
Early 1984 ended South African support for the destabilizing efforts of Renamo (formerly called the National Resistance Movement of Mozambique or MNR) in return for the withdrawal of Mozambican assistance to the African National Congress guerrillas who had been using Mozambique as a staging area for their attacks on white-ruled South Africa. Contemporaneously, the March 1984 Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa drew attention to the regional significance of Mozambican independence in 1974.

The decade-long war in Mozambique can be analyzed from many perspectives, and Thomas Henriksen, currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, has utilized an exceptionally fruitful research design in *Revolution and Counterrevolution*. Of the nine chapters in the book, seven can be designated as topical, containing discussion of the anti-Portuguese position or policy, immediately followed by analysis of the Portuguese activity and doctrine. Such an organization, involving clear sub-headings for each chapter, sharpens the focus and the analysis, thus widening the appeal of the book. To achieve this, Dr. Henriksen concentrates on insurgency (and counterinsurgency), mobilization (and countermobilization), terror (and counterterror), control of territory by both insurgent and Portuguese forces, and external aid to both parties (FRELIMO, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, and the Portuguese Armed Forces and metropolitan government in Lisbon). This structure not only avoids the often analytically sterile narrative used in recounting the course of an insurgency by partisan writers and publicists but also enables the author to introduce thoughtful comparisons of the case of Mozambique with relatively recent insurrections in Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Malaysia, and Vietnam. These comparisons reveal Dr. Henriksen's general interest in the revolutionary process, his military expertise as a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute and his subsequent experience as a U.S. infantry officer.

The continued statement in the South African withdrawal from Namibia and the seeming impotence of the so-called Western Contact Group (with American, British, Canadian, French, and West German members) in bringing stability to Namibia and neighbouring Angola suggest that Dr. Henriksen's study is appropriate for students of Southern African military and diplomatic affairs. American scholars and military intellectuals are still trying to sort through the historical rubble of Vietnam to understand what went awry, who the culprits should be, what revisionism might bring, and what this means for students and practitioners of revolution and counterrevolution. These scholars and intellectuals would do well to read Dr. Henriksen's timely and carefully written
study of the guerrilla war in Mozambique and of the subsequent departure of Portugal from Southern Africa following the 1974 coup in Lisbon. Protracted conflict is a phenomenon that Americans and perhaps some of their allies in NATO have yet to endure successfully in terms of its emotional, physical, and financial hardships, as Vietnam, Algeria, Angola, and Mozambique may demonstrate.

This pioneering and remarkably objective book is gracefully written and displays great interdisciplinary strength in terms of anthropology, history, political science, and military affairs. The author has not only done an exemplary job of handling an imposing number of books, monographs, and articles devoted to the topic but also has carefully introduced the results of his field work in Mozambique and Portugal. He wrote the book while in residence at the Hoover Institution as a National Fellow. In 1978, he published a basic history of Mozambique, and he later co-authored a study of insurgency in Southern Rhodesia with Lewis H. Gann, his colleague at the Hoover Institution.

There are a few minor flaws in this study of the Mozambican war of independence which could be corrected in a second, or lower-priced, paperback edition. The publisher would be advised to add a glossary of acronyms and Portuguese terms, to include several more detailed maps (the one opposite the title page hardly suffices), to append a brief chronology of events (for the orientation of the reader), to expand the index in greater depth and in slightly greater breadth of entries, and to delete the three page bibliographic essay and to replace it by a standard bibliography. These additions would make the book more attractive as a standard reference work. As it now stands, though, it is an exceptionally scholarly work, with over two hundred pages of text supported by no less than sixty-one pages of endnotes, containing 820 entries. It is necessary reading for Africanists, diplomats, political scientists, military analysts, and students of conflict behaviour, insurgency, and revolution.

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Generally speaking, it is customary to indicate likely readership appeal when approaching the conclusion of a review. In the case of Desmond Hamill's book, one feels compelled to do so at the outset, in the firm belief that it should certainly be read by a broadly representative audience without the need of further encouragement. Members of the military and the law enforcement professions, as well as academics and administrators having a concern for internal security problems, will all find many lessons of value within the fast-moving text. For those