

b. the action tends to limit foreign policy options; and therefore,

2) intervention, if occupation follows, is *ipso factor* a failure.

Thus, Weinberger finds that Syrian intervention and the extension of its authority into Lebanon ended up being adventurism at its worst and a gamble with an undesired outcome.

Weinberger is conversant in the relevant scholarly literature and the book relies heavily upon a distillation of materials dealing with the general theme of intervention. Yet as the case study deals with Syrian foreign policy it becomes a bit annoying to notice the lack of or even disregard for Syrian sources, official or otherwise, whereas there is a correspondingly greater reliance on Israeli scholarship. The result is a perspective that, in this instance, may be considered suspect. Another defect the reader may register is the quality of the maps employed; all that are used have been culled from various secondary sources and reproduced. The problem is that they are of unequal quality and represent different cartographic styles. Of lesser importance to the lay reader is the system of transliteration of Arabic where there is no distinction made in the use of apostrophe to indicate the guttural and non-guttural aspirate. Despite these problems, considering the interest in the region and the topic of conflict, *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon* is a serious study that should be required reading not only for background but as one of the general studies for any additional theoretical assessment of conflict resolution.

Sanford R. Silverburg
Department of Political Science
Catawba College
Salisbury, North Carolina

Darby, John. *Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986.

Since the middle of the last century there have been at least nine periods of serious rioting in Belfast. These dramatic episodes of Protestant-Catholic communal violence have usually been accompanied by movements of population as people who live in the 'wrong' ghetto are intimidated into moving. Darby's book is a study of the most recent round of territorial struggles, intimidation and relocation in three areas of Northern Ireland: two in Belfast and one in a quiet country town. Most of the research was conducted in the early 1970s for the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission.

The book is meticulously laid out. The reader is given some history of riots, intimidation and forced relocation in Belfast, detailed histories and religious geographies of the three areas under examination, a definition of intimidation which adds the useful category of "perceived

environmental threat" to the two obvious elements, "actual physical harm" and "actual threat," and analyses of the various consequences of intimidation. Chief among those consequences was a considerable increase in segregation, especially in the two Belfast areas where the public housing authority has abandoned any idea of using housing allocation to promote harmony through integration. Put simply, one of Darby's findings is that, where neither side is intent on *pogrom*, a very successful way of reducing violence between two competing peoples is to build segregated ghettos where they have little or nothing to do with each other.

Unfortunately the neatness of the presentation causes the book to remind this reviewer of *nouvelle cuisine*: a lot of presentation and little substance. The conclusions tend to the obvious. For example, Darby concludes that "avoidance" (working class Prods and working class Taigs rarely meet), "selective contact" (they only meet for specific purposes and the greater the political tension the more pressing the purpose has to be), and "functional integration" (Prods and Taigs might cooperate for practical benefits) act as effective controls on the spread of violence and explain why the place has not been completely razed.

Before mentioning the major weaknesses, there is one minor point. Doubtless for the best motives, Darby disguises the three areas with false names, yet also uses actual place names sometimes in the same sentence, leaving the reader to think about every proper noun. More annoying, and probably related, is the lack of maps. Much of the book concerns detailed geography of population shifts and would have been much more accessible if it had offered diagrams. The additional irritant is that the pretence of anonymity is undermined by the book's own bibliography. One can make a pretty good guess that "Dunville" is Cookstown because Darby cites an item in the bibliography called "Research draft on Cookstown."

One indicator of the thinness of the study is the fact that Darby uses the same quotation or anecdote more than once. For example, the insularity of one estate is illustrated by a social worker saying: "Some of these kids, if they stepped off the Falls Road, would think they were abroad" (p. 146), which is entirely apposite and very witty indeed. Eighteen pages later Darby returns to the same theme: "This encouraged a narrow parochialism, illustrated by the Kileen youth worker who observed that 'some of these kids, if they stepped off the Falls Road . . . ,' etc. On page 67 we are told that one Protestant resident of Kileen:

believed that each Catholic advance in the estate was preceded by the deliberate occupation of houses in the interface area by "hard-nosed Catholics" under instructions from the IRA; he described them as "frontier families" willing to accept aggravation for the sake of the cause . . .

On page 84, the same snippet is used, this time as illustration of the common use of military metaphors. It may well be that such snippets

re-appear because they are particularly appropriate to more than one part of the text but the overall impression is of a weak study being stretched thin.

There is also a sad lack of anything at all interesting in these case studies. What does it add up to? At the end the reader knows that the conflict in Northern Ireland has led to increased segregation. Good theory, deeper research, or a comparative perspective would have produced a better study. Darby neither has an interesting theory which he is testing nor does he have the sort of insight which would have been gained by a researcher actually living with one of these communities through the struggles described. The result is fairly shallow description barely illuminated by a few analytical glosses. One point where the study caught the reviewer's interest was in the brief discussion of four "myths" to which those who had been forced to leave their homes subscribed. There is the nostalgia myth: even those people intimidated into moving often claimed that before the trouble they got on well with members of the other religion. There is the vandalism myth: new residents often found the abandoned houses had been vandalized, the myth being that each side supposed only the other could do that sort of thing. Third, there is the invasion myth. In all three cases there was agreement that the trouble had been started by "outsiders" or "newcomers": "Victims often recounted how local people had pleaded with them to remain, arguing that the threats had come from a few agitators from outside the district" (p. 83). Finally, there was the conspiracy myth: intimidation and the subsequent relocation were organized by the paramilitaries and local politicians. The myths, especially that of outside agitators, allowed people to make sense of their unpleasant experiences without having to revise completely their views of the neighbors they had previously regarded as friends.

The discussion of myths takes less than three pages. The curious way in which interesting ideas are raised and then passed over suggests a problem with the research method. Here especially the reviewer felt that Darby was relying on second-hand sources. He offers an explanation of why people believed these four myths but he gives us little or no reason to believe that they actually did. One wants to believe him because it sounds like the sort of thing people would do but surely it calls for some evidence, some presentation of extracts from interviews. Surely more could have been said about these myths. Although Darby just lists them, one after the other, the four are obviously not the same sort of thing. The nostalgia and outside agitators stories are about relationships between the evacuees and the majority of people in the area in which they used to live. The vandalism story is about the relative moral standing of 'us and them': they do things we would never consider doing. The conspiracy myth is another sort of story again. Although it is partly a relative morality tale—they *planned* to drive us out—it is also a story about the ordered nature of the world; things have patterns and patterns have planners. Darby also fails to tell us which people used these stories: all of the evacuees, some of the evacuees, people generally, or who?

Another possibility would have been a comparative analysis of intimidation in Northern Ireland and either somewhere else, Lebanon, for example, where the violence is more intense or somewhere, perhaps Glasgow, where there is ethnic hostility with a much lower level of violence. Such contrasts might have given us a better idea of what is interesting or important in Darby's cases.

The general impression is that this study should have stayed as what it originally was: a hastily prepared report on a collaborative project involving Darby and others undertaken for a government agency. Inflation to book-length and a decade to reflect and return to the areas have not improved it a great deal. It has neither the human detail of an ethnographic case study nor the intellectual challenge of a test of an imaginative theory.

Dr. Steve Bruce
Department of Social Studies
The Queen's University of Belfast
Belfast BT7 1NN Northern Ireland

Drury, Richard S. *My Secret War*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Rinaldi, Nicholas. *Bridge Fall Down*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

As with many earlier wars, Vietnam has become familiar to most readers through personal narratives and novels written by veterans of the fighting. While books by Philip Caputo, Michael Herr and James Webb have emerged as minor classics, dozens of lesser known works, like the two under review, have arrived on the scene and it is from such publications that many have come to know this conflict in Southeast Asia.

Richard Drury's *My Secret War* is his combat record based on a journal he kept throughout his tour of duty as a pilot in the "special war" fought in the skies over Laos in 1969 and 1970. His is a strange tale of counterinsurgency warfare fought from an antiquated A-1 Douglas Skyraider, a huge, single-seat, propellered aircraft designed in the 1940s. From this "ordnance delivery platform," heavily armed with a multitude of weapons, including 500 lb. bombs, rockets, napalm, and machine guns, he dive-bombed and strafed enemy supplies moving south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by night and in daylight flew search and rescue missions, where his slow-moving aircraft provided cover for helicopters that recovered downed pilots. This kind of low-level flying required great skill, for these aviators encountered many obstacles, including tropical storms, mountainous terrain, mechanical problems and enemy ground fire to which their ponderous giant craft were particularly vulnerable. At night they navigated by instruments and dead-reckoning, the kind of "seat of the pants" flying that most appealed to Drury, who emerges as the dedicated flyer enthralled by this outdated form of aviation.