

the terrorist phenoma, namely, the members of the U.S. policy community.

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Shultz, Richard H. and Roy Godson. *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*. McLean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1984.

Since the mid-1970s, when newly-opened World War II documents revealed the widespread use of deception by the allies, the study of deception has evolved into something of an academic and journalistic cult. The range of published works is both vast and eclectic. It includes personal memoirs,<sup>1</sup> journalistic exposés,<sup>2</sup> written with the flavor of a thriller, and dense, often highly theoretical, scholarly analyses.<sup>3</sup> Much of the focus has been on the practice of deception in wartime, but it is clear from studies already published that deception has had, and continues to have, a wide variety of potential applications in diplomacy, in intelligence activities and in other international relations short of war. It is in this context that *Dezinformatsia* endeavors to make its contribution.

The term *dezinformatsia*, which translates easily from the Russian as 'disinformation,' marks one of a number of *aktivnyye meropriatia*, active measures, those covert and overt techniques — up to and including some military actions short of actual war — thought to be employed by Soviet diplomatic and intelligence services to deceive and manipulate international opponents. Western governments often are the particular targets of *dezinformatsia* activities and this book, authored by Richard Shultz and Roy Godson, attempts to illustrate exactly how the Soviet Union uses these techniques to its best advantage.

Following a brief introduction, the authors define and describe active measures and their place in Soviet strategy, foreign policy and national security framework. The third chapter consists of a content and context analysis of overt Soviet propaganda themes directed against specified western audiences over a two-decade period from 1960-1980. This exercise reveals a remarkable consistency in propaganda themes, reflecting a highly negative portrayal of American and NATO policies, even during the period of so-called 'detente.' During this era, Soviet propaganda developed in complexity, sophistication and flexibility, while maintaining uniformly high intensity.

Chapter four describes several active measures/disinformation campaigns carried out by the use of agents of influence, forged documents and certain international front organizations, the direction of which might be plausibly denied. Considerable attention is given to the

activities of Pierre-Charles Pathé who published a political and security affairs newsletter, in France, which was funded covertly by the Soviet Union. Analysis of the content reveals the newsletter's bias against western policies and toward those of the Soviet Union. While the impact of the newsletter is not estimated, the reader is left in no doubt that it reached a potentially influential audience. The World Peace Council, a Soviet front organization, is also discussed at length. The Council's connections to the Soviet government, and its campaigns against the United States and NATO, are described and documented. Further research by the authors reveals a frequent and consistent use of forged documents to disrupt American relations with its allies in Europe and the Third World. This material is supplemented by personal accounts, gained through interviews with two Soviet bloc defectors, previously involved in disinformation operations against the West, presented in chapter five.

All of this leads the authors to conclude that the Soviet leadership regards active measures as a significant tool to support their foreign policy objectives. Such a conclusion, they contend, prompts the West to counter these efforts and respond in kind. Unfortunately, these assertions serve to highlight the book's only serious analytical flaw; the authors have made no attempt to assess the effects or results of the Soviet efforts. While it may be argued that the sheer scale and variety of these activities represent sufficient indication of their importance to the Kremlin, this is insufficient by itself. The appropriate measure of a technique's importance is its ability to produce results favorable to the initiator. Perhaps this has been the case; certainly that would help explain why these techniques have been used so often. Nevertheless it is a poor substitute for analysis. Is there not in the public domain sufficient evidence upon which to base an assessment of the World Peace Council's efforts to mobilize western opinion against NATO nuclear policies? Did any of the forgeries described have a significant political impact on the intended target, and on U.S. relations with the country concerned, or were they merely of nuisance value? Without answers to questions such as these, it is difficult to accept, at face value, the authors' conclusions.

This analytical weakness should not, however, deter academics and other specialists from reading or using *Dezinformatsia*. While the intelligence professional may not find anything new in it, the uninitiated will find that it brings together, in a clear, concise and coherent manner, ideas and information heretofore scattered through a variety of sources. Thus, it constitutes a timely and useful introduction to a field of knowledge which, as the recent case of Arne Treholt demonstrates,<sup>4</sup> is likely to continue to expand in importance for diplomats, the intelligence community and scholars of international security affairs.

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**Footnotes**

1. For example, F.W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974); and, Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972).
2. See, Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and, David C. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).
3. Barton Whaley, *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969); and, Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, eds., *Strategic Military Deception* (New York: Pergamon, 1981).
4. In January 1984 Arne Treholt, press secretary in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, was arrested on charges of espionage. It subsequently transpired that during sensitive Norwegian-Soviet negotiations over the disputed 'grey zone' in the Barents Sea, Treholt acted as an agent of influence for the Soviets, very likely contributing to the final agreement which favored the Soviet claims. Treholt was convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term in June 1985.