Prospects For Nuclear Terrorism: 
Psychological Motivations and Constraints*

by

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INTRODUCTION

To understand the psychological motivations and constraints of terrorists considering nuclear terrorism, it is necessary first to identify the important features of their individual, group and organizational psychology. While there is no one terrorist "mindset," there is a pattern of psycho-social vulnerabilities that renders terrorists especially susceptible to the powerful influences of group and organizational dynamics. In particular, the act of joining a terrorist group represents for many an attempt to consolidate an incomplete psycho-social identity. A common feature is an unusually strong motivation to belong, coupled with a tendency to externalize, to blame the establishment for personal failures.

These characteristics set the stage for terrorist group members to be unusually susceptible to the forces of group dynamics. As a consequence, there is a tendency for individual judgment to be suspended so that conforming behavior results. Many of the features of "groupthink," with its accompanying tendency toward risky decision-making, are present.

In considering the implications of these psychological understandings to the specific case of nuclear terrorism, it is emphasized that distorted decision-making does not equate to totally irrational decision-making. In certain circumstances however, the distorted individual and group decision-making psychology could indeed influence the group toward a high risk option such as nuclear terrorism.

For terrorists operating within their own national boundaries, a terrorist act producing mass casualties would generally be counterproductive. For groups acting across national boundaries, however, this constraint does not apply to nearly the same degree. While the opprobrium of the West will be a constraint for some, it will not be equally the case for all terrorist groups. The degree of disincentive will relate in particular to the major audience of influence. Thus, Shi'ite fundamentalist terrorists would be less constrained than radical Palestinians, who would in turn be less constrained than more moderate Palestinian groups. Finally, there are the terrorist "losers" who are being shunted aside and losing the recognition they seek. Such a group could justify a terrorist spectacular in order to regain influence on the basis of a "what have we got to lose" rationale. Other scenarios are suggested in which terrorist groups could conclude that an act of nuclear terrorism was required.

In thinking about the possibility of nuclear terrorism, it is important to distinguish between the actual detonation of a device and the use of a device for extortion and influence. The constraints against the latter are significantly reduced in contrast to acts producing mass casualties. The
constraints are even more reduced in the case of the plausible nuclear hoax, an option that can be expected to become more frequent.

PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR TERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

Comprehensive analyses of the prospects for nuclear terrorism inevitably address two major considerations: technological and psychological. What is striking about these analyses is the great disparity between the scrupulous attention devoted to technological considerations and the cursory attention given to psychological ones. An example of this disparity is the frequently cited study *Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards* by Mason Willrich and Theodore Taylor¹, prepared for the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation. The authors provide rigorous analyses of the materials, technology, skills and resources necessary to construct a crude fission bomb or radiological weapon. They also give thorough attention to the requirements and elements of nuclear safeguards systems. Their attention to detail is exacting. In contrast, only ten of the book’s 252 pages are devoted to examining terrorist motivations and intentions and even that limited treatment is descriptive and superficial.

Thus, we are in the paradoxical position of having a clearer understanding of the interior of the atom than we do of the interior of the mind of the terrorist. In the absence of a clear understanding of our adversary’s intentions, we tend to develop tactics and strategies that are based primarily on our knowledge of his technological capabilities, and give insufficient weight to his psychological motivations.

This essay aims, on an admittedly small scale, to redress this imbalance concerning nuclear terrorism, so that the development of tactics and strategies is informed by an understanding of the individual, group, and organizational psychology of terrorism.

IRRATIONAL ACT OR RATIONAL CHOICE?

In considering the potential for nuclear terrorism, Brian Jenkins observes that the historical record does not contain incidents in which terrorist groups have attempted to acquire fissile material for use in a nuclear device. Moreover, he observed that inflicting mass casualties is usually inconsistent with the goals of terrorist groups.

On the other hand, when Jenkins considers the category of psychotic individuals, he is led to observe that “nuts are probably responsible for many of the low-level incidents and nuclear hoaxes” and that “lunatics have been perpetrators of many schemes of mass murder.” He concludes that on the basis of intentions alone, psychotics are potential nuclear terrorists, but in terms of capabilities they are the least able to acquire nuclear weapons.²

While agreeing with the overall thrust of Jenkins’ arguments, an overly quick reading of his analysis could lead to the false conclusion that the major danger is from irrational actors—from psychotic
individuals acting alone or in small groups. One could go on to conclude—again falsely—that there is little or no danger from political terrorists, since political terrorist groups tend for the most part to guide their decision-making in accordance with rational political considerations and it does not seem to be in the rational interest of political terrorist groups to engage in nuclear terrorism.

But, as Jenkins would be the first to agree, this thinking revolves around a false dichotomy. In reality, there is a great deal of territory between irrationality and rationality. Moreover, rational terrorists may reason quite logically, but the fixed premises that are at the basis of their rational calculus can lead to a psycho-logic that has dreadful consequences.

TERRORIST PSYCHO-LOGIC

In dissecting terrorist psycho-logic, it is necessary to utilize three different levels of analysis: individual psychology, group psychology, and organizational psychology.

Comparative studies of terrorist psychology do not indicate a unique "terrorist mind." Terrorists do not fit into a specific psychiatric diagnostic category. Indeed, most would be considered to fit within the spectrum of normality. Yet, it is difficult to conceptualize a psychologically normal individual who would carry out an act of mass destruction. An attempt to construct a psychology that would both lead an individual to be motivated to carry out an act of nuclear terrorism and have the wherewithal to implement it quickly reveals a paradox. On the one hand, to be motivated to carry out an act of mass destruction suggests profound psychological distortions usually found only in severely disturbed individuals—such as paranoid psychotics. On the other hand, to implement an act of nuclear terrorism requires not only organizational skills but also the ability to cooperate with a small team. To be suffering from major psychopathology—such as paranoid psychotic states—is incompatible with being able to work effectively with a small group.

Based on this understanding of terrorist psychology, one can agree with Jenkins' observation that the psychotic individuals could be—and have been—responsible for nuclear hoaxes.

PSYCHO-SOCIAL VULNERABILITIES

While there is no unique terrorist mindset, there is a pattern of psycho-social vulnerabilities that renders those who become terrorists particularly susceptible to the powerful influences of group and organizational dynamics. In particular there are data that suggest that the act of joining a terrorist group represents an attempt to consolidate an incomplete psycho-social identity. Within the broad array of terrorist groups with their disparate causes, a common feature is an unusually strong motivation to belong which is coupled with a tendency to externalize, to seek outside sources for personal inadequacies.

The major study sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior of the
Federal Republic of Germany is illustrative. The study of the epidemiology of terrorism found 25 percent of terrorists had lost one or both parents by age 14; fully a third had been convicted in juvenile court; there was a high frequency of job and educational failure. The lives of the terrorists before joining were characterized by social isolation and personal failure. For these lonely, alienated individuals from the margins of society, the terrorist group was to become the family they never had.

This alienation from the family is characteristic of a major class of terrorists whose psychological motivations were discussed by the author in earlier work—the "anarchic-ideologues." This class, of which the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades are examples, have turned against the generation of their parents, which is identified with the establishment. They are dissident to parents loyal to the regime.

In apparent contrast, the "nationalist-separatists," such as ETA of the Basques or the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), are carrying on a family mission: they are loyal to families dissident to the establishment. But while they are not estranged from their families, as are the "anarchic-ideologues," they are not at one with their societies. Thus, they too have fragmented psycho-social identities, and for them, joining a terrorist group is also an attempt to consolidate those identities.

To recapitulate, from the perspective of individual psychology, terrorists are not in the main suffering from serious psychopathology. They do not suffer from mental illness that could lead to the profound distortions of motivation and reality testing one would expect to be associated with the driven desire to carry out an act of mass destruction. At the same time, they suffer from psycho-social wounds that predispose them to seek affiliation with like-minded individuals. This strong affiliative need, coupled with an incomplete personal identity, provides the foundation for especially powerful group dynamics.

If the foregoing line of reasoning is correct, it suggests that the terrorist group is an unusually powerful setting for producing conforming behavior. Insofar as the individual psycho-social identity is incomplete or fragmented, the only way the member feels reasonably complete is in relation to the group. Belonging to the terrorist group thus for many becomes the most important component of their psycho-social identity. Indeed, data from terrorist memoirs and from interviews with terrorists suggest that there is a tendency to submerge the individual identity into a group identity. The fact that individual terrorists subordinate their own judgment to that of the group has major implications for the question of whether a terrorist group would engage in an act of nuclear terrorism.

A summary review of the evidence, both direct and indirect, bearing on the group dynamics of political terrorism helps clarify this issue. The strong need to belong, referred to earlier, becomes a major lever for ensuring compliance of group members. Andreas Baader, a founder of the Baader-Meinhof gang, used the threat of expulsion to ensure compliance. In response to members who expressed doubt about the group’s
violent tactics, he indicated that “whoever is in the group simply has to be tough, has to be able to hold out, and if one is not tough enough, there is not room for him here.” Professor Wanda Baeyer-Kaette, who had unusual access to members of the Heidelberg cell of the Red Army Faction, cites the example of a new recruit discussing an operation that had a high probability of producing a high casualty rate. When Baeyer-Kaette questioned whether it was ideologically proper to conduct an operation where innocent blood would be shed, a heavy silence fell over the room. It quickly became apparent that to question the decision was to be seen as disloyal. Moreover, to question the group judgment was to risk losing a newly won place in the group.

In fact, the risks may be much more consequential than the mere loss of one’s membership. Several members conveyed the fear that once in the group, the only way out was feet first. To disagree actively with the group and be perceived as dissident was to risk not just membership but life itself. Baumann stated that withdrawal was impossible except “by way of the graveyard.” Boock, a former Red Army Faction member, commented that the intensity of the pressures “can lead to things you can’t imagine...the fear of what is happening to one when you say, for example, ‘No, I won’t do that, and for these and these reasons.’ What the consequences of that can be.”

Thus, there are great pressures for compliance and conformity which mute dissent. Consider the dilemma of the doubting group member, at once desirous of belonging, yet uncomfortable about an action that runs counter to his principles. For him, the ideological rhetoric plays an especially important role, providing the justification for the contemplated anti-social act. Indeed, as Baeyer-Kaette has noted, there is a remarkable upside-down logic which characterizes terrorist group discussions. But there is a psycho-logic to the reasoning if one accepts the basic premise that what the group defines as good is desirable, and what the group defines as bad is evil. If the group cause is served by a particular act, no matter how heinous, the act is, by definition, good.

ABSOLUTIST RHETORIC

The rhetoric of terrorism is absolutist, idealizing and devaluing, polarizing “us versus them,” good versus evil. What is within the group is not to be questioned, is ideal. What is outside the group—the establishment—is the cause of society’s ills and is bad.

Throughout the broad spectrum of terrorist groups, no matter how diverse their cause, the absolutist rhetoric is remarkably similar. That absolutist rhetoric is characterized by narcissistic splitting. Splitting is an important psychological characteristic of individuals with narcissistic and borderline personality disturbances, personality disorders that are disproportionately represented in the terrorist population. Lorenz Bollinger, who has had the unusual opportunity of conducting in-depth psychoanalytic interviews of Red Army Faction terrorists, found a striking preponderance of borderline mechanisms, especially splitting and projecting onto the establishment the devalued aspects of the self while
concomitantly idealizing the group. To the extent that the terrorist ideology devalues and dehumanizes the establishment and identifies it as the cause of society's (the terrorists') problems, not only does it become not immoral to attempt to destroy the establishment, it becomes, indeed, the highest order of morality. By the terrorists' upside-down logic, destroying the establishment is destroying the source of evil, and only good can result.

A brief excursion into indirect evidence is also in order. Studies of the membership of the Unification Church of Reverend Sun Yung Moon are particularly instructive. They indicate that the more isolated and unaffiliated the individual was in terms of family and friends before joining, the more likely he was to find membership in the church attractive. Further, the greater the emotional relief he found upon joining, the more likely he was to accept instruction to participate in anti-social acts. For the purposes of this comparison, recall the remarkable mass engagement ceremony in Madison Square Garden, where Revered Moon assigned fiancés to 1,410 members. The individuals who found their entire self-definition in the Unification Church were the individuals willing to accept blindly an assigned marital partner, a step that was surely contrary to the social mores to which these individuals had been socialized.

A further major contribution to the power of the group over its members derives from the relationship between the group and its surrounding society. For the underground group isolated from society in particular, group cohesion develops in response to shared danger. In the words of a member of the Red Army Faction, group solidarity was "compelled exclusively by the illegal situation, fashioned into a common destiny." According to the testimony of another member, "the group was born under the pressure of pursuit" and that pressure was "the sole link holding the group together." Thus, the terrorist group represents almost a caricature version of the "fight-flight" group described by Bion. The "fight-flight" group acts in opposition to the outside world, which both threatens and justifies its existence. The "fight-flight" group perceives that the only way for it to preserve itself is by fighting against or fleeing from the enemy out to destroy it. This belief that the enemy is out to destroy it is not merely a paranoid delusion. While initially it may derive from internal psychological assumptions, as a consequence of terrorist acts the psychological assumption becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The terrorist group successfully creates an outside world that in fact is out to destroy it.

Whatever psychological pressures are within the individual terrorists, whatever psychological tensions are within the group—these tensions are externalized. Terrorist groups require enemies in order to cope with themselves. If such enemies do not exist, they create them, for if they cannot act against an outside enemy, they will tear themselves apart.

As the foregoing review indicates, there is a pattern of behavior that indicates that the predominant determinant of terrorist actions is the
internal dynamics of the terrorist group. If the terrorist group does not achieve recognition as a feared opponent of the establishment, it loses its meaning. If the terrorist group does not commit acts of terrorism, it loses its meaning. A terrorist group needs to commit acts of terrorism in order to justify its existence, and it needs to be recognized as a feared opponent in its “fantasy war” against society.

TERRORIST DECISION-MAKING

If this characterization of the psychology within the pressure cooker of the terrorist group is apt, what are the implications for group decision-making? Would a group able to rationalize that its causes justify—indeed require—wreaking violence on innocent victims be similarly able to rationalize the mass destruction of nuclear terrorism? Is it a quantum leap, an unbridgeable gulf, or merely an incremental and inevitable step as terrorist acts escalate in magnitude? Can we construct a terrorist psycho-logic that not only permits but requires nuclear terrorism?

In addressing this question, it is important to emphasize that more than most decision-making groups, for reasons elaborated above, individual judgment tends to be suspended and subordinated to the group process. Thus the focus of this inquiry is not whether individual terrorists could make such a catastrophic decision, but whether a group deciding as a group could do so.

This approach requires us to address the phenomenon identified by Janis’ as “groupthink.” Occurring when groups make decisions in times of crisis, it is defined as:

high cohesiveness and ... an accompanying concurrence-seeking tendency people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action ... a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and normal judgment that results from in-group pressures.

The symptoms of groupthink include:

(1) Illusions of invulnerability leading to excessive optimism and excessive risk-taking;
(2) Collective rationalization efforts to dismiss challenges to key assumptions;
(3) Presumption of the group's morality;
(4) Unidimensional perception of the enemy as evil (thereby denying the feasibility of negotiation) or incompetent (thereby justifying risky alternatives);
(5) Intolerance of challenges by a group member to shared key beliefs;
(6) Unwillingness to express views which deviate from the perceived group consensus;
(7) A shared illusion that unanimity is genuine; and
The emergence of members who withhold adverse information concerning the instrumental and moral soundness of its decision from the group.

This cluster of traits that Janis has labelled groupthink would seem to epitomize the decision-making of the terrorist group. Of particular importance are the reduction of critical judgment, the assumption of the group's morality, and the illusion of invulnerability leading to excessive risk-taking.

Semel and Minix have specifically investigated the effects of group dynamics on risk-taking. In a group problem-solving task, they found that US Army groups shifted in the direction of riskier policy choices than individual members preferred privately. Individual tendencies were strongly reinforced and intensified as a result of interactions within the group. Moreover, the tendency of group members to conform to the preferences of the group was found to increase with the length of their interaction with the group.

The phenomena described by Janis and by Semel and Minix occur with psychologically healthy mature adults. If mature adults with healthy self-esteem and appreciation of their own individuality can slip into such flawed decision-making under the pressures of group dynamics, what of groups composed of individuals with weak self-esteem who depend upon the group for their sense of significance? Does this circumstance not suggest that these groups would be subject to distorted decision-making to a magnified degree?

However, distorted decision-making is not equivalent to total irrationality. Looking at the world through distorted lenses is not equivalent to being blind or being subject to visual hallucinations. Is there a "psycho-logic" that, under the pressure of distorted decision-making processes, could lead a terrorist group to opt for weapons of mass destruction? Jenkins has noted that "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead....Mass casualties may not serve the terrorist goals and could alienate the population." Yet, are there circumstances in which the upside-down logic of terrorists could lead them to want a lot of people dead, where they could be drawn to conclude that mass casualties could serve their goals and could do so without alienating the population? If there is a psycho-logic that could lead a group down that path, might not the distorted decision-making described above make the difference in a close decision?

It is useful to invoke here a proposition advanced by Ariel Merari. He has made an important distinction between domestic terrorists acting on their own territory and those acting on the soil of other nations. Such groups as the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades believe they are in the vanguard of a social-revolutionary movement. They aspire to persuade their countrymen to join their fantasy war against the establishment, and they depend upon their countrymen for both active and passive support. In attempting to draw attention to their cause through acts of terrorism, it is their countrymen they are trying to influence. The
same is true for ETA when it is acting in the Basque region.

In vivid contrast, when a group operates across borders, the rules of the game in terms of the target of influence are quite different. As Merari has emphasized, when Palestinian terrorists operate in Israel, the horror and disapprobation of the population in the target country are not a disincentive, they are a reward.

The issue of audience comes into play, too. In the media age each act has multiple audiences. If a group of moderate Palestinians, in considering a particular action, came to believe that the act would invoke international opprobrium, that would mitigate against the action, for they very much value and need Western approval, and would see the act as having the potential for being a setback to the Palestinian cause. In contrast, for radical Shi'ite terrorism, different weights are probably attached to the reactions of different sectors of the international audience. The degree to which the West is alienated by a particular act is probably not a major disincentive. The key point is that a group acting across borders is significantly less constrained than one operating within its own national boundaries. It is the contention of the author that the greatest dangers lie with these groups.

THE POTENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR TERRORISM

An examination of the historical record provides a certain degree of comfort. However distorted their reasoning, their special psychological calculus, thus far terrorist groups have concluded that nuclear terrorism would not advance their cause and have rejected that option.

Lest one draw false comfort from that historical record, however, a scenario could be suggested where a group might well conclude that honor compels it to perpetrate an act of mass violence and that such an act would advance its just cause. Indeed, the scenario is not a product of fantasy, but might well have occurred had it not been for the alertness of the Israeli counter-intelligence forces.

In the spiralling cycle of violence begetting violence that characterized the Middle East, an act of terrorism was planned and set into motion that, had it succeeded, would have had catastrophic consequences and could easily have provided a plausible rationale for nuclear terrorist response.

When one thinks of Middle East terrorists, one is inclined to think only of radical Palestinian groups or Shi'ite groups such as Amal or Hizballah. In this case, however, the terrorists were zealous Jewish fundamentalists—millenarian Kabbalists—who had formed a cell within Gush Emunim. Their logic was no less twisted than that of their Arab adversaries. Reasoning with a fundamentalist logic which has been analyzed by Ehud Springzak, an Israeli political scientist, they planned to destroy the two holiest Islamic mosques in Jerusalem, two of the holiest sites in the Islamic world, the El Aksa Mosque and the Mosque of Omar (The Dome of the Rock). Only the holy sites in Mecca and Medina are more important than the El Aksa Mosque, which is described in the
Koran as the site at which Muhammad began his ninth journey. Built in 732 A.D., it has been the scene of violence in the past, for it was on its steps that King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan was assassinated in 1951, to be succeeded after a brief interregnum by his grandson King Hussein, who was at his side. Built in 1691, the Mosque of Omar is considered by many to be the most magnificent shrine in all of Jerusalem.

It is instructive to dwell for a moment on the logic of the Jewish terrorists, for it is an example—and a horrifying one—of the psychological blinders that terrorists can wear, of the twisted psycho-logic that can lead to actions which can shape history. In planning the destruction of the holy sites, they did not consider their planned action to be an anti-Arab act, nor did they dwell on the consequences in the Arab world to any significant degree. Their perspective was quite simple. The El Aksa Mosque stood on the "Temple Mount," the holiest place in Judaism. The Mosque was believed to stand on the very place where Abraham was instructed to sacrifice his son Isaac and was the site of the First Temple (built by Solomon in 970 B.C.) and of the Second Temple.

The Millenarians believe that redemption and the coming of the Messiah are due for the year 6000 (Jewish calendar). The Kabbalist millenarians feel that they can help it happen, and if that is not done, the coming of the Messiah may be postponed for another thousand years. This is why the Kabbalist band thought they had to "help" by removing the Muslim shrines, since according to their belief the Messiah will rebuild the Jewish Temple. For the fundamentalist Jewish terrorists, the planned destruction of the Islamic holy sites was necessary to restore the Temple Mount to its original form.

Had they succeeded, there is little doubt that a jihad of world wide proportions would have resulted. In that climate, it is suggested nuclear terrorism against Israel would have been considered fully justified by many in the Islamic world.

There is another scenario worth considering, perhaps less extreme, but potentially as far-reaching in its consequences. It is not, perhaps, beyond the pale to imagine a terrorist cell in West Germany, obsessed with an escalating arms race, persuading itself that the only way to avoid a nuclear holocaust would be forcibly to call attention to its humanitarian cause, and that the most effective way to do that would be to seize a nuclear weapon, not for the purpose of detonating it, but as the means of capturing the world's attention. Should such an event occur, it could have profoundly destabilizing effects upon the NATO alliance and the policies of the NATO countries most concerned with the forward deployment of Pershing IIs.

In the two examples considered above, the author has moved from considering terrorists actually detonating a nuclear device to their seizing a device in order to dramatize a cause. The next logical step in this progression is one that, from the point of view of the terrorist group, would involve even less profound consequences and hence would be more readily considered—the nuclear terrorist hoax. If it is technically feasible for a
group with a certain range of scientific and engineering abilities to construct a primitive nuclear device, it is certainly much less complicated for it to mount a plausible hoax.

While there have been a number of such episodes, it is puzzling that they have not been more frequent. A highly persuasive nuclear terrorist threat can have major consequences. Even though the probability may be judged quite low, were a group to provide plausible evidence that it had fissile material, could decision-makers afford to ignore its demands? One of the major difficulties with the low probability/high consequence act of high technology terrorism is that it tends to throw normal procedures out the window. Thus, while it is generally recommended that senior policy-makers avoid becoming involved in terrorist incidents, should a plausible nuclear terrorism threat be raised, it would be difficult if not impossible for them to avoid becoming actively involved in dealing with the crisis. High-level involvement automatically changes the nature of the crisis and would in itself constitute a success from the terrorists' perspective.

The possibility of nuclear terrorism is usually discounted because of the historical record and the logic that it would not serve the terrorists' goals. It seems highly likely that plausible nuclear hoaxes will be seen with increasing frequency. Certainly, it is a contingency that requires more active planning and preparation than it has been given.

One final class of actors must be considered—terrorist losers. Despite a stated commitment to various causes, the central priority for any terrorist group or organization is to survive. Survival means committing acts which justify and call attention to its existence. What can be said of the terrorist group or faction on its way out, that has lost its support and its headlines, and in a factional struggle, has lost its influence to a rival group? Desperate for success, might not such a group ask, "What have we got to lose?" Could the pressures of group decision-making coupled with the requirement for organizational survival not argue for a nuclear spectacular as a way of regaining prominence? While the constraints raised earlier would continue to operate, in this case, such constraints might be significantly weakened.

Endnotes

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10. Ibid.
11. W. Baeyer-Kaette, "Indoctrination Group."
12. Splitting is a psychological mechanism characteristic of individuals whose personality
development is shaped by a particular type of psychological damage during childhood
which produces what clinicians have characterized as "the injured self." Individuals
with a damaged self-concept have never fully integrated the good and bad parts of the
self. These aspects of the self are split into the "me" and the "not me." Unable to
tolerate the hated and devalued weakness within, in order to maintain a grandiose self-
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1980, p. 35.
20. A.K. Semel and D.A. Minix, "Group Dynamics and Risk Taking: An Experimental
p. 331.
23. Gush Emunim is a Jewish redemptionist Zionist group within Israel that has played a
leading role in settling the West Bank and Gaza. It bases its political actions on Jewish
religious sources.
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