

study of the guerrilla war in Mozambique and of the subsequent departure of Portugal from Southern Africa following the 1974 *coup* in Lisbon. Protracted conflict is a phenomenon that Americans and perhaps some of their allies in NATO have yet to endure successfully in terms of its emotional, physical, and financial hardships, as Vietnam, Algeria, Angola, and Mozambique may demonstrate.

This pioneering and remarkably objective book is gracefully written and displays great interdisciplinary strength in terms of anthropology, history, political science, and military affairs. The author has not only done an exemplary job of handling an imposing number of books, monographs, and articles devoted to the topic but also has carefully introduced the results of his field work in Mozambique and Portugal. He wrote the book while in residence at the Hoover Institution as a National Fellow. In 1978, he published a basic history of Mozambique, and he later co-authored a study of insurgency in Southern Rhodesia with Lewis H. Gann, his colleague at the Hoover Institution.

There are a few minor flaws in this study of the Mozambican war of independence which could be corrected in a second, or lower-priced, paperback edition. The publisher would be advised to add a glossary of acronyms and Portuguese terms, to include several more detailed maps (the one opposite the title page hardly suffices), to append a brief chronology of events (for the orientation of the reader), to expand the index in greater depth and in slightly greater breadth of entries, and to delete the three page bibliographic essay and to replace it by a standard bibliography. These additions would make the book more attractive as a standard reference work. As it now stands, though, it is an exceptionally scholarly work, with over two hundred pages of text supported by no less than sixty-one pages of endnotes, containing 820 entries. It is necessary reading for Africanists, diplomats, political scientists, military analysts, and students of conflict behaviour, insurgency, and revolution.

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Hamill, Desmond. *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984*. London: Methuen, 1985.

Generally speaking, it is customary to indicate likely readership appeal when approaching the conclusion of a review. In the case of Desmond Hamill's book, one feels compelled to do so at the outset, in the firm belief that it should certainly be read by a broadly representative audience without the need of further encouragement. Members of the military and the law enforcement professions, as well as academics and administrators having a concern for internal security problems, will all find many lessons of value within the fast-moving text. For those

individuals with a general or even a passing interest in the progress of events in Ulster over the past fifteen troubled years, the book offers a fascinating glimpse of security force perspectives as expressed by many of the participants, both civilian and military.

Hamill's very brief preface states his intent to show how the Army perceived and understood its role in Northern Ireland from the moment when soldiers first appeared on the streets of Londonderry in August 1969. He had achieved his goal to a commendable degree, while also explaining a 'parallel reflection' occurring within the Royal Ulster Constabulary. In contrast to the adversarial image of journalists often pictured by the military, Hamill reveals a definite sympathy for the difficulties faced by the Army and, particularly, by those serving in the baffling forefront of the confrontations. This supportive stance is evidenced in the selection of numerous examples of operational incidents used to illustrate the author's theme. Combined with a lively journalistic style, these incidents offer a sobering assessment of a soldier's life as he attempts to cope with domestic terrorism and to offer 'aid to the civil power.'

Hamill's considerable background experience relating to the Ulster situation is not wasted in an attempt at exploring the deep-rooted causes of the violence or in proffering solutions to the continuing eruptions of that violence. Perhaps sufficient explanation is provided in his early use of a comment which appeared in *The Times*. Quoting a Belfast citizen, the newspaper reported, "Anyone who isn't confused here really doesn't understand what is going on." Hamill neatly divides the period 1969-1984 into nine significant phases, accurately depicting the variety of challenges which arose in each and the security policies which evolved in response. Two major threads run throughout: the need for a comprehensive, coordinated intelligence infrastructure; and, the demand for a clearly articulated policy to direct the planning and the operations of the security forces. In both cases, Hamill indicates there has been a lack of substance and proper development until recently.

Hamill's treatment of his subject is wide-ranging, moving back and forth across the interrelated political and security spectra and from top to bottom through the command and control organizations. The attitudes and approaches of senior leadership are matched with those of the "squaddie" on patrol, and, not infrequently, their views conflict with the views of their political masters. The difficulties and frustrations endured are best illustrated by Hamill with his choice of another anecdote. When briefing a newly arrived Brigadier about the situation, the General Officer Commanding advised, "You must never have a short conversation with an Irishman, and you must not have a plan.... [A plan] is the one thing against which all Ulstermen will unite." Yet plans were made and, often, the lack of mutual trust and cooperation between police and the Army did little to facilitate the successful execution of their operations.

While quick to register disgust at and to condemn IRA/INLA atrocities, Hamill does accord the terrorists a grudging respect for their

ingenuity, powers of observation, surprising flexibility, and appreciable element of sophistication in the use of propaganda, weapons, and tactics. Combatting such terrorists is never easy. Academics, will be pleased to find that it was one of *their* number whose sometimes unwelcomed research provided "coherent pictures of the enemy on which Army training, tactics and strategy could be based." Consensus was universal, however, that defeat of the terrorists could only be achieved through the rule of law and by establishing a working relationship within the local communities.

Pig in the Middle is not a critique or an exposé, although strengths, weaknesses, character faults and failings are presented, along with government and public misconceptions and errors. Political and security force personalities are named and accorded bouquets and brick-bats where appropriate, and policies, such as the introduction of internment, receive attention according to their place in the attempts to restore an atmosphere of normalcy. Hamill, nonetheless, steers his way through the distractions to give a many-faceted view of the unexpected responsibilities, dangers, pitfalls, and rewards encountered by the Army during the past decade and a half in Northern Ireland. Soldiers and policemen at all levels will find much in the pages to hold their interest and to inspire a few reflections on standard operating procedures.

Only two flaws prompt some mention: one in the technical production, and the other in the context. Surprisingly, the book contains a number of typographical errors which, although minor, tend to detract from an otherwise favourable impression. The second criticism may well lie with a reader's viewpoint; it did seem, however, that insufficient explanation was devoted to factors contributing to a reduction of large-scale rioting. In this connection, little analysis was offered regarding the presence of the Army, a gradually improved police force, political measures, economic developments, or the exhaustion of the populace. Unquestionably each played a significant part, but some emphasis on this aspect would have been of welcome assistance to policy planners. Notwithstanding, Desmond Hamill has produced a timely and very readable account of a confusing and complex military experience.

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