

## **Influence Through Arms Supplies: The Soviet Experience in the Middle East**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

The Soviet Union has comparatively little to offer the Third World by way of trade, investment and technology transfer. Consequently it has elected to base its Third World policy on the only field where it can match, or even surpass, the West: arms transfers. Hence arms supplies constitute the major foreign policy instrument employed by the Soviet Union in pursuit of its goals in the Third World in general, and the Middle East in particular. Although some have questioned the efficacy of arms transfers as an instrument of policy,<sup>1</sup> most Western analyses consider Soviet military assistance rendered to the Third World to be very effective in absolute terms in building Soviet influence there. Joshua and Gilbert, for example, have concluded that "as more countries become recipients of Soviet military aid programs, there will be a tendency for these countries to become greater political allies of the Soviet Union in world politics."<sup>2</sup>

The issue of the degree of influence that the Soviet Union gains through its arms transfers policy in the Middle East is the topic of the present article. The main question put forward is as follows: To what extent, and under what circumstances, do Soviet arms transfers constitute an effective foreign policy instrument, taking into account their predominance among the various foreign policy instruments (such as economic aid) employed by the Soviet Union in its dealings with Middle East countries? Alternatively, in more concrete terms: Does the Soviet Union use military assistance as an instrument of political pressure over its Middle Eastern clients, and if so, how, and how successfully?

In order to shed some light on these questions, attention is focused on three incidents in which the Soviet Union tried to influence its Arab clients through its arms supply policy. These three case studies are: 1) Soviet-Egyptian procurement relations prior to the October 1973 War; 2) Syrian-Soviet military relations following Syria's direct military intervention in Lebanon in June 1976; and 3) Soviet-Iraqi relations following the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. In each of the three studies, the Soviet Union perceived its client's behavior as contradicting — if not actually endangering — its national goals; consequently it tried to alter this policy to a more desirable course from the Soviet point of view. In each case, Soviet efforts at exerting influence varied in their timing, intensity and scope, depending on specific conditions and circumstances. Nevertheless, a comparative overview of these incidents may reveal common characteristics which fit into a broader, general behavioral-pattern adopted by the Soviet Union in its dealings with its Arab clients.

### **THE CONCEPT OF INFLUENCE**

There is little doubt that power and influence are core concepts in the study of politics. Indeed, not a few researchers consider the quest for power to be the essence of political behavior, both in the internal and external

spheres. In Hans Morgenthau's words, "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power."<sup>3</sup> However, despite the enormous efforts devoted to the understanding of various power/influence relationships, these two concepts clearly remain among the most complex, ambiguous and untenable in political science and international relations.

For the purposes of this article, the influence of country A over the policy of country B is its ability to get country B (without the use of physical force) either to adopt, or, at least, proceed to a foreign policy course desired by A, or to refrain from taking a course of action that contradicts A's interests and/or preferences.

As defined here, influence is conceived to be a two-dimensional phenomenon, that is, both a process and a product. On the one hand, influence certainly is the net result; it is the outcome of A's attempts to influence B. Unless there is a clear observation of a successful (or even unsuccessful) attempt at influence, one might fail to detect the very existence of an influence relationship. On the other hand, any discussion of influence not grounded in a thorough examination of the influence process itself will inevitably be deficient to a considerable extent, and might in some instances lead even the most skilled observer to the wrong conclusions regarding the essence of the influence relationship.

One quickly discovers, however, that tracing the influence process is a very complicated task, mainly because of the indirect, intangible and elusive nature of political influence. This is particularly true in the study of influence relationships in international relations. While internal sovereignty legitimizes the employment of power and influence by state authorities over their political community, external sovereignty definitely prohibits any interference by one state in the internal affairs of other states or in their right to shape foreign policy independently. Consequently, although most states engage to one degree or another in influencing others, they usually tend to camouflage these attempts at influence and to deny their very existence as, ostensibly, this would conflict with the fundamental principles of sovereignty and formal equality among nations upon which the present international system is based. The Soviet Union is no exception to this rule. It categorically denies that its military aid policies are motivated by political influence considerations, attributing such motives only to "imperialists."<sup>4</sup>

This state of affairs imposes certain methodological constraints upon the researcher who seeks to identify and evaluate influence relationships. For example, an observation of B altering its behavior in conformity with A's interests does not necessarily indicate the existence of a successful attempt at influence, for it is quite possible that some intervening variables (say, country C or D) have prompted B to alter its policy. Moreover, this might not even indicate that A, in spite of its wish to see B altering its policy, actually exerted influence upon B. In order to overcome these methodological obstacles, the discussion will be conducted within a specific format. First, a determination of whether and to what degree the Soviet Union was indeed interested in influencing its Arab client will be attempted. Secondly, the influence process itself, that is, the various means and techniques employed by the arms donor in its efforts to influence its clients, will be

examined. Finally, the article will seek to assess the results of the influence attempt, and to ascertain whether its success or failure was connected with the act of influence itself, or whether it may be attributed to unrelated factors.

It should be noted that this article does not aim at creating a general analytical framework to encompass the totality of influence as a political and social phenomenon. Rather, it seeks to shed some light on a specific kind of influence relationship, limited in scope, domain and timing.

The examination here will be confined to an asymmetric influence relationship, one between a superpower and a small/medium Third World country. With regard to domain, it limits itself to the realm of foreign policy actions, and avoids any discussion of influence on the domestic political system. And finally, as mentioned above, this treatment also confines itself to a specific kind of relationship between countries, one of a "conflictual" context. Of course, situations involving conflict are not the only ones concerning influence relationships. Attempts at influence might, indeed do, occur in consensual situations, although the concept of influence does connote a difference of opinion, for if there does not exist such a difference, what is the point of influence? In any event, it is accepted for the purposes of this article that the more acute cases, those involving serious differences of opinion, might best illustrate the limits of an influence relationship. As Alvin Rubinstein put it, "Like breathing, influence becomes especially noticeable when pressure is applied or concern heightens."<sup>5</sup>

## **ARMS AND INFLUENCE**

As noted, arms supplies are generally regarded as an effective instrument of influence. It is a common assumption that the larger the arms deal and the longer the period of its implementation, the heavier will be the recipient's economic and military dependence upon the donor, and the lesser its ability to resist the latter's attempts at influence. Turning to the Soviet instance, some analysts believe that, from the economic standpoint, the relatively low price of Soviet arms and the convenient terms of payment (especially the possibility of repayment in commodities) effect a major shift in the recipient's trade toward the communist countries. This leads to a loss of markets in the West and leaves the arms recipient dependent upon the Soviet Union for its export earnings.<sup>6</sup>

From the military point of view, not only do recipients import Soviet arms, they often import Soviet training patterns and combat doctrines, rendering military hardware from non-Soviet sources increasingly irrelevant to their operative needs. Moreover, due to the relatively low level of technical and scientific competence of most Third World military personnel, Soviet and Soviet bloc experts are usually required to assemble and maintain the newly arrived weapons in the recipient countries and to instruct local military personnel and technicians in their use.<sup>7</sup> The Soviets, who are surely aware of the potential benefits inherent in their military assistance programs, do their best to implement these programs in a manner designed to create maximum long term dependence upon the USSR. Hence the Soviet tendency to supply weapons systems and military assistance within the framework of broad-scope arms deals which gener-

ally include items for all branches of the armed forces, and to prefer local advisory/technical assistance over training in the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup>

The arms donor has at his disposal several techniques for converting his client's dependence into the hard facts of influence. These range from the more delicate means, such as persuasion and the offer of rewards via threat insinuation, to explicit manipulation of the arms flow to produce policy changes by the recipient. This article focuses upon the ultimate means of applying pressure through arms supplies, namely, withholding of arms from the recipient, as an instrument of influence, as this offers perhaps the best illustration of the power of both donor and recipient within the relationship.

## CASE STUDIES

### Soviet-Egyptian Military Relations Prior to the October 1973 War

Egyptian-Soviet military relations reached their peak in the early 1970s. At that time, Egypt was the Soviet Union's major Third World arms client. Egyptian weapons procurement was estimated at about 25 percent of all arms and military equipment supplied by the Soviet Union to the Third World as a whole. The USSR, for its part, managed to turn Egypt into its main naval foothold in the Mediterranean. Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union possessed independent naval and aerial facilities in Egypt, affording its Mediterranean Squadron repair, replenishment and maintenance for its vessels and bases for conducting maritime patrol missions *vis-à-vis* the Sixth Fleet.

This apparently idyllic relationship was suddenly disrupted in July 1972, as the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, ordered the departure of most of the Soviet military and advisory personnel from Egypt. Even though Sadat later attributed this extreme move to his deep frustration with the Soviet attempts to prevent Egypt from going to war, his version is not taken at face value. Indeed, Kremlinologists differ as to the role played by the Soviet Union in the preparation of the October 1973 War. Some contend that the Soviets looked favorably upon the possibility of another, preferably limited, armed confrontation in the Middle East. Others go a step further and argue that the Soviet Union and the Arab states plotted together to launch the war.<sup>9</sup>

According to these analysts, the Soviets' behavior was a direct result of their belief that "a war in the Middle East . . . if cautiously managed, could cause great damage to the West, without affecting detente."<sup>10</sup> Operating under the assumption that its Arab clients could avoid suffering a new major defeat, the Soviet Union nonetheless believed that, in any case, such a defeat "would in all probability trigger off a process of radicalization in the Arab world from which the Soviet Union could only gain."<sup>11</sup>

An opposing school of thought maintains that, while the Soviets were most probably aware that Egypt and Syria were preparing for hostilities at an unknown (but probably early) date in the future, they did not take the initiative in pressing the Arabs to initiate hostilities,<sup>12</sup> but were, on the contrary, rather dissatisfied with the possibility of a new round of war in the Middle East. Indeed, some even argue that the Soviets tried to dissuade their Arab clients from going to war.<sup>13</sup>

According to this line of thinking, the Soviets had very good reasons, at both regional and global levels, to strive for the preservation of the *status quo* in the Middle East in the early seventies. On the global level, a war in the Middle East at that time might have hampered the course of détente to which the Soviets were then committed. In particular, it could have affected the Soviets' major goals in Western Europe: "Western recognition of the territorial *status quo* and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe; the permanent division of Germany and acceptance of the East German state; and a disunited, inadequately armed NATO, torn by jealousies, acrimony and lack of vision."<sup>14</sup> As for the regional level, the Soviet leadership appeared to be sceptical of the Arab's ability to conduct a full-scale war successfully, fearing that such an effort might end in another Arab defeat, with severe implications for Soviet interests in the Middle East. Such a setback could jeopardize the prestige of Soviet weaponry, invoke Arab pressure for direct Soviet involvement in the crisis on behalf of its clients, and cause the Arabs to conclude that the road to the return of their lost territories passed through Washington, as the U.S. was the only power able to enforce concessions upon Israel. Indeed, this last apprehension proved correct when the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, decided after the October War to move into the Western sphere of influence.

The author tends to accept this view. Not only did the Soviets have solid reasons to oppose another war in the Middle East, but there is a considerable body of evidence, relevant to this discussion. This evidence attests to the fact that from 1971 to the end of 1972 and, to a lesser degree, even in 1973, the Soviets employed their arms supply relationship with Egypt as a political lever to prevent Egypt from going to war. It is true that, during the years 1970-1973, the Soviet Union provided large quantities of arms and military equipment to all branches of the Egyptian armed forces, thereby facilitating significant force and weaponry enhancement and, eventually, enabling the launching of the October War.<sup>15</sup> However, according to Egyptian sources — primarily the memoirs of Anwar Sadat but also memoirs and writings of Egyptian decision-making personalities not known for their anti-Soviet inclinations such as Muhammad Hasanein Heikal and then Chief-of-Staff General Saad al-Shazly — and in light of the actual weapons supply pattern during that period, it emerges that the Soviet Union indeed imposed several significant restrictions upon pre-war supply of arms and military equipment to Egypt:

1. The Soviet Union did not supply Egypt with all of the weapons systems which the latter requested and believed essential for going to war. The most prominent example is the Soviet refusal to provide Egypt with MIG-23 combat aircraft and Tu-22 bombers which it had demanded consistently since 1971, despite the fact that two previous Soviet-Egyptian arms deals explicitly stipulated the supply of MIG-23s.
2. The Soviet Union forbade countries enfranchised to manufacture its weapons to supply such arms to Egypt. In 1971, for example, it barred India from responding to Sadat's request for certain military items.

3. Most of the advanced systems which the Soviet Union ultimately supplied to Egypt prior to the war (such as T-62 tanks, BMP-1 APCs, SA-6 missiles and SCUD-B surface-to-surface missiles) were not dispatched until after Sadat's sudden expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt, a step which was largely intended to express Egyptian dissatisfaction with Soviet arms supply policies.
4. Even the supply of less advanced military items, which arrived after the reduction of Soviet pressure and fostered no Egyptian-Soviet disputes, was by no means a smooth process. A number of obstacles and delays often forced Egypt to change its operational timetables. For example, the Egyptians claimed that the October 1971 arms deal was implemented at a pace which did not allow for absorption of weapons at the target dates determined by Sadat. Furthermore, they stated that several of the items included therein did not reach Egypt until after the expulsion of the Soviet advisors.
5. The Soviets attempted to place limitations on Egyptian use of arms supplies. During Sadat's visit to Moscow (March 1971), for example, they agreed to supply Egypt with "planes equipped with missiles," yet demanded the exclusive right to determine their use. Following strenuous objections by Sadat, who claimed that this stipulation violated Egyptian sovereignty, the Soviets ultimately withdrew their demand.<sup>16</sup>

These Soviet attempts at influence through arms supply proved to be highly unsuccessful. By the end of 1972, having realized that they were unable to dissuade Sadat from going to war and that, indeed, their manipulations had actually led to an open rift with Egypt, which was manifested in the ouster of Soviet military personnel from Egypt, the Soviets almost ceased their attempts at influence. Though the procedures were not always to Egypt's satisfaction, the Soviet Union resumed arms transfers to Egypt.

### **Soviet-Syrian Military Relations and the Syrian Invasion of Lebanon**

The pattern of Soviet-Syrian military relations following the Syrian invasion of Lebanon (June 1976) resembles in its general features the Soviet-Egyptian relationship prior to the October 1973 War. As in the Egyptian case, here too the Soviets employed arms transfers as an instrument of influence in an effort to dissuade their Arab clients from adopting an unfavorable course of action. The results were also similar. Not only did the Soviets fail to influence their local clients, but their attempt at influence deteriorated into antagonism, compelling the Soviet Union to cease its manipulations and, unwillingly, accept its client's policy.

During 1975 and the first months of 1976, the Lebanese crisis produced few if any indications of a possible Syrian-Soviet rift. On the contrary, the initial Soviet reaction towards Syrian involvement in Lebanon was essentially positive. For example, the Soviet communications media responded very favorably to Syria's "constructive role" in the achievement of the January 22, 1976 cease fire. According to the Soviet

argument, the cease fire undermined Israel's "plans to create another focus of tension in the Middle East."<sup>17</sup> Although the Soviets were not overly pleased with Syria's growing indirect military involvement in Lebanon (through the Syrian-sponsored Sa'iqa) after early 1976, they tried to allow their resentment the lowest possible profile, and to avoid criticizing Syria publicly over its role in the Lebanese crisis. Instead, Soviet public criticism of the foreign intervention in Lebanon focused upon the "imperialist circles," including Israel and, occasionally, even Egypt, while Syria was mentioned either positively or not at all.

By mid-1976 this Soviet attitude began to change. The severity of the Syrian-PLO armed confrontation, and the subsequent deepening rift within the leftist camp, placed the Soviet Union in an awkward position, and rendered almost inevitable a confrontation with one of its closest allies in the Middle East. The decision to risk a crisis with Syria over Lebanon cannot have been an easy one for the Soviet leadership, especially after its loss of access to Egypt and Anwar Sadat's unilateral abrogation of the two countries' friendship and cooperation treaty in March 1976. Nevertheless, the risk was taken. From May 1976, Soviet dissatisfaction with the growing Syrian intervention in Lebanon became increasingly apparent. It found prominent manifestation in the joint Soviet-Iraqi communiqué of May 31, published at the conclusion of Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Baghdad. That communiqué stated that "a positive solution to the Lebanese crisis can be achieved by the Lebanese people themselves."<sup>18</sup> President Asad, however, did not appear overly bothered by Soviet reservations regarding his Lebanese policy, and when Premier Kosygin arrived in Damascus on June 1, Asad presented him with a *fait accompli*. On the night of May 31-June 1, the Syrian regular army had rolled into Lebanon, and Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis had escalated to a higher level both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Direct Syrian military intervention in Lebanon brought Syrian-Soviet relations to the verge of an open rift. Political tension found expression in increasingly severe criticism of Syria by the Soviet communications media during late 1976.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, western press reports indicated a considerable slowdown in arms shipments from the Soviet Union to Syria. It is difficult to ascertain the scope of this arms supply cutback or of the items included. That it was perceived by the Syrians as very harmful became clear in their fierce reaction; they threatened to cancel the limited port services which the Soviets had enjoyed at Tartus since early 1976.<sup>20</sup> Like the Egyptian episode four years earlier, this abrupt Syrian response apparently led Moscow to reconsider its policy. By early 1977 all was back to normal, arms shipments were fully restored, and port services returned to the previous *status quo*.<sup>21</sup>

#### **Soviet-Iraqi Relations Following the Invasion of Iran (September 1980)**

During the 1970s, especially in the second half of the decade, following the Egyptian desertion to the Western sphere of influence, Iraq became one of the leading Soviet arms clients in the Middle East. Between 1975 and 1979, Iraqi arms purchases from the Soviet Union amounted to some \$4.9 billion, as compared with "only" \$3.6 billion for Syria. Against this

background Iraq might have expected Soviet understanding, or even tacit support, for its invasion of Iran, an invasion which Iraq portrayed in terms of a pre-emptive strike.

Instead, the USSR announced its neutrality *vis-à-vis* the warring parties and called upon them to cease fighting and resolve the conflict by peaceful means. This Soviet interest in a peaceful solution to the Iraqi-Iranian conflict was apparently sincere. The Soviet attitude towards the war, as expressed in the communications media, clearly reflected a sense that it contradicted both Soviet and local interests.<sup>22</sup>

Several reasons underlay this negative Soviet reaction. First, the Soviet Union might have been apprehensive lest the Iraqis appeal for military assistance, or even intervention on the basis of the two countries' bilateral treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation signed in 1972, in case their operational plans went awry. Certainly the Soviets would prefer to avoid such an intervention. Second, there is little doubt that the Soviets perceived the war as serving American interests by creating a convenient way for the United States to return "through the back door" to Iran, where it had lost its pre-eminent status after the ouster of the Shah in February 1979.<sup>23</sup> Whatever the Soviet reasons for objecting to the war, the relevant point for this discussion is that their adoption of neutral posture was followed by the imposition of an arms embargo on Iraq. As in the Egyptian and Syrian cases, it is difficult to discern the exact pattern of the embargo, and there are a number of conflicting and contradictory reports regarding the issue.

On the one hand, various sources (especially Western diplomatic and intelligence agencies) claim that the Soviet supply of arms to Iraq continued even after the outbreak of war, albeit discreetly and in an indirect manner. Soviet arms are said to have arrived in Iraq either by sea, to the Jordanian port of Aqaba, or by sea and air to Saudi Arabia and thence overland.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, the Soviet media repeatedly denied such reports, clearly and explicitly emphasizing the Soviet Union's neutral position in the dispute.<sup>25</sup> Jordan and Saudi Arabia also denied that Soviet arms were passing through their respective countries *en route* to Iraq<sup>26</sup> and even Iraq rejected the claim that Soviet arms were continuing to arrive.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, there is room for scepticism regarding claims that the Soviet Union continued to supply weapons to Iraq even after the outbreak of war. It appears that a Soviet embargo on arms shipments to Iraq was imposed for about half a year, until April 1981, although its precise scope and terms are unclear. Nevertheless, certain Soviet-made items may well have reached Iraq indirectly, for instance, through Warsaw Pact countries.

This assessment is based upon several observations. First of all, a retrospective view of the first half year after the outbreak of war,<sup>28</sup> irrespective of concrete reports regarding supply or non-supply of arms, indicates that the Iraqi military buildup, which had been maintained in full force for the three years preceding the war and especially during that immediately preceding the conflict, had now come to a halt. Second, reports of continued Soviet arms and military equipment supply to Iraq were diffused by Western diplomatic and intelligence sources that obviously were interested in preventing the Soviets from deriving any possible benefit from the



conflict. Dissemination of reports on Soviet military aid to Iraq in its war against Iran well suited this scenario, as it could render Soviet-Iranian *rapprochement* most difficult. Third, the Soviets, like the Iraqis, Jordanians and Saudis, repeatedly and unambiguously denied the reports on supply of Soviet arms to Iraq. Although such denials, at least that of Saudi Arabia, may have been motivated by a desire to avoid worsening relations with Iran or its supporters Syria and Libya, this does not explain why Iraq itself so firmly denied that it was receiving Soviet arms. During this time, Iraq clearly held the advantage in the war. Hence there was no obvious reason why Iraq or even Jordan would adopt an apologetic line with regard to Iran.

Even the consistent and firm Soviet denial should not be attributed to a desire to avoid worsening relations alone. In the past, the Soviet Union had always avoided publicly admitting that it imposed military sanctions upon its clients, even in cases in which such sanctions undoubtedly were adopted.<sup>29</sup> It is therefore difficult to comprehend why the Soviet Union would publicly acknowledge the imposition of political pressures upon its client were this not actually the case, and were there no clear benefits in store as a result of this measure.<sup>30</sup>

It is thus arguable that a Soviet embargo was imposed upon Iraq in the wake of its invasion of Iran. In any event, it occurred during a relatively brief episode. By April 1981, it was an established fact that Soviet supply of major weapon systems in Iraq had been restored, in accordance with previously signed contracts.

## **SUMMARY**

The main conclusion emerging from the three episodes dealt with in this article is that arms supply can, at times, hardly provide an effective basis for influence, especially when the attempts at influence touch upon local decisions regarding military operations or grand strategic policy questions of war and peace. If there is an inherent asymmetry in the arms-transfer relationship, it does not necessarily work to the advantage of the arms donor, as is commonly assumed, but rather to the benefit of the arms recipient. This somewhat paradoxical relationship may be formulated as follows: there exists a negative correlation between the volume of arms transferred and the amount of influence derived by the arms donor. Put differently, the larger the arms transfers, the less political leverage the donor has obtained over the recipient.

The rationale for this formula is quite simple. Having supplied a specific state with large quantities of arms and military equipment, the donor country — should it decide to employ the arms transfer relationship in order to prevent the local client from taking a major decision — finds itself in an all or nothing situation. The donor has to choose between employing its arms leverage vigorously and not employing it at all. There is no middle ground. Limited sanctions taken against a well-supplied client will most probably have a negligible effect upon his operative capability, due to the large quantities of arms he has at his disposal. On the other hand, the adoption of tough measures, such as a total arms embargo, against the local client might cause a confrontation, or even an open rift. Assuming that the large scale of military support rendered to that client

reflects the donor's vested interest in the recipient country, one easily perceives that a confrontation is the least desired development from the donor's point of view. It has been noted that the most unsuitable circumstances for the achievement of influence through arms are those involving decisions concerning war and peace. Since going to war is the ultimate foreign policy instrument at the disposal of any state, it is quite reasonable to assume that the adoption of such a policy indicates the prevailing importance of the interests that motivated the decision. If a state perceives certain interests as vital, it will be most unwilling to compromise them and will tend to reject any pressures designed to prevent it from carrying out its course of action.

This, in fact, was the dilemma facing the Soviet Union in each of the three episodes analyzed. An extreme Soviet attitude toward manipulating the arms flows to its client states would most probably have caused a deep, possibly irreversible, rift, as indeed happened in the Egyptian and Syrian cases. Yet completely avoiding the use of an arms supply as an instrument of influence might have encouraged these states to proceed upon a course of action perceived by the Soviet Union as harmful to its own interests. The Soviets therefore chose the middle way and tried to manipulate the arms supplies to a degree they considered sufficient to influence their local clients, without antagonizing them. However, this Soviet assessment of the clients' "tolerance threshold" proved mistaken. Attempts at manipulation caused a fierce reaction on the clients' part and this in turn led the Soviet Union to abandon its attempts at influence and grudgingly to accept its clients' policy. The Soviets dared to pull the lever, but it broke off in their hands.

#### Footnotes

1. See, for example, U. Ra'anani, "Soviet Arms transfers and the question of political leverage," in U. Ra'anani, R. L. Platzgraff, Jr., and G. Kemp (eds), *Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 131-156.
2. W. Joshua and S. P. Gilbert, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 147.
3. H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 27.
4. Concerning the Soviet presentation of the objectives of military aid see: T. S. Friedgut, "The Domestic Image of Soviet Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," and O. Eran, "The Soviet Perception of Influence: The Case of the Middle East, 1973-1976," in Y. Ro'i (ed.), *The Limits of Power* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 127-177.
5. A. Z. Rubinstein (ed.), *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 10.
6. R. Pajak, "The Effectiveness of Soviet Arms Aid Diplomacy in the Third World," in R. H. Donaldson, *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), p. 396; and L. Tansky, "Soviet foreign aid to less developed countries," in U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy* (Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 966.
7. R'anani, "Soviet arms transfers," p. 132.
8. For a detailed discussion of Soviet arms transfers policy in the Middle East and the role of advisory missions in the implementation of arms deals see, E. Karsh, *Soviet Arms Transfers to the Middle East in the 1970's*, Paper No. 22 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, December 1983).

9. See, for example, U. Ra'anan, "The USSR and the Middle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision-Making Process," *Orbis*, 17 (1973), pp. 946-977.
10. W. Laqueur, *Confrontation* (New York: The New York Times Book Co., 1974), p. 81.
11. Laqueur, *Confrontation*, p. 82.
12. W. B. Quandt, *Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, May 1976), p. 9.
13. This in fact was the Egyptian version of the Soviet policy prior to the October War. See, for example, A. Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977); and M. Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (London: Collins, 1975).
14. A. V. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 234.
15. During 1970-1973, the Egyptian army received about one thousand tanks, more than one thousand APC's, over one hundred combat aircraft, some 120 helicopters and approximately one hundred surface-to-air-missile batteries.
16. E. Karsh, *Soviet Arms Transfers*, pp. 8-9.
17. *Pravda and Izvestiia*, January 24, 1976.
18. *Radio Moscow*, May 31, 1976.
19. See, for example, the announcement of the Afro-Asian Solidarity committee in *Pravda*, August 27, 1976, as well as *Pravda*, June 10-13, August 28 and October 1, 1976; *Izvestiia*, June 12, 1976; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 10, 1976; and *Trud*, June 23, 1976.
20. I. Rabinovich and G. Golan, "The Soviet Union and Syria: The Limits of Cooperation," in Y. Ro'i (ed.), *The Limits of Power*, p. 226; and R. O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970* (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 251.
21. Rabinovich and Golan, "The Soviet Union and Syria," p. 226; and R. D. Remek, "The Politics of Soviet Access to Naval Support Facilities in the Mediterranean," in B. Dismukes and J. McConnell (eds.), *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 382.
22. *Ibid.* Port services which Syria provided to the Soviet Union included permission to anchor a number of auxiliary and maintenance ships at the port of Tartus for routine maintenance of vessels of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.
23. For the Soviet view see, for example, *Izvestiia*, September 23, 1980; October 1 and October 3, 1980; and *Krasnaya Zvezda*, October 26, 1980.
24. *Reuters*, October 4, October 7 and November 7, 1980.
25. For example, see reports by the official Soviet news agency *Tass*, October 10 and October 14, 1980.
26. *UPI*, December 13, 1980.
27. Sawt-Al-Arab radio broadcast of October 20, 1980, reported in *Hatzav*, October 20, 1980, 836/8232 (Hebrew).
28. For example, see the figures on total Iraqi forces quoted in the IISS, *Military Balance*, 1982-1983.
29. Thus, for example, the Soviets did not publicize their problems in procurement relations with Egypt prior to the October 1973 War and with Syria in 1976.
30. Since the fall of the Shah's regime and the establishment of an Islamic republic (February 1979), the Soviet Union has not succeeded in fostering any significant relations with the regime in Teheran. Concerning Soviet-Iranian relations, see M. Volodarsky and Y. Ro'i, "Soviet-Iranian Relations during two 'Revolutions'," *Slavic and Soviet Series*, Vol. 4, no. 1-2 (1979), pp. 33-59.