

The Evolution of Terrorism

by

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INTRODUCTION

Since mid-December of 1984, a number of terrorist actions have taken place in Western Europe. These recent episodes represent a watershed in terrorist activity and a dramatic change in the direction of Western European terrorism.

The current wave of episodes began with the foiled car-bomb attempt on a United States-sponsored North Atlantic Treaty Organization school in the West German town of Oberammergau.¹ This was quickly followed by successful attacks at other NATO installations and the assassinations of French Brigadier General Rene Audran, on January 25, 1985, and of West German industrialist Ernst Zimmerman, on February 1, 1985. Zimmerman's firm manufactured aircraft and tank engines for NATO, including those used in the new Leopard II tank. Along with the assassinations some sixty bombs have exploded at NATO installations across Europe.²

Amidst these actions have come communiqués from various Western European terrorist groups announcing a war against NATO and heralding an open alliance between the groups to accomplish that purpose. On January 15, 1985, France's Direct Action and West Germany's Red Army Faction, the heirs to the Baader-Meinhof gang, announced to Paris-based news agencies that the two groups would now cooperate in the fight against NATO.³ The Communist Combatant Cells, of Belgium, echoed the theme after an attack on a U.S. military recreation center outside Brussels on the same date.⁴ Two weeks later in solidarity with the Red Army Faction (RAF), a Portuguese-based groups called FP-25 attacked a West German airbase outside of Lisbon.⁵

What is different about these recent actions is that they are directed at a specific target, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and they embody an evolution in the ideology and tactics of terrorism in Western Europe. The most important change seen in this new spate of bombings and assassinations is the abandonment of indiscriminate violence, so characteristic of terrorism in the past, for the adoption of a tactic which focuses on a single, salient target. To understand the importance of this change, it is necessary to consider both the tactical and ideological role that indiscriminate violence has played in Western European terrorism.

The violent actions of the RAF have sometimes been more associated with carefully selected targets rather than with indiscriminate activities. This is in large part due to the attention given to the RAF's more dramatic operations — the kidnapping of Peter Lorenz and the assassination of Hans Martin Schleyer — than to its more common type of activity. Both in the scope of its targets and in casualties inflicted, the Baader-Meinhof gang usually practiced indiscriminate violence and the favorite weapon of the original gang was the firebomb. Ulrike Meinhof

and the other gang leaders were originally indicted for seventy-two fire bombings which killed four and injured forty. The greatest single episode of the gang's indiscriminate violence took place in May of 1972 when fifteen explosions injured some thirty-eight civilians in Hamburg. The targets of the gang's operations included, but were not limited to: U.S. business interests, U.S. military installations, El Al airlines, Lufthansa, West German magistrates, Springer publishing offices, department stores, OPEC ministers, and NATO installations, a veritable potpourri of targets. Whatever Libya's private thinking about the Baader-Meinhof gang, the government's official position was that the gang's activities were so lacking in direction and so without recognizable revolutionary goals that they were to be rejected.⁶ The second generation RAF, 1977-1984, did have a slightly more specific focus, assassinating prominent individuals, but it too lacked the congruence of a single, specific target with a broader ideological appeal that would find a resonance among German youth.

By contrast, Direct Action is best known for its indiscriminate killing of innocents. On October 20, 1981, it set off a booby-trapped van in Antwerp's diamond district, killing two and wounding nearly one hundred passers-by. On August 9, 1982, it caused the carnage at Goldberg's Restaurant in Paris which left six dead and twenty-two wounded. This was followed two days later by the bombing of the Banque de Gestion Privée which seriously injured a bystander. Direct Action has varied its rationale for violence from the struggle against what it calls "French Imperialism in Africa" to anti-semitism to the more recent anti-NATO support of the RAF.

FROM INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE TO DIRECTED VIOLENCE

Terrorism, especially terrorism as it has manifested itself in most of Western Europe, has generally meant the use of indiscriminate — sometimes referred to as "random" — violence against innocents in order to bring about political change.⁷ Victims of terrorism are generally in no position to provide the terrorists with what they want. However, that is of no consequence, for the victims are merely surrogates for the state. They serve to demonstrate the impotency of the state in being able to preserve order and to provide for the safety of its citizens. Because being a victim is the result of a random event — being in the wrong place at the wrong time — a climate of fear pervades the entire society. The psychological weapon here is that no one feels safe, for unlike the situation where only prominent officials or people associated with a specific political movement are targets, everyone is a target. No one can look upon a terrorist episode and say, "It couldn't happen to me." It could and it does.⁸

Underscoring this tactic is a philosophy of revolution drawn from a somewhat sophomoric interpretation of Marxism which sees revolution as coming about when things get worse.⁹ Taking this route to revolution inspired the Weathermen to begin the "days of rage" in October 1969.¹⁰ It is not only bad Marxism, totally ignoring the fact that Marx broke with Bakunin and Nechaev over their enthusiasm for a tactic which Marx

found ineffectual, but it produces the very opposite effect.¹¹ It is not revolution which comes about when social misery is increased as people feel their personal safety is threatened. Instead, it is support for right-wing elements to restore order, a fact which the Uruguayan military fully understood and the Tupamaros did not. There terrorism led not to a public uprising against a democratic regime which could not preserve order, but to public support for a military *coup* which snuffed out both the revolutionaries and Latin America's oldest democracy.¹²

Similar tendencies for the general public to exchange liberty for order also exist in Western European democracies. Britain, Germany, and Italy have promulgated tough anti-terrorist legislation in response to waves of terrorist episodes.¹³ When Ulster-style terrorism arrived on English soil in 1972 with an explosion which killed seven people at the Aldershot officers' mess, the stage was set for the tough Prevention of Terrorism Act which passed Parliament without debate two years later. The Home Secretary, who introduced the proposed legislation, described it as "draconian" and "unprecedented in peacetime."¹⁴ Pub bombings, which took the lives of twenty-one persons in Birmingham that year, silenced those who had legitimate concerns about the effect of the legislation on civil liberties. Although the provisions of the Act were described as "temporary," the Act is still in force.

Reality should have long ago suggested the fallacy of the theory of indiscriminate violence as the stepping stone to revolution. But there was another more important delusion which had to be overcome before the infatuation with random violence could end. That was the seductive view of violence as a mechanism of self-liberation. This was a delusion nurtured by the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre and those of Franz Fanon, the black psychiatrist who led Sartre to find in violence the psychological liberation of the oppressed.¹⁵

It was this delusion of liberation through violence, of lacerating public sensitivity through indiscriminate destruction, which brought Andreas Baader to terrorism. Baader came not as a politico but as a rake and adventurer who embraced destruction with the same commitment some men embrace religion.¹⁶

Political philosophy was hardly Baader's strong suit; violence was. Baader's politics could be summed up in the convoluted logic of fellow comrade Gudrun Ensslin, "We set fires in department stores so that you will stop buying. The compulsion to buy terrorizes you."¹⁷ Fritz Teufel, Baader's comrade in arms, believed that given the choice between owning a department store and burning one, a higher moral standard was reached having burned one than having owned one. Such was the substance of the gang's political theorizing.¹⁸

Ironically, it was none other than Baader who may have foreshadowed the evolution of terrorism from indiscriminate violence to directed violence. In a letter to the radical political group Kommune I, Baader wrote prophetically, "... when Bonn has fallen, leave NATO to us."¹⁹ With some sixty bombs exploding at NATO bases in Europe, Baader's heirs to political violence, the new incarnation of the Red Army

Faction, appear to have progressed to a far more dangerous form of violence than that engaged in by their predecessors.²⁰

THE LIMITATIONS OF ANARCHISM

Baader never approved of the academic and media communities referring to him as an anarchist. The term undermined his self portrayal as a Marxist and interfered with his group being taken seriously. Unlike irredentist terrorist groups, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or the Irish Republican Army, which, despite their violence, seemed to represent causes with a base of support, the Red Army Faction set its sights on denouncing the "wage slavery" and exploitation in a nation which had created the highest paid proletariat in the world. "Wage slavery" appeared less a characterization of the German working class than of the distorted mentality of the spoiled children of the upper bourgeoisie who had taken to believing their own extremes of rhetoric.²¹ The indiscriminate violence of the RAF was directed not against a society which had failed but against one which had produced the German economic miracle out of the ashes of World War II. As for creating a mass movement with roots in political legitimacy, the Baader-Meinhof gang had clearly sown their seed on infertile soil.

The spoiled children of the Baader-Meinhof gang had access to the best their country had to offer. To these sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie, "the working class" was an abstraction. The real working class was something distant and foreign, something with which they had no real contact.²² Rather than being enamored with these defenders of the proletariat, Communist and socialist politicians in Germany openly denounced terrorism. Not surprisingly, the working classes joined their political representatives in blessing the creation of new police powers to fight terrorism. These powers strengthened search and arrest procedures and gun control laws. They created counterterrorist units and opened the way for police monitoring of both telephone conversations and correspondence of friends and relatives of suspected terrorists.²³

The mood throughout Western societies under the threat of terrorism was summed up at the time by Lord Shackleton, the author of Britain's anti-terrorism act, "Basic civil liberties include the rights to stay alive and go about one's business without fear." Only a hard-core of alienated youth in the West seemed to think otherwise and gave their sympathy to terrorism.²⁵

FROM ANARCHISM TO FIGHTING COMMUNISTS

By attacking NATO, this new generation of RAF has found a symbolic issue that has the potential to attract a number of sympathizers among the current generation of alienated youth in Europe.²⁶ In one tactical leap terrorism in Western Europe has gone from the periphery of the youth movement to merge ideologically with a radical politics which perceives NATO and the basing of nuclear weapons on the soil of Western Europe as the most pressing issues of the day. The twisted justifications of violence so cavalierly espoused by Baader and Ensslin

have been replaced by the rhetorical "idealism" of Ulrike Meinhof, in her earlier incarnation as a journalist.²⁷ Before she made the transition from advocacy to violence, Meinhof was the darling of the radical left. Her characterization of German society as seeking the destruction of all humanity through nuclear annihilation in the same fashion that it had sought the destruction of the Jews through the death camps struck a responsive chord among the radical elements of youth, a generation which felt the shame and disgust of the deeds of their parents and carried the sins of the fathers as if they were their own.

For Meinhof, Germany was not the showcase of democratic institutions seeking to hide the shame of its Nazi past. Instead, Germany was still the "Auschwitz generation" garbed in the trappings of democracy while spreading the gangrene of "western imperialism" which could only be stopped by moral outrage.²⁸ Eventually she reached the ideological position, so well identified with the nineteenth century philosopher Proudhon, that the state itself was corruption. Hence there could be no such thing as a crime against the state.²⁹

As German youth imitated its American counterpart during the 1960s, so too the German youth movement in its own way followed the same extremes of rhetorical and political nonsense.³⁰ Whereas in America members of the youth movement of the 1960s evolved into the professionals of the 1980s and moved politically toward the right, in Germany radicalism not only persisted, it grew.

By 1977, American radicalism had subsided as the Vietnam era receded into political memory. In contrast, in Germany 1977 became a watershed year for radicalism. Not only did 1977 mark the beginning of the anti-neutron bomb protest campaign, which later developed into a larger campaign against the modernization of NATO nuclear forces, the year also saw German youth merging environmental issues with political radicalism. In May, France opened the Fessenheim nuclear reactor just across the German border. Sabotaged in 1975, Fessenheim became a symbol for environmentalists and the reactor's opening was an occasion which precipitated a convergence of demonstrators of various stripes from both sides of the border who tried to crash police lines in an effort to keep the reactor from going on line. The same year saw the "Green List for Environmental Protection" (Grüne Liste Umweltschutz/GLU), the first environmental electoral list, established in Lower Saxony. The list was established by leaders of the demonstrations against the nuclear reactors at Gorleben and Kalkar and was successful in local elections. Buoyed by this success, the GLU moved on to compete on two fronts, parliamentary politics and mass acts of civil disobedience. Although unable to capture the necessary 5 percent of the vote for parliamentary representation during its 1978 Lantag campaigns, the Greens drew strong media attention and became attractive to another source — the organized political left. The Communist League (Kommunistisches Bund/KB) and the Communist League of West Germany (Kommunistisches Bund Westdeutschlands/KBW) both gravitated to the Greens, less because of concerns for the environment than for finding a mass movement already in place which these organized communist groups could manipulate.³¹

The roots of the Greens did not lie on the ultra-left. The Greens drew their support from large numbers of conservative environmentalists as well as moderate leftists. However, their success as a party attracted remnants of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (Auserparlamentarisch Opposition/APO) and its sub-group, the better known German Socialist Student League (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund/SDS). These groups were concerned with overthrowing the capitalist system in West Germany and their intrusion into the Greens drove out segments of the conservative environmentalists and moderate leftists. This paved the way for the fusion of environmental issues with the politics of the ultra-left.³² A persistent theme of this fusion is that the current "ecological phase" of capitalism will try to save itself by increasing economic exploitation, political oppression and destruction of the environment.³³

That this intrusion has occurred does not mean that ultra-leftists dominate in the Greens. The composition of the inner leadership varies significantly from region to region. Nonetheless, communist themes — the anti-NATO posture among them — have served to create the foundations for an existent Red-Green alliance and these expressions have found a resonance among Germany's alienated youth who view the Greens as part of the alternative movement against capitalism.

Recent criticisms of the Greens for entering into correspondence with the incarcerated members of the RAF³⁴ and the defeat of the Greens at the polls, in the 1985 Land elections in both North-Rhine Westphalia and the Saar,³⁵ may appear to suggest that the threat from this segment is less serious than ever before. Nonetheless, it is largely immaterial — from the perspective of this analysis — whether the Greens received 5 percent at the polls or 3.8 percent. What is important is that the new terrorism has achieved what its predecessors had not — an articulation with a mass movement, however tangential that relationship is, and however unrepresentative that relationship may be of the diverse composition of the Greens. The Greens have come to represent a hospitable environment for the new terrorism to take root.

It should be remembered that the Greens exhibit the continuing themes of the radical elements of the 1960s, combining environmental concerns with anti-nuclear issues. Among the Greens and their ideological compatriots is found the same sense of moral outrage and alienation which gave rise to Meinhof's brand of "idealistic" radical journalism. Here, in this shared alienation and persistent moral outrage, exists a sympathetic environment for the new brand of terrorism.³⁶

The new terrorism draws heavily on these earlier themes of alienated youth. It has shown signs of rejecting the nihilistic image popularly associated with Baader as adventurer. Instead, it has turned to the earlier writings of Meinhof for ideological sustenance and to Baader's view of himself as a Marxist striving for radical social change in an exploitative repressive system more accurately characterized, as he viewed it, by its Nazi past than its democratic present. For Baader, fond as he was of Sartre, the only way to exorcise this systematic corruption was to liberate it through violence.³⁷

The heirs to the Baader-Meinhof gang, the new Red Army Faction, call themselves "fighting communists," a title which has not yet, at least, gained much currency for them in the media, but one which is widely used in radical European circles. This nomenclature serves to distinguish them from the anarchist characterization so much in evidence in describing their predecessors. It also sets them apart from what they have come to regard as the "bourgeoisie communists" of the older generation who have sold out the revolutionary spirit of Marxism for the material rewards of trade unionism.³⁸

TACTICAL COOPERATION

Not only is this new tactic sustained by a different ideological emphasis evident in the recent wave of bombings and assassinations but many observers of terrorism are talking about a new cooperation between terrorist groups. The assassination of French Brigadier General Rene Audran in Paris on January 25, 1985 appears to have been a cooperative venture between the French-based Direct Action and the Red Army Faction.³⁹

Terrorist groups have been providing each other with mutual aid since the early 1970s. The Japanese Red Army carried out the massacre at Israel's Lod Airport in May 1972 on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Basque separatists murdered a high-ranking member of the Franco regime with a bomb supplied by the Irish Republican Army. Members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Turkey and scores of other terrorist groups have received training from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who in turn have received training in the Soviet Union in what some have called "the trickle down theory of international terrorism." In fact, it was through the PFLP that the Baader-Meinhof gang developed independent ties to the Japanese Red Army.⁴⁰

Whatever doubts may have existed about cooperation between terrorist groups were laid to rest by the Israeli capture of dozens of erstwhile terrorists from all over the globe training in southern Lebanon. Captured PLO documents indicated that, between 1980 and 1981, some 2300 terrorists from twenty-eight different countries were trained at bases in Lebanon. Included in this *mélange* were representatives of the new "fighting communists," of Italy's Red Brigades, of West Germany's Red Army Faction and of France's Direct Action.⁴¹

The reason that the media have seized on the "new cooperation" is not so much because it is new, but because it can no longer be ignored. In the new terrorism, the groups themselves have gone to great lengths to publicize their cooperation.⁴² Indeed, from a tactical perspective, this type of cooperation is a clear departure from previous terrorist thinking. Prior to the new wave of terrorism, Europe's "fighting communists" adhered to the well known Pamphlet Number 4 of the Italian Red Brigades, the guiding principle of which was the prohibition of common tactical operations. Clearly, the new terrorism has departed from that position in quest of greater effectiveness and in an effort to build a larger mass following.⁴³

THE NEW THREAT: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The new terrorism is a more formidable threat than was the terrorism of indiscriminate violence. The Baader-Meinhof gang drew sympathy from only the most alienated segments of radical youth. Directed violence is a more sophisticated tactic and has greater propaganda value. Sown in an environment of a European generation which perceives NATO and capitalism — and not the Soviets — as the major evils in Europe, the new terrorism will find a larger group of sympathizers and even perhaps a larger group of potential recruits.⁴⁴

In May 1985 West German police did indeed discover that the RAF had found a new source of recruits for their action groups, namely among sympathizers no longer content to wait for social change to come about through marches and demonstrations. Called “illegal militants,” this group, unlike other action groups which operate underground and are full-time terrorists, lives a normal life-style which does not attract attention. On weekends they can be pressed into service as bombers and assassins, returning to respectability after their mission is accomplished. There is even speculation that individuals drawn from this group assisted Direct Action in its assassination of Brigadier Audran.⁴⁵

The new threat should also be seen in terms of the legitimacy which is contained in the new terrorism. By aligning with a cause which is perceived as just, the new terrorism is far more appealing to the segment of alienated youth seeking an alternative to capitalism. (The Greens, it is useful to remember, are only one contingent of what in Germany is frequently called “the alternative.”) Such legitimacy helps to recruit alienated youth into terrorism and to create the networks which terrorists desperately need to survive in an urban environment. Certainly, in terms of an ultimate, immediate threat to NATO specifically, or Western Europe generally, it is highly doubtful that terrorism, new or old, will topple either. Yet, what might happen is that the irritant which terrorism presents coupled with the pressure from mass demonstrations might make NATO countries even less receptive to modernization of their forces and expansion of their commitments, especially when it comes to stationing nuclear weapons on their soil. Those kinds of decisions can have negative reverberations from an American whose economy is beset by a disadvantageous trade balance and whose national debt appears to be without feasible political or economic remedy. The new terrorism may be no more than an irritant, but perhaps it is one which will add to weaknesses, divisions, and confusions already present in the alliance, at a time when Moscow continues to enhance her own capabilities.

If there is any consolation when observing this new wave of terrorism, it is that the new terrorism has the potential to force greater cooperation among Western nations which until until now have gone through the ritual of signing international conventions which are neither enforced nor taken seriously. Recognition of this new reality can mean cooperation in terms of the legal maxim “extradite or prosecute.” To date, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed by seventeen members of the Council of Europe, is not being effectively

enforced.⁴⁶ Italy, for example, is still unable to get France to accede to repeated requests for the extradition of 120 members of the Italian Red Brigades.

France's lack of cooperation grows out of its long tradition of emptying political crimes from extradition — "the political exception." Although the purpose of the European Convention was to do away with the political exception, legal expert Robert A. Friedlander notes that the agreement is so loosely worded as to permit France to disregard it.⁴⁷ Moreover, the Convention has been entangled in European politics. France sees her enforcement of the Convention — she has signed but not ratified it — as contingent on former French President Giscard d'Estang's proposal for a European Judicial Zone. The Netherlands has objected and in response France has not acceded to implementing the Convention. There are, of course, other concerns for the French. There is speculation that France, unwilling to incur the wrath of Basque terrorists operating against Spain, has found it in its own interest not to enforce anti-terrorist agreements of any kind but instead to develop a tacit understanding with international terrorists that France will not bother them if they do not commit crimes on French soil. As the relationship between Direct Action and the RAF develops, France will be forced to reconsider this stance.⁴⁸

Terrorism is becoming tactically, politically and technologically more sophisticated. It can no longer be dealt with as simply the problem of an individual Western nation experiencing an individual attack. The new terrorism teaches us that these attacks are now directed at the very bastion of the defense of the West. If the new terrorism moves Western European governments to greater cooperation in their anti-terrorist activities, it will have to be along both legal and tactical lines. Edward Bridgeman, a consultant on international terrorism to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, sees the new terrorism as encouraging more cross-training between NATO's anti-terrorist forces. The role of the two British Army explosives experts who accompanied the West German GSG-9 in their raid against the RAF group at Mogadishu is taken as a model for the kind of cooperation which must be continued and extended. There is also a greater need for cooperation in the gathering and dissemination of intelligence data as it relates to terrorist groups.⁴⁹ Before that can happen, the United States will have to undertake a restructuring of its commitment to its own intelligence community. The destruction of entire covert operations networks in Europe and elsewhere under the Carter administration, and the image, accurate or not, that the Europeans have of the workings of the Freedom of Information Act has created a formidable obstacle to the cooperation between European and American intelligence communities.⁵¹

The new terrorism in Western Europe, as well as Shiite actions against American interests in the Middle East, may yet result in the United States recreating a strong role for human intelligence gathering. This would help pave the way for both stronger cooperation and better intelligence sharing within NATO on political terrorism.

If the new terrorism does move Western European governments and the United States toward greater cooperation in their anti-terrorist activities, we may yet see the silver lining in the dark cloud currently hanging over Western Europe.

Footnotes

1. It has been suggested that the recent campaign began with the Communist Combatant Cells' (CCC/Belgium) October 1984 attack against Litton Industries in Brussels, a manufacturer for and supplier to NATO. This campaign is most noted for six bomb blasts on December 11, 1984 which forced a temporary shutdown of a fuel pipeline used by NATO. Although there are some good reasons for citing this campaign as the beginning of the new terrorism, there are some equally compelling reasons for seeing the CCC operations as something different. The October bombings included a broad range of targets. Some business targets had no relationship to NATO. In addition, offices of the ruling coalition were bombed. The study center of the Liberal Party was bombed on October 15, 1984 and the Christian Democrat's offices in Ghent were bombed two days later. In contrast to the RAF campaign no communiqués were issued to announce a coordinated action with other groups. From the author's perspective the CCC campaign has all the earmarks of similar campaigns where there has been a broad sweep of targets which also included some NATO targets. Perhaps even more important in establishing a baseline for the new terrorism is to recognize that the principal group here is the RAF, and to focus on their actions and their leadership in shaping the new alliance. Obviously, there is sufficient room here for reasonable men to differ.
2. *Facts on File*, January 11, 1985, p. 14, A2; January 25, 1985, p. 90, E1; and, February 1, 1985, p. 90, A2.
3. *Facts on File*, January 18, 1985, p. 19, D1.
4. "Terrorism," *The German Tribune*, March 3, 1985, No. 1169, p. 15, translated from *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland*, February 5, 1985.
5. *The German Tribune*, March 3, 1985, No. 1169, p. 15.
6. Henry W. Degenhardt, ed., *Political Dissent* (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), p. 435.
7. Robert A. Friedlander, ed., *Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control* (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1981), Vol. III, pp. 2-3; Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A Balance Sheet," in John D. Elliot, et al., eds., *Contemporary Terrorism: Selected Readings* (Gaithersburg, Md.: International Chiefs of Police, 1978), p. 236; Abraham H. Miller, "Responding to the Victims of Terrorism: Psychological and Policy Implications," in Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Stephen Sloan, eds., *Responding to the Terrorist Threat* (New York: Pergamon Inc., 1980), pp. 93-104.
8. Jenkins, "International Terrorism," pp. 236-237; Abraham H. Miller, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Law: A Discussion of Issues," in Abraham H. Miller, ed., *Terrorism, the Media, and the Law* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1982), p. 13; and, John B. Wolf, *Fear of Fear* (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), pp. 97-98.
9. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1975), pp. 7, 48.
10. For a discussion of the Weathermen see: Stuart Daniels, "The Weathermen," *Governments and Opposition*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Autumn 1974), pp. 430-459.
11. Obviously there were a variety of other issues involved in the Marx and Bakunin conflict. See: Max Nomad [psuedo.], *Apostles of Revolution* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1939), pp. 126-135. There are those who argue that the terrorism period was an aberration in the career of Michael Bakunin. See: Sam Dolgoff, *Bakunin on Anarchy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 13.
12. In 1973, the Uruguayan military, using martial law, brought an end to democracy and detained approximately ten thousand leftists and suspected terrorists. The move ended terrorism in Uruguay, but it ended democracy as well.

13. Abraham H. Miller, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Law," pp. 44-45; Miklos Radvani, *Anti-Terrorist Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Washington, D.C.: Law Library, Library of Congress, 1979) pp. 70-71; Victor S. Pisano, *Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Countermeasures* (Washington, D.C.: Law Library, Library of Congress, 1979), pp. 22-23; Lord Diplock, chairman, *Report to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, December 1972); and, Lord Shackleton, *Review of the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1979 and 1976* (London: Home Office, August 1978).
14. A complete discussion of this development can be found in Walter B. Jaehnig, "Terrorism in Britain: On the Limits of Free Expression," in Abraham H. Miller, ed., *Terrorism, the Media, and the Law*, pp. 106-121, quotes from p. 109.
15. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Preface," to Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., Evergreen Edition, 1966).
16. Some of the best material on Andreas Baader is to be found in a too infrequently used source. See: Jon Bradshaw, "A Dream of Terror," *Esquire*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (July 18, 1978). See also, Jillian Becker, *Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Gang* (London: Granada Publishing, Panther edition, 1978).
17. Quoted in Bradshaw, p. 32.
18. Bradshaw, p. 31.
19. Quoted in Becker, p. 100.
20. A comparison of the indiscriminate violence of the RAF with the new terrorism can be made by looking at a chronology for terrorist events in West Germany, even as late as 1981. See: *Terrorism: An International Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1982), pp. 380-384.
21. For an analysis which sees this development as a result of the influences of the American protest movements of the 1960s, see: Schura Cook, "Germany: From Protest to Terrorism," in Yonah Alexander and Kenneth A. Myers, *Terrorism in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pp. 154-178.
22. The work which most influenced the ideological notion that students were the vanguard of the revolution was, Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (London: Sphere Books, Abacus edition, 1972). In this respect, the RAF differed from the RZ (Revolutionary Cells) which not only saw the proletariat in more traditional Marxist terms, but, unlike the RAF, actually sought out relations with the workers. See: Peter Janke with Richard Sims, *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations: A World Directory and Bibliography* (New York: McMillan Publishing Co., 1983), p. 21.
23. A detailed discussion of the legislation and the events leading up to its passage can be found in Radvani, especially Sections IV and VI. For a similar discussion on Italy, see Pisano. When on December 5, 1979 Italy promulgated emergency anti-terrorist measures, the Communist Party newspaper *Unita* came out with an editorial endorsing the government's position.
24. From personal conversation with Lord Shackleton, Ditchley Castle, Oxfordshire, England, November 25, 1978.
25. Hans Josef Horchem, "European Terrorism: A German Perspective," *Terrorism: An International Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1982), pp. 27-51. Horchem estimates the RAF reservoir of support at about two hundred.
26. David T. Schiller, "Current Terrorist Activities in Germany," *Terrorism, Violence and Insurgency*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 1985), p. 17.
27. For Meinhof's work as a journalist, see: Becker, *Hitler's Children*, pp. 166-198.
28. Bradshaw, p. 36.
29. Jillian Becker, "Another Final Battle in the Stage of History," *Terrorism: An International Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (1981), pp. 89-105.
30. Cook p. 158.
31. Kim R. Holmes, "The Origins, Development and Composition of the Green Movement," in Robert L. Pfaltzbraff, Jr., et al., eds., *The Greens of West Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1983), pp. 36-41.
32. Holmes, pp. 29-31.
33. Holmes, p. 43.

34. Recently leaders of the Greens have entered into correspondence with jailed RAF members. See: "Terrorism," *The German Tribune*, April 21, 1985, No. 1175, p. 14.
35. "Greens find the Problems are Growing," *The German Tribune*, June 2, 1985, No. 1181, pp. 3-8, trans. from *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland*, May 15, 1985.
36. Schiller, p. 17.
37. In December 1974, Jean-Paul Sartre visited Baader in Stammheim prison. Sartre said that Baader's politics were not incorrect; only his deeds were. Bradshaw, p. 42.
38. From personal conversation with Prof. Roy Godson, Washington, D.C., March 8, 1985.
39. "Fixing Their Sights across International Borders," *The German Tribune*, March 3, 1985, No. 1169, p. 15., trans. from *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland*, February 5, 1985.
40. Abraham H. Miller, *Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, p.b. edition), p. 101.
41. Mordechai Gichon, "Peace for Galilee," *IDF Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 1982), p. 20.
42. See fn. 32.
43. Horchem, p. 35.
44. For a prediction of trends borne out by the analysis presented in this paper, see Jenkins, pp. 242-245.
45. "Red Army Faction Diversifies Its Battalions of Terror," *The German Tribune*, May 19, 1985, No. 1179, p. 15, trans. from *Die Welt*, May 3, 1985.
46. Friedlander, p. 13.
47. From personal conversation with Prof. Robert A. Friedlander, July 9, 1985. The views expressed by Prof. Friedlander are his own and do not represent nor are they intended to represent those of anyone else or any agency of the United States Government.
48. Friedlander, pp. 13-15.
49. From personal conversation with Prof. Friedlander, July 9, 1985.
50. From personal conversation with Chief Edward Bridgeman. The views expressed by Chief Bridgeman are his own and should not be construed to represent those of the International Association of Chiefs of Police nor of any other agency with which Chief Bridgeman is affiliated.
51. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see: Roy Godson, ed. *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counter-Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 281-319.