The Plight of the Phoenix: The PLO Since Lebanon*

by
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INTRODUCTION

For over a decade, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had used Lebanon as a base from which to attack Israel and to train and dispatch its minions to assault Israeli targets throughout the world. The principal objective of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was to destroy the PLO in Lebanon. The Israelis only partially succeeded. Clearly, the PLO was routed and defeated in terms of conventional conflict. Its huge stockpiles of weapons were destroyed. The vast majority of its military bases and training camps were overrun. Also, its operational capacity was temporarily neutralized and its always tenuous unity undermined by the lightning Israeli assault. But, despite these setbacks — and contrary to popular belief — the PLO's ability to undertake sustained terrorist operations against Israeli interests and citizens in Europe and in Israel itself has remained largely intact.

THE PLO, 1982-1984

Admittedly, compared to four years ago, the PLO today is a battered, divided entity that has indeed been weakened by its two expulsions from Lebanon, internal strife and reduced funding. A number of reasons account for the PLO's decline from its pre-invasion strength: the loss of Lebanon as a central operations and political base; the dispersal of the organization's ranks throughout the Arab world; the demise of its aspirations of becoming a conventional military power; intensified policy disputes and attendant internecine power struggles; and, new, and uncustomed, financial difficulties.

The PLO's recent troubles ostensibly began on June 3, 1982, when members of a renegade splinter group known as "Black June" attempted to assassinate Israel's ambassador to Great Britain. The shooting provided the justification for Israel's invasion of Lebanon three days later. In rapid succession, Israeli forces overwhelmed the PLO strongholds along the coast in Sidon and Tyre and, by June 9, had advanced to the outskirts of Beirut. There they waited, preparing for a massive assault against the remaining 2,100 PLO fighters and senior officials trapped in the city. International pressure on Israel, however, delayed the attack and, finally, on August 19, an agreement was reached between the Israelis and the PLO governing the evacuation of the PLO forces from Beirut. Shortly afterward, the guerrillas began to leave the city for one of the eight Arab countries that had agreed to accept them.

During the months immediately following the evacuation, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat maneuvered to parlay the PLO's military defeat into a political victory. For a time, it appeared that the dispersal of the organization's forces would benefit the "moderate" wing of the PLO,
led by Arafat, rather than the more radical, so-called "rejectionist" factions, associated with the PFLP, led by George Habash, Nayef Hawatmeh's DFLP and DFLP-GC, commanded by Ahmad Jabril. But this benefit to the "moderate" wing proved to be either illusory, ephemeral, or both. In retrospect, Arafat's diplomatic efforts seem doomed to failure. The only goal that he could possibly have attained that would have provided a political victory would have been the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Even this would still have been anathema to the "rejectionists," who uncompromisingly pressed for the destruction of Israel as an essential precondition to the re-establishment of the Palestinian homeland.

Accordingly, Arafat attempted to steer a middle course, hinting, on the one hand, of the prospect of the PLO accepting the Reagan peace plan (which had been announced on September 1, 1982, and which called for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip confederated with Jordan, in return for PLO recognition of Israel) while warning, on the other, that should diplomacy prove fruitless, he would "become the biggest terrorist of them all." The middle course proved as treacherous as any other, and ultimately Arafat's efforts foundered as much on his own hesitancy and uncertainty as on the entrenched intransigence of the PLO radicals and the insurmountable opposition of Syria. Serious though this setback was, it did not, at first, appear to be fatal as far as Arafat and the moderates were concerned. However, the weeks of irresolution and doubt had provoked dissident forces not only among the radical elements in the umbrella organization but within Fatah itself. Six months later these disgruntled factions, with Syria's approval and encouragement, openly challenged Arafat's leadership of the PLO.

On May 7, 1983, a Fatah detachment stationed in the Bekaa Valley mutinied. Although the insurrection, according to its two leaders Abu Musa and Abu Saleh, was prompted by the appointment of two incapable, but loyal, officers by Arafat to senior command positions, as well as by the alleged corruption and personal aggrandizement of certain senior Fatah officials, the real issue was far less parochial. As Abu Musa explained, "There is a basic issue on which we [Arafat and the mutineers] differ: it is the confederal plan, which means annexing the Palestinian communities in the West Bank and the [Gaza] Strip into the Jordanian regime." Arafat, he contended, had "put aside the military option and chose[n] the political solution," but it was a solution, Musa pointed out, that would not lead to the sovereign Palestinian state, encompassing the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as Israel, mandated by the PLO's 1964 charter. He succinctly defined the dissidents' position as one of "no reconciliation, no recognition, no negotiation." The determination of Musa and his followers to press their grievances was evinced on May 28, when they seized four PLO supply and fuel depots near Damascus. Nine days later, the mutineers clashed with forces loyal to Arafat, resulting in eight men killed and seventeen wounded. On June 12, two more men were killed and twelve others wounded. An
assassination attempt was reportedly made by the rebels against two of Arafat’s top aides, Salah Khalaf and Khalil al-Wazir. Then, on June 24, after accusing Syria of encouraging and abetting the revolt, Arafat was unceremoniously expelled from Damascus and barred from re-entering the country.

Arafat initially discounted the revolt and refused to accede to any of the rebels’ demands. On July 6, however, he offered a conciliatory gesture, announcing the reorganization of two key PLO committees into collegially, rather than individually, led entities. This was as far as Arafat would go. Two days later, he again rejected demands for a fifty-fifty sharing of power in Fatah between himself and the dissidents. Throughout the summer, Arafat stubbornly refused to negotiate with the rebels directly. His confidence was bolstered by the widespread support he continued to receive from the Palestinian community (a poll taken by the East Jerusalem Arabic-language news weekly, Bayader, reported that 92 percent of Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip still supported Arafat) and by a resounding 79-2 vote of endorsement for his leadership and calls for unity from the PLO’s Central Committee. In addition, Arafat continued to receive the support of PLO radicals like Habash and Hawatmeh who, despite their differences with him, nevertheless beseeched the dissidents to end their revolt. These factors convinced Arafat that his popularity was strong enough to enable him to withstand pressure from both Syria and the Fatah rebels.

This strategy, as events would subsequently prove, was little more than wishful thinking. Although Arafat’s position at the head of the PLO may have been politically secure, it was militarily vulnerable. This was demonstrated on September 22, when Syrian units rounded up the thousand or so Arafat loyalists still in the Bekaa Valley and forcibly removed them to an isolated corner of northeast Lebanon. They eventually made their way to Arafat’s only remaining stronghold in the country, the Baddawi and Nahr al-Bared refugee camps outside Tripoli. For a month there were no new developments. Then, on November 2, Fatah and other PLO dissidents, supported by Syrian artillery, attacked the camps.

Both camps were quickly overwhelmed and their defenders routed. Arafat and his men withdrew to Tripoli and in a scenario reminiscent of the Israeli siege of Beirut eighteen months before, were trapped with their backs to the sea. Like the Israelis, the Syrian-backed dissidents did not attempt to storm the city, but instead subjected its inhabitants and refugee fedayeen to debilitating artillery and rocket fire. Once again, an ad hoc grouping of Arab and European states attempted to find a way to extricate Arafat and his followers from their predicament. An agreement was reached whereby Syria and the dissidents would allow Arafat and his 4,000 loyalists to leave Tripoli on ships provided by Greece. On December 17, the evacuation began; it was completed three days later. In a stunning development, the evacuation fleet stopped in Egypt, where Arafat was greeted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Not since Anwar Sadat’s historic 1977 visit to Jerusalem had Arafat met with an Egyptian head of state. Not surprisingly, the meeting further ruptured
what unity remained in the PLO. Arafat was excoriated not only by long­standing opponents like Habash and Hawatmeh, but also by some of his closest associates, such as Salah Khalef.

The meetings of the 17th session of the long-delayed Palestine National Council (which functions as a Palestinian Parliament-in-exile) held in Amman, Jordan, in November 1984, again underscored the divisiveness of the PLO. Although Arafat obtained a significant victory simply by convening the congress despite the attempts by Syria and by PLO rebels to prevent it, his actual accomplishments were more symbolic than real. For example, the formal endorsement of his continued leadership, issued at the session, carried little weight since prominent figures like Habash, Hawatmeh and Jabril had boycotted the meeting and the Fatah rebel faction had been deliberately excluded. Moreover, Arafat’s procedural victories on these two issues alongside of the Council’s general approval of joint PLO-Jordanian peace efforts provoked a new round of fratricidal violence. On December 29, Fahd Kawasmeh, a leading PLO moderate, was assassinated in Amman. The murder of the popular, former mayor of Hebron, who supported coexistence with Israel, was widely believed to have been approved, or even instigated, by Syria. His death was interpreted as a message that Arafat’s manipulation of the National Council and his disregard of Syrian and rebel wishes would not be tolerated. 6

Apart from such internal strife, the umbrella organization’s operational capacity was also weakened by financial problems. 7 For years, the PLO had been accustomed to receiving huge sums of money from oil-rich Arab states. Recently, the decline of world oil prices led to a commensurate decrease in contributions to the PLO. Saudi Arabia, for example, reportedly reduced its largess from a high of $300 million per year in 1981 to $28.5 million in 1983 and 1984. The Saudis justified the reduction on the grounds that since the PLO no longer had an army to maintain, it no longer required as much money. 8 Libya similarly cut back its financial support, choosing instead to parcel out selective amounts only to those PLO member-groups which reflected that country’s “hardline” policies. In 1984, moreover, the few PLO entities still enjoying Qaadafi’s patronage were reduced still further when, after complaints over Libyan interference, aid the PFLP and DFLP was completely cut off. 9 In addition, the still unresolved Iraq-Iran war has forced Iraq to curtail drastically its contributions because of the decline of its oil production and its own burgeoning military expenditures. 10

PALESTINIAN TERRORISM, 1982-1984

It is generally believed that, in the aftermath of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, there was an appreciable decline in Palestinian terrorist activity. However, a statistical examination of data in the Rand Corporation’s Chronology of International Terrorism presents a rather different and considerably less sanguine picture:

1) There was little change in the total level of Palestinian terrorism against Israeli targets when measured over six-month intervals since January 1982, although for a time there was a decline of operations
within Israel itself. During 1984, however, there was an alarming in¬
crease of terrorist attacks in Israel.

2) Surrogate attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets outside of Israel by
European and Latin American terrorist groups increase dramatically
during the six months following the invasion but then plummeted in
an equally dramatic fashion after December 1982.

3) Even though surrogate operations in Europe and elsewhere declined,
the level of attacks on Israeli interests and citizens in Europe has re¬
mained constant since the July-December 1982 time frame.

4) Almost as many attacks are staged by Palestinian and Arab terrorists
against Palestinian and Arab targets as are committed against Israeli
and Jewish targets.

Palestinian Attacks Against Israeli Targets

Israel's invasion of Lebanon did, however, result in a significant cur-
tailment of Palestinian terrorist operations in Israel and the Occupied Ter-
ritories (see Figure 1). According to Rand's Chronology of International
Terrorism, terrorist activity in Israel declined by half during the six months
following the invasion when compared to the six months preceding the in-
vasion. It continued to decline during the first six months of 1983 and re¬
mained at the same level for the remainder of the year. But, in 1984,
Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel tripled. Whereas there were only four
attacks in 1983, thirteen occurred the following year. Three of the attacks
— the hand-grenade assault carried out by the DFLP in downtown
Jerusalem on February 28; the machine-gun and grenade attack, perpe¬
trated by the same group, only blocks from the previous attack on
April 2; and the hijacking of a bus travelling between Tel Aviv and As¬
qelon on April 12 (which was claimed by the DFLP as well as by Black
June) — represent an ominous change of terrorist tactics.

Between January 1982 and February 1984, virtually every terrorist
operation in Israel had conformed to an identical pattern of an unseen
perpetrator placing a concealed bomb on a bus or at busy thoroughfares
or simply hurling a grenade at a crowd or a vehicle passing by. This sort
of anonymous assault evinced a comparative lack of operational expert¬
tise, planning or sophistication in contrast to the more "open" attacks
which have occurred twice in Jerusalem, when brazen terrorists stood
their ground and boldly turned their weapons upon the persons in front
of them, and on the ill-fated Tel Aviv to Asqelon bus as well. Further¬
more, in April, June and September, the Israeli navy intercepted three
Lebanese ships transporting Palestinian terrorists to Israel. The vessels
were to be used as "mother ships" from which rubber dinghies contain¬
ing small groups of men could surreptitiously land ashore. In all three in-
stances, the terrorists' objective was believed to have been the execution
of "mass murder attacks" against Israeli civilians. Military spokesmen
in Tel Aviv announced that further sea-launched attacks could be ex¬
pected as intelligence reports revealed "that training for seaborne squads
had been stepped up in Lebanon and that the Palestinians have recently
bought equipment suitable for attacks by sea."
The fact that, in 1984, there were three times as many terrorist operations as during the entirety of 1983, surpassing even the early 1982 level, is disturbing in its own right. It becomes even more disquieting when viewed against the backdrop of the peculiar climate engendered by present-day internal Palestinian political dynamics. The decentralization of power within the PLO caused by the debacle in Lebanon during the summer of 1982, the internecine power struggle and fighting which erupted thereafter and the eclipse of Arafat and the "moderate" factions' influence which these events engendered, implies that whatever central control over the PLO now exists is exercised from Damascus. The DFLP, PFLP and Black June have their headquarters in that city and, accordingly, are presumably kept on a tight leash by Syria. The present escalation of terrorism in Israel suggests that the Syrians may be loosening their hold on the Palestinian groups enjoying their hospitality. Whether this will prove a harbinger of continued terrorist activity is unclear. However, given Syria's pretensions to make Lebanon its vassal and its alleged involvement in, or tacit approval of, the shadowy Islamic Jihad's operations against American and French diplomatic and military personnel and installations in Lebanon, Kuwait and Turkey, the escalation of Palestinian terrorist activity in Israel cannot be regarded as an isolated phenomenon.

One might also argue that, although the invasion of Lebanon had a salutary, if temporary, effect on Palestinian terrorism directed against Israeli targets in Israel itself, it had only a marginal effect on Palestinian operations against Israeli targets outside the country. For example, Figure 2 shows that, though there were eight attacks during the six months before the invasion, seven attacks occurred during the six months following the invasion and there were seven more between January and June 1983. Although this type of activity declined slightly in the second half of 1983 and dropped more significantly during the first six months of 1984, it rose somewhat during the latter half of 1984. The reductions are no doubt linked to the gradual escalation of terrorism in Israel itself. The final months of 1984 witnessed an increase of terrorist activity against Israeli interest and citizens abroad, with bombings in Cyprus, Italy and Austria and an assassination attempt in Egypt. This trend implies that, while the invasion may have disrupted Palestinian terrorism in Israel for a time, it only encouraged the Palestinians to shift their operations elsewhere. In any event, the overall decline of operations outside of Israel may be seen as providing further evidence of the Palestinians' intention once again to bring the struggle directly into Israel.

Surrogate Terrorist Attacks Against Israeli and Jewish Targets in Europe and Latin America

It is, perhaps, only this category which offers some encouraging news in terms of a significant decline of terrorism directed against Israeli and Jewish targets outside of Israel. As Figure 3 shows, during the six months following the invasion, there were seven times as many attacks staged by surrogate terrorists operating either at the behest of the PLO or independently in a demonstration of "revolutionary solidarity" as in the
six months prior to the invasion. Since June 1983, however, there have been only four such operations. What accounts for this sudden and dramatic escalation and equally as sudden and dramatic decline?

According to Israeli estimates, some forty different international terrorist groups, half of whom were European, with the remainder from Latin America, Africa and Asia, received training, weapons, intelligence and logistical support from the PLO in Lebanon before the Israeli invasion. In exchange, these groups complied with PLO requests to use group members on intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance missions in Israel, in operations against Israeli and Jewish targets in their respective home countries, and as couriers, arms and explosives smugglers.

In the wake of the invasion, the PLO quite naturally turned to this array of international groups and asked them to repay the debts incurred through their PLO training, weapons and intelligence supply. This "debt collection" was, no doubt, the impetus for France's *Action Directe* to bomb a number of Israeli diplomatic offices and business concerns in the last half of 1982. The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), which is believed to have close ties with *Action Directe*, claimed that it was responsible for the bombing of an Israeli diplomat's car in September. Indeed, this group appears to have been born as the direct result of the Israeli invasion which ousted diverse clandestine elements from Beirut.

Other Italian, Greek and Latin American terrorist groups undertook anti-Israeli operations either at the behest of the PLO or on their initiative. For example, in July 1983, the Greek Revolutionary Popular Struggle bombed an Israeli export concern and a Jewish-owned travel agency. In September, Colombia's M-19 stated that it was responsible for the bombings of the Israeli Embassy and ambassador's residence in Bogota, while in October, several Israeli and Jewish establishments in Brazil received bomb threats from that country's Popular Revolutionary Vanguard. Further attacks against Israeli or Jewish targets were recorded in West Germany, Austria, Australia, Guatemala, Bolivia and Ecuador, for which no group claimed responsibility.

This substantial escalation of surrogate terrorist activity may be explained as the repayment of these groups' debts to the PLO or, alternatively, as an evanescent demonstration of "revolutionary solidarity" with the Palestinians. The subsequent decline of such activity indicates that it was not part of any lasting, orchestrated campaign and that, with these debts repaid, the groups no longer felt obliged to continue their anti-Israeli/anti-Jewish operations. A related aspect of this development is that of the PLO's "bargaining" position which was compromised by the Israeli invasion. Without its vast arsenal, deprived of its numerous training camps and beset with financial problems of its own, the PLO quite simply has less to offer its international counterparts than before. During the past year, however, there has been a slight increase in surrogate attacks. The bombings in Italy and Austria (cited above) as well as another two bombings in New York and Paris may have been the work of surrogate groups operating at the request or command of the PLO. The resulting blast from two bombs planted at offices belonging to the
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Israeli Aircraft Industries in New York was claimed by the previously unknown “Red Guerrilla Resistance,” a possible surrogate.

Regional Distribution

The decline of Palestinian terrorism in Israel just after the invasion and the dramatic resurgence during the past year has been discussed. In Europe, however, the opposite holds true. There, Palestinian terrorism has remained at an identical level for 1983 and 1984. At the height of the surrogate terrorist campaign during the six months following the invasion, there was initially a tremendous upsurge in Palestinian and Palestinian-related terrorism on that continent. Twenty-six incidents occurred between July and December 1982. This number dropped to eight in each of the two succeeding six-month time frames, but then remained level in 1984 with ten incidents between January and June and six between July and December.

Internecine Palestinian/Arab Terrorism

Almost as many terrorist attacks are committed by Palestinians against their Palestinian and Arab brethren and by Arabs against Palestinian targets as are committed against Israeli or Jewish targets. Since January 1982, there have been 57 “fratricidal” incidents as opposed to 59 attacks involving Israeli interests and citizens or Jews from other countries. The fractionalization of the PLO caused by the Israeli invasion and subsequent internal warfare only partially explains this trend. For example, during the six months prior to the invasion, fourteen internecine attacks occurred, dropping to nine between July and August 1982, before increasing to sixteen during the first half of 1983.

The attacks in the first six months of 1982 mostly involved Arab diplomats or the embassies and travel and tourist offices of Egypt and Jordan. Egypt was targeted because of its peace treaty with Israel, while Jordan suffered for its involvement in Palestinian affairs. There was only one operation directed against a Palestinian when, on March 1, an official of the Iraqi-sponsored Arab Liberation Front was assassinated. The remainder of the year saw little deviation from this pattern. A senior PLO official murdered in France and the assassination of a Palestinian community leader in the West Bank were the other “Palestinian connections.”

In 1983, however, the internal disputes within the PLO and, particularly, within Fatah heralded an intensified campaign of fratricidal bloodletting. During the first half of the year, there were sixteen such attacks. In January, an attempt was made on the lives of a number of Fatah Central Committee members attending a rally in Baalbek. Less than a month later, a car bomb destroyed the Fatah military intelligence headquarters in Beirut and, just days after, another destroyed the Palestine Research Centre. Isam as-Sartawi, a well-known PLO moderate and Arafat’s personal political advisor, was shot to death by members of Black June. In June, a Syrian national was mistakenly killed and a senior PLO official was seriously wounded by unknown gunmen in
Spain and an attempt to assassinate Arafat failed, though one of his most trusted aides, Abu Iyad, was wounded.

During the second half of 1983, the number of internecine incidents dropped to six. Since then, it has remained remarkably constant, although it rose slightly in the latest six-month period. The recent increase is closely connected to Arafat’s maneuvers at the Palestine National Council meeting last November. Within days of the Council’s closing sessions, dissident Palestinians attempted to kill the Jordanian chargé d’affairs in Athens (on November 29). On December 15, Ismail Darwish, a senior PLO official, was murdered in Rome and two weeks later Kawasmeh was assassinated in Amman. Another prominent PLO member escaped injury that same day, when a large bomb was discovered outside his Amman residence. There is every reason to believe that this trend will continue. The agreement signed by Arafat and King Hussein on February 11, 1985, specifying five principles upon which their “bid for joint action” in resolving the Palestinian problem is based, may well incite further dissident attacks.

CONCLUSION: THE PHOENIX RISES

The statistics cited during the preceding narrative reveal that Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 actually had little effect, and that ephemeral, on the level of Palestinian terrorist activity. Although the invasion succeeded in securing Israel’s northern border from Palestinian artillery and rocket attack and cross-border infiltration by guerrillas, in undermining the PLO’s political infrastructure and in severely weakening Arafat’s power, it did not result in any significant decline in attacks on Israeli or Jewish targets. Admittedly, there was a decrease in the number of Palestinian terrorist operations in Israel following the invasion. Concurrently, however, this development was accompanied by an increase of terrorist attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets outside of Israel by surrogate terrorist groups operating either on the bidding of the PLO or out of feelings of revolutionary fraternity. Further, the level of Palestinian attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets outside of Israel continued at nearly identical levels to those prior to invasion.

Most ominous of all, in recent months there has been a dramatic escalation both in the number of Palestinian operations committed in Israel and in the type of incident perpetrated by the terrorists. Prior to February 1984, Palestinian terrorism was mostly restricted to bombings or hit-and-run hand-grenade assaults. Since that time, the terrorists have demonstrated a determination and willingness to carry out wanton, near-suicide machine-gun and hand-grenade attacks rather than the anonymous bombings of the past. As one observer noted, “the Israelis are discovering that wrecking the PLO and Mr. Arafat’s standing does not mean the end of the Palestinian problem.”12 Throughout 1984, Palestinian terrorists began to return to Beirut in large numbers. By the end of the year both Israeli and Lebanese intelligence sources concluded that some 2000-2500 terrorists were in training camps in and around the city,13 including the Burj al Barajinah naval base to the south, from where three unsuccessful seaborne attacks were launched.14 In the wake
of these attacks, Israel will undoubtedly undertake additional means to enhance its security and thwart further attacks. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the war against the Palestinians did not end with the PLO's defeat in Lebanon. The terrorists are recovering from the blow dealt to them two years ago and are marshalling their resources for a new, and potentially more bloody, campaign.
Fig. 2 — Palestinian terrorist operations against Israeli and Jewish targets outside Israel

Fig. 3 — Surrogate terrorist attacks against Israeli or Jewish targets outside of the Middle East
Fig. 4 — Location of Palestinian and surrogate terrorist operations: Europe (U.S. one incident)

Fig. 5 — Internecine Palestinian and/or Arab attacks against Palestinian and/or Arab targets
Author's Note


Footnotes

1. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.
2. *Al-Safir* (Beirut), May 27, 1983. Ironically, there is evidence of a recent split within the rebels' ranks as well. On August 14, 1984, the *International Herald Tribune* cited a report from Damascus that Musa had "stripped" Saleh of his responsibilities and dismissed him from the group.
3. Arafat's accusations were not unfounded. The mutiny had erupted in territory under Syrian control and had in fact been assisted by the Syrian army, who dispatched tanks to seal off the loyalists' supply lines while maintaining those to the dissidents.
5. Ibid., August 14, 1983.