

Eisenhower and the Overthrow of Rafael Trujillo

by
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INTRODUCTION

In the mid-1970s, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandals, journalists, legislators, and scholars inquired into the Cold War activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Among the most significant of the studies was the report, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, issued by the Select Senate Committee charged to study intelligence activities and chaired by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho.¹ The committee concluded that, during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, U.S. officials plotted to kill Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. The senators also found that officials supplied weapons to Dominican dissidents whose aim was to assassinate Rafael Trujillo. Finally, they agreed that in 1963 the Kennedy administration had encouraged South Vietnamese generals to overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem and that in 1970 the Nixon government encouraged Chilean military officers to block Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President of Chile. Those plots led to the death of Diem and his brother, and General Rene Schneider, the Chilean Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups. Though the Church Committee found no evidence that U.S. officials favored the assassinations of the Diem brothers or Schneider, as a result of these findings, the U.S. Congress made assassination of foreign leaders illegal.

While the senators determined that the United States had plotted against foreign leaders, they could not agree on who authorized the assassination plots. The system of executive command and control, they noted, "was so ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what levels assassination activity was known and authorized." The CIA may have acted without explicit authorization from the presidents. On the other hand, the Church Committee reasoned that "this ambiguity and imprecision leaves open the possibility that there was a successful 'plausible denial' and that a Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured."² That is, assassination was discussed in the Oval Office, but in an oblique manner to shield the president from responsibility. For example, Richard Bissell, the former Deputy Director of the CIA, testified that he felt certain that his boss, Allen Dulles, received authorization from Eisenhower and Kennedy. Bissell speculated that Dulles and the presidents would speak "circumlocutiously." Eisenhower and Kennedy would learn enough about a plot to terminate it but not too many of the details in order that they could plausibly deny knowledge of the plot.³ Other witnesses ventured that presidents and CIA directors communicated through euphemisms, generalized instructions, or synecdoches, figures of speech by which a part is used to indicate the whole or the whole to represent a part, thus "disposing of Castro" or "doing something about Castro"⁴ might be taken as only part of the phrase intended.

Although the majority of senators decided they could not answer the question of authorization, Senator Howard Baker opined, in a separate section of the committee report tagged "additional views," that "on balance the likelihood that Presidents knew of assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not." Baker argued that both the record and the application of the usual courtroom tests for determining the worth and value of a witness' testimony — the demeanor of a witness, whether the testimony has the ring of truth, the witness' interest in the subject — left him with that impression. The Tennessee Republican, who had risen to national prominence during the Watergate hearings with his penetrating question, "What did the president know, and when did he know it?," then appended evidence and documentation to the report to support his suspicion.⁵

In suggesting "what most likely occurred in terms of how authorization was obtained by the CIA for the assassination plots," Baker cited the examination of Richard Helms, a former director of the CIA, by Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland:

Senator MATHIAS. When Mr. Bissell was here I think I asked him whether the job of communicating with superior authority was one of protecting superior authority, and specifically the President, protecting him from knowledge and at the same time informing him, which is a difficult and delicate job, and he agreed that that was really the difficulty.

And you this morning have said that in advising a President or very high authority of any particular delicate subject, that you resorted to euphemism.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. Did Presidents indulge in euphemisms as well as Directors?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I found that in my experience that Presidents used the entire range of the English language from euphemisms on the one extreme to very explicit talk on the other.

Senator MATHIAS. Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas a Becket was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said who will rid me of this man. He didn't say to somebody go out and murder him. He said who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that (sanitized).

Mr. HELMS. That is a warming reference to the problem.

Senator MATHIAS. You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?

Mr. HELMS. I think it does, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the Director or by anybody else as Presidential authorization to go forward?

Mr. HELMS. That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the United States. I think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out of the Oval Office [sic].

Senator MATHIAS. And yet at the same time you felt that some spark had been transmitted that that was within the permissible limits?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; and if he had disappeared from the scene they would not have been unhappy.

After citing this historical analogy and other probable scenarios, Baker hastened to add that "whether such conversations did in fact occur is something we will never be able to prove conclusively."⁶ Nonetheless, recently declassified documents at the Eisenhower Library suggest that Senators Baker and Mathias may have been perspicacious, at least in the case of Rafael Trujillo.

THE PROBLEM OF RAFAEL TRUJILLO

Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, the absolute military dictator of the Dominican Republic, was a product of the Dominican national guard, the constabulary created by U.S. marines during their occupation of the country between 1916 and 1924. Trujillo, who was recruited by the marines and rose rapidly through the ranks, seized power in 1930 and used his position as commander-in-chief to maintain, for three decades, one of the most odious regimes in the history of the Americas. He also cultivated relations with Washington. He promoted U.S. trade and investment and retired his nation's substantial international debt. In addition, with great fanfare, he aligned the Dominican Republic with the United States during World War II and the Cold War. By 1955 the Department of State was hailing Trujillo as "one of the hemisphere's foremost spokesmen against the Communist movement."⁷ In view of Trujillo's ability to keep his country stable and friendly, many Americans were willing to excuse his gross violations of fundamental human rights. For example, in 1955 Vice President Richard Nixon toured the Dominican Republic and publicly embraced the dictator. As Nixon reported to Eisenhower's Cabinet, Trujillo had given his people clean, drinkable water, an obsession with progress, and pride in being on time, although the price of this was dictatorship. In any case, as Nixon saw it, "Spaniards had many talents, but government was not among them."⁸

During the last five years of his tyranny, a heated debate erupted over U.S. policies toward Trujillo. In 1956 allegations arose that the dictator's henchmen had kidnapped and murdered Jesús Galíndez, a Spanish citizen and scholar who had written a bitterly anti-Trujillist book, while Galíndez was within the United States. Then Charles Murphy, a young aviator from Oregon, disappeared. Murphy had become unwittingly involved in the Galíndez affair and was probably kidnapped and executed by Trujillo's men to guarantee his silence. To cover that crime, Trujillo's agents arrested, imprisoned and murdered Octavio de la Maza, a Dominican pilot and

friend of Murphy's. Dominican officials claimed de la Maza left a suicide note in which he took responsibility for Murphy's death.⁹ These related cases gained national attention between 1957 and 1959 through the persistent efforts of Charles Porter, an obscure congressman from the district in Oregon where Murphy had lived.¹⁰ Porter was soon joined in his campaign against Trujillo by his senior colleague, Senator Wayne Morse. Senator Morse used his position as chair of the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations to denounce U.S. support for Trujillo and what Morse perceived as a preference for Latin American military dictators by the Eisenhower administration.¹¹

The revulsion over the Galíndez-Murphy case merged into a general concern about U.S. policies in Latin America. Through most of the 1950s, Latin America was assigned a low priority by Washington, for, with the exception of Guatemala, it was considered beyond the grasp of the Soviet Union, with internal communist subversion the only potential problem. In view of its Cold War concerns, the Eisenhower administration worked with dictators and strongmen who maintained internal security. While it allocated comparatively little economic assistance to the region, it sent nearly \$400 million in military aid to Latin America. In addition, President Eisenhower awarded a Legion of Merit, the nation's highest honor for foreign personages, to Manuel Odría of Peru and Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela, two unsavory military dictators.¹² By the end of the decade, these policy undertakings were being widely questioned. A democratic trend swept the hemisphere, as Juan Perón of Argentina, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Odría, and Pérez Jiménez fell from power. Latin Americans, furious over U.S. actions, hounded Vice President Nixon during his 1958 tour of South America and in May a mob nearly killed him in the streets of Caracas, Venezuela.¹³

Particularly alarming to U.S. officials were events in Cuba. Stung by the mounting criticism of its policies toward dictators, the Eisenhower administration had in 1958 cut off arms shipments to Fulgencio Batista, the embattled Cuban dictator. It also suspended military aid to Trujillo. Trujillo then, against U.S. wishes, began to ship arms to Batista. The Dominican reasoned that the triumph of the guerrilla movement led by Fidel Castro would, by example, encourage his own opponents. Indeed, by June 1959, six months after the collapse of the Batista regime, insurgents were using Cuba as a base for armed forays into the Dominican Republic.¹⁴

Castro's subsequent radicalization of the Cuban Revolution and alliance with the Soviet Union produced certain anomalies in U.S. policy toward Trujillo. It seemed that support for dictators was counterproductive; frustrated reformers might resort to extreme solutions. As the State Department now saw it, " 'anti-communism' as practiced by absolute dictators is frequently used to suppress all opposition, without ideological distinctions, and thus not only undermines faith in true democracy by identifying 'anti-communism' with tyranny but paves the way for Communist takeover." Yet, simply to abandon a tyrant like Batista or Trujillo would bequeath a political vacuum to their successors which might precipitate the Communist alternative.¹⁵ Accordingly, the Eisenhower adminis-

tration had decided by 1960 that it must support leftist, but non-Communist, reformers such as José Figueres of Costa Rica and Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela, leaders whom the administration had ironically scorned through the 1950s. This alternative too presented problems. As a price for their support of anti-Castro policies, Betancourt and Figueres insisted that the United States must oppose all undemocratic regimes, including Trujillo's.¹⁶

MOVING AGAINST TRUJILLO

Within this new context of inter-American relations, the Eisenhower administration plotted against Trujillo. In mid-April 1960, President Eisenhower approved a State Department memorandum, which had been discussed before the National Security Council on January 14, regarding policies to be followed "in the event of the flight, assassination, death, or overthrow of Trujillo." The United States would be prepared to dispatch warships to Dominican waters or to land troops on Dominican soil "to prevent a Castro-type government or one sympathetic to Castro." But, in order to avoid military intervention, the United States intended to persuade Trujillo to leave and to establish contacts with civilian and military dissidents who would give the island republic "moderate, pro-United States leadership." The U.S. Ambassador, Joseph Farland, was ordered to meet immediately with those dissidents, for, as the memorandum noted, "delay in the end of the Trujillo regime has already tended to make previously pro-American Dominican dissident elements — who are increasingly desperate — more responsive to Castro's appeal and more critical of the U.S. for failure actively to help them."¹⁷

Rafael Trujillo would not cooperate with the U.S. plan. Various Americans, including Ambassador Farland, Senator George Smathers of Florida, and the former Ambassador to Peru and Brazil, William Pawley, journeyed to Ciudad Trujillo (Santo Domingo) for discussions with Trujillo regarding the possibilities of his resigning or permitting a free election. A comfortable exile, perhaps in Portugal or Morocco, with a "trust fund" was mentioned.¹⁸ The dictator resisted all blandishments, telling Pawley, "you can come in here with the Marines, and you can come in here with the Army, and you can come in here with the Navy or even the atomic bomb, but I'll never go out of here unless I go on a stretcher."¹⁹

Trujillo not only refused to abdicate but also became more of a nuisance and a threat to U.S. policies in Latin America. He picked fights with his neighbors and in April 1960 aided an unsuccessful attempt by right-wing Venezuelan military officers to overthrow the Betancourt government. Two months later, his agents tried to assassinate President Betancourt by detonating a bomb planted near the President's automobile. Betancourt survived but received severe burns on his hands.²⁰ Trujillo also counterattacked within the United States, actively promoting his cause. Having 54 consulates in the United States, more than any other country, Trujillo used his propaganda mill, taking out advertisements in newspapers and planting stories with friendly journalists. Those accounts always reminded Americans that Trujillo was a staunch anti-Communist. In addition, during the last five years of his rule, Trujillo reportedly plied U.S.

congressmen with prostitutes and over \$5 million in bribes. Indeed, Eisenhower, in a private meeting, discussed with Secretary of State Christian Herter the names of two influential legislators that, reports indicated, were "receiving money in one way or another from the Dominican Republic."²¹

Unable to persuade Trujillo to leave, the Eisenhower administration considered violent measures. On May 13, 1960, Eisenhower met with Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs R. Richard Rubottom, Ambassador Farland, and General Wilton B. Persons, a presidential assistant. The Staff Secretary, General Andrew Goodpaster, recorded the conversation in a memorandum classified "top secret." The President opened the session "by saying that he was being bombarded by people who are opposed to Castro and Trujillo." He and the State Department officials then reviewed the failures of the Pawley and Smathers missions. Under Secretary Dillon added that he had a classified report that claimed that Trujillo "did not plan to retire 'before the year 2000'." Those present agreed that an election, while Trujillo remained on the island, would be meaningless. The dissidents would fear retaliation, and, if Trujillo ran, he would win, since he controlled all news outlets and had popular support. The discussion continued:

Mr. Rubottom said that Trujillo is involved in all sorts of efforts all over the hemisphere to create disorder. The President commented that Castro is also, and he would like to see them both sawed off. Mr. Dillon commented that the State Department is about ready to propose some additional action against Castro.

The participants concluded their review both by noting the Castro menace and by recalling "that under the existing military contingency plan we would send in our forces into the area to keep Castro out." The President also remarked that the problem was "to find a way to give a chance for a new party to form."²²

It would seem that, in the words of Senator Mathias, "some spark had been transmitted" by the President to Rubottom at the May 1960 meeting. During the next six weeks, the Assistant Secretary intensified U.S. efforts against Trujillo. On June 16 he gave his "unofficial" approval to a CIA proposal that Henry Dearborn, the Deputy-Chief-of-Mission in the Dominican Republic, become the "communications link" between the dissidents and the CIA. The dissidents were to understand that, while the United States would not take any overt action against Trujillo, it would clandestinely assist the opposition in developing the "effective force" necessary to overthrow Trujillo.²³ In late June, Rubottom met with Colonel J.C. King, Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. According to King's handwritten notes and subsequent memorandum, Rubottom approved a CIA suggestion that the dissidents be provided with "a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scenes" and that these arms be placed "in [the] hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment." The CIA thereafter recommended that twelve "sterile," or untraceable, rifles with telescopic sights together with 500 rounds of ammunition be delivered to the dissidents.²⁴

Though few in number, the rifles would be critical to the Dominicans. When U.S. marines occupied the Dominican Republic, they disarmed the country and gave the national guard a monopoly over arms and munitions. Trujillo enforced his rule by retaining that policy.²⁵ The rifles the CIA proposed to pass to the dissidents would be aimed directly at Trujillo. As Dearborn advised Rubottom on July 14, the dissidents were "in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary activity in the foreseeable future except the assassination of their principal enemy."²⁶

Despite this extensive planning, the twelve sniper rifles were never furnished to the dissidents. In July Dearborn told the CIA that the dissidents now hoped that Trujillo might fall as the result of action by the Organization of American States.²⁷ The OAS met in August to condemn Trujillo's assassination attempt against Betancourt. In accordance with OAS resolutions, on August 26, 1960 the United States broke diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic. Eisenhower also imposed punitive excise taxes on the imports of Dominican sugar into the United States. Sugar production was a key sector of the Dominican economy, and the Trujillo family controlled major plantations. Eisenhower resorted to excise taxes, because he could not convince the agricultural committees to eliminate the Dominican Republic's share of the sugar quota, as the committees had recently done with the Cuban sugar quota. His inability to convince the committees prompted Eisenhower's concern about bribes and his comment to Secretary Herter that he was "very suspicious about the actions of a number of key people in the agricultural committees of the Congress."²⁸

Diplomatic and economic pressure failed to topple Trujillo. The plotting resumed. Between September 1960 and May 1961, officials in the State Department and CIA constantly discussed covert actions against Trujillo. Logistical and diplomatic problems, however, confounded their work. CIA operatives wondered how they could smuggle weapons to the dissidents. If, for example, the sniper rifles had been parachuted into the Dominican Republic, their telescopic sights might have been damaged. Moreover, the dissidents continually altered their requests, calling at times for anti-tank weapons, machine guns, and even once for "a slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in a handshake, causing delayed lethal results."²⁹ Officials also worried about a successor to Trujillo. In October 1960, Under Secretary Dillon informed Eisenhower that "we do not want to take concrete moves against the Dominican Republic just at present, since no successor to Trujillo is ready to take power, and the result might be to bring an individual of the Castro stripe into power there."³⁰ Similarly, on May 5, 1961, President John Kennedy ruled at a National Security Council meeting "that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we know what government would succeed him."³¹ After the Bay of Pigs debacle, officials hesitated to be linked at all with assassination, for, as the liaison between the CIA and the State Department, known as the "Special Assistant," wrote, "U.S. moral posture can ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world."³²

A FINAL SOLUTION

Despite these problems and misgivings, the United States aided Trujillo's assassins during the last months of the Eisenhower administration and the first months of the Kennedy government. Eisenhower and his closest advisors agreed that the United States could hope for Latin American support of an exile invasion of Cuba only if the United States moved against Trujillo. On this basis, on January 3, 1961, Eisenhower ordered his national security officials to "do as much as we can and quickly about Trujillo."³³ Nine days later, Livingston Merchant, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in the presence of Gordon Gray, the Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs, agreed that the CIA could provide the dissidents with "limited supplies of small arms and other material." Early in 1961, pistols and carbines were passed to Dominicans. The pistols came through diplomatic pouch to Dearborn, the one U.S. diplomat left behind after the rupture in relations. Dearborn, who was officially Consul General and *de facto* CIA Chief of Station, added the carbines that had been left in the U.S. consulate by military guards³⁴ to the weapons given to the Dominican dissidents.

Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, seven Dominicans led by Antonio de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, the slain Dominican pilot, ambushed and assassinated Rafael Trujillo near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassins, who included disgruntled military officers, caught Trujillo on a lonely stretch of road as the aged dictator was on his way to visit his twenty-year-old mistress. Using handguns and shotguns, they riddled Trujillo's body with 27 rounds. The Church Committee could not establish definitively whether the assassins used the .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols passed through the diplomatic pouch or whether they carried U.S. carbines from the consulate. The committee did have testimony and evidence that these weapons reached the "action element" of the dissident group.³⁵

CONCLUSION

When, on May 13, 1960, President Eisenhower, in the presence of State Department officials, commented that he would like to see Castro and Trujillo "sawed off," it seems that he indicated his desire to see the Dominican dictator overthrown. Nonetheless, as in the case of King Henry, a historian will never be certain what Eisenhower intended. A memorandum of conversation does not convey tone or inflection and it may even be incorrect. Close associates, like General Goodpaster, testified that Eisenhower never told them about any assassination efforts. The President's son, John Eisenhower, concurred and added that his father "did not discuss important subjects circumlocutiously."³⁶ In addition, there is no evidence that any official ever apprised Eisenhower of the plans to arm Dominicans bent on assassinating Trujillo. Finally, the Church Committee concluded that the United States was not as directly involved in the conspiracies against Trujillo, as it was in the plots to assassinate Castro and Lumumba. Therefore, the account of the May meeting is not comparable to the "smoking gun" meetings recorded on the Watergate tapes, which allowed Senator Baker and his colleagues to answer other questions concerning presidential knowledge.

However, for a president of the United States to say that he would like to see foreign leaders "sawed off" sounds ominous, to say the least. Certainly, General Goodpaster saw fit to record the comment in a memorandum classified top secret and prior to the May meeting, the United States tried to persuade Trujillo to leave his nation. It was after that meeting, with its presidential comment, that the United States began to aid potential assassins.

Footnotes

1. U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (hereafter cited as Church Committee), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Senate Report No. 465, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 4-7.
2. Church Committee, pp. 11-12, 261.
3. Church Committee, p. 309; and Oral History (II) of Richard Bissell, p. 23, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (Abilene, Kansas).
4. Church Committee, pp. 265-66, 277-79.
5. Church Committee, pp. 303-04.
6. Church Committee, pp. 315-17. For what King Henry may have actually said, see W.L. Warren, *Henry II* (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 508-09.
7. Lester D. Langley, *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900-1934* (Lexington, 1983), pp. 141-54; G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, *The United States and the Trujillo Regime* (New Brunswick, 1972), pp. 36-52; and quoted passage in Briefing Folder on Dominican Republic, February 3, 1955, Box 1, Series 361, Papers of Vice President Richard M. Nixon, Federal Archives Center (Laguna Niguel, California).
8. Cabinet Meeting, March 11, 1955, C-22, Box 3, Cabinet File, L. Arthur Minnich Series, Office of Staff Secretary, White House Official Files, Eisenhower Library.
9. Charles D. Ameringer, *The Democratic Left in Exile: The Antidictatorial Struggle in the Caribbean, 1945-1959* (Coral Gables, 1974), pp. 167-74; Atkins and Wilson, *Trujillo Regime*, pp. 69-74; Bernard Diederich, *Trujillo: The Death of the Goat* (Boston, 1978), pp. 14-19; and Howard J. Wiarda, *Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic* (Gainesville, 1968), pp. 147-70.
10. Charles Porter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, March 13, 1957, Foreign Affairs-Dominican Republic, 1957-59 Folder, Box 15, Papers of Charles O. Porter, Manuscript Division, University of Oregon Library (Eugene, Oregon); Congressional Record CIII, February 28, 1957, 2815-23; Congressional Record, CIII, July 15, 1957, 11754-57; Charles O. Porter (as told to Geoffrey Bocca), "The Butcher of the Caribbean," *Cornet*, 42 (July 1957), pp. 50-66. For a widely read article on the Galindez-Murphy case, see "The Story of a Dark International Conspiracy," *Life*, 42 (February 25, 1957), pp. 24-31.
11. Congressman Charles Porter to Senator Wayne Morse, March 29, 1957, Latin American Folder, 1957, Box 75, Series A, Papers of Wayne Morse, Manuscript Division, University of Oregon Library; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nomination of Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.*, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, pp. 1-28; and *ibid.*, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Historical Series), XI, 1959, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1982, pp. 519-37 and 606-26.
12. Louis A. Pérez, "International Dimensions of Inter-American Relations," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 27 (Summer 1973), pp. 50-53; Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, 1982), pp. 7-19; Charles Wolf, "The Political Effects of Military Programs: Some Indications from Latin America," *Orbis*, 8 (Winter 1965), p. 883; and U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations: Obligations and Loan Authorizations*, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1976 (Washington, 1977), pp. 6 and 33.
13. Tad Szulc, *Twilight of the Tyrants* (New York, 1959), pp. 9-13; and Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (New York, 1962), pp. 195-247.

14. Atkins and Wilson, *Trujillo Regime*, p. 90.
15. Quoted passage in Daniel T. Montenegro, Director of Office of Public Service, Department of State, to C.G. Dahm of Dallas, Texas, September 21, 1960, Box 859, OF 174, White House Official Files, Eisenhower Papers. See also National Security Council Memorandum 5902/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Latin America," February 16, 1959, NSC 5902/1 (Latin America) (1) Folder, Box 26, NSC Series: Policy Papers Subseries, Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Papers; and Third Draft of Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Revision of NSC 5902/1), November 15, 1960, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (1) Folder, Box 12, NSC Series: Briefing Notes Subseries, Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Papers.
16. Oral History of José Figueres, pp. 32-35, Harry S Truman Library (Independence, Missouri); José Figueres, "The Problems of Democracy in Latin America," *Journal of International Affairs*, 9 (May 1955), pp. 11-21; Speech of Romulo Betancourt in *Venezuela-Up-To-Date*, 10 (May-June 1961), pp. 3-4. By 1960 President Eisenhower was agreeing with Betancourt and Figueres, telling subordinates "that it would seem we should link Trujillo and Castro up and direct our actions against both of them." Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter, and Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, July 5, 1960, 6-7/60 (3) Folder, Box 4, State Department Subseries, Subject Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Eisenhower Papers.
17. Memorandum for the President, "Possible Action to Prevent Castroist Takeover of Dominican Republic," with Enclosure, "Proposed Plan," April 14, 1960, Intelligence Matters (14) Folder, Box 15, Administrative Subseries, Subject Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Eisenhower Papers; and Church Committee, p. 192.
18. General Edwin N. Clark to Eisenhower, April 14, 1960, Folder 4/60 (1), Box 49, DDE Diaries, Eisenhower Papers; Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower, Secretary Herter, and General Clark, April 25, 1960, Intelligence Matters (14) Folder, Box 15, Administrative Subseries, Subject Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Eisenhower Papers; Memorandum, Under Secretary Douglas Dillon to Eisenhower, May 12, 1960, Dominican Republic Folder, Box 4, International Series, Eisenhower Papers; and Senator George Smathers to Trujillo, April 7, 1960, Folder 5/60 (3), Box 10, Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Papers.
19. Oral History of William Pawley, pp. 33-34, Herbert Hoover Library (West Branch, Iowa).
20. Stephen G. Rabe, *The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976* (Austin, 1982), pp. 141-42.
21. Atkins and Wilson, *Trujillo Regime*, pp. 76-77; Arturo R. Espallant, *Trujillo: The Last Caesar* (Chicago, 1963), p. 75; Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, August 30, 1960, State Department 8-9/60 (2) Folder, Box 4, State Subseries, Subject Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Eisenhower Papers. The legislators mentioned by Eisenhower and Herter were Representative Harold Cooley, Democrat of North Carolina, and Senator Allen Ellender, Democrat of Louisiana. Cooley was chair of the House Agricultural Committee, the body that allocated a sugar import quota to the Dominican Republic.
22. Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 13, 1960, State Department 3-5/60 (6) Folder, Box 4, State Department Subseries, Subject Series, Office of Staff Secretary, Eisenhower Papers. General Goodpaster wrote the memorandum on May 16, 1960.
23. Church Committee, pp. 192-93.
24. Church Committee, pp. 193-94. In affidavits submitted to the Church Committee, both Rubottom and Colonel King stated that they did not recall meeting in late June nor did they recall discussing any proposal for supplying sniper rifles. See footnote 1 in Church Committee, p. 193. But, as indicated in the text, the Church Committee reviewed both King's handwritten notes and subsequent memorandum about the June meeting.
25. Atkins and Wilson, *Trujillo Regime*, 30-36; Bruce J. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation, 1916-1924* (Austin, 1984), pp. 115-82; and Wiarda, *Dictatorship and Development*, pp. 42-60. Arturo Espallant, a

- former chief of Trujillo's military intelligence service, disputed the contention that weapons from the CIA would be critical to be dissidents, arguing that weapons could be obtained in the Dominican Republic from military bases. He noted that weapons from the CIA for the dissidents were for "psychological" support. Espallant, *Trujillo*, p. 11.
26. Church Committee, p. 195.
 27. Church Committee, p. 194.
 28. Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, August 30, 1960, State Department 8-9/60 (2) Folder, Box 4, State Department Subseries, Subject Series, Office of the Secretary of State, Eisenhower Papers; Atkins and Wilson, *Trujillo Regime*, pp. 116-19; and Jerome Slater, *The OAS and United States Foreign Policy* (Columbus, 1967), pp. 184-94.
 29. Church Committee, pp. 194-215.
 30. Memorandum of Conversation between Dillon and Eisenhower, October 13, 1960, Staff Notes 10/60 (1), Box 53, DDE Diaries, Eisenhower Papers.
 31. Church Committee, pp. 209, 213, and 262-63. On May 29, 1961, the day before the assassination of Trujillo, President Kennedy cabled Henry Dearborn, the U.S. representative in the Dominican Republic, that the United States as a "matter of general policy cannot condone assassination." However, the cable also stated that, if the dissidents assassinated Trujillo and established a provisional government, the United States would recognize and support the new government. The senators could not decide how to interpret this cable. One interpretation stresses the President's opposition to assassination. Another interpretation emphasized that the President feared that U.S. involvement might be exposed and that the last-minute cable was designed to avoid a charge that the United States was responsible for the death of Trujillo. The interpretations are not mutually exclusive. For Kennedy's thinking on the post-Trujillo period, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, 1965), p. 641.
 32. Church Committee, p. 210.
 33. Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower, Gordon Gray and others, January 3, 1961, 1960 Meetings with President, Vol. II (2), Box 5, Presidential Subseries, Special Assistants Series, Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Papers. Gray transcribed the conversation on January 9, 1961. See also Whiting Willauer to Livingston Merchant, January 18, 1961, same file as above.
 34. Church Committee, pp. 196-200; and Diederich, *Death of the Goat*, pp. 40-56 and 82-96.
 35. Norman Gall, "How Trujillo Died," *New Republic*, 148 (April 13, 1963), pp. 19-20; Diederich, *Death of the Goat*, pp. 97-120; and Church Committee, pp. 200 and 213. The one surviving member of the "action element," Antonio Imbert, denied that the assassins had been armed by the CIA. *New York Times*, June 23, 1975, p. 17. Historian Howard Wiarda, in his discussion of the literature on the death of Trujillo, notes that for nationalistic reasons Dominicans have wanted to play down any assistance from the United States. Wiarda, *Dictatorship and Development*, pp. 172-73.
 36. Church Committee, pp. 113 and 115. Thomas Mann, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs during the latter part of 1960, has also stated that he "had no recollection of any discussion to assassinate anybody." See Oral History of Mann, p. 85, Eisenhower Library. See also Stephen Ambrose, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Garden City, New York, 1981), pp. 294-95 and 306. Ambrose interviewed both General Goodpaster and John Eisenhower, and they reiterated their testimony to him. Ambrose, the pre-eminent biographer of Eisenhower, concluded, however, that "it is highly unlikely, almost unbelievable," that Allen Dulles would have approved assassination plots "unless he was certain he was acting in accord with the President's wishes." Ambrose has, however, modified that conclusion in his newest study, *Eisenhower: The President* (New York, 1984), p. 557. Noting there is no documentary evidence that he has seen directly linking Eisenhower with assassination attempts, Ambrose now asserts that the President "could have given such orders verbally and privately to Dulles, but if he did he acted out of character."