The findings with regard to coalitions among terrorist organizations are more interesting, although once again they are severely limited by the failure of the date base to include terrorist incidents after 1977. As a result, Oots is unable to consider more recent cases of operation, such as the well publicized alliance between the Red Army Faction and Action Directe. Nonetheless, for the period between 1968 and 1977, Oots concludes that operational cooperation among terrorist groups was infrequent, if not rare. Further, although Oots finds that there were "working partnerships" among certain terrorist groups, "Close working partnerships are apparently more frequent among Palestinian groups," he notes that his data does little to support claims that an international terrorist network exists. Those coalitions that did occur were usually of short duration, as Oots predicted. Finally, there is limited evidence to suggest that coalitional acts were more likely to end in violence than single group acts.

In sum, scholars will find this book handicapped by limits inherent in the ITERATE II data base, and the work is perhaps too narrow and technical to interest nonspecialists. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the limited nature of its findings (and tedious first chapter that recounts previous work in the field), the book represents an admirable effort to bring discipline and sophistication to the literature on terrorism.

John E. Finn
Department of Government
Wesleyan University

Endnotes
2. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
3. Ibid., p. 74.
4. Ibid., p. 104.


The negotiations for the restoration of the Panama Canal Zone to Panama, during the Carter Administration, the victory of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and the long insurrection in El Salvador have all projected studies in Central American politics, economics, sociology and history into the forefront of scholarly activity during the past seven
years. Not only scholars but experts from other fields including labor and business were invited to analyze and formulate policies for the future welfare of America south of the Rio Grande. The two collections under consideration, *Confrontation in the Caribbean Basin* and *Western Hemisphere Stability*, are earnest and worthy examples of such conferences and study projects. These particular studies were commissioned by the Latin American Studies Center, a division of the Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh and by the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh, respectively. World Affairs councils exist in most major American cities and play the same role as the Round Table in Great Britain and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Canada.

*Confrontation in the Caribbean Basin* begins appropriately with an essay by Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes, a Latin American foreign policy expert, who worked for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Both she and Dr. Richard Miller, who commented on her paper, “Coping with Problems that have No Solutions: Political Change in El Salvador and Guatemala,” see the problem in similar terms. There is no politically centrist group large enough to support and neither the left or the right are capable of final military victory. Dr. Miller writes, “We are caught in a dilemma of our own making — unwilling to abandon control over a region but unable to pay the price needed to effectively maintain that control.” That aptly sums up continuing U.S. policy in the whole region.

Other essays include one on Nicaragua by Harold Sims, and on the English speaking Caribbean islands by Vaughan Lewis. The latter concerned himself with the internal problems of the economy and populist politics but omitted a discussion of racial problems, an omission questioned by commentator Anthony P. Maingot. Maingot also questioned Lewis’ basic analysis of the political systems, which denied the value of the British Parliamentary system. Unlike Lewis, Maingot believes such a system is viable for the Islands, provided the political parties “play the game,” and are willing to accept defeat in an election. He thinks neither the U.S. system of government nor the Cuban is as appropriate.

The second section of the work deals with the roles of Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba in the same region. The contrast between the views of the Mexicans, René Herrera and Mario Ojeda Gómez, on the one hand, and commentator Susan Kaufman Purcell, an American academic, on the other, points up the difference between political assertion and cool analysis. Mexico, as a victim of U.S. intervention, is opposed to such intervention but because it has enormous problems in its own economy and its population growth, it cannot provide the assistance necessary to bring stability to the region. With a non-exportable, rigid one-party system of its own, Mexico scarcely offers a good political model for the region.

John D. Martz commenting on Carlos Antonio Romero Méndez’s essay on Venezuela policy agrees that Venezuela’s role in the Caribbean is growing and prophesies correctly that Venezuela would not be as faithful a follower of the American line in the region as it had been in the
past. Venezuela had moderated its attitude towards Cuba but was still working for a pluralistic political system in Nicaragua.

The essay by Professor Jorge Dominguez of Harvard on Cuban foreign policy is a useful one summarizing the course of events since 1860. Cuba was not as enthusiastic a supporter of revolution as many American leaders believed, playing little role in the insurrection in El Salvador. Cuba’s role as an ally of the Soviet Union is clearly analyzed, with the emergence since 1980 of a Cuban desire to be independent in certain areas. It wished to be the leader of the non-allied nations, which was perhaps a figment of the younger Cuban leader’s imagination rather than a realistic policy. Cuba’s desire for a world role may reflect its wish to be seen as something other than a Soviet satellite. Dominguez’ attempts to foresee the future were less successful — he had ideas of right-wing action in Central America to take advantage of Reagan’s last year in office in 1984. Neither prophecy was fulfilled. There is a predictably unscholarly comment on this essay by Professor Quintero of Havana couched in left-wing rhetoric.

The remaining three essays in the book consist of studies of U.S. policy in Latin America, Soviet Strategy in the Caribbean and the Role of Western Europe, respectively. Professor Wiarda’s condemnation of American policy in the region, a policy which has treated Latin America as less important than Asia and Europe, sends second-rate diplomats to carry out policy and has been based on an unwillingness to learn about the region, is terse and correct. He also correctly foresaw that the Reagan administration would treat leftist authoritarian regimes as more evil than rightist, would be less concerned about human rights and would attempt a “realist” policy rather than “idealist.” He is pessimistic about the U.S. role in the region. Professor James M. Mallony of Pittsburgh, although claiming to disagree with Wiarda’s analysis and seeing a positive role for the United States, ends his comments by virtually accepting most of Wiarda’s arguments.

The article on the Soviet’s role in the region is of mixed value. It draws attention to the Soviet arms shipments but fails to prove a major Soviet interest. To assert that Russia would be pleased by communist successes is to over-simplify. The Russians find it useful to assist in destabilization but much of the instability of the region is due to domestic causes.

The final article on Europe is useful for its presentation of the Western Alliance reaction, basically similar to the alliance’s reaction to Korea and Vietnam. Western Europe does not want confrontation in a frontier area to escalate into a major U.S.-Soviet conflict, therefore, western Europe is skeptical about American claims that détente is threatened in Nicaragua or Honduras. The German analyst Professor Grabendorff makes clear that Europe’s dependence on the Third World countries for oil and raw materials makes it reluctant to follow American leadership in an aggressive policy.

As the editor’s conclusion points out, there is more agreement among authors about causes of problems than about solutions. The
application of a domino theory by Reagan to the region seems unacceptable to all writers in this collection but they feared direct military intervention would be part of U.S. policy. Apart from the Island of Granada, this has not occurred. This collection is useful as a brief introduction to very complex issues and policies and is recommended to those requiring a quick study.

The second collection of studies on Latin America consists of the reports of three panels, economic, political and security. The panelists were bankers, industrialists, labor leaders and academics. The background papers by Robert E. Driscoll of the Fund for Multinational Management Education on “Economic Realities between North and South” gave the participants a meaty subject to work with. Inefficiency in agriculture and failures in marketing were the principal targets but, again, while it was easy to recognize problems, it was less easy to offer workable solutions. To expect American style advertising and marketing, and supply side economics to be the answer seems simplistic to this reviewer but perhaps typical of the American approach to most problems.

The political analysis seemed very realistic and recognized America’s limited influence and room for maneuver. However, the panel went on to recommend the promotion of political modernization which seems to this writer an impossible policy. Either the elites who matter in Latin America will move in this direction or they will not, in which case the United States has little effect. Further, the panel thought to reward friends with foreign aid and punish “regimes which actively oppose U.S. interests,” seems an ambiguous policy. Education, too, was seen as an important tool and the panel recommended that Latin American politicians give up “propaganda attacks” on the U.S. that only encourage American isolationism.

The section on security reads like a primer for present-day White House spokesmen: democracy must be promoted and Marxist-Leninism is a barrier to progress. Nowhere do the panelists consider, realistically, politics in countries where there is no genuine two party system involving the masses, just tiny elites aping the American system but actually responding to family alliances and traditional Spanish fondness for authoritarianism. It was the so-called two party system in Central America (with the laudable exception of Costa Rica) which introduced guns into politics. To change government by coup d’état into government by the people and for the people will take much more than a quick fix, however well-intentioned the aims. This collection is therefore more useful for what it reveals about the panelists, many listed as Latin American experts, than about the problem.

Professor Francis Coghlan
Department of History
University of New Brunswick

67