Terrorism:
A Survey of Recent Literature

by
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INTRODUCTION

Ten years have passed since the publication of two landmark scholarly books on terrorism: Walter Laqueur's *Terrorism*, and Paul Wilkinson's, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*.[1] The literature on this subject has experienced phenomenal growth during the ensuing decade, and is now extensive, as well as being varied in quality and value.[2] What follows here is a selective survey. It excludes most studies of terrorist campaigns in particular countries or by particular groups; nor does it include print media accounts or unpublished scholarly papers.

BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND RESEARCH GUIDES

Amos Lakos lists 35 volumes, 36 documents and reports, and twelve journal articles which provide bibliographic information on international terrorism,[3] to which this author would add at least five titles. Alex P. Schmid's research guide[4] is the most scholarly survey of all aspects of political terrorism. It explores definitional issues, typologies, concepts of terrorist activity and theories of motivation, through a survey of the literature and responses from scholars to a detailed questionnaire on research. It also identifies available data bases and provides an extensive, partly annotated bibliography. The volume is currently being updated for a second edition. Edward Mickolus is a CIA analyst, and his two bibliographies are probably the most all-encompassing available for the period up to 1980. The second volume updates and expands on the first and contains both brief and detailed annotations.[5] Also noteworthy as general bibliographies are those by Norton and Greenberg,[6] Richard D. Burns,[7] and Suzanne R. Ontiveros. The latter work, which takes a historical focus, is highly selective, comprising only 598 entries. However, the annotations are extensive, and the book includes a useful chronology of events covering the period 1975-1985.[8] William W. Fowler's now dated comparative study of terrorism data bases remains an essential research tool, particularly for those engaged in statistical analysis.[9] The bibliography on terrorism and the news media by Robert G. Picard is the first of its kind focusing solely on this subject. It is a product of the on-going "Terrorism and the News Media Research Project," being carried out by a team of researchers at several American universities.[10] Peter Janke's "world directory" has been overtaken by the emergence of new groups, such as "Islamic Jihad." Nonetheless, the brief group biographies, arranged by region and country, provide a good starting point for research. Each country entry also includes a useful historical sketch on political violence and an abbreviated but relevant bibliography.[11] Henry Degenhart's *Political Dissent*,[12] is a directory of a similar nature. Among its listings by region and by country of dissident

groups of all political stripes, both violent and non-violent, it includes brief biographies of terrorist groups. Like Janke's work, it suffers from being nearly five years out of date.

THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM

The phenomenon of terrorism allows a variety of explanations and thus an equal number of lines of scholarly inquiry. The following review is hardly exhaustive, but it does reflect the different methodologies and schools of thought.

It is undoubtedly a reflection of the very current, newsworthy, controversial, and policy-oriented interest in terrorism that the social sciences have come to dominate recent writing about the subject. Indeed, if there is a significant negative feature that stands out it is the relative paucity of historical studies, particularly comprehensive general histories of terrorism. Laqueur's volume, recently revised,[13] stands virtually alone in setting the current problem of terrorism within a broad historical context. After discussing briefly its pre-modern manifestations, dating to biblical times, Laqueur devotes considerable attention to the 19th century anarchist "philosophers of the bomb," whose writings still provide much of the intellectual foundation, often unacknowledged, for modern practitioners. The volume also analyzes the social and organizational aspects of terrorist groups, contemporary terrorist groups and their motivations, and surveys, in comparative fashion, the major schools of thought on the subject. Franklin Ford's magisterial study narrows the focus to assassination of major figures.[14] Ford takes the reader from the biblical to the modern era, examining scores of cases and explaining each in the context of its time. Motives, methods, and consequences are set out with dispassionate clarity. The study of terrorism would be well-served if more scholarship could strive to match the high standard that Ford's work sets.

Turning to the social sciences, the "definitional" quest is one of the most controversial areas of research, even in the scholarly literature where political bias does not tend to dominate and distort the debate. Alex Schmid's rigorous examination of the subject yields 109 definitions,[15] and even that total is not necessarily exhaustive. Grant Wardlaw, a criminologist, devotes a whole chapter of his book to the problem of definition. He takes note of different approaches to the issue, problems of classification, moral and social aspects, and concludes with his own definition by way of an attempt to overcome the limits of existing approaches.[16] Wilkinson, even in his revised edition, does not devote any time to the scholarly debate; he offers his own short definition—"coercive intimidation"—and then elaborates at length on its characteristics and classification, drawing upon both historical examples and political theorists.[17] Laqueur opens his chapter on the "Interpretations of Terrorism" with a survey of the definition question but without attempting to resolve it. He does point out, however, that there is a considerable degree of consensus on many of the fundamental points; definitions diverge over questions of the nature and purpose of terrorism—is it

functional and systematic, or merely symbolic? Is it revolutionary?[18] Richard Rubenstein, a lawyer, explores the metaphors of "terrorism as crime" and "terrorism as war," and finds both wanting. However, his own definition is badly flawed by its foundation on assumptions of mass support and not on the characteristics of the act—specifically, the creation of fear and anxiety: terror.[19] Without this, the use of the term "terrorism" is meaningless. Moreover, Rubenstein's lack of intellectual rigor, indicated by his uncritical use of the term "urban guerrilla" and the phrase "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," point to the need, emphasized by both Laqueur and Wilkinson, to draw the distinctions clearly between the guerrilla and the terrorist.[20] Journalist William McGurn argues that by focusing attention on methods rather than motives, it is possible to distinguish clearly between the terrorist and the freedom fighter.[21] This is hardly the last word on the subject; the reader's attention is drawn to other useful contributions to the debate.[22]

The subject "the causes of the terrorism" is difficult to treat as a distinct topic, since it is really a sub-topic of the much wider subject—"the causes of conflict." Obviously, the literature on this latter subject is vast, and much of it is not relevant to this more narrowly-focused review. Even within this more limited subject, the literature is extensive and diverse both in methodology and quality. It is inherently interdisciplinary, dominated by the social sciences, embracing disciplines as disparate as international relations and behavioral psychology. A 1979 essay by Wilkinson provides a useful comparative introduction to the various social scientific theories.[23] Martha Crenshaw brings a high standard of scholarship to her 1981 article on the subject.[24] The political/behavioral psychology school is represented in a volume edited by Yonah Alexander and John Gleason.[25] Ali Mazrui provides an articulate "Third World" perspective.[26] David Rapoport, working with Alexander, leads the field in examining the ways in which terrorists create their own moral climate, both internally and externally, for justifying their campaigns.[27] Several studies by the Rand Corporation, and by Charles Russell and Bowman Miller, have attempted to probe the "mindset" of the terrorist.[28] What emerges from the literature on the causes of terrorism—only a small sample of which is represented here—is that elaborate social scientific theories concerning grievances, oppression, deprivation or class conflict do not advance our knowledge of the "why" of terrorism very much. They do not, for example, explain why some individuals and groups resort to terrorism in situations where grievances or oppression are negligible or are easily remedied by non-violent political processes, or why terrorism is selected as the preferred method of conflict, when other violent methods are available.[29] Perhaps it is sufficient merely to point out, as some analysts do, that at least some of the time terrorism achieves its objectives.[30]

The nature of contemporary political terrorism—in both international and domestic contexts—is explored at length in several excellent anthologies[31] and in a variety of articles, notably those by Laqueur, Miller, and O'Brien.[32] Others have devoted considerable effort to statistical quantitative research and the development of chronologies.

The development of such data bases constitutes an essential form of basic research from which other research can proceed. The "definitional" debate intrudes here because the lack of an agreed definition leads to different selection criteria for statistical data and hence, different statistical results. The efforts of Brian Jenkins and his colleagues have made the Rand Corporation the leader in this form of research, and this is reflected in the prominence of Rand studies in the literature.[35] Another pioneer in this field is Edward Mickolus, who produced the ITERATE data base.[34] The CIA produced annual statistical analyses until 1981; since that time the State Department has provided the official American count.[35] *INTER* published by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University is a recent addition to this field.[36] Thomas Snitch has produced a unique data set on assassinations.[37]

Few issues relating to terrorism have generated as much controversy as the role of the media in terrorist incidents and campaigns. The literature on the subject is accordingly lengthy (see Picard's bibliography).[38] A symbiotic relationship has come to be accepted as an inconvenient but unavoidable consequence of an unfettered media in a democratic state. A good starting point for understanding the problem is the work of Maurice Tugwell, which makes clear the importance of propaganda to a terrorist campaign.[39] The importance of the media is a direct consequence of the primacy of propaganda in terrorist tactics. Also of considerable scholarly value in this regard is the study by Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf.[40] There are many other works which discuss the problems of covering conflict, the particular dilemmas posed by terrorism, and prescriptive measures. Those by Clutterbuck, Cox, Jenkins, Kelly and Mitchell, Miller, Schlesinger, and Wilkinson bear reading on these issues.[41]

The question of government involvement in international terrorism is also very controversial, for a variety of reasons. The definition issue rears its head again here, since some governments acknowledge assistance to what they perceive as "national liberation movements," but deny that these same groups—whether they are Palestinians, Afghans, or Contras—are terrorists. Definition and labelling thus takes on a political or ideological character. Regrettably, this tendency finds its way into some of the literature. Another source of controversy is the matter of evidence. As several studies point out, sponsoring states usually go to great lengths to conceal their involvement.[42] Consequently proof is often circumstantial, and the "smoking gun" is rarely found. One is left instead with a nagging suspicion (as in the case of the alleged "Bulgarian connection" to the attempted assassination of the Pope), which may be sufficient for politicians, but is unsatisfactory for scholars. Not surprisingly, then, several "schools of thought" on state-facilitated terrorism have emerged. One, led by the scholarly work of Michael Stohl and George Lopez, has tended to concentrate on direct state involvement, often overt, in use of terror, including genocide, as a weapon of domestic repression. Rooted in the social sciences, these studies are characterized by impressive research which relies on quantitative/statistical analysis, modelling, developing and testing of theories. As such, they add a great

deal to the academic inquiry.[43] They can be criticized on several grounds: insufficient foundation in historical analysis concerning the cases studied; too much attention to systems, structures, and theories at the expense of the human factor; and selection of cases which suggest a political/moral bias of judgement. In this regard, what is not studied is as significant as what is.[44]

The other school concerns itself with state-facilitated terrorism in the international arena, particularly the role of specific governments in assisting nominally independent groups. Attention is focused mainly on the Soviet bloc and, to a lesser extent, on the governments of Libya, Iran and Syria. These studies have served a number of useful purposes. First, they have brought a difficult and sometimes uncomfortable subject out into the open and have made it an acceptable topic of academic inquiry. Second, they have uncovered or suggested cases for further study, noted new sources of information, and have highlighted both new areas of inquiry and the problems and pitfalls of the subject. Unfortunately these works also exhibit some important limitations: insufficiently rigorous definitions of the subject, the lack of which tends to lead discussion across a wide spectrum of conflict forms that clearly do not constitute terrorism; problems in acquiring, verifying, and interpreting evidence; and political bias or lack of academic rigor and detachment which can lead the authors to make more of the evidence than may be justified.[45] More cautious, scholarly studies illustrate the limits of what can be known or deduced reliably from "open" sources on such a closed subject.[46] James Adams, a British journalist, confines the scope of his inquiry to the funding of terrorist groups. He disposes—too easily, some might say—of the assertion that the Soviet Union is a major source of funding for terrorist groups and goes on to build a persuasive picture of groups thriving—or, in some cases, just scraping by—on a mixture of legitimate business, fronts, extortion rackets, expropriations (robberies) and narcotics trafficking.[47] On this last point Mark Steinitz, a State Department analyst, argues that the connections between insurgent groups, including those that use terrorism, and the narcotics traffickers are usually temporary alliances of convenience and are largely a coincidence of geography.[48]

There are a number of works which seek to identify and assess "trends" in contemporary terrorism, with a view to predicting the foreseeable future. The Rand Corporation clearly leads in this form of analysis, although some of their studies can be criticized for being short on hard evidence.[49] This kind of "future gazing" is highly speculative; consequently, Rand's analysts and others tend to be cautious in their prognoses. Nonetheless, various studies have made reliable predictions and assessments of developing trends in the areas of state-facilitated terrorism, "issue-oriented" terrorist campaigns, escalation of tactics, and selection of targets.[50] One question which has dominated the "futurology" of terrorism is the possibility/probability of "nuclear terrorism": a terrorist group's threat or use of a stolen or manufactured nuclear device to enforce compliance with its demands. No one, it seems, is prepared to rule it out. At the same time, most analysts agree that a

number of constraints, both political and technical, inhibit terrorist groups in this regard. It is acknowledged that constraints might be overcome, but serious analysts are understandably reluctant to suggest that such an event is inevitable.[51]

RESPONDING TO TERRORISM

Among the general literature dealing with the problem of responding to terrorism, two works stand out for their scholarly merits: Grant Wardlaw's *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures,* and Paul Wilkinson's *Terrorism and the Liberal State.* They reflect two of the prominent schools of thought in this field: criminology (Wardlaw) and international relations (Wilkinson). Both are firmly rooted in the liberal democratic tradition, and they explore in depth the problems posed by terrorism in such states, especially with regard to the need to balance responses with the protection of civil liberties and due process. These two works are essential reading and ought to be considered a starting point for further research. John Wolf's *Fear of Fear* takes a "law enforcement" perspective and is useful for its prescriptive, functional approach[52] when read in conjuction with Wardlaw and Wilkinson. Kupperman and Trent is also useful in this regard but falls short of being a complete collection.[53] The "tough-minded" American approach is represented by the works of Neil Livingstone, which if less scholarly nonetheless contain valid and well-argued chapters on particular subjects.[54] Of considerably less value is Benjamin Netanyahu's *Terrorism: How the West Can Win.* Essentially a collection of speeches, the book never delivers on the intention implicit in its title and only rarely rises above the level of polemic and hyperbole. The essays by Elie Kedourie, Arthur Goldberg, Meir Shamgar, and Yehuda Blum are the welcome exceptions in this otherwise disappointing volume.[55]

The problems of response have generated a large body of "legal" literature,[56] only a small portion of which can be represented here. Robert Friedlander's massive four-volume collection is an essential research tool containing, as it does, much of the available international, legal and diplomatic documentation on response to international terrorism.[57] An array of multi-disciplinary, multi-national level and scholarly opinions are offered in a large compendium by Alona Evans and John Murphy.[58] Ronald Crelinsten *et al* provide a smaller and more narrowly focused, but nevertheless valuable legal/criminological perspective, a "micro" view, as opposed to the "macro" approach of the other two volumes.[59] Attention is also drawn to the extensive, impressive legal scholarship of Canadian Leslie Green, a leading scholar in this field.[60] Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, takes a critical and controversial view of existing international law, asserting that as presently applied, it favors the terrorist.[61] However, he does not offer a prescription for resolving the problem. In this respect, John Murphy's volume *Punishing International Terrorists* is more satisfactory. It examines existing legal agreements and conventions, finds them wanting, and offers practical proposals on extradition, exclusion and deportation, prosecution, and judicial assistance.[62] As Murphy,

Green and others rightly point out, the key to effective international law is the willingness of nations to cooperate in enforcement. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons such cooperation has been noticeably lacking, even among the like-minded states of the West.[63] Taking the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism as a case study, Noemi Gal-Or examines one attempt to develop this international cooperative effort, the legal and political obstacles to implementing and enforcing it, and the prospect for its application. It is clear from her study that national interest will continue to prevail over the international legal "common good", thereby limiting the effectiveness of international agreements to cooperate against terrorism.[64]

This, of course, makes national counter-terrorism policies a matter of primary importance, but the existing literature is less than satisfactory. Much of it is political and polemic. In the scholarly literature few general works exist and fewer still of a comparative nature. Wardlaw and Wilkinson touch on national policies only in passing. William Waugh's study is more comprehensive in this regard.[65] Most writing centers on the United States. William R. Farrell's book is valuable in providing insights on the policy-making structures, processes and problems, but it has suffered from the passage of time.[66] The inescapable dynamic nature of American politics means that policy making and operational structures are constantly in flux. The various studies by Rand analysts reflect the "think tank" community's efforts to keep pace not only with the threat but also with the constantly changing mood and policy-orientation in Washington.[67] This makes Marc A. Celmer's recent volume the most current scholarly study of the American scene.[68] For countries other than the United States, the coverage is uneven. The extensive literature on Northern Ireland apart,[69] the literature on general British policies for responding to terrorism is quite limited. A general policy/procedural analysis is provided in G. Davidson-Smith, "Counter Terrorism: the Administrative Response in the United Kingdom."[70] Professor Frank Gregory examines the police role in countering terrorism in the U.K., pointing out the difficulties of the task and its impact on police-public relations.[71] Sir Robert Mark, former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, provides a unique "insider's"view of the subject in his memoirs and a collection of essays on policing.[72] Much of the rest of the literature concerns legal issues,[73] with emphasis on the far-reaching powers of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.[74]

The experience of Italy has attracted considerable attention since the scale of terrorist violence there exceeded that of most Western countries. Even so, the English-language scholarship concentrates more on the terrorist phenomenon and less on the issues of response.[75] Attention is directed to studies by the Centre for Conflict Studies, Robert Evans, Paul Furlong, Vittorfranco Pisano, and Piera Vigna.[76] The West German literature is similar in its asymetrical focus. Moreover, most of the writing on response is now dated, although it is useful for examining the 1970s period.[77]

Israel, the "Western" country that is most deeply involved in

counter-terrorist operations, presents a special case since it is effectively in a permanent state of war or war readiness. This status provides the backdrop for its counter-terrorism policies and methods. Palestinian terrorism and the Israeli responses to it have generated crises and events that, from time to time (in Lebanon, 1982, for example), develop into high-intensity wars.[78] The regional and global implications of this give the Israeli case especial importance. The passions aroused by the conflicts in the Middle East infect much of the writing on the situation there, and the subject of terrorism is no exception. A great deal of the coverage tends to be journalistic, partisan, and sensationalist. Nevertheless, a few balanced assessments exist. The definitive work in this regard is Hanan Alon's 1980 Rand study. His book briefly traces the development of the Palestinian terrorist problem and outlines the range of Israeli countermeasures applied in the period 1967-78, then proceeds to an analysis of the counter-measures. His findings yield some interesting observations. For example, he concludes that Israeli perceptions of the terrorism threat are disproportionate to the real threat. More important, on the question of responses, he observes that crash programmes of counter-measures were introduced without analysis and, once in place, remained whether or not they were effective. Israeli reactions to terrorism tended to be huge, even when smaller-scale effective alternatives were available. Alon concludes with his own solution for matching ends with means.[79] Even if it is now somewhat dated, Alon's study provides a useful model that could be emulated for the analysis of counter-terrorism policies of other countries. Less detailed, but nonetheless useful, is Bard E. O'Neill's study *Armed Struggle in Palestine*. His analysis of the reasons for Israeli success is generally sound,[80] although it is less probing and critical than Alon's work. The various studies of the PLO shed considerable light on Israeli operations against the Palestinian groups and the effects of Israeli counter-measures.[81] The legal framework of Israeli counter-terrorism policy is explored in an article by Robbie Sabel.[82] An article by G.J. Bensinger examines the role of the Israeli police.[83] Michael Goldstein and Yigal Karmon discuss Israeli security measures in the occupied territories.[84] The Israelis have long favored a "forward strategy" both for conventional defence and for dealing with terrorism. With respect to the latter, Israeli forces have engaged in pre-emptive strikes and reprisal attacks against Palestinian targets. American legal scholar William V. O'Brien argues that the merits of this strategy make it a model for other nations.[85] More critical views of this strategy may be found in articles by Helena Cobban and Barry Levenfeld.[86]

Because of their dramatic impact and potential for political leverage, hijackings and hostage-takings attract a great deal of attention, particularly from the news media, in spite of the fact that such incidents account for a relatively small percentage of the number of terrorist events world-wide. The peak of the hijacking problem came in the early 1970s and this is reflected in the literature on hijacking countermeasures, the bulk of which was published prior to 1977. Of the studies published since, Paul Wilkinson's book provides a useful survey of the problem, incident statistics, legal and other measures undertaken to

make civil aviation more secure.[87] Seymour Finger examines the role of the International Civil Aviation Organization in promoting airline security.[88] The literature on hostage bargaining and siege crisis management tends to be very practical and action oriented for obvious reasons.[89] Stephen Sloan's book on simulation represented a milestone in training for such incidents.[90] Still useful from the perspective of practical application, but more academic in flavor, are works by Nehemia Friedland, Martin Herz, Brian Jenkins, and Abraham Miller.[91] Clive Aston uses the 1972 Munich Olympics siege as the centerpiece for his study of crisis management in the European context.[92] The Council on Foreign Relations has published the most thorough "insiders" policy analysis of the U.S.-Iranian hostage crisis. It examines in depth every aspect of the crisis—political, diplomatic, military, economic, negotiations, and outcome, with a view to extracting useful lessons.[93] The available literature on other major hostage-taking incidents, such as the Aldo Moro case in Italy, is less than satisfactory.

Faced with the prospect that hostage negotiations might fail and the hostages might be killed, many nations have created specialized military, para-military or police units to carry out hostage rescue/siege-breaking operations. This mission and the forces assigned to it have been the subject of much speculation and ill-informed writing, so the literature must be approached with discrimination. Starting with analysis of the forces themselves Eliot Cohen's *Commandos and Politicians* is one of the few critical scholarly books on special operations forces and as such is an essential counter-weight to much of the popular literature on the subject.[94] The special forces of several countries have been studied in various formats. A 1981 article by Richard Clutterbuck provided a comparative survey of the capabilities and doctrines of European units.[95] In the Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment of the British Army and to a similar extent in the Royal Marines, the British have acquired the most impressive body of experience and capabilities for specialist anti-terrorist operations. William Seymour provides a useful and informative historical survey of the development of these units, although the research on the post-1945 period is weak, drawing upon a limited number of secondary, popular sources.[96] John Strawson's "official" regimental history of the SAS is much stronger on the post-war era. Like Seymour, Strawson deliberately avoids discussing the regiment's role in Northern Ireland, since it is still operating there. With the exception of secondary works and interviews, Strawson is unspecific about most of his primary research sources, although it is clear that he had access to selected SAS documents. The Northern Ireland lacunae not withstanding, this book provides the historical background which is essential to understanding the evolution of the regiment and the development of its anti-terrorist role and capabilities.[97] As such, it stands in sober contrast to more popular works.[98] A brief, but scholarly assessment using both documentary and secondary sources is included in *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict*.[99] There is no single history, comparable to Seymour or Strawson, for American special forces. Existing published histories cover the period

up to and including the Vietnam War. Literature on the post-Vietnam period tends to be journalistic and is less than satisfactory. The most recent useful survey of current U.S. capabilities, which draws on a mixture of official and secondary sources, is John Collins' comparative study of American and Soviet special forces.[100] Even so, it is not very informative with regard to the counter-terrorism role of such forces. The "professional" literature is full of debate on the status, roles, equipment and future of U.S. special forces, but little of it deals in any depth with counter-terrorism missions which tend to get lost within wider considerations of low-intensity conflict.[101] There are two exceptions. One is now somewhat dated and concerns itself solely with domestic terrorist incidents.[102] The West German GSG-9 unit, which has seen limited action, most prominently at Mogadishu in 1977, is described in several sources.[103] There is little reliable information published on the Israeli counter-terrorist forces. However, Gunther Rothenberg's essay places the IDF's activities in a historical context.[104] There is also a limited amount of information available on the counter-terrorism forces of the Netherlands.[105]

Because hostage rescue operations are high risk actions with a mixed record of success, there is considerable debate on the utility of such forces and the ways they are employed. For some general discussions of the military role, see the articles by Roger Beaumont and Thomas Tompkins.[106] The study *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict* offers five in-depth national studies, along with comparative analysis and conclusions, in its historical examination of army adaptation to low-intensity operations, including counter-terrorism missions.[107] Charters and Tugwell, Edward Luttwak, and Bruce Hoffman have compiled historical surveys of "commando" or special operations. Hoffman's collection is the more broadly based, providing a large collation. Some of the entries might be considered debatable but this does not detract from the overall value of the study. The other two belong properly to the "How to" or, as the case may be, the "How not to," school. They are more selective and detailed, written with a view to indentifying "lessons," organizational tasks, and "models."[108] This has been the focus of much of the literature on hostage rescue operations.[109] Shlomo Gazit's article is essential for understanding the political, operational and moral risk involved.[110] Owing to limited availability of documentary research sources, full-length scholarly studies of such operations are few. Fred Wagoner's study of the 1964 Belgian action in the Congo is a well-researched, well-written exception.[111] The American operation which failed in Iran has been dissected *ad nauseum.* The reader's attention is drawn to only a few works on the subject. The official "Holloway" report—the product of the Department of Defense inquiry—is essential reading; it details clearly the factors which contributed to the disaster. Drawing on this and other sources, Paul Ryan has compiled a thoughtful and dispassionate full-length analysis of the operation. Gary Sick, who served as assistant to the National Security Adviser during the Iran crisis, provides a unique account which places the operation within the context of the policy/decision-making process. Regrettably, the memoirs of Charlie

Beckwith, the rescue unit commander, did not leave this reader with a sense of confidence that he was the right man for the job.[112]

Regardless of the form that anti-terrorist counter-measures take, it is generally agreed that accurate and timely intelligence is one of the keys, if not *the* key, to the development and implementation of effective counter-terrorism policies and actions.[113] The reason is simple enough; terrorist groups are organized, and operate in a clandestine manner. Defeating them, or at least responding effectively, means finding them first. Hence, the importance of intelligence. Intelligence currently is undergoing considerable growth as a subject of serious academic inquiry, and this is reflected in the literature. However, owing to problems in gaining access to research sources, particularly with regard to contemporary issues, of the quality of writing remains uneven. The literature on counter-terrorism intelligence, only a portion of which will be discussed here, is no exception.

There are few general studies considering the role of intelligence in successfully countering terrorism. The only book-length study is nearly a decade old.[114] Of the more recent literature, the chapter on intelligence in Grant Wardlaw's book presents the most sophisticated analysis. He discusses the "intelligence cycle" and the role of intelligence in developing psychological profiles and assessments of individuals involved in terrorism, in propaganda analysis, and in making predictions about future activity.[115] Kenneth Robertson provides a more comprehensive list of intelligence tasks. Like Wardlaw, he points to the importance of the "analysis" phase of the "cycle."[116] Without proper analysis, the undigested mass of collected data will remain meaningless to those who need intelligence for policy/decision-making and operations. Arie Ofri, Michael Handel and Shlomo Gazit examine the range of intelligence collection sources, reaching a consensus on the primary importance of the human source for counter-terrorism intelligence.[117] Gazit and Handel take their analysis further by identifying operational intelligence requirements and collection targets. John Wolf's *Fear of Fear* offers what is esentially a "police" perspective on counter-terrorism intelligence, with a largely American focus. It is useful, even if it breaks no new ground.[118] Obviously, intelligence collection, by whatever means or organization, involves to a greater or lesser degree violations of the rights and privacy of persons targeted for surveillance. Thus, the desire to place limits on the use of such methods in democratic countries is both understandable and justified. Robertson tackles this thorny issue and asserts that, at least with respect to terrorism, the intelligence target can be defined with discrimination sufficient to minimize the risks to individual and societal freedoms.[119] It is an argument that is likely to stir further debate. The impact of such constraints on American abilities to respond effectively to terrorism is an issue which infects much of the American writing on counter-terrorism intelligence. Legal restrictions are the focus of most attention.[120] Experience suggests however, that inter-agency rivalry contributes to American problems.[121] The need for a means of coordinating intelligence activities that minimizes bureaucratic infighting is a central theme of Keith Jeffrey's thorough and well-

researched historical analysis of British counter-insurgency intelligence.[122] His observations on this and related aspects of the issue are shared by other scholars who have studied the British experience.[123]

FURTHER AVENUES FOR RESEARCH

This necessarily brief survey is far from comprehensive. Nevertheless, it does identify both the strengths and the weaknesses in the existing literature. In doing so, it may be most useful by way of indicating further avenues for research. They are implicit in the survey itself. First, there is considerable scope for the historian to produce both general historical surveys or studies of particular organizations and campaigns. The works of Robert Clark, Richard Gillespie, and Charles Townshend stand as exemplary models of the kind of historical studies that can be done.[124] Thorough research of this standard could shed considerable light on the sources of terrorist campaigns, the motivations, the strategic thought and decision-making of the individuals involved, and the ways in which governments develop their responses to terrorist campaigns. Terrorist groups do not normally accumulate massive archives, but it is in their nature, even a requirement of their campaigns, to place a great deal of information about themselves before the public. Consequently, there is more source material available than might be thought. Rather than spend time developing yet another elegant theory on the causes or motivations of terrorists, scholars might better increase our knowledge of the subject by collating and presenting the evidence in a way that allows the terrorists to speak for themselves.

The second area where scholars of various disciplines can make a contribution is in "comparative" studies. This is not to suggest such have not been done, but a number of the major compendiums fall short in terms of providing either unifying themes or comparative conclusions.[125] The subject of government and international response to terrorism is one for which comparative analysis is both necessary and possible. It is also a subject which lends itself to interdisciplinary study. At least two comparative methods suggest themselves: "national," that is, comparing the structures, policies, and procedures of several countries, and "functional" — comparison of different techniques for responding to terrorism. The "functional" subjects include: emergency powers; modification of legal processes; intelligence methods; contingency planning; conflict resolution methods (eg. hostage bargaining); "hardening the target"; military and para-military measures; international collaborative legal and security measures; sanctions; media and control information; and safeguards for protecting democratic rights and processes. Interdisciplinary comparative research projects, "national" and "functional", are currently being directed by the Centre for Conflict Studies.[126] It is hoped that, upon completion, these studies will make a modest contribution toward filling this void in existing research.

In his 1986 *Foreign Affairs* article on terrorism, Walter Laqueur drew attention to the apparent contradictions that embrace the subject of terrorism: for example, the relatively small number of casualties that

result from terrorism acts, compared with the apocalyptic rhetoric it generates from governments and the media.[127] If a problem could be solved merely by burying it in speeches and ink, terrorism would have ceased to be a matter of concern long ago. Regrettably, it persists, both as an intellectual challenge and a problem of practical politics. As this survey indicates, much remains to be done on both fronts, and scholars from all disciplines can make valuable contributions to basic and applied research on this intractable issue.

Endnotes

1. Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1977); and Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

2. For example, Amos Lakos, *International Terrorism: a Bibliography* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), lists 5622 items, including books, journal articles, official documents, reports, dissertations, and bibliographies.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-18.

4. Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1983), 585 pp. Includes partly annotated bibliography.

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126. "Meeting the Challenge of International Terrorism," sponsored by the Donner Canadian Foundation, takes the comparative "national" approach. "The Democratic Response to International Terrorism: a Multi-Disciplinary Perspective," sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, uses the comparative "functional" method.

127. Laqueur, "Reflections on Terrorism," pp. 86-7.