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More than six years have passed since the Solidarity political reform movement demonstrated the power of a popular resistance campaign and changed the face of Polish politics. Five years have passed since the Polish Communist Party and the armed forces tried to put the genie back into the bottle. The imposition of martial law in December 1981 forced Solidarity into the underground, but did nothing to diminish its popularity among the Polish people. Maintaining a viable underground organization is not easy in any police state and, as periodic arrests of leading resistance figures demonstrated, the Polish case was no exception. The resistance leadership recognized this and early in 1982 compiled "The Little Conspirator," a guide to survival in the underground. While it apparently circulated widely in Poland, even being quoted at length in the official media, until now it has not appear in full in the West. It is presented here, with an introduction explaining its provenance. Much has changed and much has remained the same in Poland during the last five years. Recent developments provide some basis for cautious optimism that the Solidarity movement may be able to "come in from the cold" and play a role in the mainstream of Polish politics. Even if that should transpire, "The Little Conspirator" will remain an enlightening historical document, both for students of a dark period of Polish history, and for those who seek to understand the mechanisms of resistance to oppression.

American concern about terrorism is principally focussed outward, toward the Middle East and Europe, rather than inward and this is understandable. Attacks on American persons and facilities abroad have been frequent, dramatic, and costly, while those incidents at home tend to be dwarfed by the statistics for ordinary violent crime. Bruce Hoffman examines the resurgence of left-wing terrorism in the United States in recent years, and identifies and discusses the groups involved. His prognosis is one of a "law of diminishing returns"; lacking regenerative capacity, these groups will continue to lose strength and momentum as preoccupation with survival supercedes action to further the cause.

In his study of the second *Multinational Peacekeeping Force* in Beirut, John Mackinlay describes a noble mission gone wrong and attempts to show why, with a view to providing lessons for such missions in the future. He demonstrates that the mission displayed some positive features, but when the volatile Lebanese politics — over which the force exerted no stabilizing influence — turned violent yet again, the very real limitations of the force quickly became apparent. Larger strategic considerations which bound the force to the unstable Lebanese government compromised its impartiality, making it part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Mackinlay is undoubtedly correct to assert that the ultimate failure of MNF2 need not preclude such ventures in the future; indeed, the success of the Multinational Force of Observers in the Sinai, proves the validity of the concept, given appropriate circumstances, resources and direction. Nonetheless, Mackinlay's account of MNF2 provides a cautionary tale and as such is a useful corrective to the often uncritical hubris surrounding the assumed virtues and achievements of peacekeeping.