

The Politics of Namibian *Immobilisme*: Conflict, Diplomacy, and Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa

by
Richard Dale

THE CHANGING LEGITIMACY OF DECOLONIZATION¹

Following the scramble for Africa in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the imperial powers retained their grandeur until the close of the First World War. Based upon the outcome of that war, only that portion of sub-Saharan Africa under German control was unscrambled and placed under new management. The novel colonial dispensation, which affected South West Africa (now Namibia), was international in name but national in implementation. Inaugurated as an institutional mechanism to camouflage the territorial ambitions of some of the Allied and Associated Powers, the League of Nations mandates system represented no radical threat to imperial values. Rather, it provided international cooperation in, and legitimacy for, the continuation of colonial rule. Indeed, no African mandated territory received independence during the interwar period.

Although reproached by the supervisory Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva for suppressing a small-scale revolt by one branch of the Nama people living in the southern portion of the mandated territory of the South West Africa and for blatant favoritism toward the resident white community in the territory, the Union of South Africa was not threatened as a mandatory power by the eurocentric League of Nations.² The Union was surrounded by British-ruled or Portuguese-ruled territories where African needs and desires were subordinated either to grand imperial designs or to white sensitivities. Despite being thwarted by the League in its aspiration to acquire German South West Africa, the Union Government still sought to acquire neighboring Southern Rhodesia and the British High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland.

Even after the white electorate in Southern Rhodesia opted for self-government rather than annexation by South Africa in 1922, the Union Government persisted in negotiating with the British authorities for the transfer of the contiguous three High Commission Territories.³ These territories were not under League supervision, yet the attentive British public was aware of the incorporation issue which protected Africans within the territories from further land alienation and from the creation of a modern economic infrastructure catering primarily to white commercial interests.

The Africans in Bechuanaland, for instance, were provided with advisory councils, as were the members of the resident white community.⁴ In neighboring South West Africa, the Africans had little opportunity for symbolic participation in governance; the South African (and, for a

while, German) white residents were granted a measure of political autonomy even though they had no representation in the Union Parliament.⁵

Following the Second World War, the international environment changed dramatically. The League of Nations was no more. After 1945 two major structural changes occurred which had a profound impact upon politics in Southern Africa. First, the United Nations Organization fashioned at San Francisco provided much greater institutional support for the scrutiny of imperial business. In particular, colonial domains once off-limits in the League era were subject to international publicity, if not supervision, through the arrangement of providing data about non-self-governing territories. These were the residues of empire left after almost all the mandated territories were transformed into trust territories. The supervisory 'back door' for non-self-governing territories was much larger and potentially more important than the international 'front door' for the trust territories, and the back door was watched by the General Assembly. Second, the United Nations General Assembly became enlarged primarily as a result of the fragmentation of empire. Most of its new members were ex-colonials who used international machinery to terminate Western imperial rule. This was not the case with the League of Nations, whose members and structures were used to legitimize, and even improve, the administrative quality of colonial rule.⁶

Prime Minister Smuts headed the South African delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1946. He sought international approval for the incorporation of the mandated territory of South West Africa by the Union instead of its conversion into a United Nations trust territory. In part, his case was based on the principle of self-determination, for he asserted that both the white and African residents of South West Africa had expressed themselves in favor of such an annexation. Only the British delegation supported the South African case, perhaps out of gratitude for the Union's contribution to the Allied cause in World War II.⁷ After the 1948 General Election in the Union, which marked the final triumph of Afrikaner nationalism, Prime Minister Malan's government persisted in pursuing the issue of the transfer of the British High Commission Territories, and became more hostile toward the United Nations General Assembly regarding the administration of South West Africa. From the watershed 1948 election until the independence of Ghana in 1957, the government of South Africa solidified Afrikaner rule, rationalized the theory and practice of white supremacy under the label of separateness, and fended off United Nations attacks on its domestic policies. In addition, it strengthened the economy of neighboring South West Africa, facilitated the *rapprochement* between the South African and German segments of the territorial white group,⁸ and linked the white residents there to the Union Parliament. South West Africa became a National Party fiefdom, and recolonization, rather than decolonization, characterized Pretoria's policy planning for the territory.

In neighboring Angola, there was no thought of retreat from empire, all the more so because metropolitan Portugal was not admitted to

the United Nations until 1955. Its leaders' fascination with Lusotropicalism represented a reaffirmation of the self-assigned imperial role for this small Iberian power. Great Britain, however, did begin to address the issue of decolonization, dramatized by the accession of India and Pakistan to independence in 1947. The British task was facilitated by the Labor Party which had an anti-imperial tradition dating back to the beginning of the century. Such credentials did not prevent it from playing punitive politics with the future president of Botswana, Seretse Khama, who married across the color bar and thus offended white mores, both in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa. The Khama affair, although it detracted from the British reputation, sensitized the British to the burdens of empire and to the dangers of white paramountcy, which were visible in both Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, as well as in South Africa.⁹

African nationalism was heavily suppressed by the Portuguese, who professed to practice an enlightened policy of non-racialism based on the assimilation of selected Africans by the colonial society. Yet revolt erupted in Angola in 1961, shortly after Zaire (then the Congo) was precipitously granted independence by Belgium. Such a transition frightened members of the white electorate in South Africa, who took a dim view of the decolonization process.¹⁰ This process was legitimized by the United Nations General Assembly, the majority of whose members passed a noted resolution in 1960, termed the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, unreservedly favoring independence. In the early 1960s the General Assembly Special Committee of Twenty Four (known formally as the "Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples") dealt with the decolonization process in Bechuanaland¹¹ while the International Court of Justice at The Hague was considering the Ethiopian and Liberian suit aimed at prying South West Africa loose from the control of Pretoria.

MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

Notwithstanding the charge that considerable resources and energy were frittered away in judicial attempts to induce South Africa to mend its political ways in South West Africa,¹² consulting the International Court of Justice rule on the international status of the League mandated territory was not a tactical mistake from the Western perspective. African decision-makers were quick to realize that the Western industrial power, and not the Soviet bloc members, had the requisite trade and investment linkages to use as leverage against South Africa. Moreover, these Western powers had three (four, until the admission of the People's Republic of China) of the five permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, which was the only organ in the United Nations authorized to apply meaningful coercive measures against member and non-member states under the provisions of the Charter. The South African government was equally attentive to the unequal allocation of power within in the United Nations system.

Ever since the Smuts government was rebuffed by the United Nations in its efforts to add South West Africa to the Union in an internationally recognized manner in 1946, subsequent South African governments have attempted to resolve matters with an increasingly hostile United Nations by negotiating with one or more of the Western powers. The South African rationale for this originally was the League mandate, awarded to the Union in 1920 by the Allied and Associated Powers which, among others, included France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Two of the three had colonial possessions in Africa, while the third (the United States) was a military and economic superpower with growing investments in South Africa. South Africa initially made no mention of either Japan (which was one of the Allied and Associated Powers as well as a mandatory power) or of West Germany (which had a number of nationals in the territory), possibly because neither state belonged to the United Nations.

From 1950 until 1966 the International Court of Justice dealt on four separate occasions (1950, 1955, 1956, and 1962-1966) with the status of the territory, the rules to be observed in scrutinizing the South African administration of the territory, and the quality of the South African stewardship as mandatory power in the absence of a mandates system. The first three times, the Court delivered an advisory opinion, but in the fourth instance, it dealt with a contentious case (with Ethiopia and Liberia as joint plaintiffs and South Africa as the defendant) and dismissed the case on a technicality in July 1966. Hence, international jurisprudence provided no binding judgements which the Security Council could enforce against South Africa. This enraged most African member states of the General Assembly while delighting the Verwoerd government in Pretoria. A month after the Court delivered its judgement, the African nationalists began guerrilla warfare in Namibia, and this was quickly followed by the granting of independence to Botswana and Lesotho in September and October 1966, respectively. A year earlier, Botswana's eastern neighbor, Southern Rhodesia, declared itself independent of the British Crown. At this time Angola and Mozambique were both in the midst of a guerrilla warfare aimed at wresting independence from Portugal.

With the onset of low-intensity guerrilla warfare in Namibia, multilateral diplomacy became even more significant. This type of warfare is, *par excellence*, political warfare. The Organization of African Unity, the United Nations, and the Commonwealth of Nations served as organizational platforms for inter-African diplomacy and for exerting African pressure on metropolitan powers. Later, two constellations of states emerged which attempted to facilitate the independence process for Zimbabwe¹³ and for Namibia: the Front Line States (which began in 1976 and was originally composed of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) and the Western Contact Group (which began in 1977 and consisted of Canada, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The division of labor between the two clusters permitted the Front Line States to deal with the African nationalist groups in Zimbabwe and Namibia and the Contact Group to act

as an extension of the Security Council in facilitating minimal contact and bargaining between Pretoria and its African nationalist protagonists in Namibia or in exile.¹⁴

INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND NEIGHBORING STATES

Encouraged by the visible success of African nationalist movements in colonial territories further north, African nationalists in South Africa challenged the Pretoria regime for the sharing, if not the transfer, of power. The governmental response was the repression of African dissent, on the one hand, and the cultivation of African subnationalism and the promotion of ethnic homelands, on the other. African nationalist organizations, such as the African National Congress (ANC) or the Pan Africanist Congress, were either outlawed or counterbalanced by ethnic particularism. Those deeply committed to eventual African majority rule were often able to exit South Africa illegally through the High Commission Territories in the early 1960s.

Bechuanaland (and thereafter Botswana) became a main conduit northward for South African, as well as Namibian, refugees bent on political life in exile and perhaps on returning as trained insurgents. Because of Botswana's proximity to battlegrounds in neighboring South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, refugees became a permanent feature of the political landscape.¹⁵ The refugee influx was a catalyst in the fruition of African nationalism in Botswana, which moved from self-governing status in March 1965 to full independence in September 1966. Insurgencies in neighboring countries adversely affected Botswana's domestic tranquility, yet Botswana waited eleven years (1966-1977) before creating its own armed forces in response to repeated cross-border operations by the Southern Rhodesian security forces. Very few, if any other, African states have begun their independence without an army. Botswana managed the initial years of independence with only a police force, which had an effective paramilitary unit to handle security threats.¹⁶

At the time of independence, Botswana was flanked on the east and west by white-ruled neighbors whose regimes were under attack by African nationalist forces. Because Botswana had a heavy population density along the railway line linking South Africa with Southern Rhodesia and because the economic, transportation, and communications grid bound Botswana tightly to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the insurgency in Southern Rhodesia was a more immediate threat to the decision-makers in Gaborone.¹⁷ In South West Africa, the South African government initiated its counterinsurgency program by building an elaborate legal system designed to hobble any conceivable type of resistance to the prevailing order and to restrict its response to the Police Force. This was all that was needed, from Pretoria's perspective, at this time¹⁸ when the government was busy imposing its vision of separate development upon the Africans of the territory. South Africa would counter the symbols and rhetoric of African nationalism with

bread-and-butter subnationalism which would hold economic attractions for traditional elites, particularly in Ovamboland, an African reserve in the north bordering on Angola. Until the displacement of the Caetano Government by a *coup* in 1974, the South Africans were able to rely upon the Portuguese armed forces to make Angola inhospitable to members of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

Over time, the conduct of the SWAPO insurgency, undertaken through its military component, the People's Liberation Army (PLAN) was increasingly conducted from rear area bases in Zambia as well as in Angola. Unlike the situation in Mozambique, PLAN has yet to be able to secure staging and control areas within Namibia itself.¹⁹ With the cooperation of Zambia, PLAN was able to extend its operations east of Ovamboland into the Kaokoveld and Caprivi Strip areas by 1973. The previous year, 1972, the South African Defense Force (SADF) moved into Namibia to take charge of the war against PLAN, and the costs have escalated from R90 million in 1972 to R650 million in 1981.²⁰

By 1980, the war was being fought on a national, local, and ethnic basis with support from SADF units, from a newly-raised South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF), and from black units recruited in both places. For a long time, South African military and political traditions forbade the recruitment and deployment of Africans in combat roles. The manpower requirements on the border were such that military innovations were needed.²¹ One regional consequence of the shift in recruitment policies involved the use of Basarwa (Bushmen) as trackers in the SADF. These aboriginal people live in both Namibia and Botswana, and concern has been expressed by anthropologists regarding the 'modernization' of the Bushmen in such a military manner. Botswana has now passed legislation proscribing the recruitment of military personnel within its borders for any army except the Botswana Defense Force (BDF).²²

As in counterinsurgency operations elsewhere, the SADF devotes attention to civic action programs among the African inhabitants of the operational zones, hoping to weaken the inhabitants' links to SWAPO which is unable to deliver such services except in its rear zones in Angola.²³ The Namibian guerrilla war, which has lasted two decades, has had a substantial impact upon the local inhabitants and upon the South Africans in the metropole.²⁴ Not only has Namibia become, effectively, a preserve of the SADF but also it has contributed to the SADF vision of the proper societal response to what is viewed as a "total onslaught" against the South African way of life. Heretofore, the SADF had been a secondary, subservient force in the South African body politic, but the ongoing guerrilla warfare in Namibia, where most officers serve a tour of duty, has heightened the political consciousness and attentiveness of the SADF officer corps especially in the field of political ideology and revolutionary warfare.²⁵

Beginning with Operation Zulu in 1976, the SADF has launched attacks from Namibian bases into southern Angola. Its first foray into Angola resulted in some bitterness toward the United States because

South African decision-makers thought that the Americans had given tacit approval of such a venture.²⁶ Since President Agostinho Neto's MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government in Luanda played host both the PLAN and to Cuban troops,²⁷ the South Africans rationalized their cross-border operations as little more than forward defense and deployment to halt SWAPO infiltration into Namibia at its source. In addition, the Pretoria regime furnished aid and comfort to a dissident southern Angolan group, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), led by Dr. Jonas Savimibi.

South African military support was also given to support a dissident Mozambican group, RENAMO or MNR (Mozambique National Resistance Movement), which waged a low-intensity war against President Samora Machel's FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) government in Maputo. This policy of encouraging ethnic fragmentation was South Africa's political specialty, for it was the bedrock of apartheid (and later separate development) and served to blunt African coalition building. On the more overt level, the SADF undertook punitive raids against Lesotho and Mozambique for harboring South African refugees whom South African authorities regarded as clear and present threats.

Coupled with this projection of military and air power was a diplomatic offensive against African-ruled southern African states to entice them to sign non-aggression pacts and thus freeze out ANC insurgents, denying them staging areas for attacks on South Africa.²⁸ The process worked well in Mozambique and Swaziland, whose governments signed these pacts.²⁹ Botswana resisted South African blandishments and later was raided by the SADF,³⁰ while Lesotho responded to a South African blockade with a military *coup*, displacing the Jonathan Government, which originally had been a pliant one from the South African perspective.³¹

IMMOBILISME IN NAMIBIA

The Namibian insurgency has continued for twenty years, while South African *de facto* control over the territory has lasted for forty years in this golden age of decolonization. This situation yields several questions. Why have the negotiations among the Contact Group, the Front Line States, and the two principals (South Africa and SWAPO) over the proposed independence of Namibia produced such meager results? What accounts for the temporizing? What outcomes are most likely?³²

In the first place, on the basis of 1984 public opinion surveys conducted among the white electorate and white elite in South Africa, it appears that the climate of electoral opinion has grown more supportive of direct talks with SWAPO. On this particular issue, the electorate leads the bureaucratic and political elite. Nevertheless, there is a feeling that the war with PLAN could be won. On the one hand, there are signs that the burdens and costs of counterinsurgency are mounting and that talks

might lead to the termination of hostilities. Yet, on the other hand, there is no evidence of a lack of confidence in South Africa's martial abilities.³³ Even though there have been instances of white South Africans evading conscription into the SADF, draft-dodging has yet to become a serious, debilitating problem.³⁴ This suggests, then, that the political leadership could harness white public opinion to support direct talks with the SWAPO leadership regarding the cessation of hostilities, but it also means that public support for the twenty year-old war has not eroded.

A second factor which is repeatedly mentioned in the literature on the conflict over Namibia is the need of the Pretoria Government to protect its electoral flank from the ultra-conservatives. It is argued that this group would be able to capitalize upon the loss of Namibia by the white authorities. In addition, should the loss of Namibia mean the concomitant exodus of Afrikaner voters from Namibia to South Africa, there is the anticipation that these displaced whites would punish the government for their loss by endorsing ultra-right South African political parties. The conclusion seems to be that the government in Pretoria would not willingly be a party to its electoral defeat by disengaging from Namibia. Hence, there is a quest for politically palatable formulae and lines of retreat. The graceful exit is one of the keys to the solution of the problem.³⁵ Yet it is equally important to recall that the German-speaking whites involved in commercial pursuits in the territory are thought to be less anxious about who controls the territory. They could make their peace with SWAPO provided that private entrepreneurs were welcome in the new nation.³⁶ Hence, part of the solution to the problem lies in the development of minimal minority rights for those whites who choose not to emigrate, and this is a topic well-suited to diplomatic agreements made under the aegis of the Western Contact Group and the Front Line States.³⁷

The third element to consider in the resolution of the conflict is the interjection of Cold War issues by South Africa and the United States, primarily the presence of roughly 25,000 Cuban armed forces and 6,000 Cuban civilians in Angola.³⁸ The Cubans, in turn, receive some assistance from the East Germans and the Soviets, with the Soviets providing the weaponry and logistical support.³⁹ This Eastern bloc support is used mainly to insure the political primacy of the MPLA government in Luanda, which had fought two other rivals — FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA — for the Portuguese patrimony. Unlike the situation in Mozambique, where the Portuguese relinquished power to FRELIMO, in Angola, there was no one single African nationalist group which enjoyed supremacy on the battlefield and a monopoly of international recognition. Recently, Dr. Savimbi's UNITA has been attempting to force the MPLA to share power with it. UNITA has enjoyed South African backing and aspires to tap anti-communist sentiments within the United States Congress to acquire even greater levels of aid in its battle against Luanda.⁴⁰ At stake is "borrowed power," that is, power from outside the region used to tip the balance in favor of a disputant.⁴¹

Many American Africanist scholars are disturbed at the intrusion of East-West concerns into what they claim is a regional issue, seeing the attempt to couple South African disengagement from Namibia with a symmetrical Cuban disengagement of forces from Angola as an unnecessarily complicating factor.⁴² The issue is the essential weakness of the two neighboring regimes: that of South African-governed Namibia, with its clutch of internal political parties which have yet to generate the mass appeal and legitimacy of SWAPO; and that of the MPLA regime in Luanda which is challenged by UNITA in the south, financed in large part by royalties from Gulf/Chevron Oil operating in Cabinda, and supplied with military hardware by the Soviet Union. Neither side has undisputed legitimacy — SWAPO and UNITA have seen to that⁴³ — and neither party can win on the battlefield and enforce a victor's peace on the other.⁴⁴

What, then, are the prospects in the near future? Will Namibia join Botswana as an independent state, probably as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations? Will the United States recognize the Angolan government? Will the combat continue or will there be commotion but no motion? It seems that the short-term outlook is bleak and could be characterized as *immobilisme*. To the extent that the Namibian impasse is characterized as a Cold War issue with concerns about "borrowed power" there is even less opportunity for conflict resolution.⁴⁵ It is also most likely that the solution to the conflict rests with a sequential approach in which the MPLA-UNITA fragmentation is considered first, the Angolan state is consolidated and then the Namibian question is handled.⁴⁶ Moreover, the South African regime has shown itself perfectly capable of dilatory bargaining techniques,⁴⁷ and the recent announcement to the South African Parliament by President P.W. Botha that South Africa would begin to implement the relevant United Nations Security Council resolution on August 1, 1986 if the Cuban troop issue were resolved,⁴⁸ provides little concrete evidence of change.

In light of Dr. Savimbi's trek to Washington, D.C. and his apparent willingness to hold Gulf/Chevron Oil hostage by means of economic sabotage,⁴⁹ it seems that the Cuban forces will be all the more necessary for the dos Santos regime. That government, in turn, is hardly likely to reward the Botha regime with a diplomatic settlement as a result of the deliberate undercutting of its own domestic base of power. Commentators have noted the insensitivity of American mediators in the Namibian issue regarding fundamental security concerns in Luanda.⁵⁰ In addition, the Americans may have, in their fixation upon "borrowed power," fallen prey to the maxim of the American liberal tradition that "distributing power is more important than accumulating power." This maxim runs counter to patterns of political development in Third World states.⁵¹ It could be argued that political survival is a pressing concern for the Angolan government elite, just as it is for the elite in Pretoria. The smoldering discontent of African urban youth in South Africa and the rising death toll even after the lifting of the state of emergency are areas of far greater concern to Pretoria, which has to cope not only with a weakened economy but also with declining sources of revenue in

Namibia. SWAPO's political inheritance is now diminished by falling commodity prices for Namibia's principal exports, thus making the territory less of an economic prize than when the insurgency began in 1966.⁵²

The lack of a buoyant economy, the threat of escalating economic sanctions from the West, and anxiety about the extreme right-wing of Afrikanerdom, which is transfixed by the loss of white privilege, give Pretoria little reason to accept an increasing debt burden (from the loss of Namibia) in a time of penury. Political solutions are easier to sustain when there is the lubricant of affluence, and thus it seems that *immobilisme* rather than conflict resolution is the less expensive option at present. As Professor Zartman correctly observed, "... low-level conflict is preferable to possible political compromise for SWAPO and for South Africa as well, which is why the war goes on."⁵³ To expect otherwise in an ideologically supercharged and economically bearish environment would be myopic.

Endnotes

1. The author wishes to thank the Chairmen (Lt. Col. Michael B. Patterson, followed by Lt. Col. Robert A. Kromer) of the Department of Social Studies, as well as the Director (Major Daniel W. Henk) of the African Seminar, School of International Studies at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he was a visiting professor in 1984-1985, and the Office of Research Development and Administration of Southern Illinois University for their support of his Southern African research work. The visiting professorship, which, included a short research trip to Botswana in 1985, was funded under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, administered by Southern Illinois University. Only the author is responsible for the data and views set forth in this article, which was originally presented as a paper at the pan-African conference at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale on April 5, 1986.
2. South Africa's relations with the League regarding South West Africa are carefully analyzed in Robert L. Bradford's "The Origin and Concession of the League of Nations' Class 'C' Mandate for South West Africa and Fulfilment of the Sacred Trust, 1919-1939" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1965).
3. The most complete work on this topic is Ronald Hyam's *The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908-1948* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1972).
4. For an evaluation of the significance of the two Advisory Councils in Bechuanaland, consult Jack R. Bermingham, "The Settler/Imperial Complex and the Bechuanaland Protectorate" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1979), pp. 122-161.
5. Israel Goldblatt, *History of South West Africa from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century* (Cape Town: Juta and Company Limited, 1971), pp. 208-209, 219-221, 229-237, and 243-245.
6. On this general topic, consult Stanley J. Michalak, Jr., "The United Nations and the League," in *The United Nations in International Politics*, ed. Leon Gordenker (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 60-105 and David A. Kay, "The United Nations and Decolonization," in *The United Nations: Past, Present and Future*, ed. James Barros (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 143-170.
7. Deon J. Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 8.
8. The German estrangement was the result of the growth of National Socialism in the territory after 1933 and the subsequent internment of German aliens by the Smuts government in the Second World War. Many Afrikaners were loyal to the Smuts

- government during that war, but a number were neutral, and several of them (including a subsequent Prime Minister, Mr. B.J. Vorster) were interned during the war. Common antipathy toward the Smuts government brought the interned Germans and Afrikaners together after 1948, thus making the territory a political preserve for the National Party, which represented the whites of South West Africa in the Union Parliament, where they were granted representation after 1949.
9. John M. Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government: A Study of the Ideas Expressed by the British Official Classes in Planning Decolonization, 1939-1964*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 22.
 10. Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics* (New York: Harper and Row), p. 81.
 11. The work of this international institution is discussed in King-Yuh Chang's study, "The United Nations and Decolonization, 1960-1968: The Role of the Committee of Twenty-Four," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971).
 12. Suresh C. Saxena, *Namibia: Challenge to the United Nations* (Delhi, India: Sundeep Prakashan, 1978), pp. 284-285.
 13. The United Kingdom, however, oversaw the final transition to independence. See Jeffrey Davidow's insightful work, *A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984).
 14. For a remarkably balanced assessment of this important matter, consult Marianne A. Spiegel, "The Namibia Negotiations and the Problem of Neutrality," in *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, eds. Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, SAIS Papers in International Affairs No. 6 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 111-139.
 15. Further details are given in Roger J. Southall, "Botswana as a Host Country for Refugees," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* (London), 22, no. 2 (July 1984), pp. 151-179.
 16. For a fuller treatment, see Richard Dale, "The Creation and Use of the Botswana Defence Force," *The Round Table* (London), 290 (April 1984), pp. 216-235.
 17. This matter is examined in greater depth in Richard Dale's "The Loosening Connection in Anglophone Southern Africa: Botswana and the Rhodesian regime, 1965-1980," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* (Pretoria), 2, no. 2 (April 1983), pp. 257-285.
 18. On the early phase of the guerrilla war, consult Richard Dale, "South African Counterinsurgency Operations in South West Africa." Paper presented at the eleventh annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Los Angeles, October 17, 1968.
 19. Air Vice-Marshal Stewart W.B. Menaul, "The Border War: South Africa's Response," *Conflict Studies* (London), 152 (1983), p. 15.
 20. André du Pisani, "Namibia: From Incorporation to Controlled Change," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 1, no. 2 (April 1982), pp. 286 and 304.
 21. For an extensive treatment of this development, see Kenneth W. Grundy, *Soldiers without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 249-272.
 22. According to Professor Richard Lee of the University of Toronto, some twenty-one out of 500 Basarwa working for the SADF were from Botswana, as reported by Mmoniemang Madikwe, "Basarwa from Here Serve for SA Army--Lee," *Daily News* (Gaborone), July 30, 1980, p. 1, cols. 2-4. The relevant legislation, the Foreign Enlistment Act no. 44 of 1980, is written in such a way as to exclude all foreign powers, not just South Africa.
 23. A self-congratulatory example of this may be found in J.A. Visser's thirty-five page pamphlet, *South African Defense Force's Contribution to the Development of South West Africa* ([Pretoria]: SADF Military Information Bureau, c. 1982).
 24. Compare Barbara König's appraisal, *Namibia: The Ravages of War: South Africa's Total Onslaught on the Namibian People* (London: International Aid and Defence Fund for Southern Africa, 1983) with Major General G.L. Meiring, "Current SWAPO Activity in South West Africa," *ISSUP Strategic Review* (Pretoria), June 1985, pp. 8-18.

25. Philip H. Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil Military Relations in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 41-42 and 104; and Robert S. Jaster, "South African Defense Strategy and the Growing Influence of the Military," in *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, ed. William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 127-134.
26. The defense correspondent of *The Cape Times*, Willem Steenkamp, has provided a careful, autobiographical account of that foray in his *Adeus Angola* (Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1976), while Deon J. Geldenhuys covered the larger political and strategic view in his *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, pp. 75-83.
27. For a scholarly analysis of the Angolan-Cuban link, consult William LeoGrande, *Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980*, Policy Papers in International Affairs No. 13 (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1980), pp. 13-34 and 53-56.
28. Offers of non-aggression pacts with African states are not a novel development in South African foreign policy. They date back as far as 1970, according to Deon J. Geldenhuys, "From South West Africa to Namibia" in *Changing Realities in Southern Africa: Implications for American Policy*, ed. Michael Clough, Research Series no. 47 (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1982), pp. 135 and 160.
29. A thoughtful account of these developments is provided in Heribert Adam and Stanley Uys, "From Destabilization to Neocolonial Control: South-Africa's Post-Nkomati Regional Environment," *International Affairs Bulletin* (Braamfontein) 9, no. 1 (1985), pp. 6-27.
30. The 1985 raid is covered in Richard Dale, "Botswana's Southern African Security Policy, 1966-1985," paper prepared for delivery at the twenty-eighth annual meeting of the African Studies Association, November 23, 1985. It appears that Botswana has put the South African ANC on notice by passing even tougher internal security laws proscribing the use of its territory for staging extraterritorial acts of violence. Whether such legislation is the direct result of Pretoria's pressure is debatable, because only the implementation of the policy, and not the principle, has changed. See "Botswana, Eying S. Africa, Unveils Antiterrorism Law," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 21, 1986, p. 2, col. 3.
32. See John Barratt's careful exposition, *The Namibian Dilemma: Factors Preventing a Solution*, Occasional Paper (Braamfontein: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1982).
33. Deon J. Geldenhuys, *What Do We Think? A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues — Number Two*, Occasional Paper (Braamfontein: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1984), pp. 12-16.
34. Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians*, pp. 126-127 and 133-134. This matter is dealt with in Catholic Institute for International Relations and Pax Christi, *War and Conscience in South Africa: The Churches and Conscientious Objection* (London: author, 1982), pp. 11-66.
35. David F. Gordon, "Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa: Why Namibia is Not Another Zimbabwe," *Issue: A Journal of Africanist Opinion*, 12, nos. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 1982), p. 42. It has also been pointed out that the resolution of the Namibian issue would remove one further barrier between South Africa and the remainder of the world and thus increase the pressure on South Africa as the sole target of international hostility (Clarence G. Redekop, "The Limits of Diplomacy," *International Journal* [Toronto], 30, no. 1 (Winter 1979-1980), p. 87-88). Events during the state of emergency period in South Africa in 1985-86 suggest that, Namibian shield or not, international pressure on South Africa, especially from the financial world, can escalate rather quickly and inflict visible economic damage.
36. Wolfgang H. Thomas, *Economic Development in Namibia: Towards Acceptable Development Strategies for Independent Namibia*, Entwicklung und Frieden Wissenschaftliche Reihe 18 (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag; Mainz: Matthias-Gruenewald Verlag, 1978), p. 151.
37. Spiegel, "The Namibia Negotiations," pp. 122-123 and 138.

38. These are the figures as of August 1984, as given by the South African Foreign Office, according to Carole Cooper *et al.*, *Race Relations Survey, 1984* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1985), p. 853.
39. Consult Peter Vanneman, "Soviet Foreign Policy for Namibia: Some Considerations and Developments," *ISSUP Strategic Review*, November 1985, pp. 13-18.
40. See Michael Hough, "The Angolan Civil War with Special Reference to the UNITA Movement," *ISSUP Strategic Review*, November 1985, pp. 1-12; Charlotte Saikowski, "Angolan Guerrilla Launches Skillful Quest for US Aid," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 31, 1986, p. 1, cols. 2-3 and p. 32, cols. 1-3; and Barbara Bradley, "Lobbying for Foreign Interests Is Booming Business in Washington," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 5, 1986, p. 6, cols. 1-3.
41. I. William Zartman, "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts," in Alexander L. George, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 362.
42. The Stanley Foundation, *Strategy for Peace, 1985: The Stanley Foundation US Foreign Policy Conference Report* (Muscatine, Iowa: author, n.d.), pp. 13-14, 16; and Gerald J. Bender, "American Policy toward Angola: A History of Linkage," in *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 110-128. A dissenting view is registered in Peter Duignan's "Africa from a Globalist Perspective," *African Crisis Areas*, pp. 291-307.
43. Barratt, *The Namibian Dilemma*, pp. 9 and 12 and John E. Shepherd, Jr., "Crisis of Legitimacy: The Failure of Namibia's Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)," paper prepared for the Foreign Area Officer Course, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, March 25, 1983, pp. 7-23.
44. On the SADF, see Daniel W. Pike, "Namibia: An Angolan Perspective," paper prepared for the Foreign Area Officer Course, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, May 15, 1983, p. 19. On SWAPO, see Gordon, "Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa," p. 41.
45. Professor Zartman observed that "The most effective way to keep African ... conflicts from becoming East-West conflicts is through external efforts at conflict management and resolution." See "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy," p. 362.
46. This was suggested by John D'Oliveira, "Angola Struggles On After 10 Trouble-Torn Years," *The Star* (International airmail weekly ed.) January 13, 1986, p. 13, cols. 1-4.
47. These are catalogued and discussed in Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, pp. 222-231, especially 229-230.
48. "Major Announcement on SWA/Namibia Independence," *South African Digest* (Pretoria), March 8, 1986, p. 191.
49. "Angolan Rebels Says They Raided US Oil Installations," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 26, 1986, p. 2, col. 2.
50. On Angolan security concerns, consult Gordon, "Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa," p. 43; and Bender, "American Policy toward Angola," p. 119.
51. Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 151-160.
52. For a brief overview, see André du Pisani's "Namibia: The Political Economy of Transition," *South Africa International* (Johannesburg) 15, no. 3 (January 1985), pp. 150-156.
53. Zartman, "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy," p. 350.