
In a lecture at the Harvard-MIT Summer Program on Nuclear War and Arms Control in 1985, Professor Michael Nacht of the University of Maryland offered a vivid comparison between two schools of thought within the United States on how to handle the Soviet Union, "One group," he said, "longs to see the FBI surround the Soviet Supreme High Command, with the Director shouting through a megaphone: 'Gorbachev, come out with your hands up!'" For this group, the United States and the USSR are locked in mortal combat, two scorpions in a jar with only one winner, a zero-sum game. Another group sees matters quite differently. For its members, avoidance of a nuclear conflagration which would destroy both superpowers—perhaps the world—lies in trying harder to achieve a lasting, peaceful coexistence with the Soviets. From this vantage point, the superpowers have a common interest in a negotiated resolution of their (comparatively few) disagreements, a game where both can win and live. For this group, the Soviets are (in Nacht's words) less "aggressive expansionists" than they are "defensive opportunists." The appropriate policy prescription is not to isolate the Soviets, as the first group would advocate, but rather to integrate them into the world of nations—chiefly through economic inducements.

Nathan Leites has referred to differences in outlook toward an adversary as the "perception of the enemy," the central construct in his influential theory tying "operational codes" to leadership behavior (*The Operational Codes of the Politburo*, McGraw-Hill, 1951). From an individual's position somewhere along this core axis in his Weltanschauung—from zero-sum at one end to shared-sum at the other—one can estimate related perspectives on a wide range of issues. To change the metaphor, one's "perception-of-the-enemy" is a seed giving flower to an entire garden of subsidiary views on arms control, defense policy, intelligence policy, and the like. While the operational-code approach remains rudimentary with much theoretical work still to be done, the idea of "the enemy" as a central organizing concept holds great power.

This intellectual vantage point illuminates, at least for this reviewer, the figure in the carpet for the essays which comprise the last two of a seven-volume series on intelligence edited by Roy Godson and entitled *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s*. The series began in 1979 under the auspices of the National Strategy Information Center with an introductory volume on *Elements of Intelligence* and has offered separate treatments on *Analysis and Estimates* (1980), *Counter-intelligence* (1980), *Covert Action* (1981), *Clandestine Collection* (1982), and now
Domestic Intelligence (in this review referred to as Vol. VI) and Intelligence and Policy (VII). These works are touted by Godson as the "only major public attempt to review the entire range of United States'—or indeed any nation's—intelligence requirements," with the "possible exception of the Church Committee" (p. 1 of Intelligence and Policy).

The project indeed has been ambitious and those interested in intelligence policy will find in each volume many veins to mine. One must proceed with caution, however, for the ground is uneven and some lodes are riddled through with the fool's gold of ideology stemming from "perception-of-the-enemy" bias. In lieu of the "great diversity of views" promised at the beginning of Vol. VII (p. 3), the reader finds instead that a large portion of both volumes (as with their earlier companions) is colored by what might be called the "Georgetown perspective," that worldview which guides the National Center for the Study of Intelligence and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. These two organizations are headquartered at Georgetown University, where Professor Godson serves as the Consortium coordinator and Dr. Ray Cline, former deputy director of intelligence for the CIA, as president of the Center. Through publications, seminars, conferences, and remarks to the press, the Consortium and the Center have left no doubt regarding their "perception of the enemy." The view is decided zero-sum, and their recommended intelligence requirements flow from this premise.

"One's attitude [about intelligence policy] depends on how one measures the degree of threat to the United States," observes one of the essayists (VII, p. 108). For all but a few of the participants in this series, the threat is ominous. Dr. Angelo Codevilla of the Hoover Institution warns that "the United States is engaged in a conflict for its own survival" (VI, p. 29), a desperate "struggle" (pp. 38, 42). He writes of treason, implicating Western bankers and industrialists, even American farmers, for their trade cooperation with the USSR (pp. 29, 33-34). He eyes with deep suspicion the likes of Armand Hammer, the U.S. businessman with long-time commercial ties to the Soviet Union.

Midge Decter of the Committee for the Free World concludes that we have suffered from "appeasement", "apology", and "intellectual paralysis" (VI, p. 57). Why do the "spoiled brats of liberty" wish to "hamstring" our intelligence efforts and "cripple" the United States, she asks (p. 58), proclaiming that it is the job "for us intellectuals" to identify "people and ideas as being in the service of Communism" (p. 59). In a chilling call for what sounds like a third round of the Red Scare, Decter advocates "open public war for the soul of the American public" to "put a stop to the steady hemorrhaging of aid and comfort to [U.S.] enemies . . . ." (p. 59). Not exactly dispassionate analysis.

Another participant confides that his "anti-Communism is perhaps more strenuous than that of most U.S. intelligence agencies" (VI, p. 61). Yet another reminds us that "we are locked in a mortal struggle with adherents of 'political ideologies' that unmistakably seek to destroy our way of life" (VI, p. 101). In the preface to Volume VII, the late Frank R.
Barnett, President of the National Strategy Information Center, warns of the "Soviet Union's capabilities and unremitting hostility toward democratic institutions" (p. x). For Godson and Codevilla, what worries most is the Soviet Union's "major geopolitical conquests of the 1970s," that is: Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia, examples of the "expanding Soviet empire" (VII, pp. 91, 95). For Richard Pipes, the Harvard University historian and adviser to the Reagan administration, the objective of the United States should be to deprive the Soviets of all economic assistance in an effort to stimulate an economic crisis in the USSR (VII, p. 53).

In a word, here are two volumes with a distinct ideological perspective: the far-right (though not every contributor shares this view). At times, the project participants found even the Reagan administration too soft, arguing that it had played down the Soviet military buildup as well as Soviet violations of arms control accords (VII, p. 83).

From this perspective emerges a number of questionable conclusions about intelligence policy, though given the underlying premise one finds them hardly surprising. Bashing of the Church Committee becomes the first order of the day for several essayists, for here supposedly is one of the causes of our "crippled" intelligence services.

"The pendulum swung too far," says Godson; the reforms of the 1970s were too "hurried" (VI, pp. 7, 10). "The shock, hysteria, and vituperations of congressional committees, echoed by the press, public, and media pundits destroyed many good intelligence officers, untold records, files, and hard-earned collections of data and analysis, and exposed the much-reduced skeleton of American intelligence policy and process for all to see," Peter Lupsha tells us (VI, p. 205). Herbert Romerstein, a former aide on the House Committee on Internal Security, bemoans the "antiintelligence hysteria of the mid-1970s" and its "severe damage to American intelligence" (VII, p. 151). Laurence Silberman, a former deputy attorney general from 1974-1975, is even able to refer to the shock over the exposure of Operation COINTELPRO—a series of FBI covert actions against Americans, including an attempt to blackmail and encourage the suicide of Martin Luther King, Jr.—as an "overreaction." In his words, "COINTELPRO was not obviously grossly wrong and grossly harmful to the American people" (VI, p. 214).

No one among the essayists spells out why the Church Committee investigation became necessary; no one bothers to question whether the investigation truly weakened the intelligence community. This, despite the fact that former CIA directors William E. Colby and Stansfield Turner (among others) have often explained that the inquiry was actually a benefit to the intelligence agencies by clarifying the boundaries of acceptable intelligence policy and by sharing responsibility with new legislative oversight committees; despite the fact that the budget for the intelligence community has more than doubled since 1976. One participant, though, was at least willing to suggest that "... the best constitutional advice would be that COINTELPRO-types [of operations] are forbidden" (Professor Richard Morgan of Bowdoin College, VI, p. 74).
Each of these two volumes examines a central problem for intelligence policy. In *Domestic Intelligence*, the problem is whether to accept "the criminal standard" or "the national security standard" as investigative thresholds in domestic intelligence cases. The criminal standard is reactive; authorities are prevented from opening an investigation against someone until federal law has been or is about to be violated. The national security standard is more aggressive and preventive in character, allowing investigations on far less evidence of potential culpability. Does one go after possible bomb-throwers before or after they throw the bomb? Vern Countryman, a professor at the Harvard School of Law, has argued elsewhere: "My judgment would be that if the only way to detect that bombing is to have the FBI infiltrate political organizations, I would rather the bombings go undetected." This position was ridiculed by several essayists. Lupsha for one argued that we need "an intelligence system that checks terrorism before the bombs go off" (p. 212). For Silberman, "the criminal standard is wrong" (p. 215).

Yet, as Michael O'Neil (chief counsel for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) points out in one of the more thoughtful contributions to this project: "If the criminal standard is to be abandoned completely, the FBI could in essence begin investigations at any time and against any individual or group that it believed might be engaged in activity worthy of its scrutiny" (p. 198)—in other words, a possible return to COINTELPRO operations. Professor Morgan held hope that the latest proposed FBI investigative guidelines would strike an appropriate balance between the criminal and the national security standards by turning to a "rhetoric-plus" standard, that is, one based on the threat of violence "plus any circumstantial indication to which the investigator is willing to commit himself for the record as making it appear [to him] that the threat is substantial" (p. 79). Had these particular experts been formally polled, no doubt the overwhelming majority would have expressed preference for the national security standard.

In *Intelligence and Policy*, the central issue for most participants was again how aggressively to use intelligence agencies in the pursuit of policy. As one would surmise from their foreboding "perception of the enemy," Godson and Codevilla opt for a "‘full-serve’ intelligence system." They favor an aggressive use of covert propaganda—above all, deception operations—against the Soviet Union. Among their objectives is to "neutralize Eastern Europe" (p. 92) and, by implication, as another essayist put it, to "disestablish the Soviet Empire" (p. 108). Not even Silberman, on practical grounds, can endorse this approach: "I doubt that it can be managed," he says (p. 108). A seasoned practitioner of CIA covert action, B. Hugh Tovar, is equally skeptical. "Are these ideas practicable, and does the United States have the consensus that would permit it to implement them?" he asks politely (p. 113).

Codevilla tells us in *Domestic Intelligence* that "in the past generation public opinion has been led to believe that almost nothing really threatens the United States from within" (p. 55). If anything, we have learned just the opposite. The Vietnam War, Watergate, Operation
Chaos, COINTELPRO, and now the Iran-Contra affair have reminded us of the wisdom of Lord Acton. Power continues to corrupt and, although we must be careful to maintain an appropriate defense against foreign adversaries, we must also guard against unchecked intelligence operations. Here is a vital lesson from the past two decades—one that seems to hold, at best, secondary value to most of the essayists in these volumes. Perhaps if a similar set of studies is prepared for the 1990s, an effort will be made to strike a better balance of people and philosophies in the ongoing debate about how to have, on the one hand, capable intelligence agencies and, on the other hand, adequate protections against the abuse of civil liberties at home and the improper use of secret power abroad.

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Many journalists, policy makers and scholars hold Shi'i Islam accountable for a disproportionate share of the conflict in the Middle East and the Ayatollah Khomeini for much of its inspiration. As a result of this indictment, Shi'i Islam and its distinctive historical patterns of religious leadership and communalism—the Imamate—have been greatly misunderstood and, in the current round of events, miscalculated. Judged by the prevailing models for assessing and reacting to international conflict, Lebanon has proved to be an anomaly to almost all analysts, including those most practical, activist and efficient Orientalists of our time, the Israelis. In this kind of situation, no single scholarly work is likely to grasp the range of complexities involved or to satisfy the diversity of impassioned opinions in the worlds of politics and academics (which are becoming much less separate than scholars once preferred them to be). A notable contribution to a serious understanding of the politics of Shi'i Islam in Lebanon is *The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon.* The author is Fouad Ajami, professor of Islamic Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.

Ajami's approach is biographical and, to a degree, autobiographical, for he is himself a native of south Lebanon, whose story he tells with a personal feeling for its unique pathos. The protagonist of Ajami's story, Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian mullah who also had (distant) family ties to south Lebanon, was invited to Lebanon in the late 1950s to become its leading Shi'ite cleric. During the next two decades, Musa al-Sadr brought the Shi'a for the first time more directly into the tenuous power sharing dominated primarily by Maronite