

should shape our legal rules for dealing with terrorism and whether the domestic or international system should have jurisdiction. The concluding essay, by George Quester, poses the question "Why be so appalled at terrorism?" and warns that societies must assess the costs of various modes of response to terrorism as well as the cost of terrorism itself. It is a timely and salient warning.

There can be little doubt that terrorism is as much a moral problem as a political or strategic one and yet little serious attention has been paid to the moral aspects of the phenomenon. For this reason the appearance of *The Morality of Terrorism* is most welcome, though it is by no means a definitive examination. Some contributions seem a little distant from consideration of the real moral issue, while a number of important areas are left untouched. Nonetheless, the essays provide an intelligent and stimulating introduction to a realm which should become a focus of much more analysis and discussion.

Grant Wardlaw  
Australian Institute of Criminology  
Canberra, Australia

Henze, Paul. *The Plot to Kill the Pope*. New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1983.

Sterling, Claire. *The Time of the Assassins*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983.

Both *The Plot to Kill the Pope* and *The Time of the Assassins* address the abortive attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II, perpetrated by Turkish national Mehmet Ali Agca in St. Peter's Square on May 13, 1981. Authors Paul Henze and Claire Sterling convincingly repudiate the notion that the assassination attempt was conceived and executed by a "loner" or that it was the fruit of a rightist conspiracy, as disseminated internationally by much of the mass media. More problematic to substantiate, in terms of satisfying the requirements for a conviction in court, is their joint conclusion that the principals behind the material event are the Bulgarian secret services under the direction of their masters in the Kremlin, who regard the Polish Pope as a threat to Soviet domination over Eastern Europe.

Although Henze and Sterling reach the same conclusion, each author pursues a different approach in the quest for a rationale behind this emblematic terrorist attack. It is precisely because of the difference in approach that the two books complement each other and should be read together.

Consistent with his background as student of history, diplomat, and staff member of the U.S. National Security Council, Paul Henze's scholarly approach is highly systematic. He collects all available facts from open sources and, by way of recapitulation, appends a detailed chronology beginning in 1958 — the year of the would-be assassin's birth

— through 1982, with references to “Papal and Polish developments.” He explores, in depth, the family background, education, social and political contacts, ideological propensity, financial status, and foreign travel of Mehmet Ali Agca, capitalizing, where possible, on his own knowledge of the Turkish language and foreign service experience in Turkey. He examines the nature and dynamics of terrorism in both Turkey and Italy, as well as Soviet planning and utilization of political influence, subversion and terror tactics abroad through Russian clandestine structures, such as the KGB, and those of the Communist satellite nations, particularly Bulgaria. He analyzes the threat posed to Soviet interests by Catholic Poland’s national aspirations at a time when a Pole — and a very energetic one — is sitting on the Papal throne. Likewise, he assesses the manipulation of the media through Soviet disinformation in the aftermath of the attack on the Pope and during Italian judicial proceedings and investigations. In summation, he observes:

The Bulgarians were the prime contractors for the undertaking. It is extremely unlikely that they were the initiators. Subcontractors included Turkish mafia tycoons, petty smugglers, profit-seekers, corrupted and deceived political rightists, probably a few misguided leftists as well. The whole cast of characters who aided Mehmet Ali Agca on his way to Rome has not yet been identified. How he was selected, trained and prepared remains to be clarified too. But the general outlines are clear....

As evidenced by a pamphlet authored by Yona Andronov of the Soviet periodical *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Henze’s reconstruction and assessment of the plot against John Paul II must have been a source of particular irritation to Moscow. Published in Paris by Sofia Presse, the pamphlet, which title translates into English as “On the Trail of the Wolves,” alleges that Mehmet Ali Agca was in fact employed by a CIA European network functionally headed by Paul Henze himself, who is also represented to be a former CIA ‘head of station’ in Turkey.

Not as systematic as Henze’s exposé — and at times somewhat confusing as was her other recent work, *The Terror Network* — Clair Sterling’s approach is that of an expert in investigative journalism. In addition to a broad range of open sources, she relies on personal interviews with police, security, and intelligence operatives, whose identity she cannot always disclose. Particularly effective is her investigation into, and treatment of, the web of connections between what on the surface would otherwise appear to be organizations and activities totally devoid of linkage: namely, the Turkish mafia, the Turkish Gray Wolves and their European neo-Nazi network, the Bulgarian state-owned commercial firm Kintex, international smuggling and trafficking in weapons and currency, and the Bulgarian secret services. Her investigative work in this direction helps explain how and why Mehmet Ali Agca, who shed a rightist image, could, in fact, be a well-forged and effective tool for Communist-bloc clandestine endeavors.

From her account, which is autobiographical to a degree, also emerges a general reluctance on the part of Western governmental officials to identify the Soviets as sponsors of international terrorism or even to accept the existence of the "Bulgarian connection" in relation to the attack on John Paul II. While Sterling ultimately blames the intelligence-gathering services for failing to ascertain the facts, what is most striking to the reader is the author's intensity of conviction in her findings and, perhaps, her state of personal frustration *vis-à-vis* what she seems to regard as willful bureaucratic blindness. These characteristics offer additional stimulation to the reader to delve further into the subject matter.

Recent developments at the judicial and political levels have tended to enhance, albeit in dissimilar ways, the findings and arguments presented in Henze's and Sterling's works. For example, throughout the judicial investigation, the advanced stages of which were subsequent to the publication of both books, Italian judicial authorities consistently denied the provisional release of Sergei Ivanov Antonov, the Bulgarian national and Balkan Air representative who was arrested in Rome in November of 1982 as a co-conspirator following Ali Agca's belated repentance and confessions. To date, Antonov's attorneys have only been able to obtain house arrest for their client because of his reportedly poor health.

Moreover, in May of 1984, the Prosecutor filed his report requesting that three Bulgarians (including Antonov), Mehmet Ali Agca (already convicted for the assassination attempt), and five other Turks *be brought to trial for conspiracy* to assassinate the Pope. The contents of this report, which, under Italian law, are subject to secrecy until completion of the judicial investigation, were disclosed, in part, in a *New York Times* article of June 10, 1984, authored by Clair Sterling, who obtained the report through personal channels. According to Sterling, the Prosecutor makes no direct reference to the U.S.R.R., but takes into account the political turmoil in Poland and confirms the existence of the 'Bulgarian connection' and its Turkish ramifications.

Political developments may also corroborate the contentions of Henze and Sterling. In December 1982, following Antonov's arrest, diplomatic connections between Italy and Bulgaria were limited. However, in the spring of 1984, Rome and Sofia resumed normal relations at the ambassadorial level. Curiously, the Italian Government seems to have overlooked the fact that the newly appointed Bulgarian Ambassador, Raiko Marinov Nikolov, was expelled from France in the late 1950s and denied entry in that country in the mid-1960s. Moreover, Bulgarian air and naval attache Ivan Jueorguiev Kotchovski, who should have been expelled from Italy on espionage grounds in November of 1983, was apparently simply allowed to leave the country because of "the normal expiration of his posting," as announced by the Bulgarian Embassy. Equally significant is the release from prison and repatriation to Italy of Gabriella Trevisin and Paolo Farsetti in May and September 1984, respectively. The couple had been arrested and tried in Bulgaria on

debatable espionage charges in 1982, just as the 'Bulgarian connection' was beginning to surface. These developments could be indicative of a politico-diplomatic accommodation between the two countries.

Concerned observers reconcile the contrasting judicial and political developments on the basis of a rather disquieting consideration. Pursuant to Law No. 398 of July 28, 1984, on the Reduction of Pre-Trial Confinement and Granting of Provisional Release, Sergei Ivanov Antonov may eventually have to be released because of the lapse of the new pre-trial confinement term. The other two Bulgarian co-conspirators, who enjoyed diplomatic immunity, have left Italian territory long ago. This is a rather anticlimactic ending for the fascinatingly tangled web of conspiracy so cleverly unravelled by Sterling and Henze.

Vittorfranco S. Pisano, J.S.D.  
Member of the Rome Bar  
Rome, Italy