Linkages Between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism

by

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INTRODUCTION

The illegal traffic in drugs has moved to centre-stage as an issue of concern to all countries. It has reached such proportions that it is able to influence international financial flows, affect domestic economies and development plans, and contribute to political instability. It has become a significant source of friction between consumer and producer states. It has implications for national security and international harmony.

For many, a development which has contributed considerably to these concerns is the forging of links between drug traffickers and various sorts of terrorist and insurgent organizations. Traffickers and terrorists are each seen in isolation as considerable threats to the welfare of states and the international system, but their conjunction is seen as even more frightening and sinister. This paper argues, however, that much of the debate about these linkages, and the fears and responses generated by them, is based on an inadequate analysis of the problem. One basis of this inadequacy is continual reference to a phenomenon known as 'narcoterrorism.' This categorizes and combines together a wide range of different sorts of links between drug traffickers and a myriad of different exponents of political violence. By treating this disparate group, with widely divergent motives and types of relationships with drugs, as a coherent entity we have failed adequately to define the nature of the threat posed by the drug/political violence linkages and have often descended merely into emotive name-calling and scare-mongering. The catchword 'narcoterrorism' therefore needs to be examined seriously to determine its adequacy as a pivotal concept in this debate.

THE POWER OF CATCHWORDS

Catchwords may serve many purposes. They may encapsulate a complex concept or phenomenon and serve as a convenient shorthand which facilitates discussion. They may serve as a focus, a rallying point, or a call to action. As with all simplifications, however, catchwords must at some point be examined critically to ensure that their use does not become dysfunctional. Often, catchwords are both the cause and the effect of conceptual confusion. They are ideal vehicles for propagandizing an issue. They can serve to blur distinctions, inflate threats, inspire unrealistic expectations and motivate unworkable or counter-productive solutions.

'Narcoterrorism' is a catchword of some contemporary currency. It is a word pregnant with implication. In the contexts in which it is used, it often implies a conspiracy with strategic as well as tactical goals. It
implies a new kind of threat, different in both type and degree from that posed by either drug trafficking or political terrorism alone. Increasingly, it is viewed as a global phenomenon which can be conceptualized in the same terms wherever it occurs. ‘Narcoterrorism’ has emerged as a potent weapon in the propaganda war waged by governments against terrorists, insurgents, organized crime, drug traffickers, and even other sovereign states.

Many important questions are raised, however, by the use of this catchword. First, of course, is the question of definition. Just what is narcoterrorism? Next are questions of evidence. However we define it, what evidence do we have of the extent and nature of narcoterrorism? Is it the result of a temporary coincidence of needs, a marriage of convenience between traffickers and terrorists, or does it have longer-term, broader, more strategic aims? Does it reflect a deep-seated conspiracy or merely a tactical accommodation? What is the nature of the threat? How does the conjoining of terrorists with drug traffickers affect the dangers posed by either drug abuse or terrorism in isolation? Are different types or levels of threat posed by different combinations of terrorists or insurgents with traffickers? Are the threats essentially those of a domestic nature, facing either drug producer or consumer countries, or are they of an international nature, threatening to undermine vital national interests which have security implications for regions or for the international community more generally? Finally, there are questions of the policy implications of answers to the foregoing questions. Should narcoterrorism be viewed as an enforcement issue, a foreign policy issue, or a security and military issue (or some combination of these)? Does the term have any real policy relevance at all, or does it embrace too many disparate phenomena to be useful? Is its use primarily as a propaganda tool, rather than as an analytical one? These are questions which have as yet been unanswered or avoided in much of the current debate about narcoterrorism. They are issues which need to be examined if the concept of narcoterrorism is to have meaning and is to be used responsibly as part of the debate addressing how best to combat the international traffic in illegal drugs. It is the purpose of this paper to stimulate some of this necessary questioning process.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Defining the parameters of narcoterrorism is of importance in ensuring precision of analysis, evaluation of evidence, and determination of policy. There is little difficulty in reaching agreement about what constitutes international drug trafficking, which is represented by the ‘narco’ part of the term ‘narcoterrorism.’ It is "the illicit movement of prohibited drugs across international borders by individuals, groups or states for financial gain and/or political purposes."1 The terrorism part of the word, however, poses all the difficulties inherent in defining that concept which has always bedevilled analysts, legislators and diplomats.2 For the purposes of the present discussion, political terrorism is defined as "the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group,
whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators."

In general, this implies a distinction between terrorism and other forms of political violence such as guerrilla warfare or insurgency (which may include terrorist tactics, but need not necessarily do so). Although the distinction between terrorism and insurgency is often blurred in practice, there are broad differences in major tactics. Whereas the essence of a terrorist campaign is to use fear as a multiplier to make up for a deficiency of force, an insurgency generally involves the application of small-unit forces in direct conflict with military forces, albeit using irregular tactics. Eventually, many insurgencies aim to build up their forces to such an extent as to be able to confront their enemies in more conventional conflict. This being so, insurgents will have forces in existence and will often occupy or at least effectively control territory. Such is seldom the case with terrorists. The confusion is engendered by the fact that terrorism may evolve into insurgency and that insurgents may sometimes employ terrorism. Nevertheless, in most cases the scale of the conflict or the predominance of tactics of one sort or another will allow a reasonably easy decision to be made about categorizing the violence as essentially terrorist or insurgent in nature. Distinguishing between terrorism and insurgency is not only an academic question. It is of direct relevance to the determination of countermeasures. Although, once again, there may be features common to both counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, there will usually be significant differences (for example, counter-terrorism can often be approached within a law enforcement framework, whereas counter-insurgency will usually be a primarily military concern). If the distinctions between terrorism and insurgency have any meaning, and I believe they do, then whatever the term ‘narcoterrorism’ means it cannot be used in relation to insurgencies. It follows that the term ‘narcoterrorism’ is of limited value, except as a centrepiece of political rhetoric or as a headline for the news media, since many of the cases cited as instances of narcoterrorism (especially those in South America and South East Asia) in fact refer to the involvement of insurgents with drug traffickers. Where ‘narcoterrorism’ is used as an analytical concept intended to convey information about the dimensions of an activity and methods of countering it, it must have well defined boundaries and not subsume under the one rubric a variety of activities of different types, involving different sorts of actors and having a range of (sometimes contradictory) law enforcement and national security implications. In fact, these conditions are violated by most uses of the term ‘narcoterrorism’. The catchword has now become so inflated and its meanings so many that it has little or no analytical value.

BEYOND NARCOTERRORISM

To suggest that the word ‘narcoterrorism’ has no sensible meaning and should be avoided does not imply that problems raised by the
involvement of drug traffickers with terrorists and insurgents are not real or serious. They are both. But looking at each case of the linkage allows us to define the nature of the relationship more clearly and to tailor our response more precisely. In particular, it avoids the temptation to view drugs-terrorism-insurgency links as part of a global conspiracy. This latter view, of terrorists worldwide using the drug trade primarily as a deliberate instrument to further their political aims, has been aired in a number of congressional hearings and in the popular press. For example, Professor Yonah Alexander, in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary, has characterized the situation in the following terms:

... drug trafficking is an important element of low-intensity conflict. It is calculated political-military struggle short of conventional warfare undertaken by states and their sub-state proxies in order to achieve ideological and political objectives.¹

Similarly, in his introductory remarks to the same hearing, Senator Jeremiah Denton specifically argued that we should not look at these events as being unrelated. Speaking of terrorism generally in the context of concern about its links with drug trafficking, the Senator said that:

Although many incidents may appear to be unrelated, historical facts demonstrate that there is, generally, a globally cohesive plan. The plan is laid out in general, even ideological terms. . . . Certainly, not all terrorist acts are related; but many are carried out tactically and strategically from the same book — and I mean that literally — the same book with the same, or similar goals.² [Emphasis added]

In fact, there is no convincing evidence either that drug trafficking is an important element of low-intensity conflict or that there is a globally cohesive plan to make it so. Three cases are frequently cited in support of assertions that penetration of drug trafficking organizations is a deliberate tactic to undermine Western societies as part of a larger strategy of destabilization. One is an alleged Bulgarian Committee for State Security Directive issued in 1970 which is meant to have approved the use of the narcotics trade, among other tools, as part of a plan to hasten the ‘corruption’ of Western democracies. The source of this allegation is an interview with an ex-Bulgarian State Security officer reported by Nathan Adams in an article in Reader's Digest.* There is no independent or documentary verification of this claim. There is substantial evidence of the involvement of Bulgaria, through its state trading agency KINTEX, in both arms and drug smuggling, but the aims of this activity are somewhat more realistic and specific than an intention to undermine Western society by flooding it with drugs. As a 1984 report from the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) makes clear, the immediate goals of the Bulgarian support for both arms and drug smuggling activities are:
1. An attempt to supply and support several dissident groups in the Middle East with Western arms and ammunition, in support of communist revolutionary aims. Payments for arms at times are made by these revolutionary groups with narcotics, which then are smuggled to Western democracies and sold at a considerable profit; and

2. Intelligence gathering requirements which the Bulgarians are able to levy on the various traffickers in both the Middle East and in Western Europe by allowing and supporting such traffic.

As the DE A report states, it may be inferred that an ultimate goal of using drugs as a political weapon is to destabilize Western societies, but there are real questions about how seriously this aim is taken by the Bulgarians and others. First, even if such a tactic could work, and there is considerable doubt about the direction of the cause-effect relationship between drug use and collapse of moral values etc., it would have to be pursued on a much larger scale than is currently obvious if it were to have real impact. To do so would expose the sponsor to much wider condemnation than is currently the case and probably to some form of international action against it. Second, it provides the target countries with a powerful propaganda weapon to use against it, particularly in view of the rising international concern about drug trafficking. Third, if the Bulgarians ceased their support, there is no reason to believe that there would be much (if any) long-term effect on the flow of drugs to consumer countries. This is no reason to be unconcerned about the situation because it obviously affects the way we conduct our relations with Bulgaria. But, understanding this reality should serve to dampen unrealistic expectations. The fact is that demand is a vital determinant of the size of the drug trade. If, as seems to be the case, demand is growing in many countries, then somebody will succeed in supplying it (given that, despite all our best efforts, we interdict only a relatively small proportion of the supply of illegal drugs). It is abundantly clear now just how dynamic the trafficking scene is. Traffickers adapt with relative success in response to law enforcement initiatives, so that both the methods and the players can change quite quickly to re-assert the status quo (in terms of volume of drugs trafficked). If Bulgaria stopped its involvement in the drug traffic it would soon be replaced by a new player.

Another reason for believing that the goal of destabilization by the drug route is little more than rhetoric or wishful thinking is that no country which aids the traffic in illegal drugs has enough power to actually control it. There is a very real danger that having a supply of drugs passing through its territory, having traffickers visit its country for deals to be arranged, and having links between traffickers and criminal elements in its society — all of which describe the situation in Bulgaria — may well lead to the growth of a drug problem within its own borders. Indeed, there is evidence of a significant and growing problem of drug abuse in a number of communist countries. All of these drawbacks indicate that
Bulgaria is motivated by more immediate and practical concerns (as outlined in the DEA report) than by a belief that somehow drug use will sap the strength of the West. The outcomes are too unpredictable and ill-defined and the risks to itself too great to make that the primary goal. Countries like Bulgaria may well take the risk with respect to the danger of promoting drug use within their own borders, however, in order to achieve what, to them, are important immediate goals.

The same basic arguments apply to the case of Nicaragua which currently also stands accused of active participation in the drug traffic as a matter of state policy. Here again the case is made that a major justification for involvement in drug trafficking is an ideological one. For example, a witness who was a former senior member of the Nicaraguan Internal Affairs Ministry testified before a congressional committee that the Sandinista view was that drug trafficking could be an ideological weapon to be used against the United States. He reported a luncheon conversation between senior officials at which the view was expressed that:

... the Yankees did not realise that Yankee imperialism was going to perish, eaten from within by covert ideological subversion, the drug traffic and economic competition with Japan and the European Economic Community.

The lack of logic which sees economic competition, subversion and drug trafficking as equal partners in the overthrow of a so-called imperialist system causes one to suspect that such sentiments are more the product of an overheated revolutionary fervour than a sound plan and a real threat which the United States must take seriously. Once again, it must be stated that deriding such sentiments is not intended to imply that the consequences of drug trafficking are not themselves serious. However, one must be realistic about what these effects are and how much of the traffic can be manipulated for particular ends. There is certainly ample evidence that senior members of Nicaragua’s government are involved in running or protecting aspects of the traffic in drugs, particularly cocaine, to the United States. The Interior Minister Thomas Borge and members of his staff have been implicated by a number of sources including the testimony of one of the former officials of his Ministry, evidence has been collected concerning the activities of cocaine smuggling pilot (and DEA informant) Adler Barriman Seal and protection afforded him at a military airfield northwest of Managua in June 1984, and testimony given by two witnesses previously engaged in narcotics smuggling in Nicaragua. It is still not clear, however, just to what extent these activities reflect state policy as opposed to the corrupt behaviour of high officials. If the latter is the case, then certainly it is known to the Sandinista government as a whole and no effort is made to stop it. To the extent that the activities are condoned by the authorities and funds from drug trafficking are used for the purposes of the regime (and there is evidence that significant amounts are in fact being siphoned off to enrich senior officers personally), the motives appear to be practical ones.
similar to those reflected in Bulgaria's behaviour. Primarily the accommodation with existing drug traffickers produces hard currency which the regime lacks and facilitates the smuggling of arms to terrorist and insurgent groups supported by Managua.

A third obvious candidate for evidence of a conspiracy to employ drug trafficking as a weapon of low-intensity warfare is Castro's Cuba. There are many accusations, much intelligence, and some documented cases pointing to this involvement. The best known case is the so-called Guillot-Lara affair which resulted in the indictment of fourteen persons in 1982, including four senior Cuban officials, in the Federal District Court in Miami. According to the indictment, the Cuban officials agreed to allow Colombian narcotics trafficker Jaime Guillot-Lara to use Cuban waters as a drug transhipment point and sanctuary from US Customs authorities. The advantages to the Cubans from this arrangement were the levying of large payments for their services and the use of the drug trafficking network to smuggle arms to the M-19 Movement in Colombia. In addition to this case, Colombian officials have claimed that aircraft carrying drugs out of Colombia have returned with Cuban-supplied weapons for the FARC guerrilla forces. The 1986 President's Commission on Organized Crime cited "recent reports that indicate that drug traffickers regularly fly through otherwise tightly controlled Cuban airspace . . . [and that] Cuba also reportedly allows Colombian traffickers to offload drugs to other carriers for the final journey to the United States." The report also admitted, however, how difficult it is to distinguish between drug-trafficking by corrupt high-ranking officials and government-sanctioned involvement in the trade. In Cuba, as in Nicaragua, there is little solid evidence of a policy decision to join the drug trade actively, but it seems unbelievable that there is not some degree of official sanction for these activities. Whatever the official status of such cooperation with drug traffickers, there is no evidence from any of these examples of a global conspiracy to use the drug trade as an instrument of low-intensity warfare in its own right. To use the term 'narcoterrorism' to suggest that such a conspiracy exists and that it is a real threat is both to imbue such a tactic with more effect than it is ever likely to have and to confuse the really vital connections between drug traffickers, and terrorists and insurgents.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AS TERRORISM

Before discussing these connections it is also necessary to point out that the term 'narcoterrorism' and discussions about drug trafficking have both been rendered less clear by the expansion of the term 'terrorism' to include the act of drug trafficking itself and the use of extreme violence within the trafficking process. The first part can be dismissed rather easily. Drug trafficking itself cannot be referred to as terrorism because it does not meet any of the definitional requirements of terrorism. It is not violence, in the sense of a hijacking, a bombing or an assassination, which is intended to induce fear in order to coerce an audience into acceding to political demands. It is therefore inaccurate and misleading to inflate the term to include drug trafficking.
The second expansion of the term is more problematic. This is the view that drug traffickers become terrorists when they use terrorist tactics to attain limited political objectives, such as relaxation of enforcement efforts against them or changes of government policy in respect to extradition. For example:

Some drug traffickers have adopted terrorists tactics to fight drug enforcement efforts. While these traffickers are not thought of as terrorists by definition, their use of threats, violence, assassination, and kidnapping is clearly terroristic. These intensified violent acts constitute attempts by drug traffickers to intimidate sovereign governments into weakening or abandoning their drug control policies.\footnote{This is a borderline case as far as being terrorism is concerned. Certainly it must be realized that not all uses of terror constitute terrorism as used in the term "political terrorism." If this were the case, much crime, and certainly all war, would be terrorism, thus making the category so large as to lose analytical usefulness. Much of what is described in the above quotation is the classic Mafia-style attempt at intimidating specific individuals inducing in them a reluctance to carry out their duties; this is not political terrorism. However, where the tactics are used in an attempt to change government policy in relation to enforcement it may properly fall within that category. In either event, it is a problem of increasing seriousness, especially in relation to drug trafficking in Latin America. The consequences are by far the most serious when a government is itself intimidated by traffickers in this manner. It remains true, nevertheless, that to refer to this as terrorism, implying that it is of the same status as other forms of terrorism, is analytically confusing. It is terrorism in the very limited sense of being aimed at a specific policy change with the goal of allowing the commission of a crime. The goals of political terrorism are usually much wider and usually involve attempts to change the nature of the social system in the presumed interests of a broader group than just the terrorists. For these reasons, it is suggested that the analysis is made easier if intimidatory tactics used by drug traffickers are not referred to as instances of terrorism.}

Definitional purism aside, use of such violence to intimidate law enforcement officials or force changes in government policy is a major concern which requires resolute and brave responses. So too does the related development of terrorist tactics and media activities aimed at influencing public opinion about drug enforcement activities. Charles Frost has pointed to a number of incidents which are designed to portray the local government's cooperation with US drug control programs as treasonous.\footnote{For example, in July 1984 a bomb exploded at the University of the Atlantic in Barranquilla, Colombia. In claiming responsibility, a previously unknown group, the Urban Insurrection Front, stated that it was protesting the spraying of marijuana crops in the Sierra Nevada mountains. In Peru, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL)
insurgent movement has also focused on drug eradication programs as a propaganda issue. As DEA official David Westrate stated in evidence before congressional hearings in 1985, commenting on violent attacks against a number of anti-coca projects:

"Sendero Luminoso's ideology is to create a rural-based revolution that will rid the predominantly Indian population of the foreign and 'imperialistic' influences of the United States and the non-Indian governing classes. Many of the Indian peasants make their living from coca cultivation and the Sendero Luminoso has presented the anti-coca issue as an example of the central government attempting to take away the livelihood of the Indian population. This creates a climate that may be encouraging the attacks on anti-coca projects."

The Sendero Luminoso may, in fact, be achieving two aims with these tactics. First, they are exploiting an issue which drives a wedge between the central government and the Indian peasants, thus assisting in their aim of mobilizing them as a revolutionary force. However, they may also be protecting their own involvement in the drug trade. There are persistent rumours of connections between coca producers and Sendero Luminoso. Some local SL commanders seem to export protection money from producers and the links may well be more extensive and more lucrative. The association of Sendero Luminoso with opposition to eradication projects has had implications for the vigour with which the latter are pursued. When the government moved the army into the Huallaga valley in August 1984, in order to contain the insurgents, they virtually stopped protecting eradication workers, even going so far as to confine the anti-narcotics police to their barracks. In order to gain local support for their efforts against the insurgents, the army felt it best not to antagonize the local population by eradicating coca plantations. Such cases illustrate how the requirements of counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist operations can easily conflict with those of anti-narcotics efforts. Since an insurgency will usually be viewed as a direct and immediate threat to national security, the counter-insurgency campaign will inevitably be assigned first place if a conflict of priorities exists. This is one of the benefits for the drug trafficker of aiding the terrorist or insurgent. As long as there is a balance of power such that the terrorists feel they need the expertise of the traffickers and do not take over their organization or set up a competing one, then it pays the traffickers to cooperate with the terrorists by supplying them with arms through their smuggling routes, thus increasing the security threat to the government. The aim is to change the focus from anti-drug operations to anti-terrorist ones.

The problem for the traffickers is in making accurate calculations about the effects of an intensified terrorist campaign. There are real dangers, as well as advantages. In the long-term, the policy of cooperation may be self-defeating if the insurgents win power and if (a very big 'if') they remain ideologically pure. While the Sendero Luminoso, for
example, are willing to exploit the issue of foreign interference in the agricultural practices of peasants, it is less certain that as a governing power they would countenance wholesale trafficking in illegal drugs. With their intimate knowledge of the personalities and precise locations involved in the drug traffic and their enthusiasm for violence untrammeled by legal restraints, such an organization, if it came to power, could well represent a greater threat to the existence of drug trafficking than any legitimate government. To traffickers, such potential dangers are probably given little weight when considering the short-term fortunes to be made.

It is probable, however, that some traffickers, to the extent that they are able, try to calculate the shorter-term impact of the level of their cooperation with terrorists. While in some cases the government may wind back the enforcement effort (particularly in terms of eradication projects) in order to win popular support for counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency initiatives, in others the government may well focus on destroying the terrorism-drugs nexus which is seen as a particularly virulent threat to internal security. In such a case, cooperating with terrorists too far, thereby ensuring them the finance and weapons necessary to make them a more severe threat, may act to increase the resolve of the government to clamp down on both drug runners and terrorists. Indeed, in some circumstances, the appropriate point upon which to apply pressure may primarily be drug trafficking, if that is seen as an essential source of terrorist funds and supplies. The centrality of drugs to the fortunes of some terrorist groups is illustrated by the case of Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombias (FARC), the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party. According to one study, the involvement of FARC in the drug trade enabled it to expand from a fighting strength of little more than 100 in the 1970s to a force of 2,050 armed members supported by 5,000 political cadres by 1984. In such cases, if the government reacts to the problem basically as if it were an insurgency, and gives low priority to anti-drug measures, such actions may form a self-defeating strategy.

THE NATURE OF THE LINKAGES

It has been argued above that it is important in determining relevant policies to move away from a global concept such as 'narcoterrorism' and to look instead at the many different types of connections between drug trafficking and political violence. This may allow a more precise delineation of the problem and assignment of priorities between law enforcement, foreign policy, security and other initiatives. This paper will not present a comprehensive survey of the examples of these connections, as this has been well done elsewhere. Instead, what follows is a selective set of examples of the types of groups involved with drug runners and the types of relationships formed.

Probably the most threatening set of relationships between the drug traffic and political violence currently are to be found in Latin America. As already noted, both Nicaragua and Cuba have been implicated in the
provision of sanctuary to drug traffickers in return for cash payments and the use of the trafficking network to supply arms to terrorist and insurgent groups in the drug producing countries. The evidence for the precise nature of these links, particularly regarding whether or not such cooperation is a matter of national policy or merely the turning of a blind eye to high-level corruption and/or independent initiative, is imprecise. What does appear to be certain, however, is that the accommodation exists and that its primary motives are practical ones — obtaining hard cash and shipping weapons to groups supported by the regimes.

In Peru, the case of Sendero Luminoso again poses a series of difficult problems in the interpretation of various types of information. The Peruvian authorities certainly believe there are close connections involving either SL operatives extorting protection money from drug growers or actual trafficking, but there is no independent confirmation of this. Rather, it seems that the relationship is one of convenience based on the fact that both groups operate in inaccessible rural areas in opposition to the government. The State Department believes that the SL and narcotics interests cooperate to the extent that the former sometimes protect the latter, but that they operate separately. Weapons seized from terrorists do not seem to be those one would expect if drug trafficking routes were being used to smuggle arms from abroad. For the SL the importance of the drug cultivation is its existence as an issue to be exploited for propaganda purposes and the coca growers are fertile ground for SL recruitment efforts. In spite of these connections, however, I believe the conclusion drawn by the State Department about the level of terrorist-inspired violence is an accurate one:

It should be clearly understood that a considerable amount of the violence in the Upper Huallaga Valley is *criminally motivated and without ideological connotations*. Repeated threats to and attacks on coca eradication workers and bombings of narcotics program headquarters have not been accompanied by standard terrorist propaganda. [Emphasis added]

Bolivia represents perhaps the clearest case of sheer lawlessness being cited as narcoterrorism. This country has the dubious distinction of having been the world’s only example of a government run by and for the *narcotraficantes* (drug traffickers). It suffers from endemic corruption, economic chaos and chronic political instability. Considerable tracts of the countryside, including massive areas such as the Chaparé are not under the control of the government and are effectively run by the armed gangs employed by the *narcotraficantes*. The importance of the illegal drug trade to the economy is unparalleled. The head of the Bolivian President’s Advisory Committee on Narcotics said in 1983 that 300,000 people (or 5 per cent of the population) are involved in cultivating, processing and transporting coca and its products. Other estimates range as high as half a million. As then Bolivian Vice President Jaime Paz Zamora told the *New York Times* in mid-1984: “The real Central Bank of Bolivia isn’t in La Paz. It’s in the Chaparé.”
A situation such as this has led to considerable and perpetual violence which is often mentioned in discussions of narcoterrorism. Yet it is in cases like that of Bolivia, that the emptiness of the term is shown up. Although accusations are made frequently that attempts are being undertaken to develop links between drug traffickers and politically violent groups, there is no reliable evidence of direct relationships between traffickers and political terrorists. The amount of violence and the control exerted by the traffickers is so great that terrorists would have nothing to offer any of the major drug-running organizations. The latter have the funds, the personnel and the arms to control territory themselves — and they do so ruthlessly. In Bolivia, the traffickers themselves constitute a serious threat to the security of the state.

The country which has the most publicized and direct links between terrorists and drug traffickers is Colombia. The most extensively involved group is FARC, mentioned earlier, which has extorted protection money from growers, dealt with the traffickers in order to obtain arms and, in some cases, actually controlled the drug trafficking activities directly. In some areas FARC literally taxes the coca industry, one of its 25-odd guerrilla fronts allegedly earning US$3.8 million per month from the tax. In addition, FARC guarantees drug traffickers access to vital clandestine airfields in areas it controls, provides traffickers with warnings of the impending arrival of police or military forces and on occasion has harassed or interdicted these forces as they move through strategic points controlled by the insurgents. The benefits to both sides of the relationship are direct and obvious. The traffickers obtain protection and other services which insulate them from the effects of law enforcement operations; the terrorists or insurgents get money and weapons.

A similar nexus exists in Colombia between the 19th of April Movement (M-19), with about 900 activists, and major drug traffickers. The best known of these links was with leading trafficker Jaime Guillot-Lara who, as noted earlier, supplied M-19 with guns from Cuba in return for Cuban assistance in his smuggling efforts in the form of sanctuary for his boats as they transited through Cuban waters. This relationship, although successful for both sides in limited ways, has not been without its problems. First, there is evidence of an ideological debate within M-19 of the propriety (in terms of revolutionary theory) of the relationship. In earlier times, the movement had been directly at odds with the traffickers because of their tactic of kidnapping the relatives of wealthy drug smugglers for ransom. The traffickers responded to this by forming their own retaliatory group known as Death to Kidnappers (MAS). It appears, too, that the relationship may be under question because M-19's involvement does not seem to have developed to the same extent as FARC's and, indeed, the movement seems to face competition from two other groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), which are reported to be 'taxing' drug growers and traffickers in M-19's areas of operation.

It is also to be expected that these relationships should be unstable ones due to the lack of ideological affinity between the two groups. As Richard Craig has noted:
Colombian guerrilla leaders and smuggling lords differ dramatically in ideological orientation. Replicating the Peruvian scenario, the former are leftist radicals bent on bringing down the system; the latter simply want the system to let them be. More to the point, Carlos Lehder and Pablo Escobar [major narcotraficantes] have gone public on several occasions to reaffirm their patriotism, denounce political extremism, and distinguish themselves unequivocably from guerrillas.

The Latin American examples, of which the above are representative rather than all-inclusive, show something of the range of relationships which might exist between drug traffickers and extremist political groups. They show why grouping them all together as one entity makes no sense and discourages analysis which may lead to the development of counter-measures tailored to the dimensions of particular relationships.

Examples of other links from other regions of the world reinforce the necessity for detailed analysis of the characteristics of the relationships and their policy and operational implications. The second most frequently cited set of drug trafficking/political extremist linkages comes from South East Asia and the control of the heroin trade in the Golden Triangle region encompassing the mountainous border regions of Western Burma, China's Yunnan Province, eastern Laos and the north-west provinces of Thailand. Use of the term 'narcoterrorism' to refer to activities in this area are particularly inaccurate and misleading because the groups involved are clearly insurgent in nature, rather than terrorist. There are other differences as well. In general, they are fairly isolated groups not functioning as part of a loose coalition of international extremist organizations, as are many of the Latin American groups. Their control of the drug traffic is much more direct than in almost any other part of the world. In many cases, the groups are themselves the traffickers. These are not examples of an accommodation between two outlaw groups but of the integration of functions. Profits from drugs have become so central to the continuation of the insurgency that in many cases the insurgents have taken over the trade altogether.

The catalogue of groups active in the Golden Triangle is lengthy and composed of many different types. Jon Want divides the groups active on the Shan plateau, the major opium-producing area, into four categories:

(i) Ethnic insurgents covering a wide span of Shan separatist movements. The principal organization is the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and its military arm, the Shan State Army (SSA). Other organizations include the Shan Nationalities Liberation Group, the Lahu State Army, the Wa National Army, the Karen National Progress Party and the Kachin Independence Army. These groups all maintain armed forces and have been or are involved in various relationships with the opium trade. Their participation includes control of trafficking by taxing of opium passing through their area of control to
refineries, provision of protection to refineries, running of refineries, and operation of opium caravans to the border. Some of the organizations have a variable or minor role in the trade while others are key organizations.

(ii) Revolutionary organizations which seek to overthrow the central government, rather than create a separate state. The principal group is the Burmese Communist Party (BCP). The BCP apparently decided to move more deeply into the drug trade in about 1979 as an alternative source of finance as a result of reductions in support from China following improved relations with Rangoon. Prior to this time the BCP Central Committee had publicly opposed opium cultivation and narcotics trafficking, although local leaders certainly acted as middlemen in selling opium. With the decision to seek funds from the trade, however, the BCP developed its own narcotics production and sales capacity. It has links, too, with other insurgent organizations giving the BCP access to wider local markets and buying arms from the Shan United Army (SUA) in return for opium from BCP controlled areas.

(iii) Warlord organizations which have existed in some form in the northern and eastern Shan State since the eighteenth century, and whose major activities are producing and trafficking narcotics and controlling the illicit trade routes. These groups have been mobilized as irregular forces at various times, notably by the Kuomintang during the Sino-Japanese War and World War II and more recently by the Thai Army Supreme Command which has used the soldiers of one organization, the Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF-third generation remnants of the KMT divisions which retreated into Burma in 1949-50 after the communists took over in China) on some security operations. In the 1960s, the Burmese government deputized fifty of the warlord armies as mobile militias called Ka Kwei Yei (KKY), which were allowed to engage in smuggling opium and other goods in return for their help in fighting a Chinese-backed Burmese Communist insurgency. The KKY were outlawed again in 1971-73, following which a number moved more deeply into the narcotics trade. The major warlord organization is the Shan United Army commanded by Chang Chi-fu. By 1978, the SUA "was the most important narcotics trafficking organization [in the Thai-Burmese border area], and Chang Chi-fu had emerged as the undisputed king of the Golden Triangle."35

(iv) The final group described by Wiant is composed of syndicates and consortia of traffickers which provide heroin laboratories for those insurgent groups which do not operate their own. It is these syndicates which move the heroin into the international drug distribution system.
The complex array of groups in the Golden Triangle and their varying degrees of involvement in the drug trade illustrate the difficulties of adopting a general approach to the drugs/insurgency problem. The governments, especially those of Thailand and Burma, have been equivocal in their policy towards the groups. While viewing the groups as a security problem, both countries have at times done little about their activities because the groups have been viewed as a buffer against communist insurgency in the border area. In Thailand, fear of provoking an uprising has limited the government’s efforts to eradicate opium production in some areas. However, since 1981, when they changed their policy on border sanctuaries, the Thais have attacked the major groups running trafficking operations on Thai territory and pushed the refineries back across the border into Burma.

The Golden Triangle examples also illustrate the impact that drug involvement may have on insurgent groups. Once a viable insurgency, the SUA, for example, has concentrated so much of its resources on the drug trade that it has effectively ceased to be a political organization. Links between insurgents, terrorists and drug traffickers are evident in many other parts of the world. It seems clear that some of the funding for the mujahedin struggle against the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan is derived from opium production. Trafficking heroin at least partially to fund the separatist struggle being waged by the Tamils in Sri Lanka has become a major drug law enforcement problem for a number of countries in recent years as Tamils have established major trafficking networks into Europe.

Europe itself has seen a number of drug/terrorism connections. The heroin trade has produced income for urban terrorists in Turkey. The Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left) group was shown by a police investigation in 1981 to have sold heroin to finance arms purchases, as has the right-wing terrorist group, the Grey Wolves. This latter group has close links with the Turkish Mafia and with Bulgarian intelligence services. Other groups posing security problems for the Turkish authorities have also had drug links. There is evidence that Kurdish separatists have received money from drug trafficking and used it to purchase arms. Armenian groups have also featured in drug investigations. Since the Lebanon became a major base for American terrorists and because of their close links with Palestinian groups themselves entrenched in the drug trade, it is no surprise to find links between the Armenians and the traffickers. The Turks themselves have vigorously pursued claims of such involvement in recent years. One of the major Armenian terrorist groups, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) has itself indicated links with the drug trade by issuing threats on behalf of a group of Armenian narcotics traffickers arrested by Swedish police in 1981.

Mainstream European terrorist groups have on many occasions been accused of having drug trafficking links, but the evidence is generally of poor quality and does not reveal a substantial and continuing interest. The Red Brigades (BR) in Italy have certainly had links with
criminal organizations which deal in drugs, but the relationships have been uneasy. Indeed, on occasions Italian organized crime has assisted the authorities with information on terrorists when anti-terrorist operations have interfered with their ability to carry out their normal level of criminal activity.

The separatist Basque Fatherland and Freedom group (ETA) has been accused of narcotics trafficking in the Basque region of Spain. There has been sufficient indication of some involvement for Catholic bishops in northern Spain to issue a pastoral letter in 1984 criticizing ETA for involvement in the drug trade. They also accused the Spanish security services of paying for information with drugs. Although there are indications that pressure may be on ETA to seek for new sources of funding, it does not seem in its best interests in terms of appeal to the local population to involve itself in the drug scene. It seems unlikely that an organization which generally has a record of sound decision-making would risk the dangers inherent in too deep an involvement, although individual members may involve themselves and channel funds into the organization. In fact, ETA has taken a public stand against drug trafficking. As Steinitz reports:

ETA, for its part, denies involvement in drug trafficking. In 1982 the group warned that it would begin killing alleged narcotics dealers in the Basque region and has carried out that threat at least several times in recent years.

Accusations similar to those concerning ETA have also been levelled against the provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). There are three cases in particular which have fuelled speculation on such involvement. The first was the arrest in the Irish Republic in 1979 of a member of the Provisionals in possession of a lorry load of cannabis. However, there is no clear evidence this was part of an attempt by the PIRA to diversify its fund-raising activities. Indeed when he was imprisoned, the offender was badly beaten by Republican prisoners and the PIRA issued a statement denying he was acting for it with regard to the drugs. Speculation was fuelled again in 1983 when New Zealand drug boss Terrence Clark (known as 'Mr Asia' and then imprisoned in Britain following his conviction for murder) claimed he would be prepared to reveal how laundered money from drug sales was used to purchase arms for the PIRA. Reports also indicated that long-term Provisional prisoners imprisoned with Clark on the Isle of Wight had threatened to kill him if he talked. Unfortunately, no information was revealed before Clark's death from natural causes in August 1983 (although there has been considerable speculation over the cause of death). The third source of suspicion is the claim made in papers filed by the US government in connection with the widely publicized trial on cocaine distribution charges of John De Lorean. According to the papers, De Lorean claimed to have had an intimate relationship with the IRA and claimed it to be behind his multi-million dollar cocaine trafficking organization. In the proceedings, however, no evidence on these matters emerged and De Lorean was acquitted.
As with ETA, some sources claim that the search for new sources of funding has forced the IRA to turn to the drug trade. For example, a report published in 1983 by the London-based Centre for Contemporary Studies, claimed that drugs have become the main source of hard cash for the IRA. It further claimed that the IRA made a distinction between drugs at home and abroad, maintaining that while not being opposed to export sales, the IRA was ideologically opposed to drugs and brutally punished local users and pushers.

The best that can be said of PIRA involvement in the drug trade, then, is that such activity is possible, but there is no solid evidence for it. Major involvement in drug trafficking to the United States, as alleged in the Institute for Contemporary Studies report, is unlikely in view of the immense propaganda damage such links could cause if they were revealed to PIRA’s many American supporters. Further, as Michael McKinley has pointed out:

In Dublin, where the drug problem is acute, the evidence is held [by the police] to be poor to nonexistent. Similarly, official British government papers which detail all manner of IRA nefariousness, do not charge it with drug trafficking.

It is also significant that a drug link to the IRA is not mentioned in James Adams’ comprehensive examination of the sources of terrorist incomes around the world. In his analysis of the IRA, Adams discusses manipulation of EEC subsidies, smuggling, fraud, blackmail, protection rackets, extortion, robbery, ‘fencing’ of stolen goods, and running of illegal clubs as major IRA activities — but, significantly, not drug trafficking. In his chapter on terrorist-drug trafficker connections, Adams treats in detail the Latin American terrorists and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) — but, again, not the IRA. It can only be concluded that either the IRA is more successful at concealing its drug links than it is in concealing links to a myriad of other criminal enterprises — which is extremely unlikely — or that the case of the IRA merely illustrates how easy it is for opponents of a particular group to make accusations of drug running and have them taken seriously. I would argue that this is particularly easy in the emotional atmosphere created by the indiscriminate use of words such as ‘narcoterrorism.’

The final major example of drug-terrorist connections relates to a myriad of relationships between drug producers, manufacturers and traffickers in the Middle East and various terrorist groups and senior officials of a number of regional powers. The Lebanon, for example, remains a primary source of hashish for the international market and both production and trafficking occur either with the permission of or in partnership with a number of terrorist organizations and military officers of Syrian occupying forces. The links are so pervasive that nearly all of the militant groups in the area — Palestinians, Phalangists, Druze and Shiites — obtain revenue from the drug industry, either directly or by protecting the contraband as it is transported through their areas of
influence. The existence of this huge drug economy, estimated at $1 billion in 1981, remains one of the major obstacles to the restoration of central government fiscal authority in Lebanon.\footnote{46}

That the conjunction of terrorism, drugs and states can have profound implications for international security issues is also illustrated by the Lebanese situation. It is widely known that Rifaat Asad, the younger brother of President Asad of Syria, and head of Syria's secret service, provides the security that guards the hashish crops in the Beka'a valley. Rifaat and his associates have benefited personally from these activities, earning huge profits for themselves.\footnote{47} In view of this it has been suggested that the threatened loss of this lucrative income could heavily influence any Syrian decision about withdrawing from the area.

CONCLUSIONS

The discussion about the nature of linkages between drug traffickers and violent political extremists, together with a very brief overview of the types of groups involved, illustrates that the simplistic notions fostered by most discussions of 'narcoterrorism' are not a useful basis for policy making and action. We should eliminate the term 'narcoterrorism' in an effort to encourage a more critical and specific study of drug links to terrorist and insurgent groups. In fact, in most of their testimony before congressional hearings, US agencies such as the Department of State, DEA, and FBI have sought to draw the appropriate distinctions, particularly with regard to the motives behind the linkages. Thus John Langer of the DEA writes:

> The distinctions blur between terrorism and other violent crime when media reports give similar modus operandi and similar results, attain similar reactions from authorities and involve international political relationships. There are, however, important differences between political terrorism and acts which are sometimes identified as terrorism.\footnote{48}

Clyde Taylor, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters gave evidence to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and the Judiciary in 1985 that:

> ... narcotics trafficking in Latin America, in Asia, in the Middle East, and in Europe, is dominated by narcotics traffickers who are governed only by their greed and whose only ideology — if it can be called one — is the pursuit of profit. Most of these groups cannot be called terrorists, or even political insurgents, nor do we have evidence of a general communist conspiracy to use drugs to undermine Western democracies, or our own society in particular.\footnote{49}

In his evidence to the Hawkins subcommittee in 1984, Francis Mullen, then Administrator of DEA, acknowledged the existence of the trafficker-terrorist connections but, correctly I believe, minimized its contribution to the size of the drug traffic:
Although DEA believes the terrorist connection to drug trafficking is increasing, we do not believe that it has had a significant impact on drug availability in the United States. At this time, terrorist groups are not in a position to compete with established drug smuggling organizations and are not a threat to their operations. 50

Administrator Mullen did acknowledge that the threat of increased terrorism was a worry as terrorists increased their revenue from drug involvement. FBI Director William Webster directly took issue with the 'narcoterrorism' label in an interview with the Los Angeles Times. According to the Times, Webster disputed suggestions, commonly heard from both Congress and the White House, suggesting a union between drug traffickers and terrorists aimed at undermining the Western World and is quoted as saying: "Words like 'narco-terrorism' tend to exacerbate the realities as we know them." 51

These statements all reflect the reality that there are important distinctions between different types and levels of drug-terrorism connections, that eliminating the terrorist links will have little impact on the flow of drugs and that the connections are for practical reasons rather than ideological ones. This reality is not reflected in many of the statements of politicians made during congressional hearings on these matters, however. Indeed, some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the agencies have deliberately understated the threat because they fear "that their inability to deal effectively with the problem could undermine the legitimacy of their positions, and could lead to a loss of public faith in the ability of the State to protect its citizens from danger." 52 These researchers call upon the government to educate the public about the threat posed by what they term 'the narco-terrorist phenomenon.' What dimensions should such education take? For such people, the task is to lump together all forms of connections, substantiated and unsubstantiated, between drug traffickers and terrorists, insurgents, organized criminals and states and treat it as if they form a single phenomenon posing a massive threat on several fronts. I would contend, on the other hand, that we need to de-emphasize the existence of a phenomenon as such and concentrate instead on defining, gathering intelligence about, and acting against a number of connections which pose very real, if less globally conspiratorial, threats.

The basis for the analysis should be the recognition that the basic reasons for the connections have to do with specific advantages accruing to each side — very practical advantages such as protection, intelligence and facilitation for the drug runners, and money and weapons for the terrorists and insurgents. We must realize that these relationships cannot easily be categorized and must be each examined in detail separately. We must recognize that the linkages are not all necessarily to the advantage of each side at all times and seek either to exploit the differences between groups or be prepared for yet other negative spin-offs for law enforcement.
We should not over-emphasize the inevitability of drug-terrorist connections developing when terrorists and traffickers inhabit the same environment. As Steinitz has pointed out, the long-term goals of the two groups are often diametrically opposed. Traffickers generally champion the status quo and would be uneasy about their chances of survival in a revolutionary society. Insurgents and terrorists (especially those of leftist persuasion) can encounter severe propaganda difficulties by participation in the drug trade and may also be ideologically opposed to the drug trade. While these differences can be overcome, especially by the terrorists who may be feeling the pinch of falling sources of income, they are possible points of exploitation in a clever anti-drug and anti-terrorist strategy.

It may also be the case that, in the long-term, the relationships between drug traffickers and terrorists act to increase the resolve of governments to attack both problems with equal vigour. Currently, many states facing insurgencies give priority to the anti-terrorist effort, often at the expense of anti-drug operations. The growing realization of the impact of domestic drug abuse and the contribution to terrorist capabilities made by drug money is convincing some of the necessity for an integrated, hard-hitting approach to both problems. Even so, it should be kept firmly in mind that the dictates of expediency will sometimes mean that goals relevant to one part of the program will need to be sacrificed, at least temporarily, in the service of the goals of the other. If one thing should now be clear it is that in the fields of both drug control and anti-terrorism there are no answers. As fast as we find partial solutions to one problem, the opposition adapts to create a new one. We must learn not to expect clean solutions and should educate the public not to demand them. Part of this process is to avoid the simple characterizations of problems by terms such as ‘narcoterrorism.’

What this analysis has shown is how little we know in detail about the linkages and what they mean. Clearly the drug-terrorism nexus is an important one, in some cases a critical determinant of the direction a terrorist movement will take. The role of intelligence in determining the parameters of the situation is central and needs to be given much more priority. Only with first-rate intelligence will we be able to approach the problems with the degree of sophistication which is required if we are to have any hope of making any impact at all on the international drug traffic.

Endnotes

1. This definition is one presented by a senior DEA official, John Warner, except that I have added 'states' to the list of possible perpetrators. See John Warner, “Terrorism and Drug Trafficking. A Lethal Partnership,” Security Management, vol. 28, no. 6 (1984), pp. 44-46 at p. 44.

2. See generally, Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), chapter 1, for discussion of difficulties surrounding defining terrorism.

3. Ibid., p. 16.

5. Ibid., p. 5.


18. See note 4, p. 147.


23. The same point is made by Charles Frost, former National Estimates Coordinator, DEA in note 17, p. 197.

25. Taylor, "Links Between International Drugs Trafficking and Terrorism."
26. Ibid., p. 73.
27. The Garcia-Meza regime of 1980 gained power by what became as the "cocaine coup."
31. Steinitz, p. 142.
32. Taylor, p. 71.
34. Wiant, pp. 125-140.
35. Ibid., p. 126.
36. Ibid., p. 138.
37. Cited by Steinitz, p. 146.
40. Cited by Steinitz, p. 146.
41. Ibid., p. 147.
46. Steinitz, p. 145.
49. Taylor, p. 69.
53. Steinitz, pp. 149-150.