

Should the United States Impose a Peace Settlement on Israel?

by
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INTRODUCTION

The failure of Israel to achieve its more sweeping objectives in its 1982 invasion of Lebanon, largely, though not entirely, supported by the United States, together with the subsequent collapse of the American effort to create a stable, pro-Western regime in that country, makes it clear that the Reagan Administration's overall policies in the Middle East are in need of fundamental re-evaluation.¹ Unless the United States initiates major changes in its policies and seeks to make use of the potential leverage its political, economic and military assistance to Israel gives it over that country's policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly regarding the Palestinian problem, basic American national interests are likely soon to be in serious jeopardy.

The fundamental Mideast policy of the Reagan Administration — to an even greater degree than that of previous American administrations — has been that of nearly unqualified support of Israel. It is based on several factors. First, there is the assumption that Israel's interests, as defined by the Begin government and the present Labour-Likud coalition government, and America's interests are essentially identical. Second, it is presumed that the Arab-Israeli conflict is stable or at least that Israeli military might is unassailable, thus making political concessions to the Arabs unnecessary. Third, it is believed that the root cause of continued turmoil in the Middle East lies not in indigenous conflicts but rather in Soviet meddling. Finally, the American policy assumes that the "moderate" Arab states basically share the American view and can be convinced to ignore the Arab-Israeli conflict and join with the United States and Israel in a "strategic consensus," a *de facto* anti-Soviet, anti-communist military alliance.²

To implement these policies the Administration has shipped billions of dollars worth of the most advanced American weapons systems into the Middle East. Although some of the weapons have gone to Arab states, particularly Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Israel has received the lion's share. This massive new military support of Israel, which goes well beyond even the previously high levels, has been accompanied by matching policy statements. Whatever differences the United States might have, in theory, with some of Israel's policies, the Administration has no intention of using growing Israeli military and economic dependence on the United States as leverage to induce changes in those policies.

American economic, political and, above all, military support have allowed the Israeli government to pursue its own highly nationalistic and military bent without fear of effective U.S. disapproval. Thus, within the past four years Israel has bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, bombed

civilian areas of Beirut in the summer of 1981, annexed the Golan Heights, invaded and occupied southern Lebanon, and has rapidly moved toward the *de facto* annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Though the Reagan Administration has been unhappy about some of these actions, particularly the 1982 siege of Beirut, its disapproval has been limited to mild diplomatic statements and the temporary suspension of planned strategic military cooperation programs between the American and Israeli military establishments. Moreover, in the past year the Administration has discarded as "impractical" and "unrealistic" its earlier, desultory efforts to persuade Israel to reach a political settlement with the Palestinians and to withdraw from the West Bank, has resumed the "strategic military cooperation" programs, and has authorized record levels of economic and military assistance to Israel in the coming years.³

AMERICAN POLICY AND ISRAELI REALITY

The assumptions on which the Reagan Administration's policies are based are all inaccurate. There is widespread agreement that the major U.S. national interests in the Middle East are to ensure the survival of Israel, to maintain access to Arab oil at reasonable prices, to contain any actual or potential Soviet expansionism in the area and to attain these objectives without a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.⁴ All of these interests are currently endangered. Israel's policies, supported by the United States, are a threat to its own survival, are jeopardizing continued access to oil, are facilitating rather than containing the growing Soviet role in the area and are posing an on-going danger of a super-power showdown. While it is true that a strongly anti-communist, pro-American, politically stable and militarily powerful Israel could be a major bulwark against the spread of Soviet influence, as well as against the indigenous Arab radicalism or fundamentalist nationalism, in an area critical to the economic prosperity of the West, the Lebanese war has made it clear that the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to overshadow other issues in the Middle East. Thus, a political settlement of the conflict is the necessary, even though not sufficient, precondition for the avoidance of war, the stabilizing of the Middle East, the securing of Western oil supplies, and the containment of expanding Soviet influence — if not for more ambitious goals, such as the creation of an alliance of *status quo*, anti-communist states.

To a substantial degree because of recent American and Israeli policies, the overall situation in the Middle East has never been more perilous. To begin with, Israel is in the midst of the worst internal crisis of its history, one that threatens its democratic institutions and traditions, and perhaps even its viability. Inflation, fuelled by the world's largest military budget and the costs of occupying Lebanon, has risen at an alarming rate in the last few years, accelerating from 140 percent in 1981 to an estimated 450 percent in 1984, with some economists predicting a rate of over 1000 per cent in 1985 unless current trends are arrested.⁵ Such inflation levels have been historically incompatible with the maintenance of democracy and political stability. The viability of

Israeli democracy is also threatened by a number of other alarming trends in Israeli society and political life. Since at least 1967 the role of the armed forces in the Israeli policy-making process has steadily increased, accompanied by several serious conflicts between the military establishment and the civilian political leadership. This trend reached its peak in the Lebanon war, in which Generals Sharon and Eitan planned and conducted the war to a considerable extent outside the realm of effective political control.⁶ There are other serious strains on Israeli democracy as well, particularly the growth of religious fundamentalism and extremist nationalism and the burgeoning class, ethnic, and even racial conflict between the largely middle-class and well-educated Ashkenazi Jews of European descent and the poorer, less-educated Sephardic Jews more recently arrived from the Arab countries of the Middle East.⁷

In addition to these intra-Jewish problems, Arabs already comprise over 40 percent of the population of Israel proper and the occupied territories (500,000 Israeli Arabs and about 1.3 million Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza). Because of the higher Arab population growth rate, the diminishing rate of Jewish immigration, and the rising rate of Jewish emigration, it is generally estimated that within a decade Israel is likely to be an Arab majority state. Thus an Israel determined to hold on to the occupied territories will either cease to be a Jewish state or (far more likely) it may have to restrict increasingly the political and civil rights of the Arab majority, resort to large-scale expulsion of the Arabs, and/or rely on repression to maintain the *status quo*.

The overall effect of all of these strains on Israeli democracy is already severe, so much so that a number of prominent Israeli writers are warning of the growth of what they do not shrink from labelling "fascism" or "Judeo-Nazism," even "civil war" is not ruled out.⁸ That it is not only intellectuals who are alarmed by all of these recent trends in Israel is indicated by the fact that for the first time since the establishment of Israel in 1948, more Jews have emigrated from Israel in the last few years than have immigrated.⁹

Second, the moderate, pro-Western Arab governments of the Middle East are being endangered by a combination of Islamic fundamentalism, Israeli intransigence, and the unwillingness or failure of the Reagan Administration to curb Israel or, at a minimum, to disassociate itself from recent Israeli expansionism. Supporters of Israeli policies like to argue that Israel is America's only reliable ally in the Middle East. At the moment this is oversimplified, but it could well become self-fulfilling. Arab nationalism focusing on the plight of the Palestinians could threaten the internal political stability of all of America's allies in the area, especially Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Revolutionary upheaval could be sparked either by the radical left, supported by Syria, Libya, the PLO and the Soviet Union, or it could come from the fundamentalist right, modelled on and supported by Iran.¹⁰ In either case, the overthrow of existing Arab governments in the most vulnerable countries would be a disaster for both Israel and the United States. Even short of this, it is by no means certain that the Mubarak government in Egypt

will find it politically feasible, in light of both internal and external Arab pressures, to maintain a separate peace with an Israel bent on continuing its present course.¹¹ If the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and other provocative Israeli policies resulted, for example, in an Egyptian repudiation of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel or, even worse, a replacement of the Mubarak government with a fundamentalist Moslem regime, those consequences alone would far outweigh any of Israel's military victories.

Third, Western access to Middle Eastern oil at reasonable prices could again be jeopardized by Israeli policies (though, of course, other unrelated area conflicts, such as the Iraq-Iran war, could also have this effect). The identification of the United States with Israel led to the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and facilitated the political cooperation among the Arab oil-producing states that provided the necessary underpinning for the dramatic OPEC oil price increases later in the 1970s. At present, U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, the key oil-producing state of the Middle East, have been seriously strained by the U.S. failure to use its influence with Israel regarding Lebanon or the West Bank. Though the Saudis have refrained from threats to invoke the oil weapon again, perhaps in part because the current oil glut would make an embargo or major price rise ineffective, the revival of a tight oil market, expected by many oil experts within the next few years, could dramatically change the situation.¹² In the worse case, the replacement of the Saudi regime by a radical or fundamentalist regime could result in the cut off of Western oil from that country, as happened in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah.

Finally, Israeli policies have created opportunities for the expansion of Soviet economic, political and military influence throughout the area and have increased the risk of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. This is particularly the case in Syria. Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Soviets have sent their most modern tanks, aircraft and SAM missile systems to that country, along with some 7000 troops or advisors to man directly Soviet weapons systems and to support front-line Syrian units. To be sure, the Syrians have often demonstrated their independence of the Soviet Union. Still, given the escalated Soviet commitment to Syria, a new Syrian-Israeli war would seriously increase the prospects of a super-power confrontation.

What should be done? Israel must be induced to make fundamental changes in its current policies, particularly in the occupied territories, by some combination of U.S. carrot and stick policies. An imposed peace settlement would be in Israel's true interests as well as those of the United States. The fundamental interests of Israel lie in military security, economic prosperity, political independence, and the preservation of its democratic system — not in expansion, which threatens all of those values. Israel, as George Ball has argued, must be saved "in spite of herself."¹³ This may seem presumptuous, but history affords numerous examples of nations that have come to grief because of disastrous miscalculation about their best interests. Both Ball and others feel the Israeli government is making grave errors in its assessment of the Palestinian problem, and that its policies are harming both Israel's and America's long-term interests. Therefore the United States, which has consistently provided

crucial support for Israel and whose record leaves no doubt of its commitment to that country, has not only the right but the obligation to act on the basis of its own assessments.

Currently, there is something approaching an international consensus on what would constitute a fair settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This consensus is shared by most independent analysts of the conflict, by most European governments, and increasingly by moderate Arab states as well as a substantial number, though still very much a minority, of Israelis. The most important elements of this perceived settlement are an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders, with possible minor modifications, the creation of a limited and controlled Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and a full and guaranteed peace between Israel, the Palestinians, and all the leading Arab states.¹⁴ Moreover, there is a general agreement that an active American role in seeking such a settlement is essential, for "the factors hampering communication and eventual negotiation between Palestinians and Israelis are much too powerful to be overcome without outside help . . . [which] can only come from the United States."¹⁵ Finally, few believe that the *status quo* can be perpetuated much longer, given the explosive nature of the current situation.¹⁶

However, there is no agreement on what the American role should be. Most interested individuals call simply for active mediation.¹⁷ However, in the author's judgement this is inadequate, given the depth of Israeli intransigence on the question of a Palestinian state and the ongoing process of *de facto* annexation of the West Bank through Jewish settlement.¹⁸ It is for these reasons that an imposed settlement may be unavoidable, despite the formidable arguments that can be made against it and despite the general importance of maintaining the non-intervention norm in international politics.

What can be done? In the short-run, continued major U.S. economic and military assistance to Israel should be made contingent upon several Israeli policy changes. First, Israel must suspend any further settlement of the West Bank. Second, Israel must be induced to withdraw from its current position on the future of the West Bank, namely, that it will never withdraw under any conditions, not merely or even primarily because of security concerns but because "Judea and Samaria" are Jewish lands. As long as Israel holds to this position, there is no basis for negotiations either with the PLO, whatever its future role might be, or even with far more moderate Palestinians.¹⁹ Still, given the PLO's historical record, at this point Israel should be asked only to agree to the principle of eventual withdrawal from the occupied territories, the actual implementation occurring only gradually and in the context of a variety of strong guarantees for Israel's security. Third, the Israeli government must be induced to drop its current policy that it will not negotiate with the PLO under any conditions, even if, for example, the PLO should agree to recognize Israel and explicitly and unambiguously seek the path of political change. Such a policy offers no incentive for moderation on the part of the PLO, and indeed is probably so designed.²⁰ Finally, Israel must agree to withdraw its opposition to

beginning negotiations on the basis of the "Reagan Plan," under which the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would be offered "autonomy" and self-rule in a vaguely defined "association" with Jordan. Although this proposal ignores the PLO and definitely rules out an independent state for the Palestinians, the moderate Arab states, and evidently even some sectors of the PLO (perhaps including Arafat himself), view it as a starting point.²¹

SETTLEMENT AND THE PALESTINIANS

Until now, those groups in the PLO willing to begin negotiations on the basis of the Reagan Plan have not been sufficiently strong to carry a majority. However, even if for tactical reasons the PLO should eventually agree to begin talking on such a basis, in the long run it is highly unlikely that half measures will suffice. Palestinian nationalism, like Zionism, or Jewish nationalism before it, will be satisfied only with the creation of an independent state. Thus the overall goal of American policy should be the creation of a full-fledged Palestinian state, and American assistance to Israel should be increasingly tied to Israel's willingness to allow the creation of such a state under the appropriate conditions.

The best way to create a Palestinian state would be to partition the ancient land of Palestine between Israel, within its pre-1967 boundaries, and the Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza strip.²² There are a number of reasons by the West Bank and the Gaza form appropriate locations for a Palestinian state. In the first place, no existing state has a clear, unambiguous claim to either area. The Gaza strip, through administered by Egypt for some years, is not Egyptian territory and is not claimed by the present Egyptian government. Similarly, the status of the West Bank is uncertain. After the British defeated the Ottoman Empire in 1917 the West Bank became part of the League of Nations mandate to Britain. During the course of the 1948 Arab attack on Israel, the West Bank was occupied by Jordan. However, it was lost to Israel in the 1967 war, and King Hussein has since renounced any claim to the land in favour of a claim by the Palestinians. Israel's major claim to legitimate ownership of the area is based on the religious ties of Judaism to the area and previous occupation some two thousand years ago. This claim, to put it mildly, is not impressive, having no standing in either international law or common sense. The religious ties of Islam to the area are no less strong than those of Judaism and, of greater importance, Arabs have lived on the land for thirteen hundred consecutive years and still form the overwhelming majority of the current inhabitants, even after the fifteen years of Jewish settlement since the 1967 war.

Thus, the present status of both Gaza and the West Bank is anomolous, which has the major advantage of making it easier to create a new state there. Secondly, the area is appropriate for a new Palestinian state for symbolic reasons. It is undeniably part of ancient, historical "Palestine." The creation of an Arab Palestinian state located primarily on the West Bank would amount to a partition of historical Palestine,

the normal compromise solution whenever two diametrically opposed and irreconcilable nationalist movements lay claim to the same area. To be sure, prior to the creation of Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states repeatedly rejected partition plans that the Zionists were prepared to accept. Nonetheless, given the current Middle East realities, there are good reasons to believe that the Arabs would be more amenable to a partition settlement today.²³ Thirdly, the West Bank and Gaza are the appropriate places for a new Palestinian state because the current population of those areas is still overwhelmingly Palestinian.

Of course, no Palestinian state could or should be created if this were irreconcilable with the basic security of Israel. However, it can also be contended that the establishment of such a state would be far more likely to be conducive to real peace, and therefore real Israeli security, than a continuation of the attempt to prevent it. To begin with, a Palestinian state could not be created on an unconditional basis. Israel would have to have both the right and the capability of ensuring that such a state would accept a variety of constraints on its policies and actions designed to ensure that it would not become a base for continued Palestinian war on Israel. A new Palestinian state would have to commit itself officially and unambiguously to a peace settlement with Israel based on the permanent partition of "Palestine." It would have to accept severe limitations on its armaments, with its military establishment tailored to that necessary to maintain internal order. It would have to refrain from entering into military alliances with other states, particularly the Soviet Union and extremist Arab states; and, it would have to prevent terrorist groups from using Palestine as a base for continued attacks on Israel.²⁴ The Palestinians are entitled to a homeland and a state of their own, not a base for the destruction of Israel. In any case, the former is the most they can possibly get, and there are a variety of indications that most Palestinians, including Arafat and a growing number of his followers within the PLO leadership, know and accept that reality.²⁵

Supposing, then, that the PLO agreed to accept a state on the West Bank and the Gaza as the definitive realization of its nationalist aspirations, and was further to agree to a number of measures designed to reassure Israel of its security, how could such an agreement be enforced once a new state was formed? What would happen if a subsequent Palestinian government reneged on the agreement? Is Israel being asked to "trust" the Palestinians with its future in exchange for paper promises? This is not the case. To begin with, a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza would be tiny, economically highly dependent on outside support, divided in two by Israel itself, and militarily inconsequential. It would be vulnerable not only to economic pressure but to being overrun by Israel in a matter of hours. The Israelis cite geography as the basis of the security concerns, with the West Bank located only fifteen miles from Tel Aviv. But this could be seen as advantageous to Israel, especially given the disparity of military power between Israel and a prospective Palestinian state. In effect, a Palestinian state would be on permanent notice that any serious violation of the restrictions which it

accepted, as a condition of existence, would be grounds for reoccupation by Israel, which could accomplish this with relative ease.²⁶

Secondly, the leading moderate Arab states, on whom the PLO is more dependent than ever, have indicated, at least privately, their willingness to accept a partition of Palestine as the definitive settlement of the overall Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁷ Once a Palestinian state was established, Israel would hardly be the only state in the area that would insist that it refrain from radicalism, terrorism and interventionism. A Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza would have Jordan on its east, and that country's ruler, King Hussein, has already quite convincingly demonstrated his willingness and capability to suppress Palestinian radicalism. To the west would be Egypt, which has already reached a peace settlement with Israel and has repeatedly demonstrated its reluctance to go to war regarding the Palestinians. Not far to the south would be Saudi Arabia, clearly the primary potential source of financial assistance to a new Palestinian state, and not likely to be interested in subsidizing a new focal point of radicalism in the Middle East, especially in the context of a general peace settlement with Israel that included some form of Moslem rule or administration of East Jerusalem. Of the "confrontation states," only Syria seems adamant. However, even Syria might want to disengage from such an isolated struggle, especially if Israel returned the Golan Heights.²⁸ Despite his extremist rhetoric, Assad of Syria has demonstrated his pragmatic view of Israel on a number of occasions: negotiating a military disengagement with Israel in 1974 and 1977, preventing the PLO from attacking Israel from Syrian territory since 1975, violently repressing the PLO in northern Lebanon in the late 1970s, and avoiding any significant military conflict with Israel since 1973, other than the fighting initiated by Israel in Lebanon in 1982.

In short, surrounded by far more powerful neighbours determined to ensure that it remained on its best behaviour, as well as financially weak and dependent on foreign assistance, a new Palestinian state would have little choice but to concentrate strictly on ensuring domestic stability and development. The logic of that position at present is not lost on many Palestinians and, once they were given a real stake in preserving the *status quo*, the logic should surely be more compelling in the future.

Perhaps the most decisive argument for the creation of a Palestinian state is that there is no other practical or morally acceptable alternative. Until now, Israel has chosen the path of military suppression of Palestinian nationalism, but in the long run this policy is most likely to fail. Alternatively, even if suppression should succeed indefinitely, the price would be too high. The historical experience of colonial rule since World War II is instructive in this respect. Though Israel came into possession of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 as a result of a purely defensive war provoked by persistent Arab aggression against Israel, nonetheless, in the seventeen years since then, Israeli policies, attitudes and behaviour in the occupied areas have increasingly come to resemble classic colonialism. Of particular concern is the formal Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, military rule over the Gaza strip, and the occupation and settlement of the West Bank, which is inexorably

leading toward annexation, *de facto* if not formal. The territorial expansion of Israel has been accompanied, as was that of the Western colonial powers, by a variety of ideological, religious and nationalistic rationalizations seeking to legitimize force and justify outside rule.²⁹

The colonial experience has demonstrated that once nationalist resistance is aroused it rarely can be effectively suppressed and it is only a matter of time before outsiders are driven out. Until that occurs, however, the effort to maintain control invariably brings out the worst in both ruler and ruled. What only a few years ago was simply a prediction for Israel is now rapidly becoming a reality. Among the Arabs in the occupied territories — and increasingly among Israeli Arabs as well³⁰ — there is an inflamed nationalism, the development of violent resistance to Israeli rule, and the silencing through social pressures or outright terror of the more moderate voices. Further, among the Israeli occupiers there is an increasingly nationalist and violent response, including private, vigilante actions, government curtailment of basic political rights and military repression.³¹

As instructive as the general history of the failure of colonialism may be, of much greater importance has been the specific history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even before the invasion of Lebanon, Israel's policy, in fact, if not officially, was that of massive retaliation — not merely an eye for an eye, but many eyes for one eye. This was justified on the familiar assumption that “the only thing the Arabs understand is force.”³² Presumably what the Palestinians are supposed to “understand” is that they have more to lose than to gain through terrorism. Thus, the test of Israeli policy, leaving aside moral considerations for the moment, must obviously be whether it has successfully deterred terrorism. Yet, the historical evidence strongly suggests that terrorism has not been deterred and, rather, that the Israeli policy of massive retaliation leads to war.³³ In the early 1950s Israel began responding to Palestinian terrorist raids from bases in Egypt by ever-increasing retaliation in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza strip. In 1955, following a particularly devastating and humiliating Israeli raid into Gaza, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for arms, and it was the large-scale Egyptian acquisition of Soviet arms that precipitated the Israeli attack on Egyptian forces and Palestinian base camps in the Sinai in 1956. Similarly, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was set in motion by a cycle of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli retaliation. By early 1967 growing raids on Israel, this time from guerrilla bases in Jordan and Syria, led to an Israeli decision to mount a major military operation against Syria, the most important source of arms and political support for the Palestinians. To counter the imminent Israeli attack, the Syrians signed a defense pact with Egypt, and it was Nasser's subsequent decisions to move major military forces into the Sinai, to expel the UN peacekeeping force, to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and to escalate the rhetoric of hatred and proposed annihilation of Israel that precipitated the Israeli preventive attack on Syrian and Egyptian forces in June 1967.³⁴ Recently, years of Palestinian raids on Israel from Lebanon, followed by much more devastating

Israeli retaliatory raids against PLO bases, ended in the 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon.

It seems, then, that Israeli retaliation resulted only in new recruits for the PLO, renewed support of Palestinian nationalism by leading Arab states, a cycle of action and reaction, attack and counterattack, that has always culminated in war. Somehow the Israelis have failed to observe that thirty years of massive retaliation have inflamed Palestinian nationalism rather than diminished it and, in turn, have precipitated Palestinian terrorism rather than deterred it.

Moreover, the moral issue cannot be ignored. In the last few years the actions of the Begin/Shamir governments have gone a long way toward hopelessly clouding the "terrorism" issue.³⁵ In strictly numerical terms, Israeli retaliation has been far more destructive of innocent lives than PLO terrorism.³⁶ Even before the invasion of Lebanon, Israel had been responding to PLO attacks (including those against soldiers as well as civilians) with massive attacks in Lebanon and elsewhere, using indiscriminate weapons such as artillery, air bombardment, napalm and anti-personnel weapons that have had the predictable consequence of a heavy loss of life among innocent civilians, many or most of them not even Palestinians. For example, in 1978 Israel invaded southern Lebanon in retaliation for PLO terrorism that, in the course of the previous year, had killed 140 Israelis. The Israeli raid, making use of massive firepower, was reported to have killed at least a thousand people, nearly all of them Lebanese civilians rather than PLO fighters.³⁷ In April 1979, Israel retaliated against a Palestinian raid with four days of heavy artillery fire and air attacks, killing about fifty, wounding hundreds, and inflicting heavy property damage.³⁸ In July 1981, Israeli planes bombed an apartment house in Beirut that allegedly contained "PLO offices," killing at least three hundred people, few of them either PLO leaders or even Palestinians.³⁹

All of this, of course, pales before the destructiveness of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. There is a bitter dispute over the number of civilian casualties stemming from the invasion, with estimates ranging from about five hundred (the Israeli claim) to nineteen thousand (according to the Lebanese government).⁴⁰ Whatever the exact figure, there is no doubt that Israel bombed and shelled highly populated areas and killed large numbers of civilians, that it levelled large numbers of Palestinian homes and businesses throughout all occupied Lebanon as part of its clear policy of making it difficult not merely for the PLO but for all Palestinians to remain in Lebanon, and that it stood idly by while its closest Lebanese allies, the Phalangists, massacred hundreds of Palestinian men, women and children.⁴¹

Aside from the moral issue, the invasion of Lebanon has been a disaster in terms of its economic, political and military consequences. If the purpose of the Israeli attack had been limited to restoring security to its northern border areas, the foray might have turned out differently. However, it is clear that Begin and Sharon had far more ambitious or even grandiose objectives: to drive the PLO and perhaps the Palestinians in general out of Lebanon, to break the political power of the PLO in the

occupied territories by defeating and humiliating it in Lebanon, to discourage Palestinian resistance to Israeli control over and eventual annexation of the West Bank, to drive the Syrian Army from Lebanon and thus curtail Syrian influence in that country, to install pro-Israeli Lebanese Christians in power throughout Lebanon, and to secure a permanent peace with Lebanon.⁴² None of the objectives has been attained. Even Israel's minimal objective of security in the north is likely to last only as long as Israeli forces continue to occupy southern Lebanon, an occupation that is increasingly unpopular in Israel because of the growing Lebanese resistance to it, the continuing Israeli casualties, and the high economic costs. Even though the PLO was initially driven from Lebanon, its guerrilla forces have since returned to the northern part of that country and reportedly are filtering back into southern Lebanon. Moreover, the PLO forces now returning to Lebanon represent the most radical, aggressive, and best-armed elements of the movement. Further, there is no evidence that the political power of the PLO and/or its leadership position over the Palestinians in the occupied territories have been permanently destroyed, despite defeat in Lebanon and despite, indeed, its own internal divisions and the expulsion of Yasir Arafat from Lebanon by dissident PLO groups supported by Syria. On the contrary, the PLO's military defeat in Lebanon has paradoxically led to important, unexpected political gains, for the Israeli invasion has generated increased worldwide sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause and, more than ever, the PLO in general and Arafat in particular are recognized as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. Currently, Arafat is negotiating on behalf of the Palestinians with President Mubarak and King Hussein.⁴³ Meanwhile, Syria has rebuilt its army with high-technology weaponry, supplied by the Soviet Union, and Syria also received direct support with over ten thousand Soviet advisors stationed in the country. As a result, it has established control over northern Lebanon, and has gained substantial control over the anti-Arafat wing of the PLO. The short-lived Lebanese peace treaty with Israel has already been abrogated, and Lebanon has once again been plunged back into political instability and internecine violence.

Having argued that Israel must agree to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories because its current policies of repression of Palestinian nationalism are morally unacceptable, are serious straining Israeli democracy, and in any case are failing to achieve their objectives, consideration should be taken of at least three additional reasons for Israel to change course. First, there are indications that Pan-Arabist sentiments are again on the rise throughout the Arab world. The focal point of Pan-Arabism today is the Palestinian cause. No Arab state outside of Egypt either wants or feels free to make peace with Israel in the face of Palestinian opposition. It is hardly certain that even Egypt will be able to maintain the peace treaty with Israel in the present circumstances. Second, Israel has never been more politically isolated for many of its previously strong supporters in Western Europe and the United States are profoundly disturbed by Israel's recent policies and increasingly inclined to view the continuation of the Arab-Israeli

conflict as at least as much a function of Israeli militarism and intransigence as of Arab fanaticism.⁴⁴ Because of this disenchantment, in the future Israel may not be able to depend on the nearly automatic support of the United States, its last reliable ally.

Most fearful of all is the prospect that, sooner or later, certain Arab states and perhaps even the PLO will acquire nuclear weapons, raising the spectre that future Arab-Israeli wars could end with the destruction of Israel. Thus, even so far as "security" considerations genuinely played an important role in the invasion of Lebanon and in the continued occupation of the West Bank, those considerations must fade into insignificance when one considers the long-term security consequences for an isolated Israel in an Arab world dominated by fanatics and fundamentalists and armed with the most modern weapons of mass destruction.

This last point can hardly be overemphasized. The major implication of the nuclear prospect is that real security for Israel can be found only through coexistence, or at least mutual deterrence, between Israel and an independent Palestinian state. If for no other reason, the prospect of a desperate, fanatical, Palestinian terrorist group in possession of a single nuclear weapon should persuade Israel that military suppression of Palestinian nationalism is utterly hopeless. A stateless nuclear terrorist group may be, quite simply, undeterrable, for the Israelis might not know where, or even against whom, to retaliate if they were subjected to nuclear blackmail or an outright attack. A Palestinian state, on the other hand, would be subject to the same calculations of deterrence as any other state and because of this would pose far less of a nuclear danger to Israel.

WOULD AMERICAN PRESSURE WORK?

The central argument of this article has been that the United States, both in its own interests and those of Israel, should use its enormous potential leverage to bring about changes in Israel's current policies toward the Palestinians. However, there is a widespread view, assiduously fostered by the Israeli government, that Israel simply will not be moved by external pressures or, alternatively, that such pressures would be dangerous and counterproductive. It is contended, in support, that the Arabs might be misled about the basic U.S. commitment to Israel and be encouraged to become more intransigent or that a desperate Israel might react to diminished American economic and military assistance by a "preemptive" attack on its Arab enemies designed to score a decisive military victory before Israel became too weak.⁴⁵

Certainly, it is the case that any U.S. pressures would have to be serious and sustained to be effective. Israel would have to be convinced that it could not ride out short-term shifts in U.S. policy and rely on ambivalence and internal divisions within the Administration, Congressional resistance to policy changes, and the domestic Israeli lobby to force a quick return to traditional policies of unconditional U.S. support. Recent history is quite instructive in this regard. Each American president since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and before Reagan became

convinced in turn that both Israeli and American national interests required a negotiated and guaranteed peace resulting in Israeli withdrawal from virtually all the territories captured in the 1967 war.⁴⁶ However, in seeking to induce Israeli flexibility, American administrations have wavered inconsistently between two beliefs. First, it was argued that the best way to bring about Israeli concessions was to make Israel feel more secure by providing it with increased economic and military assistance and closer security ties to the United States. Second, and conversely, it has been contended that unconditional U.S. support merely induced Israeli overconfidence and intransigence.

Most frequently, U.S. government policies have been based on the first premise. However, from time to time American presidents have become disillusioned with the results of that course and have shifted to the second premise. In the typical pattern, Israel has then been publicly and privately threatened with a fundamental "reassessment" of U.S. policy, and these threats have been accompanied by some mild, largely symbolic pressures, such as the "suspension" of the next-scheduled delivery of U.S. war planes. Usually within a very short time, the "reassessments" are called off and full-scale assistance is resumed. There have been several reasons for this pattern. Often the administration itself has been internally divided, with a number of powerful groups, particularly in the defense establishment, arguing that America's own Middle Eastern interests require unreserved support of the powerful Israeli military machine. The Israeli government, too, has reacted to mild pressures with a show of indignation and an insistence that it will ignore U.S. views and hold fast to its policies. Finally, there has been effective protest from the American pro-Israeli lobby and its numerous and powerful supporters in Congress. The classic example of this pattern occurred in 1975, when Henry Kissinger publicly blamed Israeli stubbornness for the existing stalemate in Israeli-Egyptian negotiations over the Sinai, and the Ford Administration then threatened a "reassessment" of U.S. policy. For a brief period, the U.S. government delayed delivery of weapons and other assistance to Israel. At this, the Israeli lobby mounted a major campaign against the Administration, and seventy-six Senators signed a letter to President Ford strongly opposing any continued pressures on Israel. With the Administration divided on the wisdom and the efficacy of pressuring Israel and the Israeli government seemingly unmoved, the Senatorial letter and other cries of outrage in the United States put an end to the Administration's "reassessment," and normal aid deliveries were resumed.⁴⁷ Accordingly, over the years Israel has learned that it can disregard the passing or, in some cases, the deeper disillusion of American presidents. Other American disenchantment, governmental or private, with Israeli policies, can be treated in much the same manner. All Israel has to do is wait for — or, more accurately, help to induce — the inevitable counterpressures. In most cases within a brief period American assistance is resumed at even higher levels, freeing Israel from any further need to take U.S. policies and preferences into account.

Israeli policy, then, does not respond to positive inducements alone,

nor to diplomatic appeals, public criticism, or symbolic, short-term, evidently half-hearted sanctions. However, there is abundant evidence that the Israelis do respond to serious American pressures. In 1956 Israel withdrew from the Sinai when the Eisenhower Administration threatened to cut off all U.S. aid.⁴⁸ In 1967 U.S. pressures forced Israel to accept a ceasefire and refrain from further advances into Syria.⁴⁹ In the 1973 war Israel agreed to a ceasefire and halted its advance into Egypt only after Henry Kissinger threatened to end the American military airlift to Israel and to fly in food, water and medicine to surrounded Egyptian forces.⁵⁰ In 1975 Israel agreed to a partial withdrawal from the Sinai after the Nixon Administration combined promises of new American aid with the threat of a major shift in U.S. policy if Israel failed to withdraw.⁵¹ In 1979, similar carrot-and-stick policies by the Carter Administration induced a reluctant Begin to agree to the complete withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai in exchange for a peace treaty with Egypt.⁵² In July 1981 suspensions of some U.S. military aid deliveries, this time augmented by pressures from American Jewish leaders and close supporters of Israel in Congress, convinced Begin he had to end the bombing of civilians in Beirut and accept a ceasefire in Lebanon or face a major shift in American attitudes toward Israel.⁵³ Finally, the Israelis discarded their planned ground assault against the PLO in Beirut in 1982 after strong Congressional representations that threatened the end of the policy of unconditional U.S. aid to Israel.⁵⁴

The potential for American leverage over Israeli policies has never been greater than it is at present. The United States is now providing \$2.6 billion annually in military and economic assistance to Israel, and for the next fiscal year the Israeli government has requested a total of \$4.85 billion.⁵⁵ In addition, the American government in effect subsidizes private foreign aid to Israel, for it allows Americans to make tax-exempt contributions to a number of U.S. Jewish organizations. A good part of the estimated two to three billion dollars raised every year by these organizations is known to be channelled to the Jewish Agency in Israel, an unofficial subsidiary of the Israeli government.⁵⁶

Israel's economy is critically dependent on this flow of money from the United States. Additionally, Israel is at least equally dependent on American assistance in order to maintain its military edge over its Arab neighbours. Over 40 percent of Israel's gross national product is spent on defense, an enormous burden it could not afford but for American help, and the United States directly pays for 37 percent of Israel's total defense budget in the form of loans on extremely concessionary terms or of outright grants.⁵⁷ Moreover, the United States is the only source of the high technology, weapons systems that are so critical to Israel's power.

Besides this economic and military assistance, the United States guarantees Israel's oil supply and is Israel's only reliable and significant source of diplomatic friendship and support on the world scene. Without this support, Israel would be almost completely isolated. Not surprisingly, Israel also relies on the United States to deter possible Soviet intervention in any future Arab-Israeli wars, a deterrence which came into play during the 1967 and 1973 conflicts.

For all of these powerful reasons, Israel has every incentive to take seriously any U.S. pressures to change its present policies. There are as well additional positive inducements that the United States could offer to produce Israeli flexibility and concessions. The most important would be a firm, formal U.S. defence treaty with Israel that would commit the United States to guarantee Israel's territorial security within (and only within) its pre-1967 borders. The United States has been moving closer and closer to such a commitment since the mid-1950s, when it became Israel's major supplier of economic and military assistance. As a result of this aid and of U.S. actions to deter possible Soviet intervention in the 1967 and 1973 wars, it is now taken for granted by all concerned that the United States will not allow the destruction of Israel. In the last few years, the United States has gone well beyond previous assurances in its efforts to convince Israel to agree to the disengagement agreement with Egypt and Syria and the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. As a result, the United States is now committed to: supplying the most modern armaments to Israel; providing its own troops to watch over the international buffer zone in the Sinai; taking diplomatic, economic and military measures as appropriate if the security of Israel is endangered by Egyptian violations of the peace treaty; and supporting Israel if its survival or security is threatened by a "world power." Finally, in the last few years the American defence establishment has been developing increasingly close military and intelligence links of various kinds with the Israeli armed forces and intelligence services.⁴

In effect, then, the United States already has a *de facto* military alliance with Israel, and it remains only to formalize and institutionalize it in the context of an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Such a treaty would be given added credibility and deterrent value by the stationing of U.S. troops (at least in symbolic numbers) in Israel, a step that Israel, which, in the past, has been disdainful of international guarantees, has indicated it would now welcome.

To be sure, a formal Israeli-American alliance would entail some risks. However, the truly vital U.S. national and moral interest in a just and lasting Arab-Israeli peace settlement justifies taking those risks. Moreover, there have been a number of indications that in the context of a comprehensive peace most Arab states would not oppose a U.S. alliance with Israel and an American military presence in the area. Such a presence would provide the Arab states with a powerful argument against the actions of their own militants and rejectionists in continuing a dangerous and futile struggle with Israel. Indeed, many Arab states would welcome a U.S. military deterrent against potential Soviet expansionism and perhaps even against internal uprisings aimed at their own governments.

What would be the Jewish reaction — in the United States, in the world Jewish community, and in Israel itself — to a shift in American policies toward Israel? It is clear that new American policies, genuinely designed to bring about a fair political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, would command substantial Jewish support, even with bitter

opposition from the Israeli government. The last few years have seen prominent Jewish political leaders and intellectuals publicly criticizing Israel for the first time since 1948, particularly over the invasion of Lebanon, the siege of Beirut, complicity in Phalangist massacres, and the continuing settlement of the West Bank.⁵⁹

Within Israel itself, there is widespread and growing opposition to the policies of the Israeli government. The Peace Now movement, though a minority, is an important force in Israel, and even before the invasion of Lebanon it was criticizing the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza on moral grounds, for its distortion of internal resources, for the international isolation it caused Israel, and because it endangered the peace process. Since the invasion, a growing number of Israel's former political and military leaders and "the mainstream of Israeli scholars, intellectuals and writers" have begun to speak out bluntly about the diminishing prospects and for the continuation of Israeli democracy should the government continue on its present path.⁶⁰

Disenchantment with the government is not limited to elite sectors of Israeli opinion. Though the Labour Party's position on the future of the West Bank is vague and ambivalent, the announced position of the party is "territorial compromise" and the return of substantial sectors of the area to Jordan. This is a long way short of support for an independent Palestinian state, but it is an equally long way from the hard-line of the Likud government and represents a major step in the right direction. Similarly, general Israeli public opinion is far more flexible than that of the government. Recent polls show that 53 percent of Israelis are willing to return all or part of the occupied territories in exchange for peace, and 54 percent favour a freeze on new settlements.⁶¹

Most remarkable of all is a recent development that would have been simply unthinkable only a few years ago. At first only privately, but now sometimes publicly, prominent Israeli leaders are urging both American Jews and the U.S. government to end their unconditional political, economic and military support of Israel. Political writers such as Jacobo Timerman, Amos Elon, Gideon Samet and Amos Kenan, former generals such as Mattiyahu Peled, and a number of prominent leaders of the Labour Party are all calling for sharp cuts in private and public American aid and warning that the present position of American Jewish organizations and the Reagan Administration will lead to "future calamity both for Israel and for American interests in the region."⁶²

CONCLUSION

In summary, vital American interests and the future of Israel itself are gravely endangered by Israel's current policies and by lavish American support of those policies. A combination of U.S. pressures and positive inducements to Israel to reach a comprehensive settlement, which inevitably must include nearly total Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 boundaries and the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, would best serve both U.S. and Israeli interests, would have an excellent chance of success, and would command widespread support in the United States, in the West, in the world Jewish community, and in Israel itself.

Footnotes

1. See the sections below for a discussion of Israeli objectives in Lebanon. For the evidence of basic American support or even encouragement of the invasion, see Ze'ev Schiff, "The Green Light," *Foreign Policy*, 50 (Spring 1983), pp. 73-85; and, Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984).
2. On the overall policy of the Reagan Administration, see Seth B. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Larry L. Fabian, "The Middle East, America and the World 1983," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 3; and, Schiff and Ya'ari.
3. On these developments see Schiff and Ya'ari; Fabian; "Israel's Lebanon Gains," *New York Times*, June 10, 1983; "Reagan's Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, October 26, 1984; and, "U.S.-Israeli Panel Will Coordinate Military Planning," *New York Times*, November 30, 1984.
In the 1985 fiscal year, Israel was given \$1.2 billion in U.S. economic assistance, and \$1.4 billion in military grants, both record levels. "Senate Report is Pessimistic on Israel's Economic Plight," *New York Times*, November 21, 1984.
4. For statements on this consensus view, which includes the Reagan Administration, see (among many others) Tillman and William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
5. Don Peretz, "Israeli Policy," in Robert O. Freedman (ed.), *The Middle East Since Camp David* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); "Senate Report is Pessimistic on Israel's Economic Plight," *New York Times*, November 21, 1984; and, Assaf Razin, "American Incentives," *New York Times*, December 28, 1984.
6. Schiff and Ya'ari, two of Israel's most respected military correspondents, have recently written that although this behaviour "was not a cut-and-dried case of a *coup d'état* in the classic sense ... nevertheless Israel's spirit of democracy was severely abused during the war in Lebanon, for its military machine was operating outside the real control of the country's legitimate government..." (p. 58). For other discussions of the growth in power of the armed forces, see the Israeli writers quoted in Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle* (Boston: South End Press, 1984); Mattiyahu Peled, "Too Much U.S. Rope," *New York Times*, December 30, 1982; Yoran Peri, "The Israeli Military's Political Interference," *New York Times*, October 17, 1983; and Amos Oz, *In the Land of Israel* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983). Oz writes that since the sweeping victory of the Six Day War of 1967, Israel has been "engulfed [in] ... a mood of nationalistic intoxication, of infatuation with the tools of statehood, with the rituals of militarism and the cult of generals..." (p. 132).
7. For Israeli analyses of these developments, and more generally regarding the effect of all these tensions and conflicts on Israeli democracy and political stability, see Oz; Shai Feldman, "Peacemaking in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 756-780; Jacobo Timerman, "Journal of the Longest War," *New Yorker*, October 18, 1982, pp. 59-124, October 25, 1982, pp. 55-104; Meron Benvenisti, "Regaining Israel's Soul," *New York Times*, October 1, 1982; Gideon Samet, "Unwise Grins at Israel," *New York Times*, August 16, 1983; Ofira Seliktar, "The New Zionism," *Foreign Policy*, 51 (Summer 1983), pp. 118-138.
8. On Israeli "fascism" or "Judeo-Nazism," see Oz, p. 90; Professor Yeshayah Leibovitz, as quoted in Chomsky and in Michael Jansen, *The Battle of Beirut* (London: Zed Press, 1982); Jacobo Timerman and Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem, as quoted in "Israelis Worry Over What Some View as a Tendency to 'Growth of Fascism,'" *New York Times*, June 25, 1981. Oz, one of Israel's leading novelists and political analysts, asks: "Is it possible that Hitler not only killed the Jews but also infected them with his poison?" (p. 98); he writes that what is happening in Israel is now "a matter of life and death, pure and simple..." (p. 128). The warning of "civil war" is also from Oz, p. 128.
9. Israeli government statistics, cited by Peretz, p. 155; Mark A. Heller, *A Palestinian State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 161; and, Donald Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 357.
10. On the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, including among young Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, see James Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 1 (Fall 1984), pp. 108-127.

11. On Egyptian disenchantment with the Camp David agreements, see Heller. According to one report, Egyptian government officials are giving serious consideration to embarking on a major military buildup, in particular to acquire weapons systems capable of threatening Israeli cities, in order to deter Israeli attacks on their cities in any future war. See Stephen Green, "Camp David: Has it Become a Framework for War?," *World Policy Journal*, vol. II, no. 1 (Fall 1984), pp. 155-168.
12. On the Saudi position and the prospect of a resumption of oil shortages, increased leverage for Saudi Arabia, and even a future oil embargo, see Tillman, pp. 51-52. Saudi Arabia still controls 25 percent of the world's total proven oil reserves. "OPEC Never Was the Enemy," *New York Times*, October 29, 1984.
13. "How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 55, no. 3 (April 1977), pp. 453-471. See also Tillman, for a more recent argument on the need for the United States to use its leverage if necessary to force a settlement on Israel.
14. On this consensus, see Tillman, Heller, and John Edwin Mroz, *Beyond Security: Private Perceptions Among Arabs and Israelis* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).
15. James Leonard, "The Autonomy Talks," in Harry S. Allen and Ivan Volgyes (eds.), *Israel, the Middle East, and U.S. Interests* (New York: Praeger, 1983).
16. "American passivity would condemn the Middle East to a volcanic *status quo* leading to possible explosion." Abba Eban, "No Choice But Activism," *Foreign Policy*, 57 (Winter 1984-85), p. 4.
17. For example, Eban, Heller, Mroz, and Leonard.
18. Some Israelis argue that this process may *already* be irreversible. Cf. Larry L. Fabian, "The Red Light," *Foreign Policy*, 50 (Spring 1983), pp. 53-72; Meron Benvenisti, "The Turning in Israel," *New York Review of Books*, October 13, 1983, pp. 11-16; Arie Eliav, "Sever Israel's Twin," *New York Times*, October 13, 1983; Ian S. Lustick, "Israeli Politics and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 2 (Winter 1982-83), pp. 379-399.
However, others argue that even "accomplished facts" can be reversed if the incentives are high enough. For example, Gershon Shochen, "Israel in Election Year 1984," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 1 (Fall 1984), pp. 77-92. It is in this context that U.S. pressure could play a central role, for (as George Ball has argued) it would help protect Israeli political leaders from internal charges of a sell-out, by providing them with the necessary excuse for flexibility.
19. Until the past two years, there would have been no doubt that the PLO would have had to represent the Palestinians in any negotiations with Israel. Now, in the wake of the PLO's defeat in Lebanon and its subsequent fracturing into pro- and anti-Arafat factions, it is no longer quite so obvious. However, the PLO has suffered a number of major setbacks in the past and has always re-emerged as the dominant political and military organization of the Palestinian movement, so it would be premature to write it off now, especially in view of a variety of indications that it continues to have very widespread support among the West Bank Palestinians. Cf. Heller.
20. On a number of occasions, Arafat has privately said that he cannot play his "trump card" of official recognition and acceptance of Israel, thus risking the division of the PLO, the collapse of his leadership, and perhaps his assassination, so long as the Israeli government says, in effect, that there will *still* be no change in Israeli policy. On Arafat's position, see Feldman; Herbert C. Kelman, "Talk with Arafat," *Foreign Policy*, 49 (Winter 1982-83), pp. 119-139; and, Eric Rouleau, "The Future of the PLO," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 1 (Fall 1983), pp. 138-156.
That the Begin/Shamir governments strongly preferred that the PLO remain violent and intransigent to having it eschew terrorism for a political strategy is the assessment of a number of Israeli analysts. Several have argued that it was precisely the decline in PLO terrorism that led to the Israeli attack on the PLO in Lebanon in 1982. According to this assessment the Begin government feared that as the Arafat-led sectors of the PLO turned away from violence in favour of politics, Israel would come under greater pressure to negotiate with it. Cf. Danny Rubinstein, "The PLO's Future," *New York Times*, September 14, 1982; Yehosha Porath has written: "Our government hopes that after losing their logistic territorial base [as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon] the PLO shall go back to terror methods.... Thus it would lose much of the political

legitimacy that it had gained, the Israelis would be unified in hate...towards it, and the possibility of the development of a moderate body on the Palestinian side that could be a legitimate negotiating partner would be prevented..." (*Ha'aretz*, June 25, 1982, quoted by Jansen, p. 128).

21. The recent agreement between Arafat and King Hussein on the formation of a joint negotiating team to participate in an international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict may represent movement toward the Reagan Plan, although its full significance is not yet apparent. On PLO divisions over the Reagan Plan, see Rouleau; "On the Mideast Checkerboard, It's Arafat's Move," *New York Times*, February 22, 1983; and, "West Bank Grows Critical of Arafat," *New York Times*, November 20, 1984. On the general coalition politics of the PLO and of Arafat's relative moderation within the system, see Aaron David Miller, *The PLO and the Politics of Survival* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1983).
22. The "viability" of such a geographically divided state has often been questioned. It may be noted, in response, that East Pakistan has been divided from West Pakistan for nearly forty years, without undermining Pakistan's viability. On the viability of a Palestinian state more specifically, see Heller.
23. This is explicitly argued by Walid Khalidi, one of the intellectual leaders of the Palestinian nationalist movement, in his "A Sovereign Palestinian State," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 56, no. 4 (July 1978), p. 695-713. Khalidi writes: "The fact that partition is an old formula is no argument against its validity today.... Nor is it a valid argument against partition that Palestinian and Arab leaders rejected it at the time.... A different generation of Palestinian and Arab leaders in different circumstances today are prepared to accept it with all the implications of such acceptance for Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab reciprocal recognition and coexistence..." (p. 702).
24. Cf. Heller for a detailed discussion of these conditions.
25. The evidence for the private acceptance by many PLO leaders of a partition settlement as the maximum, feasible Palestinian goal is to be found in a number of recent discussions of this issue. The most important are Khalidi; Kelman; Tillman; Mroz; Edward R.F. Sheehan, "Step-By-Step in the Middle East," *Foreign Policy*, 22 (Spring 1976), pp. 3-70; and, Harold Saunders, "An Israeli-Palestinian Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 1 (Fall 1982), pp. 100-121.
 Mroz (who later acted as an unofficial representative of the U.S. government in exploratory talks with the PLO) conducted private discussions with a number of Palestinian, PLO, Arab and Israeli officials in 1978-79, and was privately told by PLO leaders of their willingness to accept a limited Palestinian state. This is also the judgement of a number of journalists, academicians and U.S. congressmen who have privately talked with Arafat and other PLO leaders in recent years, as has been reported on a number of occasions in the *New York Times*.
 Conversely, however, Miller has warned that if the current stalemate continues the PLO could be taken over by much more extremist groups, which would resume international terrorism, link up with Islamic fundamentalist movements throughout the Arab world, and seek to provoke the Arab states into a new, apocalyptic war with Israel (see especially p. 125).
26. Cf. Tillman: "The principal restraint on, and principal insurer of the good behavior of, a Palestinian government would be the overwhelming power...of Israel, with its demonstrated will and ability to use that power..." (p. 280). Heller also places great weight on this argument. The Palestinians are hardly unaware of these realities: Khalidi discusses it at length, and Mroz quotes Palestinian leaders as observing that if a Palestinian state was seen by Israel as threatening, the Israelis "would swoop down and reoccupy us..." (p. 91). A West Bank Palestinian businessman is quoted: "We Palestinians are so tired of fighting and death that I can assure you of the unbelievable determination we would have in our own state to prevent extremist attacks on Israel — which would result in retaliatory or preemptive attacks on us as a response..." (Mroz, p. 157). Such comments are inherently plausible, for they represent a simple recognition of a clear reality. In particular, it seems unlikely that any Palestinian illusions about their military strength could have survived the brutal but effective Israeli crushing of the PLO in Lebanon in 1982.

27. On the position of the moderate states, see Edward R. F. Sheehan. *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger* (New York: Readers Digest Press, 1976). Also, Jordan's Crown Prince, El Hassan Bin Talal, has recently quite explicitly indicated the acceptability of such conditions to Jordan, in his "Jordan's Quest for Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 60, no. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 802-813.
28. On Syria's position, see Heller; Rouleau; Amos Perlmutter, "Begin's Rhetoric and Sharon's Tactics," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 1 (Fall 1982), pp. 67-87; and, Shlomo Avinieri, "Beyond Camp David," *Foreign Policy*, 46 (Spring 1982), pp. 19-36. Avinieri concludes: "In essence, Syria is at the moment a status quo power, Despite its belligerent and radical public image..." (p. 28).
29. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was officially justified on security grounds alone. In fact, however (as discussed in the text), the objectives of Begin and Sharon were far more sweeping.
30. Recent Israeli public opinion polls show that the Israeli Arab minority (16 percent) of the overall population is highly sympathetic to Palestinian nationalism, with 65 percent supporting a Palestinian state in the West Bank and 78 percent supporting the right of a Palestinian refugee return to Israel (Peretz, pp. 155-156).
31. To be sure, recently Israeli authorities have cracked down on some of the more extreme cases of *private* Jewish terrorism.
32. The late J.C. Talmon, one of Israel's most distinguished historians and intellectuals, so characterized the Israeli position in "Report From the Middle East: The Impotence of Victory," *Dissent*, November-December 1970, pp. 504-516. Recent Israeli governments can hardly be described as having broken with this philosophy, which of course is precisely mirrored by the Arab perception of the Israelis. For example, a West Bank official told Mroz that terrorism is "the only possible language which an Israeli like Begin understands..." (quoted by Mroz, p. 36). Talmon's comment on these mirror images is still apt: "If anything has been proved by the fifty years' conflict, it is precisely that it is just not true that the adversary 'understands only the language of force.' Instead of bringing him to his knees, despair goads him on to more desperate acts of resistance or aggression..." (p. 511).
33. Admittedly it is the case that since the crushing of the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 there have been few incidents of terrorism directed against Israel. However, it would be rash to conclude that terrorism finally has been deterred after years of failure, for the decline of terrorism evidently reflects a deliberate tactical decision by the PLO at this time. Cf. Aaron David Miller, *The PLO and the Politics of Survival* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1982). It seems unlikely, however, that Arafat's apparent decision to pursue a political strategy for the moment can survive many more years of Israeli immobilism; alternatively, Arafat may lose power to more extremist groups.
34. On the background to the 1956 and 1967 wars and the central role of the Palestinians in precipitating them, see Nadav Safran, *From War to War* (New York: Pegasus Press, 1969) and *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); Walter Laqueur, *The Road to Jerusalem* (New York: Macmillan Press, 1968); Yair Evron, *The Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York: Random House, 1982); and, Miller.
35. Tillman explicitly labels the Israeli pattern of massive retaliation as "counterterror" (p. 186), and discusses a number of instances in which the Israelis appear to have deliberately struck at Palestinian civilians, either in "retaliation" or "preemptively." Chomsky also focuses on Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians; particularly revealing are his quotations from a 1978 Israeli press interview with General Mordechai Gur, Chief-of-Staff of the Israeli armed forces, in which Gur admits that civilians were attacked in Israel's 1978 invasion of southern Lebanon: "For thirty years ... we have been fighting against a population that lives in villages and cities..." (p. 181, quoting from the Israeli newspaper *Al Hamishmar*, May 10, 1978). Ze'ev Schiff commented on Gur's remarks: "In South Lebanon we struck the civilian population consciously, because they deserved it.... The importance of Gur's remarks is the admission that the Israeli Army has always struck civilian populations, purposely and consciously...even when Israeli settlements had not been struck..." (Chomsky, p. 181, quoting from Schiff's column in *Ha'aretz*, May 15, 1978).

36. According to *Ha'aretz*, the total number of Israelis killed in all acts of terror from 1967 to 1982 was 282, while Israel killed many thousands of Palestinian or Lebanese civilians (July 16, 1982, cited by Chomsky).
37. Tillman, p. 209.
38. "Israelis and PLO Agree to UN Truce," *New York Times*, April 27, 1979.
39. Peretz, p. 163; "U.S. Seeks to Mute Criticism of Begin Over Attacks," *New York Times*, July 23, 1981.
40. Randal, p. 281. Jansen estimates the figure to be twelve to fifteen thousand Lebanese killed, forty thousand wounded, three hundred thousand made homeless (p. 38). Undoubtedly the correct figure will never be known, but no independent observer accepts anything like the official Israeli version.
41. The most detailed and persuasive accounts of the Israeli attacks on civilians in Lebanon are those contained in Randal, Jansen, Schiff and Ya'ari, and the *New York Times* coverage of the invasion, particularly the stories "Little Left Standing in Refugee Camps," August 14, 1982; "Bombing Halts as Reagan Sends Warning," August 15, 1982; and, Thomas Friedman, "Reporter's Notebook," August 20, 1982. On the Phalangist massacre at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, the official Israeli investigating commission (the Kahan Commission) concluded that Generals Sharon and Eitan were "indirectly responsible" for the massacre because they failed to foresee its probability or take quick action to stop it. However, a number of independent analyses of the massacre and the Kahan Commission's conclusions (including those by Israelis) go further than that. For example, see Randal, Schiff and Ya'ari, and Avishai Margalit, "Israel: A Partial Indictment," *New York Review of Books*, June 28, 1984, pp. 9-14. Margalit, an Israeli philosopher, argues that the evidence of Israeli collaboration with the Phalangists is so great that the Begin government — *not* just Sharon and Eitan — bear much more than "indirect responsibility" for the massacre.
42. On the Israeli objectives, see Randal, Schiff and Ya'ari, Saunders, Perlmutter, and Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
43. On the PLO's continued importance, see Peretz, Miller, Heller, and Schiff and Ya'ari. The latter write: "While Arafat was skillfully reshaping his image from remorseless terrorist to long-suffering leader of a homeless and hounded people, Israel was earning itself the reputation of a country that indulged in overkill to advance objectives far beyond its legitimate security needs..." (p. 218).
44. Heller puts it this way: "[There is] a growing international consensus on the legitimacy of Palestinian claims, especially the claim to self-determination and an independent state. Against these claims, Israel has waged a futile and increasingly lonely diplomatic campaign that appears to clash with both the practical interests of third parties and the dominant political idea of the modern era..." (p. 31).
45. For such views, see Thomas R. Wheelock, "Arms for Israel: The Limits of Leverage," *International Security*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 123-137; Shlomo Avinieri, "Peacemaking: The Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 57, no. 1 (Fall 1978), pp. 51-69; and, Ian Lustick, "Killing the Autonomy Talks," *Foreign Policy*, 41 (Winter 1980-81), pp. 21-43.
46. Cf. Quandt, Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*.
47. For discussions of this case, see Sheehan, Quandt, Tillman, and Charles McC. Mathias, "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 5 (Summer 1981), pp. 975-998.
 Later the Carter and Reagan Administrations also became disenchanted with particular Israeli policies, let it be known they were reconsidering overall U.S. assistance policies and briefly suspended weapons deliveries. In each case, for example, after the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the siege of Beirut, aid was resumed at even higher levels.
48. Ball, 1977, and "The Coming Crisis in Israeli-American Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 58, no. 2 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 231-256; and, Safran, 1978.
49. Safran, 1978; Quandt; and, Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Canal War* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974).

50. Safran, 1978; Quandt; Sheehan; "Dayan Says U.S. Threatened to Fly Supplies to Egyptian Unit Trapped in '73 War," *New York Times*, December 20, 1974; and, Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, "The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 132-156.
51. Safran, 1978; and, "On Sinai, Pledges and Pressures," *New York Times*, August 19, 1975.
52. Tillman, quoting Ezer Weizman, p. 25; and, Sydney Zion and Uri Dan, "The Untold Story of the Mideast Talks," *New York Times Magazine*, January 21, 1979, pp. 32-43.
53. "Israelis Startled by U.S. Anger at Beirut Raids," *New York Times*, July 31, 1981.
54. Randal; and, "In Congress, The Invasion Has Eroded Israel's Almost Automatic Support," *New York Times*, July 21, 1982.
55. "Senate Report is Pessimistic on Israel's Economic Plight," *New York Times*, November 21, 1984.
56. "Tax U.S. Jewish Funds, Arab Lawsuit Argues," *New York Times*, October 7, 1983.
57. Ball, 1979-80; and, Report by the Controller General of the United States, *U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel*, June 24, 1983, cited by Neff, p. 353.
58. "U.S.-Israeli Panel Will Coordinate Military Planning," *New York Times*, November 30, 1984.
59. For major Jewish criticisms of recent Israeli policies, see Nathan Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Israel Isn't Threatened, The War's Ill-Advised," *New York Times*, June 20, 1982; Roger Hurwitz and Gordon Fellman, "U.S. Jews and Lebanon," *New York Times*, June 26, 1982; the statements by Saul Bellow, Irving Howe, Nathan Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset, in "Discord Among U.S. Jews Over Israel Seems to Grow," *New York Times*, July 15, 1982; Irving Howe, "Warn Friends of Israel, Open Critics of Begin-Sharon," *New York Times*, September 23, 1982; Irving Howe, "The West Bank Trap," *New Republic*, July 4, 1983; Gordon Fellman, "Cliched Responses Mock Jewish Moral Tradition," *Brandeis Review*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Spring 1983); and, Arthur Hertzberg, "Israel and the West Bank," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 5 (Summer 1983), pp. 1064-1077. Rabbi Hertzberg, Vice President of the World Jewish Congress and former President of the American Jewish Congress, calls for the partition of ancient Palestine between the Jews and the Arabs.
That this reaction is not limited to intellectuals is indicated by recent polls of American Jews generally, showing that two-thirds favour a freeze on Israeli settlement of the West Bank and the return of the Israeli-occupied territories in exchange for peace. "U.S. Jews Assert Right to Argue with Israel," *New York Times*, November 23, 1983.
60. Irving Howe, *New Republic*, p. 20.
61. "U.S. Jews Assert Right to Argue with Israel," *New York Times*, November 23, 1983.
62. The quote is from Gideon Samet, who is specifically critical of the Reagan Administration's return to open acquiescence in the Israeli Government's Likud's Palestinian policies: "Holding out *carte blanche* to ... [the Likud] to do what it wants on the West Bank would be, in the long run, disastrous for Israel and the United States..." from "Unwise Grins at Israel," *New York Times*, August 16, 1983. For other evidence of Israeli criticism of American Jews and the U.S. government, see Max Frankel, "Help Us By Cutting Aid," *New York Times*, November 16, 1982; Mattiyahu Peled, "Too Much Rope," *New York Times*, December 30, 1982; and, Bernard Avishai, "Can Begin Be Stopped?," *New York Review of Books*, June 2, 1983, pp. 41-48.
The most sweeping call for outsiders to help save Israel from itself comes from Jacobo Timerman: "It is possible that only the Jewish people outside of Israel can now do something for us. There are Diaspora Jews who have kept the values of our moral and cultural traditions, which have been trampled here by intolerance and nationalism, so they are the ones who should pass judgment on the Israeli government It may help those of us who are in Israel to cure the sickness that is destroying Israel, and, perhaps, to preserve our country's future..." in *New Yorker*, October 25, 1982, pp. 103-104.