

than by the British military and Jewish colonists combined. In addition, the material devoted to an analysis of politics within the Palestinian Arab community makes but brief mention of the role of families and clans. Without greater emphasis on Palestinian Arab social structure there can not be, in this reviewer's estimation, a proper appreciation of that group's use of violence. From a historical perspective, violence by Palestinians has frequently been a method of either maintaining family dominance in the community or attempting to shift smaller groups' loyalties.

The sources employed to support the study are overwhelmingly official Israeli documentation or Israeli scholarship; certainly a strong Israeli orientation is in evidence. While the origin of the source material is not in question, the validity of the conclusions can be more easily called into question. There is, to be sure, a candid examination of Israeli administrative practices in the West Bank which have had the impact of disrupting the lives of Palestinian Arabs.

Perhaps the most significant contribution can be found in the appendices and bibliography. In the former, one can find data detailing discrete and collective violence initiated by the PLO in the Administered/Occupied Territories and internationally during the period of 1967-1981. Overall, however, there is insufficient material that supplements the work of Bard O'Neill's *Revolutionary Warfare in the Middle East: The Israelis vs. The Fedayeen* (Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press, 1974) to warrant a favorable recommendation for this book.

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Amstutz, J. Bruce. *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*. Washington: National Defense University, 1986.

Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation is thick, interesting, and loosely organized. While neither the best nor the most complete book on Afghanistan, it remains a valuable addition to the literature on Afghanistan and is likely to have something of value for most students or researchers.

The book's throw weight - 383 pages of text, 31 of appendices, 107 of notes and sources - give it scope for completeness. The author, who was senior diplomat in the U.S. embassy in Kabul after the killing of Ambassador Dubs in 1979, has also wisely focused primarily on the events leading to, and flowing from, the Soviet invasion. Of these, the war itself receives the bulk of attention. This is especially welcome, as many of the books on Afghanistan have put their emphasis more on the pre-invasion period, where there was greater opportunity for access to sources.

While not encyclopedic, the book does succeed in covering the broad spectrum of the issue. Most of the key issues on both sides of the conflict are covered, not only military and political but diplomatic, refugee, human rights, and regional considerations, are all well documented.

The most serious limitation is the time-lag in preparation of the book. It takes the war in Afghanistan to 1984, but the book itself did not appear until late 1986. Since 1984 the situation inside Afghanistan, and in the world capitals which deal with it, has changed greatly. Still, there remains a great amount of worthwhile information, and all writers on Afghanistan sooner or later earn their O.B.E. (in this case, Overtaken by Events).

Organization is not this book's strong point. It has something of an antiquarian approach, with interesting facts presented for the reader's approval, rather than integrated together. Often, however, analysis of the facts, as presented, is lacking. Soviet order of battle data, for example, that appeared in the western press in the year or two following the invasion, is repeated without mentioning that these figures have been subsequently revised - also in the western press - in the light of improved information. Similarly, an appendix provides a useful "snapshot" of one province - Badakhshan in late 1982. This strategic province, whose inhabitants were described by Marco Polo as "Moslem and valiant in war," certainly merits such an examination, but again, what appears seems largely driven by the fact that the author came across some first-person accounts from the time and place detailed. There is much scope for analysis here. Why has one party become dominant? Have Soviet tactics been successful? What are the key differences and similarities between the war north and south of the Hindu Kush? All of these are important questions, raised but not answered.

Nevertheless, while lacking in organization and sharpness and depth of analysis, the book's completeness is among its strengths. Most all of the major events, issues, and individuals are covered, with sources documented. However, inaccuracies of detail and oversights cannot be avoided.

The focus and the sources of the book are consistent with its aim. The author commendably has made use of some of the range of Afghan sources and some use of interviews - generally the most effective research approach on Afghan subjects - as well as covering the sources available through the U.S. FBIS and JPRS translations. There are, however, apparent limitations. English-language sources that would have been most useful to the author's task have gone unused even when readily accessible. Similarly, the range of European sources in languages other than English - the French have been particularly good on writings on Afghanistan - do not seem to have been fully exploited, nor have Soviet sources, even those available in English, been widely used.

While it lacks the depth of Henry Bradsher's *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, there is much here that is worthwhile. The author has

considerable sympathy with, and understanding of, the Afghans. One hopes that Dr. Amstutz will soon be in a position to produce a second volume, entitled, it is to be hoped, *Afghanistan: The Last Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, to update this book.

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Paine, Lauran. *Silicon Spies*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Despite the presentation of some useful information, this is a book which will perplex many scholars of the subject and will confuse and mislead the general reader. The subject of Soviet acquisition of "Western" technology is a vital one, but this effort to address it is a bewildering array of unsifted data, undigested material, some facts, largely undocumented, tortuous logic and eccentric argument.

Readers who are concerned about references and the documentation of this wilderness of weird generalizations will be frustrated. There are no footnotes, the mediocre bibliography lists, in no particular order, twenty books, without publication dates in most cases, and lacks the most important and current works¹ on the topic under study as well as on peripheral subjects discussed such as robotics, SDI and West German security problems. Like the bibliography, which appears to be an afterthought, the index is virtually useless and omits significant items such as West Germany's School for Economic and Industrial Security (SEIS), one of the cases where the author presents interesting, fresh material. Except where the author cites the source directly in the text much of the material is difficult to check or document.

Readers familiar with the vast literature of intelligence studies will recognize author Lauran Paine as a non-fiction writer who since the 1960s, mainly in British titles, has written prolifically on a range of topics from the CIA and British intelligence services to the Abwehr in World War II and terrorism. Many of his works share the same general features of this book: brevity, some factual inaccuracy, awkward writing and unfathomable generalizations. The basic thesis is indisputable: since World War II the Soviets and their allies have acquired, by various means, important elements of Western technology, including nuclear technology, which enabled them to achieve parity in some areas, superiority in others, and that this leakage of technology continues today and has causes which go beyond Soviet espionage. Paine presents a fairly comprehensive list of technologies, labelled the "Soviet shopping list":

1. Inertial guidance systems
2. Solid propulsion technology
3. Smart bombs and projectiles
4. Antiballistic missile systems