our national legislators, and our citizenry in general, the subject of special operations is not adequately understood." Despite being "capable of self-sustained missions," special operations forces "can support conventional operations. They are not competitors, nor should they be isolated from conventional forces. In an era of collective security, their capabilities in the field of military assistance and training are exceedingly important."

The subsequent eight chapters deal with a diverse range of topics regarding special operations: threats to U.S. interests in the 1980s; American moral, legal, political, and cultural constraints; the Soviet approach; military capabilities; intelligence assets; economic/security assistance; psychological operations; and organizational strategy and low-intensity conflicts.

In sum, this is an informative, highly-readable, thoughtful book which provides useful insights into the ongoing DOD special operations forces revitalization program. It is highly recommended for policymaker, professional military personnel, and the serious student of national security affairs.

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Confrontation or Coexistence consists of the papers and proceedings of a workshop sponsored by ISIS in February 1983. It ostensibly addresses the question of what kind of relations the ASEAN states should promote with Vietnam in light of the intractable Cambodian conflict. Workshop participants included Canadian, ASEAN, American, and Australian academics as well as regional journalists and diplomats. The book is, however, more narrowly focused than the title suggests, actually concentrating on Thai-Vietnam relations. Only two of the ten papers deal with broader implications for ASEAN and the great powers. Nevertheless, this volume provides a useful snapshot of the Thai and Vietnamese positions toward each other and Cambodia in the early 1980s and discusses each actor's relations with both mentors and adversaries.

In a brief historical overview Dhavorn Sukhakanya argues that Thai suzerainty over the Khmer had been more benevolent than Vietnam's, since the former left internal affairs to the Cambodians and supported Khmer Buddhism, while the Vietnamese had attempted to destroy Cambodian culture and institutions, supplanting them with Vietnam's.
Moving to the post-1975 period (the end of the Second Indochina War) Gareth Porter declares that Vietnam viewed the American defeat as the beginning of a new era in regional international politics in which the SRV would be accepted as a major new socialist power. ASEAN's resistance to Vietnam's plans for Indochina led Hanoi to conclude over the remainder of the decade that ASEAN was simply a surrogate for continued U.S. domination. This view of ASEAN changed, according to Porter, after China's invasion of Vietnam. With Beijing as Hanoi's new major adversary, Hanoi has come to believe that common cause can be made with ASEAN against the PRC, if only the Southeast Asian group accepts Vietnam's hegemony over Indochina. As Peter Polomka notes, however, Vietnam's hopes run afoul of Thailand's insistence, with ASEAN backing, that Cambodia be restored as a neutral buffer between the historic rivals. Prospects for a return to a pre-Vietnam war era balance within Indochina were rated as 'dim' by virtually all Workshop participants. Instead, it was feared that prolonging the conflict would only create strains within ASEAN between those states which see China as the longterm threat to regional stability and Thailand which, as the frontline state, fears the prospect of having to live with Vietnamese soldiers on its Cambodian frontier.

Most participants saw the present polarization of Southeast Asian politics as virtually impossible to alter so long as Vietnam remained in Cambodia. Vietnam's empire depends on Soviet largesse. Even if other countries were willing to provide economic assistance to Hanoi, its military position in both Cambodia and Laos would remain dependent on Soviet arms and petroleum. Moreover, as Carl Thayer notes, the Soviet-Vietnam relationship is also directed against China as part of the Russian encirclement strategy.

The study concludes with Polomka's assessment of the situation. First, because of Cambodia, great power rivalry has once more been inserted into Southeast Asian politics. Second, Chinese influence in Thailand will increase as Vietnam continues to rely on the Soviets, and third, a growing estrangement between Bangkok and the rest of ASEAN is probable if the war continues. From a 1986 vantage point, this assessment remains valid.

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When the Spanish Civil War erupted in July 1936, contemporary observers in Europe and North America generally had little or no difficulty understanding the "true" nature of the conflict. Whatever