful for the comforts, the refinements and the hollow spiritual delights that filled the lives of this class. "They understood that the essence and the aim of a popular revolution was of itself coarse and lacking in finesse, that it would not hesitate to destroy the world of the bourgeoisie in which they lived so comfortably, thus . . . they were not eager for revolution, were in fact fearful of it." When he spoke of this class as "swindlers, most of them deceiving themselves, who are not prepared to give up any of the conveniences and pleasures that are so characteristic of a minority that possesses privilege and property within the existing society and who, at the same time, try to adopt as their own the title of revolutionaries, just so long as this is not connected with too much inconvenience," Bakunin thus struck out at the broad category of intellectuals belonging to his own generation. In condemning them to their fate, in declaring that "all words are vain, until such time as the revolution makes it possible to bare their true faces and take its vengeance upon them," Bakunin in fact sealed his own fate and foretold that waiting for an entire generation.

Nechayev, for his part, wasted few words and instead tried to "bare the true face" of this generation. He settled his account with Herzen and Bakunin in the most biting terms in an article published in London in a paper called Obshchina. Writing in the first issue (of the two that
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appeared), Nechayev said that the old generation, of which Herzen had been one of the leaders, marked the last flowering of the liberal lord, "the theoretical radicalism of Herzen was nothing more than a hothouse for flowering plants which, while they did remarkably well in the artificial temperature of an assured standard of living, dropped rapidly on their first contact with the cool air of action in reality." Against this generation, Nechayev juxtaposed his own, "We have no time for amusements. We have been depressed by the atmosphere of social backwardness, and since those amateurs have given us nothing, cannot lead us, we have turned our backs upon them in scorn. Our brothers starved to death before our very eyes, our eyes heard the whistle of the whip that lashed our fathers, and the sobbing of our sisters sold for a crust of bread. The fire of rebellion burns in our veins, our minds seek a way to redemption that shall lead to another form of life."41

NECHAYEVIAN DEED AND ORGANIZATION

Nechayev cannot then be pinned down by reference to a certain theoretical weltanschaung. His weltanschaung was action. Within the student circles with which he was connected he was distinguished neither by his intellectual level nor by his influence as an ideologist or political thinker. Yet there was one quality which marked him out as a central figure, "a daring, which in him amounted almost to cruelty" and a "dedication to the people's cause." It was these qualities and his sharp-mindedness that influenced those who were superior to him in education. Surprisingly, Nechayev, to whom friendship and friends were no more than tools towards revolutionary action, and who in fact led many into long years of imprisonment and exile, never for all that aroused in them any lasting feelings of hatred or revenge. When brought to trial, they never denied him, and almost all left behind memoirs that spoke sympathetically of his personality;42 even Bakunin, who was hurt by him and knew how to hate, was for all that never able to free himself of Nechayev's particular magic. Nechayev rejected all discussion of the society of the future and of "revolutions on paper," for "we have lost all faith in words," he wrote, while in the first issue of the resurrected Bell, he declared that "we hold out our hands to all who are ready to take part with us in overthrowing the Czarist regime in Russia, and to do so not in words alone, but in deed too."43

Nechayev developed the techniques of revolutionary conspiracy, of propaganda and of modern terrorism as a consequence of his ideology of the deed. True, despite all the conspiracies and the sophisticated underground systems that he adopted, his organization was exploded and overthrown; yet despite this, Nechayevian revolutionary techniques were to appear time and again through the years that led up to the triumph of the Russian Revolution. Thus, his personality and his historic contribution are under favorably critical review by Soviet historians.44

Contrary to what is generally thought, Nechayev's organization was no inconsiderable affair. In this matter Bakunin was not the victim of a fraud. The real fiction was not that which was presented by Nechayev,
but rather that "European Revolutionary Alliance" and its "Central Committee" which Bakunin allegedly represented. Within a short time, Nechayev was able to set up a broad student organization with some forty members and some 400 associates. "It is a fact," writes A. Lehning, "that Nechaev succeeded in creating what was, for his period at least, a very strong organization of student youth." In the course of the searches mounted subsequent to the arrests of November 1869, two documents were found that had been published by this group and that bore a seal in the centre of which was an axe and the signature "The Committee of the People's Vengeance"—the date was that of February 19, 1870, the day on which it was expected that revolution would break out. The two documents include the *General Statutes of the Organization* and *The General Statutes for the Network of Branches*. Together they provide a picture of the Nechayevian organization not as it was in reality but as it was meant to be, with a very clear Buonarotti-Blanqui influence, in Russian guise. At the centre stood the entire fictitious and mythical "Central Committee." The network itself was built of a carefully graded system of nuclei and periphery, founded on secrecy and discipline and the careful delineation of spheres of activity. Because of their relevance to the development of the terrorist movement I cite them below virtually in full.

**THE GENERAL STATUTES OF THE ORGANIZATION AND FOR THE NETWORK OF THE BRANCHES**

The following articles of the Nechayevian *General Statutes of the Organization* and the *General Statutes for the Network of Branches* exemplify the characteristic traits of this new type of revolutionary underground:

i. The structure of the organization is based on individual trust . . . .

iii. The structure of the organization is kept secret from all idle inquiry; hence the range of contacts and the course of activity remain secret to all save the members of the central group to whom the organizer submits reports at specified times . . . .

vii. The general rule of the organization is not to convince, but rather to unite all the existing forces; thus all discussion that has no direct bearing on the practical aim is to be eliminated.

viii. The organizers are not to be asked questions about the activities of the circles under their control.

[From the *General Statute of the Organization*]

vii. All those organized in accordance with the general statutes are to see themselves as the means of or the tools for the achievement of the organization's purpose and are to use themselves to this end. The branch members alone shall know the real programme in respect of any operation that it has to carry out. Under no circumstances should those who are required to take some
part in the operation, or to carry it out, know its true purpose. Such knowledge shall be confined to those details, those parts of the operation which it has fallen to their lot to perform. In order to arouse their enthusiasm it is vital to represent the nature of the operation in a false light.

viii. The plan for an operation initiated by the members shall be made known to the committee and its implementation shall be conditional upon their agreement . . .

xi. As to financial resources: these are to be raised from members of the association, from supporters, and from parties and concerts arranged for fictitious purposes. Operations against private persons [Author’s note: what is meant here are blackmail and minor expropriations] are not to be so excessive in scope as to be beyond the powers of those carrying them out, but they are to help implementing them in accordance with the instructions of the committee. [Author’s note: what is meant here are large expropriations] One third of all proceeds shall be handed over to the committee.

xii. Essential conditions for the start of branch operations are:
   a) the setting up of dens;
   b) infiltration of the milieus of peddlers, bakers, etc. by quick practical men from among those in the branch;
   c) acquaintance with public gossip and with whores and with the means of spreading rumours;
   d) acquaintance with the police and with the veteran clerks;
   e) the making of connections with the so-called criminal world;
   f) influence over high-ranking persons via their womenfolk;
   g) the literary intelligentsia;
   h) the carrying on of propaganda via all possible means.

It should be noted that this copy of the statutes is not intended for circulation, but should be kept in the branch.

[From the General Statutes for the Network]

In reality, Nechayev's dictates were fated to be implemented by other, later, revolutionary groups. The Executive Committee seal with its axe appeared on the broadsheets issued by Osinsky with the start of the new wave of terror in the south at the end of the 1870s, but it was then only a Nechayevian fiction. It came into real being only with the establishment of the Narodnaya Volya. The active organization, those who undertook the work, were in fact the members of the Executive Committee; however, both for internal and external consumption, both during the trials and the imprisonment, this group was the invisible, all-powerful "general staff" of the revolution, while its members, when caught, declared themselves to be only its second or third class agents.
When contact was established between the Executive Committee of the Narodnaya Volya and the imprisoned Nechayev, the latter wrote in praise of the new body, but he also added a typical criticism: how, he asked, was it possible that the "awesome and all-powerful" Executive Committee should publish a report on unimportant financial contributions. Nechayev, consistent and with a very simplistic approach, nevertheless thoroughly understood that a legend must surround itself with glory and uplift if it was to be accepted by the people, and that such detail as the Narodnaya Volya had reported was counterproductive.

NACHAYEVIAN TERROR

Comprehensive terror occupied an important role in Nechayev's scheme of operations. After Karakozov's attempt on the Czar's life on April 4, 1886, Nechayev wrote that "the Karakozov affair was . . . the prologue. Let us try to ensure, friends, that the drama itself commences as soon as possible." In the first issue of The People's Vengeance which appeared in August 1869, he wrote that "secret societies which show no outward, practical sign of activity at all are in our opinion nothing more than a ridiculous, abominable, childish game . . . with no thought for our lives, and undaunted by any threats, dangers or difficulties, we must, by means of a succession of individual acts and sacrifices which follow a strictly ordered and agreed plan, by means of a series of bold, nay, audacious ventures, burst into the life of the people, and when we have inspired them to faith in us and in themselves, must unite them and stir them to the solemn accomplishment of their own task . . . ."

In the Catechism of a Revolutionary, Nechayev delineates the vision of a rational terror motivated not by revenge and impulse, but by considerations of efficiency and efficacy alone. Such terror is intended to inspire fear in the faint-hearted members of the regime's leadership and to tear down the supporting pillars of the existing order and administration, but on the other hand it should not necessarily be aimed at the cruel or the tyrannical who particularly oppress the people. A list is to be drawn up comprising those destined to be targets for destruction or exploitation, and this list should be headed by the intelligent and talented members of the regime who are particularly dangerous to the revolutionary organization — for it is their murder that Nechayev sees as likely to strike special fear into the hearts of the government, while "depriving it of its cleverest and most energetic figures will shatter its strength." "The second category must consist of those who are granted temporary reprieve to live, solely in order that their bestial behavior shall drive the people to inevitable revolt." Lower down on the list are the liberals and the doctrinaires, frivolous women and conceited, foolish members of the regime who are to be thoroughly intimidated and then exploited to the utmost.

Yet another factor linking Nechayevian terror to modern terror is the stress on the creation of a revolutionary elite. The standard bearers of the techniques of revolution are a small group of professional revolutionaries, men whose fate is sealed, who are ready at the outset to lay
down their lives beneath the galloping hooves of the victorious revolu­
tionary chariots. "The revolutionary is a dedicated man, merciless
towards the state and towards the whole of educated and privileged
society in general; and he must expect no mercy from them either. Bet­
ween him and them there exists, declared or undeclared, an unceasing
and irreconcilable war for life and death." The terrorist’s right to
destroy and to engage in acts of cruelty is won at the expense of his life,
and at the cost of a self-inflicted destruction of his own personality.

In summary, the Bakunin-Nechayev alliance was no passing episode
or tale of tragic misunderstanding. No one looking at the letter written
by Bakunin to his friends on June 20, 1870 can attach importance to the
repeatedly renewed discussion as to the true part that Bakunin played in
the formulation of the Catechism. In fact, what emerges is that the
Catechism was in large measure the expression of Bakunin’s thought, but
that it was Nechayev who carried it out — in deeds.

Endnotes

1. J. Joll in The Anarchists (pp. 95, 96) and R. Hunter in Violence and the Labour Move­
ment (pp. 10, 11), both see Bakunin as the Father of Terrorism, as does E.H. Carr,
paganda of action," writes E.V. Zenkere, in Anarchism, A Criticism and History of
the Anarchist Theory (New York and London: 1897) "was the pretty embellishment
with which the West received back Anarchism from Russian hands in the era of the six­
ties and seventies. Bakunin was entrusted with the gloomy mission of handing this gift
over to us . . . ." (p. 148).

117.


5. See Lampert, Studies, p. 122.

6. See Lampert, Studies, p. 127. On Bakunin’s Confessions, published in 1921 only see
E.H. Carr, Bakunin, pp. 221-228. Yaroslavsky notes that behaviour such as this was
judged as betrayal by the political prisoners (p. 14). But while one may possibly under­
stand the episode of the confession in light of his terrible circumstances, it is more dif­
ficult to understand the letter he wrote to his land-owner brother in which he justifies
the beating of his peasant serfs. See E. Yaroslavsky, History of Anarchism in Russia

7. See Lampert, Studies, pp. 121, 127.

8. Carr declares categorically that Bakunin was impotent. Lampert says that his marriage
to Antonia Kvyatkovskaya, 25 years his junior, was only in name only. The father of
his children was Carlo Gambuzzi, a member of his Naples Circle. Katkov hurled up at
him the charge that he was a eunuch and spat in his face. The pornographic novel that
he never quite finished testifies to his scarred psyche, featuring as it does a hero who
rapes three virgins at their father’s request. Lampert, Studies, pp. 125 ff, and E.H.
Carr, Bakunin, pp. 90, 91.


10. See Lampert, Studies, p. 125.

11. Dostoevsky, while writing The Devils, wrote in his diary: "N.B. everything is to be
found in Stavrogin’s personality, Stavrogin is everything." To Katkov he wrote:
"Nicolay Stavrogin is a gloomy character . . . a monster. Yet, it seems to me that his is
a tragic character, he is, I think, a truly Russian type, I have wrung him out from my
very soul." See M. Confino, "Bakunin et Necaev," Cahiers du Monde Russe et


19. Ibid., pp. 252-55.


25. A. Camus contends that “Bakunin was fascinated by Nechayev because he recognized in him that implacable figure the type of human being that he recommended and what he himself would have been if he had been able to silence his heart” (italics added), Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (London: Penguin, 1967), p. 129.


30. Ibid., p. 323.


32. B. Nikolayevsky “Gaspar Michal Turski,” *Kat. i Ssylka*, 23(1926), pp. 211-227. Gaspar Tursky was born in 1847, son of a Polish land-owner in the province of Kherson. He was educated first in Odessa and later at the University of Kharkov. In 1867-68 he was brought to trial for political offences and exiled to Archangelsk, but escaped a year later and spent the next 56 years as an exile. In 1870, he found himself in Paris, deep under the influence of Blanquism. After participating in the Commune, he fled to Switzerland. In the middle of the controversy that swept through the exiles, Russian and Polish alike, Tursky opposed the Bakuninist trend. At this point, Nechayev was hiding out in Zurich and a close connection developed between the two men. Tkachev, too, arriving in Zurich in 1874, was drawn into the group of which Tursky was leader and moving spirit. In answer to Nikolayevsky's questions, Zemfir Ralli said that in his opinion Nechayev was no Blanquist, but rather a Republican who admired Robespierre. He was not a socialist and did not know Marx; he understood neither the International nor the Commune. He was one of Felix Pyatt's disciples, and the latter was then an ardent proponent of political terror, seeing himself as a successor to the Jacobins, d la Robespierre. Ralli also relates that Tursky was behind the attack on Stempovsky, the man who turned Nechayev in (pp. 216-218). As for the 'Nabat' group, Nikolayevsky asserts that Tkachev was the central theoretician, yet Tursky was tactically the central figure. The 1877-78 articles endorsing personal terror were his
work, while Tkachev, who favoured terror only against informers and provocateurs, was forced to accept their publication or leave the journal (pp. 218-222). Such Jacobin groups went into a decline after 1881, although in 1888-89 there was an unsuccessful attempt to resurrect them. After 1890, Tursky swung over to the PPS and the Polish movement. On the connection between Nechayev and Tkachev, and the essay the two co-authored on the Blanquist programme, see, B.P. Kozmin, *Iz Istoriy Revol. Dvizheniya*, pp. 356-9; on connections between Tkachev and the Tursky group, see, pp. 364-367 and on Blanquist influence see, F. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, N80-82, pp. 779-781.


40. Here, *inter alia* the familiar strains of the “Catechism of the Revolutionary” are again to be heard. The revolutionary, says Bakunin, having cut all his ties is to see himself as the valuable “capital” of the revolution, belonging simply and solely to that cause. *Revolutsyonnoye Narodnichesivo 70-ch godov* (Moskva: 1964), pp. 38-55.


42. M. Confino *Bakunin et Necaev*, p. 68.

43. Ibid., p. 71.

44. Jonathan Frenkel, “Party Genealogy and the Soviet Historians, 1920-1938,” *Slavic Review*, vol. XXV, no. 4 (December 1966), pp. 571-2, 578. As early as the 1920s, M. Pokrovsky was claiming that the revolutionary program “fulfilled almost word for word in 1917” first made its appearance among the Nechayevian circles in 1868. M. Pokrovsky, *Ocherki po Istoriy Revolutsyonovo Dvizheniya V Rossiyi* (Krasnaya: Nov. 1924), p. 64.

45. A. Lehning, “Bakounine et ses Relations,” intr., p. XVII.


47. Bakunin felt no squeamishness about the implementation of the great expropriations in partnership with Nechayev; he merely insisted that they be carried out on the basis of intelligence work concerning the location and the persons to be robbed and that they be characterized by some “sense.” This is testified to in a letter from Bakunin to Mrozkovsky, of August 19, 1870, see: *Daughter of a Revolutionary*, pp. 317, 318 (doc. 102); and Jan Kucharzewski, *Od Bialego Caratu do Czerwonego* (Warszawa: 1931), T. IV, pp. 427, 428.

49. In a letter to Herzen and Ogarev of 19.6.1866 Bakunin writes concerning the Karakozov affair: "Not for anything in the world would I have thrown a stone at Karakozov. Like you, I think that no good can come out of regicide in Russia . . . but I am not at all surprised that in the stress of the present situation a man has come who imagines that the Gordian knot can be cut with one stroke. I sincerely respect him for thinking this and for accomplishing his purpose." M. Bakunin Selected Writings, ed. by A. Lehning (London: 1973), pp. 61, 2.

50. See "Nechayeff's Revolutionary Catechism" in David C. Rapoport, Assassination and Terrorism (Toronto: 1971), Appendix, pp. 79-84. "Nechayeff's generation," writes Rapoport, "was the first to be fully conscious of its destiny, of its obligation: 'Terrible, total, complete, destruction' . . .", p. 49.