INTRODUCTION

The second Multinational Force (MNF) to deploy to Beirut in 1982 was by mandate, if not always by behavior, a peacekeeping force. Its purpose was to encourage and maintain a suitably peaceful environment in Beirut to allow negotiations to take place, thus assisting the establishment of a more lasting political settlement in Lebanon. Because of the force's multi-national nature and the complicated political situation in Beirut itself, the situation had many facets, requiring a great deal more space than is available here to describe and assess it in a complete manner. This paper is therefore selective in its scope and deals only with the actions of the military contingents. The purpose is to examine their conduct and emphasize the lessons that emerge from this interesting but nevertheless controversial operation. In order to provide an explanation of the political and operational context of the MNF's conduct, it has been necessary to include a summary of events leading up to and during their deployment. Unfortunately, in the interests of keeping within the limitations of this assessment, it has not been possible to consider the details of the May 17 Agreement, the attitude of the Syrians and the political initiatives of the American special representative and his negotiating team. All of these items would be essential factors in a wider study of the political aspects of the MNF but do not have a great impact on the day-to-day operations and management of the military force.

THE BACKGROUND EVENTS: JUNE TO SEPTEMBER 1982

The Israeli Defence Forces' (IDF) Operation Peace for Galilee was launched across Israel's northern borders on June 6, 1982. By June 13 the leading elements of the IDF columns had reached the edge of Beirut. Trapped within the densely populated Muslim areas of the city were the surviving elements of a number of PLO units which had withdrawn in the face of the IDF advance. Although the main objective of Sharon's continued northward advance appeared to be the destruction of these remaining PLO forces, the execution of the final coup de grâce raised two problems. First, some individuals in the Israeli government and their supporters were growing increasingly disenchanted with the extended nature of Sharon's advance; and second, the PLO was preparing positions among the high-rise buildings. The final attack, if there was to be one, threatened to be a costly affair for the IDF.

Sharon's dilemma was averted by the arrival of MNF1 some weeks later on August 25. This international force of 800 United States Marines, 800 French Foreign Legion and 400 Italian Bersaglieri deployed at the request of the Lebanese Government (GOL) to oversee the peaceful removal of the PLO militias from Beirut. The operation was
entirely successful and the international force withdrew on September 10 having completed its task.

The IDF, however, did not withdraw. In fact, leading units moved further into the heart of the city to anticipate violence after Bashir Gemayel's assassination on September 14. On September 17 and 18 it became clear that local military or militia units had entered the now undefended Palestinian camps at Sabra and Shatila and killed hundreds of civilians. The Israeli enquiry on the Beirut massacre, held in Jerusalem in 1983, found substantial evidence to indicate that those directly responsible for the massacres were Phalangist militiamen; the number of dead was estimated to be between 700 and 800. The killings in Sabra and Shatila had considerable impact on television audiences around the world, particularly in the United States where the full horror of the incident became clear to viewers during the weekend of September 18 and 19.

THE DEPLOYMENT OF MNF2

On September 20 President Reagan announced to the American nation that the United States, along with its French and Italian allies, would be returning to Beirut by invitation of the Lebanese Government to assist that government in the resumption of sovereignty over the capital. The force, designated MNF2, deployed soon after the Letters of Agreement legitimizing its presence had been exchanged with the GOL. The leading elements of the French and Italian contingents arrived on September 26 and the United States contingent arrived on September 29. The United States contingent comprised approximately 1700 men and included a tank platoon, an artillery battery and support helicopters; the French force was increased to approximately 2000 and included an armoured car squadron of Foreign Legion Cavalry, while the Italian force numbered about 2000 troops with infantry mounted in armoured personnel carriers. The mission of the force, detailed in the Letters of Agreement, was to "provide an interposition Force at agreed locations and thereby provide a Multi-national presence to assist the Lebanese Government (GOL) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area." It was clearly a mandate for peacekeeping although the weapon systems which accompanied the force were not those normally associated with a peacekeeping role.

The locations selected for each contingent in the city reflected their individual national perspective on the Lebanese problem rather than a collective approach. The French took up a position near the race course in the Christian-Maronite area, the Italians occupied the centre close to the Muslim refugee camps where their field hospital provided a great success and the United States occupied the airfield close to the IDF units which had ostensibly withdrawn southwards into the Shouf. Although IDF patrols and forward unit positions were still to be seen in the neighbourhood, by the beginning of October it was the MNF who was the doyen of Beirut's miscellaneous militias and military units.
THE HONEYMOON PERIOD

Prior to the arrival of the MNF2, conditions in Beirut had been dangerous and uncomfortable. The power of the GOL had been considerably diminished by the presence of the confessional militias as well as the IDF in the capital. Necessities such as petrol, water, electricity, port facilities and the freedom to move around the town were controlled by the various neighbourhood militias. The ‘debut’ of the regiments from three of the most powerful armies in the world made a certain impact. The streets were now patrolled by white armoured cars driven by alert, smartly dressed troops. The citizens could see the powerfully equipped 26 Marine Amphibious Unit deployed around the airfield where helicopter traffic moved continuously between the land and the offshore fleet. There were smiles and waves on every side and there seemed to be mutual goodwill between the majority of the city population and the newly arrived troops.

As a result the tension relaxed and the GOL began to reassert itself. The rubble was cleared away and the streets reopened. The control of the essential facilities and services was resumed by the civil authorities. There was an effort to reimpose tax collection and car owners who for months had grown used to random parking in the city centre were now dismayed to find tickets on their windscreen. A pattern of commercial activity returned to the capital; for awhile there was even a rush hour. During this period, on February 8, a small British contingent of approximately 100 troops with some armoured reconnaissance cars joined the force and took up a position at Al Hadath in the eastern suburbs of Beirut.

THE WAR IN THE SHOUF

Though there were a number of acts of violence against MNF troops, including a serious bombing incident at the U.S. embassy in April 1983, killing approximately 60 civilians of several nationalities, the coming of the MNF2 brought a period of comparative calm. This calm came to an end as the war in the Shouf began to impinge on the city itself.

The violence in the Shouf began in earnest when the IDF units withdrew to the Awali River on September 4, 1983. Until then the Israeli troops had enforced an arbitrary peace among the potentially hostile Druze and Christian militias were seeking hegemony in the hills around the capital. On Israeli withdrawal, the Druze militias and their Muslim allies began to reassert themselves successfully in the enclaves taken over by Christian forces during the IDF occupation. The LAF were unprepared for this situation and failed to control the movement and prevent the violence from spreading toward the city. These reversals reduced the authority of the GOL, once again, to those neighbourhoods and districts where it could underwrite its wishes with an effective show of military force. Druze shells began to fall on Beirut and, whether by accident or design, killed and injured several soldiers of the MNF. The continued deterioration of the situation saw the LAF driven from the Shouf villages on the south side of the city (with the exception of the LAF
position at al-Gharb). This prompted the United States and France to use their offshore and air support weapon systems to assist the LAF in the struggle against the Druze. In October there was an attempt at reconciliation in Geneva. However, in spite of talks, a ceasefire and a treaty, the violence continued. Increasingly, the French and American contingents by deed and declaration became identified with the fortunes of the LAF and the GOL while the British and Italians managed to maintain a more neutral position. The Italians continued to provide protection, in their area, for the Shia and Palestinian communities that supported the anti-government forces in the Shouf war and to operate the field hospitals. Meanwhile, the British fostered a close liaison with both sides and in November provided a neutral security presence at the continuing ceasefire talks which offered a point of contact between the opposing factions.

The effects of the Shouf war now began to be manifested in Beirut. As it became clear to the street militias that the MNF troops were unlikely to use heavy weapons to ferret the militias out of their enclaves within the city, they took advantage of that situation. Fighting broke out between the LAF and the urban militias in West Beirut. The activity of the suicide bombers such as the group known as the Islamic Jehad, an Iranian-backed Shia faction, provided further evidence of the increasing violence. A number of attacks took place against buildings and positions occupied by the Israelis, the Lebanese Government, and the American and the French contingents. The most significant bomb attack occurred on October 23, killing 241 United States Marines and 59 French soldiers. Given the climate of the American presidential election campaign, the bombings took on a great significance in the American media. In an attempt to redress these outrages, the French and American contingents stepped up the use of their naval and air support weapons, bringing them into confrontation with Syrian forces.

By October 1983 it was clear that the French and American contingents of the MNF in particular were considered as part of the war between the government forces on one side, and the Druze, Palestinian, Shia forces on the other. Sniper attacks, artillery, rocket and mortar fire began to increase. Kidnapping and major acts of lawlessness were part of the day’s hazards and Beirut resumed its former state of anarchic misery with the front lines of the war running around Ash Shuwayfat between the British and United States compounds.

By November the French and Americans had reduced their military efforts to influence the local situation and had assumed a more passive role in the city with a view to protecting themselves. At a political level the situation seemed hopeless; the continuing violence of the Shouf War diminished the prospect of pressuring the anti-government factions to negotiate. By the end of January/early February the situation in the city was so hazardous that even the simple processes of resupply and liaison between contingents became a problem. On February 6/7, 1984 all ambassadors from contingent countries received an unsigned circular letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister requesting them to “deploy to safer
locations.” They withdrew from Beirut separately between February 8 and March 31, 1984, leaving the city in much the same state as when they arrived in September 1982.

THE POLITICAL FACTORS

A complete explanation of the MNF’s circumstances also requires some assessment of their political problems. First of all, whatever the size and potency of each military contingent, and however independently each nation may have wished to behave within the city of Beirut, the fortunes of the force as a whole were irrevocably tied to the success or failure of American initiatives. The political instruments of negotiation lay in U.S. hands, for America not only enjoyed a special relationship with the Israelis in the international arena, but had the power and resources to negotiate from a position of comparative strength. Unfortunately, the American presence in Lebanon could not be disassociated with an overall position in the Middle East particularly the U.S. relationship with Iran. Iranian antagonism was expressed through the Shia militias and played a significant role in undermining American efforts to secure a peaceful settlement.

The mandate provided a second political factor to be considered. At a purely military level it was the expedient of a crisis situation which gave legality to the presence of foreign troops in Beirut. However it also made it clear that each contingent was bound to assist in the restoration of the GOL’s sovereignty and cooperate with the LAF. Although the degree of support given to the GOL varied among contingents, the fact remained that from the moment they landed the MNF’s status could not be considered as impartial. After the immediate crisis was stabilized and new factors began to emerge, such as the internal security threat in the city and the opening phase of the Shouf war, the MNF continued to operate on the same mandate. The MNF’s support for the government of Lebanon was a necessary condition for the forces’ initial deployment, nevertheless as the country slid into a state of civil war, such support prevented the MNF from acting in a genuine peacekeeping role between the two sides and compromised MNF impartiality.

It is not true that the MNF was doomed from the start. At the time of their arrival in September 1982 and in the months that followed there were a number of favorable circumstances which encouraged optimistic forecasts for success. There was a peaceful environment in the city, the Syrians and Israelis, for quite different reasons, seemed likely to cooperate and in Lebanon itself the confessional groups were showing goodwill toward the GOL and Amin Gemayel the new president. That this period of opportunity was never exploited was due primarily to political failure on the part of the United States, which had taken the initiative and in whose hands lay the instruments of negotiation. However, that failure is not within the scope of this assessment.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MNF

The MNF was organized in a federal manner, each contingent was operationally independent and logistically self-sufficient. Operationally,
the forces were based in separate compounds and patrolled their own zones of responsibility. Logistically, each maintained its own sources of supply and organized independent medical support and workshop facilities. In effect, the MNF was four separate contingents, established in Beirut by the invitation of and individual agreement with the GOL. At a command level, each contingent responded directly to the instructions from its national defence headquarters in its country of origin rather than to a locally based command. The federal character of the force was tempered at theatre level by the unilateral cooperation and liaison which took place between the contingents and the GOL in Beirut. Am­bassadors and contingent commanders met formally on a weekly basis as part of the political and military liaison committees which convened regularly under a Lebanese chairman at the Presidential Palace. In addition, each contingent provided a liaison officer on 24-hour watch in the Lebanese-organized liaison cell at the Palace. Goodwill generally prevailed, fraternization, took place at a local level and contingents patrolled through each other's operational areas. Through these means contingents were kept informed regarding activities of other contingents on an hour-by-hour basis. Thus, although the MNF was federally organized and controlled, it succeeded in operating with a workable degree of cooperation and liaison at command level and with an appearance of integration at street level. Nevertheless, the federal character of the force had been indicted by critics of the MNF who have asserted11 that it encouraged confusion and reduced the international image of the whole initiative. These criticisms are hard to sustain for a number of reasons and the overwhelming evidence points to the federal organization being the only possible solution in the circumstances.

Politically, it was unacceptable for any of the contributing countries to abdicate control over its contingent by virtue of it become part of a genuinely integrated force. For the organizers, a fully integrated HQ required negotiation and time to convene; between the news of the massacres on September 18 and the return of the MNF contingents on September 25, there was simply too little time. (The integrated HQ of the FMQ in the Sinai, for example, took over eight months to assemble before it was deployed.) Furthermore, the chief reason for having an integrated HQ was to superintend an integrated force, for example, a force whose infantry element is provided by one group of countries and its support units by another. In the case of the MNF, each contingent was self-sufficient; even the tiny British force had its own logistic system and medical arrangements. Further, as each contingent was in itself an extremely complex organization, the idea of integrating them in the proper military sense was technically impracticable. As long as each had its own defined areas of responsibility there was no need to coordinate the detailed manner of their operations. By not integrating, each contingent could respond to the requirements of its own national interests and as a result, each was seen as a national entity and not as part of a collective force. This was fortunate for the vulnerable British and Italian contingents because when the situation worsened, with French and American troops becoming increasingly identified with the LAF and the GOL, the
reprisals and animosity of the anti-government forces were directed largely against the French and the Americans, not against the MNF as a whole. Nonetheless, it is true to say that, in an ideal situation, the hostage effect of placing a soldier from a fully integrated, internationally convened force between two opponent forces is probably greater than if the soldier is merely representing his own country.

PEACEKEEPING IN URBAN AREAS

There are a number of problems which a peacekeeping force has to face when operating in urban areas. These were particularly evident in Beirut. Essentially, the multi-faceted nature of the local power groups made it impossible to decide where the interpositional forces should be stationed. In Lebanon each confessional group was supported by a number of militias and this array of forces was further confused by schisms and factions operating under the broad banner of their confession but also enjoying the patronage of foreign powers — the main patrons in 1983/84 being Iran, Israel, Syria and Libya. In some cases, the long-term, long-range interests of certain foreign countries were superimposed over the local manifestos and interests of the militia leaders and confessional politicians. Such countries continued, conditionally, to supply financial aid and weapons to the sympathetic factions which were operating at street level.  

In some cases, the terrorists/freedom fighters who made up these groups and sub-groups could not be regarded as having a deep political sense of commitment. They were, instead, recognizably in the same category of the urban psychopaths and hoodlums just as readily attracted to violence in the streets of Liverpool or New York. However, in the case of Beirut they had to be taken far more seriously because of the quantities of powerful weapons freely available and the groups' readiness to use such weapons in a gratuitous manner. Therefore, in addition to the confused political situation in Beirut, there was also an extremely dangerous internal security threat. The MNF troops were required to behave in a calm, authoritative, interpositional role and simultaneously protect themselves and their compounds from attack.

In Beirut it was neither possible nor appropriate to negotiate a demilitarized area of operations. Initially, this was because the MNF deployment was an immediate response to a crisis and there was no time for detailed appraisal of the area of operations. In the long term, it proved impossible because there was no space in the city for a people-free zone and because there were so many facets to the violence that it was no longer a question of placing a buffer zone between two defined opposing forces. This added to the problem of acting as an interpositional force and made contingents more vulnerable to the internal security threat.

THE USE OF FORCE

For a peacekeeping mission the MNF had a considerable offensive capability. Most contingents had air strike and naval gunfire support. The United States Marines deployed a platoon of M60 tanks and each
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force had armoured reconnaissance vehicles which could be used to great effect against an unsophisticated enemy. The French and the American contingents also had close support artillery and mortar weapons. This firepower was used in three ways: first to support LAF operations on a fairly large scale; second to "redress" the October 23 bombings; and third to return fire against individual weapons systems which were interdicting the MNF compounds. Supporting the LAF and carrying out the October 23 reprisals were the result of political decisions while the decision to return fire, in self defence, was delegated to military commanders.

Because military commanders were generally more in touch with the local situation than were their political masters at home, "returning fire" was one use of force that was carried out successfully. Its purpose was to protect the soldiers in the compounds from the gratuitous attacks which were occurring throughout the area without drawing the MNF into local fire fights. Certainly in the case of the United States Marines there were scrupulously defined conditions for returning indirect fire which set out to warn the attacker that his position was known before fire was returned by a counter bombardment weapon similar in size to that of the attacker's. The United States Marine Corps seldom used indirect fire weapons in this role because the attackers usually stopped firing on the realization that counter-fire could be returned effectively.

The use of firepower to support the LAF and to respond to the activities of militia groups such as the Islamic Jehad was not so effective. When support weapons were used by the French and United States forces to support the LAF in the Shouf war the decisions were usually taken at national level and in some cases the criteria for the use of firepower were political rather than military. Politicians wished to show the home constituencies a satisfactory display of military power and give the appearance of resolving the Lebanese problem. The evening news showed battleships with blazing guns and jets screeching across the Lebanese capital. However effective politically, at a local level the effects of these bombardments were extremely negative. Without the benefit of effective target intelligence, on the whole the bombs and shells were directed against approximate areas rather than specific installations. Local newsmen drove to the impact areas and were shown bomb damaged fields and villages but there was not much evidence that this use of firepower, in any sense, could have turned the tide of events in the Shouf war. Such damage did rouse the intense indignation and antagonism of the local forces who appeared to have been targeted and their retribution fell not on the politicians at home but on the contingents in Beirut city. The use of force "to redress" the October bombings also had a negative effect. As mentioned earlier, the American and French intelligence agencies were not immediately able to find the real identity or motive of the individuals from the group styling themselves as the Islamic Jehad who were responsible for the October 23 bombings; they were referred to as the "trucks bombers" until the end of the MNF operation. It is doubtful whether the raids carried out by French and American aircraft could have succeeded in destroying many, or any, members of the Islamic Jehad.
NATO ARMIES IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE

In Beirut the contingents operated in a peacekeeping role and in an internal security self-protection capacity. The European forces had experience of both types of operation, with the Italians and French acting as peacekeepers in South Lebanon until UNIFIL and the British in Cyprus having had a longstanding commitment to the UN Force. In addition all three armies had previous experience of anti-terrorist operations in urban areas. With the benefit of this experience, the forces were able to adapt themselves swiftly when the local situation changed from the initial 'honeymoon' period to a civil war situation in the Shouf. The experience of urban operations also showed itself during the greenline patrols. The contingents moved with the confidence of professional soldiers, relaxed where they could afford to relax and alert in the hostile zones of the city. This confidence was reassuring to the local people who greeted the patrols in the more relaxed areas with hospitality and information. The attitude of the United States Marines was manifestly different. They regarded themselves as trained primarily for a 'hot' war and had no experience with low intensity operations either as peacekeepers or in the urban anti-terrorist role. As a result their approach was noticeably more aggressive. Their vehicles were painted in disruptive camouflage patterns (the French and Italian vehicles were all white) and their on duty troops wore combat equipment and steel helmets throughout the day. Their positions were sandbagged and bunkered and when not on duty, the men lived in the field conditions. An aspect of this absolutist approach showed in the lack of sensitivity and discrimination expressed by their patrols in the streets. Often travelling in large, aggressively armed AMTRAC vehicles, the patrols did not understand the various shades of local feeling in quite the same way as the Italians and the British. The Marine presence was intimidating, their attitude antagonized the arrogant street militias and made the Marine base a particular target for attack, not for political reasons but because the local "guns" saw the Marines as threatening their own territorial status.

The Europeans also had the advantage of language experience. The French diplomatic and military staff had sufficient numbers of Arab speakers and were fortunate to have a French-speaking environment at the coordinating conference arranged by the Lebanese Army staff. The Italians were fairly careful to appoint staff with recent UNIFIL experience in key posts. They also had no problems with language. Even in the British team, the Ambassador was a fluent French and Arab speaker and the initial military commander was a French linguist. The Americans, however, appeared to make little effort to anticipate the requirement for French and Arabic in their initial diplomatic and military staff appointments. It was an indication that, to some extent at least, they did not place much value on communication either with the locals at unit level, or on the liaison and coordination conferences at Lebanese government level.

In spite of these criticisms, there is no doubt that the forces deployed in the MNF were superior in conduct and quality to the average standard
of UN troops. Furthermore, it is not possible to assert with much conviction that the UN’s special international status would have afforded the troops of a UN force in Beirut with any significant additional protection in this dangerous environment. In 1982 the tiny unarmed UN observer group in Beirut suffered six killed out of a total force of approximately 50 men. These were not volunteer schoolteachers acting as peacekeepers during a convenient sabbatical but professional soldiers employed as United Nations Military Observers, arguably the most experienced peaceforce in the region. This unfortunate statistic seems to illustrate that unarmed UN observers were just as vulnerable to attack as the overarmed multinational soldiers. Moreover the UN military observers in Beirut were of a much higher standard than the average troops to be found in a UN peacekeeping force which generally comprised a professional element as well as a sizeable volunteer and conscripted element. This latter category of peacekeeping soldier may operate successfully in the comparatively ordered environment of a peaceforce buffer zone but would have been rudely shocked at the intense and constantly changing patterns of violence in Beirut.

THE RESULTS OF THE OCTOBER 23 BOMB ATTACKS

On October 23 two powerful bombs were detonated in the city killing 241 marines in the United States’ compound and 59 soldiers in the French compound. The effects were wide-spread. In America, France and Italy popular demand for withdrawal from Beirut was intensified as a result and in the Lebanon the professional standing of the troops diminished in the eyes of the street militias. The fact that there were so many casualties was not due to any great measure of skillful insight or careful planning on the part of the so-called “truck bombers.” Instead, the unlucky coincidence of several circumstances caused this appalling number of casualties. Some were military factors: poor assessment of intelligence; lack of knowledge about the capabilities of potential attackers; lack of an effective security zone around the bases; and the perceived need to concentrate troops into particular buildings. However, none of these failures mattered as much as the “disastrous” level of military incompetence which is sometimes cited by critics of the MNF as a major reason for its overall failure.

The incidents, while particularly horrifying for the countries involved, were not as significant as some commentators have argued. Taken in the context of events in Beirut, the bombings may actually say little about the ultimate failure of the MNF. In the streets of Beirut it seems likely the neighbourhood gangs and militias derived great satisfaction from the incidents. Certainly a number of colourful organizations claimed responsibility and the bombings also lent themselves to the Belfast style of football score graffiti — Jehad 241 - Marines 0. On a more analytical level October 23 was used to demonstrate the unpopularity of the MNF, the intensity of the conflict against the MNF and that French and American involvement with the LAF led to immediate, large-scale reprisals.
None of these assessments really considers the strong element of luck in the whole affair. If it is, in fact, an element of luck which produced the large numbers of casualties from this one incident, the high figures obviously cannot be used to demonstrate a sustained feeling of animosity against the MNF. Nor does it argue that a high number of attacks were directed against the force. Even assuming that it was the Islamic Jihad which carried out the attack, one cannot conclude that the bombings were, necessarily, a reprisal for the earlier French and American involvement with the LAF. Previous bomb attacks claimed by Islamic Jihad, an Iranian-sponsored group, had been in the oblique execution of Iran’s long-term stated policies and not local issues. The group’s bomb attacks against the Iraqi Embassy in 1982 and the U.S. Embassy in April 1983 were apprently part of this campaign; certainly they could not have been as a result of the MNF’s activities. Moreover, Islamic Jihad’s campaign against France and the United States has continued and still appears to be linked to American and French long-term policies vis à vis Iran, not Lebanon.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that MNF2 failed in its overall purpose in Beirut and left the city in a worse state than when it arrived. However it is not fair to say that the initiative was doomed from the start. During the ‘honeymoon period,’ experienced shortly after the arrival of the force, successful negotiations might have taken place. The failure to seize this opportunity was a failure on the part of the politician, for the behavior of the military could not have had much impact except in a negative sense. The main task of the military force was to encourage a sufficiently peaceful environment for political negotiations to take place between a Lebanese government, with its authority restored, and the foreign and local forces who threatened to recommence violence. The military forces were successful in establishing an atmosphere of comparative calm from October 1982 until September 1983. In the tendency to emphasize the political failure of the initiative, one should remember and attempt to understand the military lessons, the successes and the failures, experienced in Lebanon. Finally it would be unwise to assert that the failure of the MNF will seriously discourage any future initiatives involving the use of federally-organized, multinational units. Their experience in Lebanon notwithstanding, international forces, recruited from the same nations and organizations on the same principals, have been deployed on various missions such as famine relief and clearing terrorist mines from the Gulf of Suez.
Endnotes

1. The synopsis of events concerning the activities of the Israeli Defence Forces during Operation Peace for Galilee is taken largely from Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari's account in Israel's Lebanon War (Simon and Schuster).

2. The circumstances of the massacre were fully investigated by the Kahan Commission in February 1983. A synopsis of this enquiry is found in Keesings Contemporary Archives 1983, vol. XXIX, p. 32034.

3. The New York Times for September 21, 1982 (p. A17) carried the full statement which indicated a wider purpose than the restoration of peace and security in Beirut.

4. The letters of agreement between each nation and the Government of Lebanon were the same in the terms of their peacekeeping role. This particular text is taken from page 2 of HM Stationery Office Services No. 9, Beirut 31 January 1983.

5. Luigi Caligaris, "Western Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Lessons of the MNF," Survival, Nov./Dec. 1984, p. 263, argued "the various nations involved did bring with them quite different perspectives of their own roles...."

6. "Confessional" throughout this study is used in its Lebanese context as a translation of the Arabic term ta'iffiya which refers collectively to the religious and ethnic sects to which the Lebanese give their loyalty in preference to the nation as a whole.

7. Interview with Dr. Marwan Buheiry, Oxford Fellow, in which he gave an account of the reassertion of normality following the arrival of MNF. Oslo, October 1985.

8. See the DOD Commission Report on Beirut, Intelligence, 20 December 1983, Part 4. "By mid to late August 1983, Druze, Shia and Syrian leaders had begun making statements to the effect that the multinational forces especially the U.S. element was one of the enemy."

9. Interview with Dr. Geoffry Kemp, Georgetown University, Washington, who was a National Security advisor to the White House during the MNF2 deployment. He described the situation in October 1982 as a providing a window of opportunity for the United States to behave as a great power.


12. A 1985 UN assessment of confessional militias and their factions shows the Shia militias comprising fifteen military subgroups; the Sunni with thirteen; the Druze with five, and the Christian forces with nine. There are a further fourteen military factions which appear to have no confessional ties.

13. See David Hirst's articles in the Guardian, August 26-29, 1985, in which he questions a militia fighter regarding his motives for fighting, revealing a startling lack of any real political motivation or even understanding of "the enemy" whom he was seeking to destroy. It seemed that violent behavior had a self-sustaining nature which had nothing to do with politics.

14. "Green line patrols" were a manifestation of the inter-contingent liaison whereby troops in open vehicles and armoured cars mainly from the French, British and Italian contingents patrolled separately along the Green Line which nominally divided the Muslim and Christian sectors of the capital. The patrols were discontinued at the close of the "honeymoon" period.

15. This attitude was well described recently by Ian Taylor in "Living with Soldiers," The Listener, December 3, 1985. During his filming of "Soldiers," Taylor visited the USMC recruit training at Parris Island, South Carolina and described the results of the motivation procedure in which "the new recruit is mentally brutalized and broken and then rebuilt in the stereotype of the Marine. An instructor spoke quite openly of 'motivating a recruit to want to kill someone.' The problem with this absolutist approach is how to adapt the "trained killer" to the grey shades of low intensity operations.