Intelligence studies have become some of the hottest properties on the academic real estate market. Since the decade began there has been a veritable boom in university courses dealing with intelligence, in centers and organizations specializing in its affairs, and in books and journals devoted to unravelling its contributions to the past and present. However, similar to most real estate booms, it rests on a shaky foundation. Its products frequently resemble shoddy tract housing, and the inhabitants, attracted by easy credit and the meretricious claims of the promoters, have only the haziest notion of what they inhabit. Invariably, they overvalue their investment.

Just as housing booms rarely answer the problems of the homeless, the intelligence boom offers little of value to the real needs of intelligence. In the United States, at least, its popularity has far more to do with political pathology. It has become necessary to explain the decline of U.S. influence in the world and the relative expansion of Soviet power and to find a way out of this unfamiliar and uncomfortable position. What better answer to this decline than 'Intelligence'? No one knows too much about it, thus answers can be delivered with some certainty. Soviet intelligence in its various forms of deception, disinformation and active measures provides the easy key which deciphers the mysteries of Soviet success, while the recreation of an American intelligence capability offers a solution to the recapturing of world influence. Rub the Aladdin’s lamp of intelligence, and the mysteries of our present discontents will be revealed! Beneath the current boom lies a world of hidden — and not so hidden — ideological assumptions and values. No wonder that so much of the product is shallow and that what frequently passes for scholarship is barely sophomoric.

Therefore, the appearance of a volume like this is welcome indeed. Written by scholars with integrity, most of them historians with a keen sense of the ironies of history and the limitations of power, it makes a valuable contribution to intelligence history. It also provides a useful corrective to those who would have us believe that giving a freer hand and more money to intelligence services will somehow solve the intractable problems of a complex world order in which change is unpredictable and often unpleasant.

The eleven essays — most by British academics — illustrate two main themes. First, there is the erratic progress towards the professionalization of intelligence services in the twentieth century and the troubled relationship between them and their governments. Rivalry among intelligence agencies within national communities has often completely negated the value of intelligence gained. Indiscretion has been rampant, and examples of the bad and perverted use of intelligence abound. Second, the essays illustrate what the title says, that intelligence indeed is “the missing dimension” of international affairs. It is missing partly because the material remains hidden; secret services tend not to deposit their archives...
where historians can find them. However, it is missing too because historians have failed to look at and read the evidence properly. When this reviewer began to investigate the wartime British SOE in the early 1970s, he was told on several occasions by senior members of the profession that the exercise was a waste of time because the material did not exist. In fact, a great deal of it was resting in the public records and much could be found by looking elsewhere. Christopher Andrew, David Dilks, and the other historians here have illustrated the same point. It is a useful lesson: believe the evidence of your own eyes and not that of others. The overwhelming point that emerges is that intelligence was a constant factor in international diplomacy this century, and that until the 1960s cryptanalysis was the single most important source.

Scepticism about the value of much in modern intelligence studies should not be taken to imply that intelligence is not important. There was potent symbolism in Brezhnev's funeral on 1983. His successor, Yuri Andropov, was a former head of the KGB. The chief mourner from the rival superpower, George Bush, was a former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet whether intelligence communities can deliver the goods expected of them is doubtful. History, as this volume teaches us, should teach us to be sceptical. Intelligence is no panacea, and we should recognize its limits both to ourselves and others.

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