

The Lebanese Army: Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980s

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INTRODUCTION

In the Lebanese political maze, the army has played an important role in supporting the legitimacy of the ruling establishment, particularly between 1958 and 1970 when the country was governed by Presidents Fu'ad Shihāb and Shari Hilū. Historically, Lebanon's ruling oligarchies pursued the goal of preserving the established political and economic interests by holding on to the unwritten National Pact of 1943, as well as the outdated Constitution and parliamentary divisions in place. Successive Presidents, including Franjyah, Sarkis and Al-Jumayyil continued to pursue this goal and rejected any attempts at compromise of a new dimension. Throughout the past ten years, successive challenges to the stability of the Lebanese Republic have been carefully engineered by both Christian and Muslim leaders to uphold these goals and objectives. The army, traditionally the single most apolitical institution in Lebanon, has been caught in the middle of the country's constitutional quarrels, and has recorded several significant challenges and threats to its unity.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the recent history of the Lebanese army and assess its future capabilities in light of existing and growing challenges emanating from Christian and Muslim militias as well as regional powers. What are the capabilities of the new Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)? Are there sources of threats which may be identified? How is the new leadership likely to respond to these threats?

Ultimately, the question must be raised regarding the future of the Lebanon and its military establishment. Can the country unite once again in the absence of a strong centralized force with a popular mandate to uphold law and order?

ROLE OF THE ARMY WITHIN LEBANON'S CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

In the context of the Lebanese political formula, power is granted to the executive branch according to the Constitution of 1926¹ and the unwritten National Pact of 1943,² while the legislative and judicial branches are called upon to "share" governing responsibilities. Lebanon's Constitution does not include references to the military establishment, except in terms of the overall authority of the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the Republic, over the entire armed forces. Historically, however, Lebanon's military establishment has respected the Constitution and perceived its role as the upholder of law and order throughout the country. As a result, despite severe political crises throughout the Levant, few military *coup* attempts have been recorded in the country. Colonel Joseph Bitar from the LAF, writing in 1973, defined the mission of the armed forces as being "limited to protecting the Lebanese

Constitution,"³ basing his remarks on the views of the founding fathers of independent Lebanon, including Presidents Bishāra al-Khūri and Fuʿād Shihāb. In fact, President al-Khūri revealed in his memoirs that prior to his resignation in 1952, he "trusted" the Constitution to General Fuʿād Shihāb.⁴ Al-Khūri's successors reiterated their understanding that the army's ultimate loyalty was towards the Constitution which provided the Lebanese with specific rights and responsibilities.⁵

Clearly, the "army constituted the principal support of the government in Lebanon,"⁶ even though more often than not that support was based on inaction, which permitted the oligarchy to share power and "govern" the land. This inherent pattern of inaction on the part of the LAF was first manifested in 1952 and 1958, when the Commander of the Army, General Shihāb, refused to commit his troops against anti-Shamʿūnist forces, viewing the crisis as a contest over the personality of the President rather than a challenge to the State. In addition, Shihāb may have feared that any show of force against the anti-Shamʿūnists might threaten the cohesiveness of the army.⁷ Shihāb's motives must be analyzed in terms of Lebanon's power-politics which, based on the 1943 entente, promised to maintain a balance between the leading factions. In order to prevent any one group from claiming preferential authority, the army was foreseen as a "neutral force" capable of checking apparent or planned takeovers by any group or faction threatening the *status quo*. The "neutral army" gained considerable influence under Shihāb, whose intelligence service (Deuxième Bureau)⁸ proved extremely capable in defusing a number of crises against successive regimes. While the tactics of the intelligence service may have terrorized large segments of the intelligentsia and while political freedoms may have been sharply reduced throughout the sixties, the Lebanese felt that *their* army was protecting them from foreign threats.⁹

Clearly, the importance of the military as a source of influence in Lebanon, at least until 1970, cannot be overemphasized. The Lebanese Army, however, never played the role of a neutral force. It may be safe to state that the concept of an effective neutral force capable of exercising a balancing role is inapplicable to Lebanon, particularly when the army's defined mission is to uphold a constitution and a pact whose essence rejects the creation of a superior force which would maintain order among differing factions.¹⁰ Adel Freiha, in his major contribution on the "Army and the State in Lebanon," contends that, in 1958 at least, the army did indeed play such a role because it was "torn between its duty to obey the orders of a civilian power whose legitimacy was contested and its ideal to belong to all the nation and thus remain an example of Lebanese compromise."¹¹ Given that choice, the army opted for the protection of the State as well as the people of Lebanon. It accomplished this by opposing its own government. While President Shihāb's motives are difficult to read, the army's overall weakness (its entire strength of between five and six thousand vs. an estimated number of between ten and twelve thousand insurgents of whom possibly four thousand may have been non-Lebanese)¹² should not have prevented it from using force in a successful manner. Indeed, the army had fared well when it was put to

the test. In 1958, the only battle between the army and the Junblattist forces occurred near Kabr-Sharmil in the Shūf mountains where the Druze forces were attempting to cut the Beirut-Damascus highway and link with Saʿīb Salām's forces through the Beirut International Airport.¹³ Despite this major success, however, Shihāb restrained his military machine, holding to his principal preoccupation of "keeping" his military establishment intact. He opposed a major attack against the Lebanese rebels, because he believed that if such an operation were attempted, the religious differences in his forces—particularly the pronounced sympathy of some of the Muslims for the rebel cause—would split them asunder. In effect, his army would "melt away."¹⁴ Other commentators have suggested that Shihāb's non-intervention may have brought the disturbances to a rapid halt and that Shihāb is to be credited for displaying qualities of leadership.¹⁵ Noted Lebanese historian, Kamāl Salībī, wrote that

Shihāb, by his policy of non-committal, had preserved the integrity of the Lebanese Army at a time when the rest of the Lebanese Republic was falling apart, [though he] found little appreciation among Christians. On 23 September 1958, when Shihāb assumed power, only two institutions of the Republic stood intact: the Presidency ... and the Army, thanks to the wisdom of Shihāb, and his refusal to involve his troops in the conflict.¹⁶

Yet, despite the overall praise reserved to Shihāb for his sense of leadership in 1958, his refusal to commit Lebanese troops to put down internal unrest may have placed the seeds of discontent among a number of factions whose political views did not coincide with those of the reform-minded President.

It is critical to note that at this stage in Lebanon's turbulent history, internal unrest in the country could not be blamed on the Palestinian guerrilla movements. The fundamental question was whether there would be room for everyone in Lebanon's political growth. Shihāb's rule, which focused on economic developments, failed to answer this question. In addition, while the powers of his intelligence service increased, the army was not strengthened to act as a deterrent against internal as well as external threats. When the opportunity existed to transform the LAF into a strong fighting machine, capable of sharply reducing sectarianism within its ranks and turning the army into a national force, political considerations dominated Shihāb's views. This was, clearly, a lost chance.

THE EARLY CHALLENGES AGAINST THE ARMY

Between 1946 and 1975, the LAF had witnessed several challenges to their legitimizing role, emanating from pro-Syrian elements. It is important to describe them briefly in order to reassert the point made above, namely that these warning signs should have compelled General Shihāb and his two successors to strengthen the Army.

In July 1949, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) orchestrated an attempted *coup* under the leadership of Antūn Saadih.¹⁷ SSNP forces attacked Hasbaya and Rashaya in Southern Lebanon and sought the assistance of Syria to help them topple the government of Bishāra al-Khūrl and Riad al-Sulh. A political accord between the Sunni Prime Minister and Syrian President Husni Al Za'im led to Saadih's arrest on July 8, 1949, after violent skirmishes in the village of Sarhamul between Lebanese gendarmes and SSNP militias. Saadih was sentenced to death on July 8 and executed the following day. Three years later, Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh was assassinated at the Amman airport in Jordan by an SSNP member who claimed to have perpetrated the act to avenge Saadih.¹⁸

In December 1961, the SSNP attempted a second armed revolt, but, once again, it failed to materialize despite the support of Lebanese Captain Fu'ad 'Awad's armored battalion composed of eight to eighteen tanks. The *coup* attempt in Beirut came following the rupture of the United Arab Republic (between Egypt and Syria) and the September 28, 1961, successful takeover in Damascus by Ma'mūn Kuzbāri.¹⁹ In his zeal, 'Awad arrested a number of high-ranking Lebanese officers, including Hanna Sa'id, the future Commander-in-Chief, and François Genadry, the future Commander of the Lebanese Military Academy. Other Lebanese military officers were arrested by SSNP militia forces, including Colonel Shmayat (Chef d'Etat Major), Colonel 'Abd al-Kādir Shihāb, Commander Jalbūt (Sureté Générale) and Colonel Naufal (Commander of the Gendarmerie).²⁰

Interestingly, several SSNP members, including former Syrian Army Commander Fadlallah Abu Marsun, may have alerted Colonel Antūn Sa'ad, head of the Deuxième Bureau, of the party's plans in time for the LAF to defuse the *coup* plot. It seems, however, that the primary reasons why the *coup* failed were a lack of a concise ideological-revolutionary spirit and extremely poor logistical preparations. Without any support from Damascus, the forty or so soldiers who were kept in the dark regarding the intentions of their hasty maneuvers, could not pull an upset victory. 'Awad is said to have wanted to seize power for personal reasons, much more than cooperate with the SSNP. Clearly, this was no *coup d'etat*, but another in Lebanon's historic and numerous "*coups de tête*."²¹

Yet, the failed *putsch* demonstrated that the SSNP, at least, was in opposition to the position of the army and its power base. In response to these challenges, the army arrested seventeen thousand individuals believed to be sympathizers of the SSNP. A good deal of controversy exists regarding their treatment, which may have included torture. Suffice it to say that the treatment may have been severe, yet must be placed in the perspective of regional politico-military developments with Shihāb's rising power and the Deuxième Bureau's position in the Arab world.²² Finally, prior to the outbreak of the 1975 Civil War, an interesting, albeit bizarre, episode occurred which merits attention.

In 1958, Colonel Fu'ad Lahūd attempted to contact several Syrian officers to "expediate" President Sham'ūn's term in office and bring

Shihāb into power three weeks earlier than scheduled. Whether an actual *coup* was in the offing may never be known. What is clear, however, is that potentially the attempt may have been *against* Shihāb, orchestrated by pro-Syrian elements.²³ Former President Shamʿūn supported Lahūd's claim that he did not collaborate with the Syrians against the state and had in fact managed, along with three hundred soldiers, to stop rebels assembled on the Syrian frontier who planned to attack Marjayʿūn²⁵ for three months.

These developments in Lebanon's early history indicate that the army's legitimacy was challenged by pro-Syrian elements from within the country's polity. As a result, the army's perceived role as a "neutral force" could not but weaken it beyond any hope for an effective power base. Furthermore, during the early seventies, a strong anti-army feeling existed in the country. While opposition was targeted to the past abuse of the Deuxième Bureau, the army's intelligence services, LAF morale diminished considerably, especially when large segments within the intelligentsia were calling for the army to remain neutral and not obey President Franjīyah. The latter's anti-Palestinian attacks led to a further schism between supporters of the core Arab cause, and die-hard anti-Palestinian Lebanese.

THE 1975-76 CIVIL WAR AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE LAF

Between 1973 and 1975, Lebanon witnessed unprecedented political turbulence which led to the first round of its on-going civil war.²⁶

During the 1975-76 Civil War, the question of sending in government troops to reestablish order was at the center of the debate between Prime Minister Rashīd Karāmi and Interior and Defense Minister Shamʿūn. Karāmi did not favor an army intervention on the basis that the military, being dominated by Christian officers would side with the Christian militias against Muslim Lebanese and Palestinian forces. Shamʿūn, on the other hand, wanted to uphold the central government's legal prerogatives and intervene in the fighting. These political maneuvers led to the army's disintegration and at least four clear items may be identified to justify this assertion.

First, the army failed to impose "Lebanese" authority after its intervention against the Saida demonstrations on February 26, 1975. Political prerogatives forced the LAF to withdraw from the southern Lebanese city on March 2, 1975. Second, the Franjīyah-appointed military government, led by Prime Minister Nūr al-Dīn al-Rifai, a retired Sunni gendarmerie brigadier, was received with very strong political opposition. The military government lasted three days, from April 23 to 26, 1975. Third, on September 10, 1975, LAF Commander, General Iskandar Ghanim, was dismissed from office following accusations that he was supporting Christian militias and extending valuable logistics assistance to them. Fourth, after bloody clashes between the Army and Muslim militias in the northern city of Tripoli, dissent within the ranks appeared around the first two weeks of October 1975.

These four identifiable factors exacerbated the army's disintegration. A decisive development in the process occurred on January 16, 1976 when the Lebanese Air Force was called in by Defense Minister Shamcūn to attack Palestinian and "leftist" forces in Damur where Shamcūn himself was besieged. This action, more than any other, may have widened the gap within LAF ranks, leading Lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib in the Biqa^c garrison to declare the creation of the Army of Arab Lebanon (AAL) on January 21, 1976. Al-Khatib and his AAL may have received extensive support from the Murabitūn forces of Ibrahim Kulaylāt (pro-Nasirists) and by Libya.²⁷ Interestingly, the young lieutenant's quest stressed the Arab identity of the army and hence of the country, which remains one of the most difficult questions that the Lebanese need to answer. Nevertheless, in response to this new *coup de tête*, President Franjiyah declared on national television (March 14, 1976), that he "wished to inform everyone of the identity of Lebanon, which is an Arab, sovereign, free and independent state."²⁸ It may have been too little, too late, for it seems that "rebel" forces did not believe him. In an attempt to avoid a total disintegration of the LAF, Brigadier General Aziz Ahdab, commander of the Beirut garrison, executed a *coup de force* on March 11, 1976 by seizing the radio and television stations and demanding that President Sulaymān Franjiyah resign within forty-eight hours. By this time, fifty percent of the army's 18,500 men had abandoned their positions and either joined certain militias or gone home. Franjiyah refused to resign and instead preferred to abandon his presidential palace at Ba^cabda and moved to Juniyah. Within the military, new groups emerged, including:

- 1) the Vanguard of the Lebanese Army (pro-Syrian), led by Lt. Col. Fahim al-Hajj;
- 2) the Army of Lebanon, under the command of Fu^cad Malik, supporting the Christian militias; and,
- 3) the Army for the Defense of South Lebanon, under the command of Sa^cad Haddad.

As the first round of the Civil War wound down, Lebanon's state army was in shambles. President Ilyās Sarkīs and Army Commander Victor Khūri faced a formidable challenge in their repeated attempts to reconstruct Lebanon by strengthening its legitimizing institutions. By this time, however, both Syria and Israel had tasted the "fruits of conquest" and intended to transform the Republic of Lebanon to their image.²⁹

On the Lebanese domestic scene, major definitional problems remained unresolved. In 1978, after three years of civil war, the debate centered around whether the army and its commander were to remain neutral. During an interview with the respected *Al-Hawadith* magazine, Army Commander Victor Khūri revealed that the goal for the new army was to balance its composition fifty-fifty between Muslims and Christians without emphasizing ethnicity, and evaluated the divisions within the army ranks as inevitable after several years of civil war. Khūri went further to suggest that the upheaval in the country's values and

institutions led the army to bear the brunt of this upheaval.³⁰ The new Commander took over in the spring of 1977, and started by evaluating the damage done to the military establishment before agreeing on plans to rebuild the army.

Acknowledging that the legacy of the army was responsible for its decomposition, Khūri stated that the general command of the army was composed entirely of Christian elements,³¹ and that this Lebanese "phenomenon," added to the legacy of two years of war, prevented him from pardoning those officers who defected. An additional hurdle for Khūri was the fact that a number of Lebanese Army officers who collaborated with militias (both Christian and Muslim) had plundered or burned the barracks in areas under their control.

An important development under Khūri was his selection of a new Chief of Staff. His choice was Colonel Munir Tarbiyah, a Druze officer, whose acceptance by officers in the General Command was something of a challenge. But the commander prevailed and set the course of rebuilding the army by creating new battalions throughout the country. A mixed camp at Al-Saliniyah was opened and a mixed military police battalion revived. Finally, the military academy at Fayadiyah and a number of other military facilities, were once again operational in and around Beirut.

THE 1977-1978 REORGANIZATION

The Lebanese Army's reorganization in 1977 and 1978 included three basic developments. First, with respect to officers and recruitment, a new order was issued on February 10, 1977, which gave career officers an opportunity to resign in exchange for generous financial compensations. This pilot program was to last for three months, but was later extended until December 31, 1977, with the hope of persuading a number of Maronite Colonels to resign their posts. Simultaneously, deserters, most of whom were from the ranks of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), were offered an opportunity to return while a new recruitment campaign was launched. The resounding success of this campaign led to the creation of an army of 23,000 by 1980.

Second, punitive measures were taken against the principal leaders of the AAL, including Lieutenant Al-Khatib, who was arrested by the Arab Deterrent Force (read Syrian forces), and dismissed from the Army. Similarly, the LAF suspended Major Haddad's salary on February 1, 1979, before expelling him on April 19, 1979, the day after he proclaimed the "State of Free Lebanon" in the southern border area under his and Israeli control.

Third, a genuine institutional reform program was initiated on March 13, 1979 with the adoption of a New National Defense Law (NDL). The NDL intended to upgrade the military's command, reorganizing the LAF into eight brigades.³²

Before discussing the NDL, it is important to examine General Khūri's efforts in reorganizing the army in 1978, without which the 1979 law would not have materialized. In December 1978, an effort was made

to base the new objectives of the reconstructed army on the following principles:

- 1) Securing unity of command in a cohesive way;
- 2) Reducing the number of subordinates under each commander in an effort to provide higher efficiency;
- 3) Delegation of authority to subordinates in order to increase the effectiveness of the chain of command;
- 4) Soundness of decision made by qualified officers in the echelon nearest to the problem; and,
- 5) Unification of the appropriate activities and their coordination.

Several steps were also taken to improve the army's staff organization, including the upgraded duties of the Chief of Staff whose authority extended over the directorates of training and legal affairs, as well as the two deputy Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the Chief of Staff was to supervise the implementation and co-ordination of staff activities for rapid fulfillment and auditing of the staff's work, in order to alleviate the duty load on the commander of the army.³³

The most prominent characteristics of the 1978 proposals for re-organization were the following:

- 1) to relieve the Commander of the army of some of the heavy burdens of command and delegate them to the Chief of Staff and his four deputies;
- 2) to initiate this delegation in order to improve the LAF decision-making process and assume speed, effectiveness and productivity;
- 3) to create a cohesive and integral unit at the general command level, enabling it to achieve a single integrated function through a distribution of efforts and responsibilities; and
- 4) to place the new army organization on the road to reconstruction with safe, stable, well-developed nationalistic and military foundations.³⁴

These sound proposals, nevertheless, could not be implemented without political support. That support would, in fact, come in 1979 with the new Defense Law. But, it is important to note that given the enormous pressures of the war and those caused by the Syrian-dominated ADF, these modest proposals were indeed major achievements.

THE 1979 NEW DEFENSE LAW

Under the NDJ, six major reforms were introduced in the military with the purpose of alleviating some of the long-standing disputes. It is important to list them briefly in order to underscore the fact that prior to 1982, a serious attempt was made in Beirut to set the course of reconciliation in Lebanon on the proper footing. The NDJ was drawn up by the Parliamentary Formulating Committee, presumably representing the views of all factions in the Assembly. It was the first major post-civil war law which defined the country's critical defense policies. There are six important items in the NDJ which require careful scrutiny.

First, the powers of the Chief of State are implicitly restricted despite the fact that the President exercises his prerogatives according to the provisions of the Constitution. While Article 2 of the NDL states that “the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces,” it also states that “He exercises these powers through the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Defense Council.”³⁵ This implies that the President must reach an agreement with the government on issues of national security. Before the NDL, the President enjoyed a free-hand in devising and implementing national and international policies.

Second, the government (Cabinet) and the Supreme Defense Council are called upon to *decide* the country’s defense policies and to *define* their aims (Articles 3, 5 and 6).³⁶

Third, the NDL created the Supreme Defense Council (SDC), consisting of the President (Chairman), the Prime Minister (Vice Chairman), and the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior and Finance, as well as the Deputy Prime Minister, if available, as members (Article 7). In addition, the Commander of the Army takes part in SDC meetings in an advisory capacity, independent from the SDC’s own Secretariat with specific functions (Articles 8, 9, 10).³⁷ The SDC Secretariat is responsible to the Prime Minister and must be headed by an active officer of the rank of Colonel or above. The Secretary General is charged with gathering information, preparing studies and plans for the SDC, conveying SDC decisions to competent bodies and following up on the implementation of the decisions (Article 9).

Fourth, according to the NDL, the Minister of National Defense and all attached institutions — the Military Bureau, the Army, the General Administration Department, the Inspectorate General and the Military Council (Article 18) — are placed under the exclusive control of the Minister of Defense (Article 17).³⁸

Fifth, the new military command is defined. The Commander of the Army will assume command and be seconded with a Chief of Staff who will be directly responsible to the Commander (Articles 22 and 23).³⁹ The Commander in Chief is appointed by cabinet decree from among the staff officers on the proposal of the Defense Minister.⁴⁰ He has the rank of General and is directly responsible to the Defense Minister, who supervises him in the exercise of his duties except for military and security operations, for which the Commander in Chief has sole responsibility.

Sixth, the new law also set up a Military Council directly attached to the Minister of Defense (Articles 29 and 30).⁴¹ Its members are the Commander of the Army, the Secretary General of the SDC, the General Administration Director, the Inspector General and two officers with the rank of Colonel or above. By unwritten agreement, the council includes a member of each of the principle communities: Maronite, Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic. Its duties, formerly carried out by the Commander in Chief, consist primarily of organizing the institutions attached to the Defense Ministry and naming the commands of the military regions, divisions, brigades, air force, navy and military academies, as well as the Military Attachés in embassy posts.

These major items in the NDJ have undergone a series of "endurance tests" over the past few years with varied successes. One of the more interesting elements in the NDJ is Article 82 which determines the retirement age for officers. Since the LAF suffers from a chronic abundance of Maronite colonels, and since an attempt has been made in recent years to reduce their numbers as a means of achieving a semblance of equality in the rank between Muslims and Christians, Article 82 of the NDJ is rather significant. According to the NDJ,⁴² retirement age in the Lebanese Army is as follows:

Second Lieutenant	50
First Lieutenant	51
Captain	52
Major	53
Lieutenant Colonel	54
Colonel	56
Major General	59
General	59

Measures adopted by the parliamentary committee of the Lebanese Assembly were not received with *éclat*. In fact, the Chairman of the Parliamentary and Labor Committee, Deputy Nazim al-Qadiri (Sunni-Western Biqa^c) warned against politicizing the debate over the military institution and said that "the military measures which General Khūri adopted [described above] are preventing development of the army in a national manner."⁴³ In reality, however, opposition to the NDJ was over the expected promotions which would occur under the proposed law. Indeed, several months later, eleven hundred officers, of whom 817 were army officers, were promoted⁴⁴ to the dismay of "rightist" leaders.⁴⁵ Official reasons for granting the promotions included: "brilliant acts; carried out dangerous missions; and made exhausting efforts to[ward] rebuilding and unifying the army."⁴⁶ Sixty officers were promoted to full Colonel and ninety officers were promoted from the rank of Major to that of Lieutenant Colonel. This was perceived by "traditional leaders" as an invasion on the protected turf, leading Piyer Al-Jumayyil to declare that "it [would] be wise not to place the Lebanese and the foreigner on the same level of equality, nor absolute allegiance and the lack of allegiance."⁴⁷ Since all officers were in fact Lebanese citizens, this vitriolic accusation was clearly directed against Muslim officers and politicians who had penetrated the army General Command, on the grounds that throughout the Civil War, many LAF officers had deserted and violated their oath of allegiance to the state. While this charge by the head of the Kata'ib Party is very accurate, it is applicable to both Muslim and Christian officers. More significantly, the promotions were ill-advised particularly when very few LAF personnel, and certainly not eleven hundred, had distinguished themselves during the Civil War. Clearly, the political move produced a backlash with every political party voicing an opinion on what otherwise would have been routine military matters. The debate over these promotions and the NDJ continued throughout 1979 and 1980.

On January 22, 1981, a Presidential decree was promulgated concerning the organization of the army. This move was intended to settle a long-standing political dispute over the Intelligence Bureau, which had until then been under the exclusive control of the army Commander-in-Chief, and which the Muslim community had sought to place under the supervision of the Military Council. The new law stipulated that the Intelligence Bureau is to answer directly to the Commander of the Army, but will provide the Chief of Staff with all the information available to it. As the Chief of Staff is traditionally a Druze, this compromise allowed the Muslim community to share in certain prerogatives formerly reserved to the Christians. In addition, the Intelligence Bureau would not be responsible for military rather than national security. In this way, it was hoped to reduce the influence of the Bureau, often accused of abusing its powers and meddling in domestic policies.

These measures did not allow the army to take over areas of Lebanon under Palestinian/Muslim militias' control,⁴⁸ and more importantly, discouraged the army from conducting operations *against* militias. One such example was the hasty withdrawal of the army from the 'Ayn al-Rumāni district of Beirut on October 31, 1980 following Kata'ib attacks on its positions. The last nail in the coffin was hammered in by the Syrian forces of the ADF, who refused to turn over their positions to the "reconstructed army."

Against this background of events, Lebanon "experienced" the problems of 1982 when two modern armies (Syria and Israel) and the Palestinian forces transformed and further polarized the population. With the deployment of a Multinational Force composed of U.S., French and Italian troops, later to be reinforced by a small British unit, and the election of Amin Al-Jumayyil as President of the Republic, a fresh effort was made to reorganize the army and create a fighting force capable of defending the country from domestic unrest and foreign interventions.⁴⁹ Under the leadership of Amin Al-Jumayyil and with the assistance of the United States and several Western European states, the LAF underwent a major reorganization. It is to the present capabilities of the LAF that we turn next. What are those capabilities and what is the new philosophy governing the LAF?

CAPABILITIES OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN THE 1980s

The capabilities of the LAF must first be evaluated in terms of the existing and expected leadership. Since General Shihāb, Lebanon has had no single, dominant military figure within the ranks of the LAF. Generals Hanna Sa'īd and Victor Khūri have had to deal with the presence of a strong foreign armed occupant in Lebanon which was not permitted to occur under Shihāb. Yet, both commanders were carrying political order from their government whose weak regional positions were further debilitated by successive accords and agreements negotiated in Cairo and Damascus, where Lebanon's domestic problems, more often than not, were not fully appreciated.

With the accession to "power" of Al-Jumayyil in 1982, General Ibrahim Tannūs was selected as the new Army Commander. Tannūs was perceived to represent the character of a resurgent army which will be called upon to rejuvenate Lebanon and project an image of confidence to the population. Al-Jumayyil and Tannūs succeeded in persuading the United States to assist Lebanon in re-creating its army. Under the Lebanese Army Modernization Program (LAMP), the United States committed itself to the rebirth of the LAF in late 1982. It was hoped that LAMP would succeed in accomplishing what had been tried since 1978 but which had failed. Critical to LAMP training was the creation of leadership. According to U.S. Colonel Arthur Thomas Fintel, the officer in charge of LAMP in 1983, the disintegration of the Army in 1975 was due to a "lack of civilian leadership as [well as] the lack of military leadership."⁵⁰ General Ibrahim Tannūs is reported to have filled a serious vacuum in Lebanon's military leadership by motivating his newly appointed brigade commanders and delegating extensive powers to them. Conceivably, this was an indication of how the reorganization was functioning once again through an established chain of command. Parallel to this injection of leadership into the military, the LAMP commander noted that a solid civilian leadership also existed with President Al-Jumayyil who was concerned about the future of the army and had a "good relationship" with General Tannūs.⁵¹ By early 1984, however, there was little evidence that the leadership had succeeded in winning the minds and hearts of weary and demoralized troops. This is a key aspect of the Lebanese Army's overall weakness which will be further discussed below.

The second hurdle that the LAF had to cross in its re-creation was the acquisition of modern weapons capable of defeating the displayed strengths of the militias. In this respect, progress was more tangible. The year 1983 proved to be a logistic boon for LAF both in terms of equipment and manpower. LAMP proved to be very successful and Colonel Fintel reported that the armed forces had progressed beyond all expectations.⁵² Over a very short period of time (late 1982 to mid-1983), the army exceeded all manpower projections and grew at the rate of ten percent per month, even though the majority of volunteers and conscripts were coming from the militias. As a result of this surge, objectives were amended to include a 35,000 combat-ready army in twelve fully-trained brigades. In June 1983, the army counted fourteen thousand combat troops and ten thousand support soldiers, considerably larger than in any militia in the country.

Originally, Beirut's goal was to rebuild the new army into several brigades, each composed of 2,400 men capable of growing to about 3,900.⁵³ The LAMP plan was to

assemble the first four brigades at a strength level of 2,400 men apiece, complete with equipment and ... do some work with the Beirut-sector [between December 1982 and February 1983]. Then between February 1983 and February 1984 ... put another brigade in, raise one to 100 percent and have four others at 70 percent with

the Beirut-sector troops. Then between February 1984 and June 1985 ... bring on two more brigades at roughly 70 to 80 percent strength, for a total of seven brigades at an average strength of 75 to 80 percent — 2,600 to 2,700 men apiece.⁵⁴

Interestingly, the army had reached these objectives by June 1983, well ahead of LAMP's planned schedule.

As a result of these encouraging manpower increases, the Lebanese Army increased its objectives to 35,000 by the end of 1983, and decided to create an eighth ranger brigade which had achieved mid-strength by June 1983. Further, General Tannūs

decided to form four additional light infantry brigades for a total of 12 brigades by the end of [1983], with a total strength of 27,000 men. This does not include the logistical support brigade, the combat support brigade, various regional and Army headquarters, schools and training centers — all of which, with 8,000 men, w[ould] bring the year-end total manpower strength up to 35,000.⁵⁵

While this objective could easily be reached given the fact that there was no manpower shortage, the situation was greatly different logistically. LAMP-trained units were graduating faster than their equipment was reaching them. A good example was the 21st Battalion deployed in Āyn al-Miārisah. According to the Fintel, the battalion, had "completed [its] training with the U.S. Special Forces, but the U.S. government ha[d] not yet been able to provide them with the equipment they need[ed] including the M-113s APCs," which would transform the battalion into a light infantry outfit.⁵⁶ Attention was devoted to training Lebanese Army mechanics at the large, yet overcrowded Badaro depot.

Logistics complications arose with the variety of equipment which was transferred to Beirut. In recent years, Lebanon decided to purchase equipment from the United States, Britain and France, depending on the availability of foreign military credits. As a result, in 1983, Colonel Fu'ād Āun, LAMP staff coordinator, was forced to reorganize all LAF hardware in separate units, with the French equipment in special battalions and the U.S. hardware in others. The new Kfarshima supply depot, which replaces the old facility at Barado, has been undergoing renovations and has catalogued close to 65,000 items to support the army.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the question remains whether constant refurbishments and uninterrupted supplies would be made available to the Lebanese Army, especially after the suspension of U.S. transfers in early 1984.

LAMP training activities cover the full spectrum of military warfare, from conventional to urban fighting, although the major emphasis is on internal security and stability operations. Every soldier participating in a LAMP unit receives four weeks of basic training prior to specialized exercises in urban and anti-terrorist operations.

The U.S. military training program, according to Colonel Fintel, used the presence of the Marine Contingent deployed near Beirut as part of

the MNF, as example-setting units to demonstrate to Lebanese soldiers in concrete terms how a functioning unit should look.⁵⁸ Whether the withdrawal of the Marines from the MNF will have a demoralizing effect on the remaining Lebanese armed forces, remains to be seen, of course. What is certain, however, is that the eighty or so U.S. Army training personnel (of whom fifty-three were Green Berets) deployed in Lebanon in June 1983 would have to reassess their activities, particularly following the U.S. decision to suspend military transfers.⁵⁹

Particular attention has been devoted to equipping the army with 105mm cannons which enjoy a high degree of firing precision. In addition, a new tank battalion with Jordanian M-48s has been assembled. Given the nature of Lebanon's terrain and the need to move a battalion of infantry rather rapidly, the army has relied on the Air Force to assemble a helicopter wing able to accomplish the task. In June 1983, Lebanon's twenty-eight French and Italian-made helicopters (Pumas, Gazelles, Alouettes, and Augusta Bells) could lift a total of three hundred men. This figure was projected to rise to between four hundred and six hundred with new airlift purchases which would bring the wing to forty aircraft.⁶⁰ The jet fighters of the Lebanese Air Force are less effective, given the sorry state of most of the equipment. Out of twenty-five jet aircraft, eleven are trainers (five Fouga Magisters and six Bulldog propellers) with ten Mirages in mothballs requiring extensive repairs. Lebanon's ten Hunters were armed and operations, but suffered heavy losses in September 1983 during the Sūq al-Gharb battles.⁶¹ The Hunters proved to be easy targets, with their age and relative slowness.

Despite the shortage of modern weapons, Colonel Fintel of LAMP assessed the Lebanese soldiers' willingness to learn and their moral qualities by stating that he "would give them high grades in every area [willingness to learn, strength, courage, patience and discipline ... and] would be very happy to have Lebanese soldiers working under [his] command anywhere in the world."⁶² Comparing the Lebanese and Vietnamese (Fintel served in Viet Nam for two years) soldier, the U.S. officer stated that "the difference between the Vietnamese soldier and the Lebanese soldier is a difference of about 500 years. With the Lebanese soldier, you are working with a man who lives, works and thinks in the 20th century ... The young men here are modern young men — and I am talking about all [of them], from all over Lebanon, including the villages."⁶³

This positive assessment notwithstanding, the disintegration of the army in early 1984 indicated that training and modern equipment will only go so far in the rebirth of the Lebanese Army. It should come as no surprise that two years of LAMP training in Lebanon did not produce a cohesive fighting machine, capable of gaining the support of the warring factions. Encouraged by the presence of the MNF and the massive support of the U.S. Sixth Fleet stationed off the Lebanese coast, the LAF considered its options and chose boldly to deploy in the Shūf Mountains where Christian and Muslim militias were engaged in a series of battles. Additionally, the Army decided to enter West Beirut in force and

“clear” the capital’s southern belt of its impoverished inhabitants. With the selective use of force, a new philosophy developed in Beirut, leading government officials to believe that its two recent tests illustrated how strong the LAF was. The challenges to the army, however, proved to be much more serious than anticipated.

THE CHALLENGES TO THE LEBANESE ARMY: THE LEBANESE FORCES AND THE DRUZE/^CAMAL COALITION

Through the late seventies and early eighties, Lebanon’s Christian and Muslim militias gained in military as well as political strength. At present, the two most important groups which challenge the authority of the state and hence that of the army, are the Lebanese Forces and the Druze/^C Amal coalition.⁶⁴ Both deserve careful attention.

The ascendancy of the Lebanese Forces (LF) as a unified Christian military alternative to the central government in Beirut has dramatically altered the traditional political puzzle which is Lebanon. While the LF do not represent all Christians, they do enjoy a monopoly of sorts in the Mount Lebanon area. Simultaneously, Muslims in Lebanon, particularly among the Druze and Sunni communities, fear and distrust the Lebanese Forces, given the latter’s very close ties to Israel, especially after the Sabra and Shatilla massacres where not only Palestinians but also *Lebanese citizens* were killed. Increasingly, the LF have become a force with which to reckon, with considerable financial and military support from Israel. While initially the LF sought Israel’s aid to “rid” Lebanon of the Palestinians and Syrians, and counted on the Jewish State to help them create a Christian State in Lebanon,⁶⁵ they ended up with an occupation which will be in effect for the foreseeable future.

Jonathan C. Randall reports how the relationship evolved between Bashir Al-Jumayyil and successive Israeli leaders, leading to the election of the head of the LF to the Presidency of Lebanon.⁶⁶ It is important to add that the “regroupment” which took place among the numerous Christian militias in the early ’80s was not a diplomatic achievement, but rather a succession of bloody feuds which scarred, perhaps permanently, the Lebanese political environment. In their effort to unify all right-wing militias, Bashir Al-Jumayyil and his Lebanese Forces attacked the Sham^Cunist forces, killing as many as five hundred of their fellow Christians, including many who were innocent bystanders.⁶⁷ This victory over Sham^Cun came two years after the June 13, 1978 attack on Ehden and the assassination of Tony Franjiyah and his family.⁶⁸ These actions meant that all Maronites, at least, would have little choice but to obey Bashir Al-Jumayyil, and by August 1980, the only Christian forces outside the control of the LF were the Franjiyah Marada in northern Lebanon, under Syrian tutelage. In a recent article on the Lebanese Forces, Lewis W. Snider suggests that the LF’s “policy orientation and some of the activities of the Front suggest a Lebanese-centered view of Lebanon’s problems, politics and approaches to post-war recovery, that potentially speaks to a much broader constituency than just to the Christians.”⁶⁹ But as long as elements within the Muslim communities continue to fear the LF, it is safe to assume that its primary constituency will

remain in the Christian enclave of Mount Lebanon. It is crucial to note that staunch pro-state identity of the Lebanese Forces cannot keep others from expressing similar nationalistic feelings. Prominent Muslim political figures are also capable of expressing, and do express, their patriotism. Therefore, the LF cannot enjoy a monopoly, at least not on their Lebanese-ness. While set up independently from the Kata'ib Party, the LF are its most dominant elements, and while it is accurate to state that the Al-Jumayyils do not dominate the LF and that their reliability is questionable,⁷⁰ this point should not be stretched too far. Undeniably, the Al-Jumayyil family in 1984 is the leading political component of the Lebanese politico-military scene.

By collecting taxes and imposing conscription in their enclave, the LF have attempted to create an alternative, legitimate structure to that of the government in Beirut. In addition, the LF have seriously jeopardized the authority of the Lebanese Army when it suited their purposes. Assuming that the Lebanese Army and Government eventually gain control over all of Lebanon, the fate of the militias will remain to be determined. Will they dismantle peacefully and turn over their considerable military equipment to a potentially strong central government?

Undoubtedly, Christians and Muslims living in LF controlled areas have enjoyed a modicum of public services not available in other parts of the country. Every attempt has been made to provide the population with needed services, even at very high prices. But it is clear that these social services could not be provided without the backing of a strong military establishment whose harsh punitive actions may in fact "ruin" anyone who steps out of line. In addition, many of these goods and services reach Lebanon through illegal importations, further eroding the legitimacy of the central government.

Assuming that the Al-Jumayyil government could in fact secure the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, and succeed in restoring the government's authority over all parts of the country, it is difficult to predict whether the LF would relinquish its non-military organization. With respect to the LAF, the Lebanese Forces could conceivably become a competitor for recruits, and it is safe to assume that the Army would not tolerate this.⁷¹ While a potential military confrontation between the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Army may not be excluded, the more serious aspect of this contest is the support-base among Lebanon's Christians. In the absence of an element of trust towards the central government, would the Lebanese Christians ever turn their backs on the Lebanese Forces?

Extensive use of force against the Druze and the Shi'a populations of Lebanon by the Lebanese Army and its MNF backers, has created a severe polarization, leading Walid Junblatt and Nabih Berri to seek the assistance of Syria. Amin Al-Jumayyil's government placed itself in the opposition camp as far as the Druzes and Shi'as were concerned following the signing of the ill-advised May 17, 1983 Withdrawal Accord with Israel. In the absence of a consensus among all Lebanese factions, Al-Jumayyil played his American card and lost.⁷² The Accord may have been an American foreign policy victory, but it did little to assist

Lebanon's political reconstruction. Opposition to the Accord grew steadily among Druze and Shi'a leaders who received additional support from Syria, all too anxious to profit from the opportunity to voice an opinion on Lebanese affairs and remind Beirut that the road to Lebanon's peaceful reconstruction passes through Damascus.

Throughout the fall of 1983, the Lebanese Army was pitted against Druze forces in the Shūf Mountains and in and around Beirut against Shi'a forces. Early victories in November and December, led Shiite and Druze leaders to call on Muslim soldiers and officers to stop firing against their fellow citizens. In September 1983, eight hundred Druze soldiers deserted their command in Hammāna and Bayt al-Dīn, including the LAF Chief of Staff.

By late January 1984, Beirut offered to reinstate and promote the Druze who had deserted the Army.⁷³ While this action may have had a demoralizing effect on those troops who had remained loyal, President Al-Jumayyil had little choice but to agree to the reinstatement, given the fact that Beirut had already set a precedent by reinstating Major Sa'ad Haddad, after having tried him in absentia and dismissing him from the army.

As the winter '84 showdown progressed, Shiite and Druze militias took control of West Beirut with "40 percent of the army's 27,000 active fighting men" having gone over to support the Muslim militias or refusing to take part in any further fighting against them.⁷⁴ These massive defections crippled the LAF as Washington's Lebanon policies were rapidly changing. The resulting ambivalence, both in Lebanon and the United States, increased the confidence of the Druze and Shi'a leaders, influencing them to demand major political changes, including the resignation of Al-Jumayyil. Calls for U.S. pressure on the Al-Jumayyil government increased. Daniel Pipes, for example, has suggested that the United States should use its military and economic aid as well as its diplomatic and moral support, to extract, from Beirut, some concrete steps in the reconciliation process. Presumably such steps would include "taking a new census, opening government offices to leaders of the opposition forces, scrapping the six-to-five ratio of Christians to Muslims in Parliament, and holding new elections."⁷⁵ Once implemented, these suggestions would conceivably pre-empt a Syrian take-over in areas north of the 'Awwali river and preserve the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Invariably, these suggestions include a hope for an ideal peaceful resolution of the Lebanese conflicts. Conversely, however, the logic behind these assumptions rests on the belief that *all* Lebanese, both Christians and Muslims are indeed willing to work for a united Lebanon.

It is not impossible to assume that the Phalange Party controlling East Beirut and much of the Mount Lebanon region, would be satisfied by seceding from the Republic, should that solution guarantee the security of the area and the population inhabiting it. The result of this potential occurrence could undermine the President of the Republic, whether Amin Al-Jumayyil or another person, and deny the central authorities in Beirut any capacity to influence the course of events in the country.

President Al-Jumayyil's preferred position of increasing the strength of the LAF and uniting the public behind an institution whose legitimacy may be acquired fairly rapidly, may appear to offer a salutary avenue. In order to accomplish this, however, both Syria and Israel must refrain from interfering in the reconstruction of the LAF.

CONCLUSION

According to Paul Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, Damascus "viewed Lebanon as a member of the Eastern Front, and foresaw the creation of a Syrian-dominated LAF that could tie down the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) in southern Lebanon." But following the 1978 Syrian assaults on Christian controlled territories, "the Syrians concluded that they would be unable to control the Lebanese Army, and consequently, had very ambivalent views about strengthening it."⁷⁶

Israel, in turn, opposed the return of the LAF to southern Lebanon, and ordered Major Haddad to attack two LAF army battalions attempting to deploy in the south, claiming that the LAF was dominated by the Syrians.⁷⁷ Furthermore, while the army was capable of assuming positions evacuated by the Israeli army in the Shūf Mountains in 1983, the Israelis decided to turn over their positions to both Christian and Druze militias, thereby putting the Lebanese Army in its costly Shūf battles.

The Lebanese Army's mission was to unite all factions in the country around its institutions by providing security for all and establishing Lebanese authority over all of the national territory. In late 1982 and early 1983, the LAF proved capable of withstanding the enormous pressures exerted against it and "experienced no defection problems whatsoever."⁷⁸ By the fall of 1983 and early 1984, however, forty percent of the army had deserted and most Muslim officers and soldiers refused to obey the orders issued by the Defense Ministry at Yarze. The root question here is that of loyalty. Why were not these soldiers loyal to the LAF?

The question of loyalty is extremely important in this instance. Whether officers and soldiers in the Lebanese Army were loyal to the state or their immediate superiors will be debated for years to come. It is important to note that these defectors did not consider that the national government enjoyed genuine public support. Since military obedience is towards the law of the nation, the question must be raised of whether positive or natural law, or the law of the state, or the law of God applies in this case?⁷⁹ The defections in Lebanon must be analyzed in terms of the will of each individual to pursue the dictates of his conscience, particularly when he perceives the state's partisan policies to favor one religious faction over another.

In supporting the Constitution and preserving the National Pact, the Lebanese military attempted to lessen the chances of any violent change of government and to consolidate the traditional and constitutional transfer. This attitude was best exemplified by General Fu'ad Shihāb who considered himself a student of the Michel Shiha Constitutional School.⁸⁰ Undoubtedly, the 1943 Pact reinforced confessionalism in the

country. More recently, a number of leaders have voiced their opinions regarding the future unification of the Lebanese people, and suggested that the means of achieving that stated goal would be to pursue laicization. Cardinal Khoreiche (Maronite) had declared in 1977 that "democracy [in Lebanon] may be achieved through laicization" and the Greek-Catholic Council had adopted in 1976 a program which states that "laicization is the perfect means to unify the Lebanese and replace the motto 'Lebanon = compromise' with 'Lebanon = nation'."⁸¹

It is clear that as long as confessionalism is practiced in the country, it is impossible to expect the military or for that matter any other subgroup in a society, not to be affected by it. Ironically, the recent resurgence of nationalism in Lebanon seems to have bypassed the Army. It remains to be seen whether a fresh commitment to the reconstruction of the LAF will be made. Both France and the United States have already invested considerable sums in the LAF,⁸² and despite the freeze of its Lebanon policy, Washington continues to provide training assistance to the Lebanese Army.⁸³

Despite this effort, past U.S. involvements, including the May 17 Accord which permitted constant IDF presence in Lebanese territory,⁸⁴ may have damaged the confidence of the LAF beyond repair. It remains to be determined whether Beirut can find an accommodation with both Muslim and Christian leaders to re-draft the National Defense Law permitting the army to restore order throughout the country. A lesser effort would mean that the *de facto* partition of Lebanon will turn into a permanent reality.

Cognizant of this threat, President Al-Jumayyil turned to the veteran Sunni politician from Tripoli, Prime Minister Rashid Karāmi, to head a new government of national unity. Karāmi astutely proposed new reforms for the LAF and executed the first stage of his plan by replacing LAF Commander-in-Chief Tannūs with the more "neutral" Michel Cawn (Aoun).⁸⁵ In the second stage, the Prime Minister authorized Cawn to set up a six-member confessionally balanced committee mandated to end the fighting across factional lines. By early July 1984, the Lebanese capital experienced the long-awaited respite from the war as Druze, Shi'a and LF militia forces started to withdraw their heavy guns from the city and turn over key positions to LAF troops.⁸⁶ Significantly, West Beirut was entrusted to the LAF's 6th Brigade (Muslim majority among the rank and file) and East Beirut to the 5th Brigade (Christian majority). The infamous Green line barricades were once again cleared leading Brigadier-General Muhammad al-Hajj to declare: "There is no longer East or West Beirut ... It's now a United Lebanon with a united capital."⁸⁷ Yet, despite this show of optimism, two serious problems have arisen which require immediate attention.

The first is the fate of several hundred missing individuals whose families took to the streets and delayed the government's unification plans. They demonstrated on the Green line and *demand*ed an official investigation to determine the fate of their loved ones. A presidential committee was finally set up and is expected to expedite the release of those kidnapped prisoners who remain alive. Ironically, no more than two

hundred hostages may be accounted for, leading to speculation that this issue will return to haunt the government of national unity, as the number of those missing may be over fifteen hundred.⁸⁸ The second important problem is the refusal of all militia forces to turn over their heavy guns to the army. Instead most of this arsenal was returned to mountain strongholds readily available for a future round of fighting if negotiations on political issues are not resolved. Defense Minister ^UUsayrān is reported to have predicted that the LAF would indeed collect heavy guns from militia forces "in and around the capital city."⁸⁹ These assurances notwithstanding, it is amply clear that the LAF would have to pursue militia forces in the mountains in order to regain LAF authority throughout Lebanon.

These recent developments indicate that the LAF's search for a new mandate cannot be completed as long as Lebanon lacks the political will to initiate genuine national unity talks. The accidental death of the LAF Chief of Staff Major-General Nadim Hakim, the highest-ranking Druze officer in the army, further enlarged the gulf separating the Druze community from the government of Amin Al-Jumayyil. While Hakim's death may have been mourned in the Shūf mountains, it went unnoticed in Mount Lebanon. Similarly, the death of Piyer Al-Jumayyil, despite eloquent statements, was largely scorned in the South. Tragically, concern for "others" in Lebanon may have given way to a sense of restricted patriotism, creating a significant societal gap. Today, the LAF seems to be the prisoner of this limited environment, one which may only be expanded with a resurgence of nationalism.

Table 1 — Lebanon: Armed Forces**ARMY****Troops and Officers:**

25,500 (Increased to 35,000 by the end of 1983)

Equipment:

Main Battle Tanks, M48	54
Light Battle Tanks, AMX-13	13
Armored Cars, Saladin	100
Armored Personnel Carriers, M-113	400
Other APCs, VAB	5
Guns: 122mm	10
155mm	36
105mm how	18
81/83mm, RPG-7, 85, 88 RI and RCL, 106mm	200
Anti-Aircraft Guides Weapons, Milan	18
TOW	± (several)
Other guns, 20, 23, 30 towed mm, Zu-23, M-42, 40mm SP AA	± (several)
On Order, M-113 A2 APCs;	150
155 mm how	12

The army is divided into the following brigades:

- 9 Infantry Brigades
- 2 Artillery Brigades
- 1 Mechanized Infantry Brigade
- 1 Ranger Brigade (forming)

NAVY**Sailors and Officers:** 250**Equipment:**

Patrol Crafts, Large	1
Patrol Crafts, Byblos Class Coastal	4

AIR FORCE**Pilots and Support Personnel:** 1,250**Equipment:**

- 1 Squadron with 8 Hunter F-70 (4 destroyed in September 1983)
- 1 Helicopter squadron with 11 Alouette II/III, 11 AB-212, 6 Pumas and 4 Gazelles (with SS-11/ -12 ASM)
- Trainers: 6 Bulldogs and 5 Fouga Magisters
- Transports: 1 Dove, 1 Turbo-Commander 690A (on order 6 Gazelles)
- Reserves (Requiring Extensive Repairs): 2 Hunter T-66, 9 Mirage IIIEL, 1 Mirage IIIBL, 5 Alouettes and several R-530 AAM

Source: *The Military Balance 1983-1984*, (London: IISS, 1983).

Footnotes

1. For the text of the Lebanese Constitution, see Amos Jenkins Peaslee, *Constitution of Nations* (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), vol. 2, part 1, pp. 633-647 — Articles 49 to 72 discuss the Executive Branch.
2. The 1943 “National Pact” understanding between the Presidents Bishāra al-Khūri and Riad al-Sulh is analyzed in Edmond Rabbath’s important work, *La formation historique du Liban politique et constitutionnel: Essai de Synthèse* (Beyrouth: Librairie Orientale, Publications de l’Université Libanaise, Section des Etudes Juridiques, Politiques et Administratives, 1973), pp. 524-526.
3. Colonel B.E.M. Joseph Georges Bitar, *Armée de metier et service militaire au Liban* (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1973), p. 35.
4. Bishāra al-Khūri, *Hikāyat Lubnāniyah (Lebanese Tales)* (Beirut: Awraq Lubnāniyah Publishers, 1961), vol. 3, p. 237, as cited in Adel A. Freiha, *L’Armée et l’Etat au Liban, 1945-1980* (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1980), p. 37.
5. Freiha, *ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
6. John J. Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 277.
7. For an excellent discussion of Lebanon’s 1958 crisis and the role of the army, see Fahim I. Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), pp. 81-83.
8. A discussion of the Deuxième Bureau is beyond the scope of this paper; for a concise analysis, see Freiha, *L’Armée*, pp. 141-163.
9. Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 546-547.
10. Adel Freiha discusses the concept of a “neutral force” as defined by Benjamin Constant who thought that such a force was indispensable if a country and its population were to enjoy freedom. Constant also conceived the utility of a neutral force to function effectively in a monarchic parliamentary system, which, according to Freiha, could conceivably be applicable to Lebanon. In this case, the Lebanese executive may be said to play the role of a monarch, with neutral forces checking the excesses, i.e. the 1958 crisis. It is clear that in Lebanon the LAF have been kept outside the mainstream political system except during Shihāb’s rule. Lebanon’s military were always perceived as partisans of one faction against another, leading to the split between a pro-Christian army and a pro-Sunni Internal Security Forces (ISF). For a discussion of Freiha’s point, see Freiha, *L’Armée*, pp. 95-97.
11. Freiha, *ibid.*, p. 117 (text in French — my own translation).
12. Camille Chamoun (Shamcūn), *Crise au Moyen-Orient* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), p. 393.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 418; see also Freiha, *L’Armée*, p. 119.
14. Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), p. 400.
15. Freiha, *L’Armée*, p. 121.
16. Kamal S. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976* (Delmar, New York: Caravan, 1976), p. 2.
17. For a complete discussion, see Michael Sulaiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967); and, Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965).
18. Freiha, *L’Armée*, pp. 59-63.
19. For a full discussion, see Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970* (3rd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
20. Freiha, *L’Armée*, p. 68.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-74.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
23. Edward Hopkins, *Military Intervention in Syria and Iraq: Historical Background, Evaluation and Some Comparisons* (unpublished Masters Thesis, American University in Beirut, January 1971), as cited in Freiha, *L’Armée*, p. 34.

24. Freiha, *ibid.*, p. 87.
25. Sham^cūn, *Crise*, p. 408.
26. A number of important books have been published in recent years on the Lebanese Civil War, which is not fully analyzed in this paper; see in particular, Daad Bou Malhab (Beyrouth: n.p., 1980); Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Harald Vocke, *The Lebanese Civil War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978); Antoine Jabare, *La guerre du Liban: Moscou et la crise du Proche Orient* (Paris: Belfond, 1980); and P. Edward Haley and Lewis S. Snider (eds.), *Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1979).
27. Haley and Snider (eds.) *Lebanon*, p. 39; see also, Freiha, *L'Armée*, pp. 214-215.
28. *An-Nahār*, March 15, 1976, pp. 1 and 8.
29. For a cogent analysis of Syrian and Israeli intentions over Lebanon, see Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, *Une proie pour deux fauves? Le Liban entre le lion de Juda et le lion de Syrie* (Beyrouth: Ad-Da'irat, 1983).
30. Walid ^cAwad, "Army Commander Discusses Rebuilding Army" (Interview with General Victor Khūri), *Al-Hawadith*, November 27, 1978, pp. 22-24.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
32. The text of the ND 79 was published by *Al-Safir*, December 21, 22, 1978 and translated in *Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS)*, no. 72769, February 6, 1979, pp. 58-90. References in this paper are to the *JPRS* text.
33. "The Reorganization of the Structure of the Army as Headquarters sees it: The Aim is Reconstruction on Sound, Nationalistic Bases; Among its Characteristics are lightening the burden of the Commander and delegation of authority," *An-Nahār*, December 7, 1978, p. 5, translated in *JPRS*, no. 72848, February 22, 1979, pp. 35-37.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
35. *JPRS*, no. 72769, February 6, 1979, p. 59.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-61.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.
40. While the ND 79 does not specify whether the Commander must be a Maronite, a Druze, a Sunni or a Shi'ca, it is understood that the "unwritten" rules shall continue to apply for the foreseeable future. As far as the letter of the law is concerned, however, no religious identifications are specified for the different positions.
41. *JPRS*, no. 72769, February 6, 1979, pp. 67-70.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
44. "Three Military Organizations Notified of Laws: 817 Officers in Army included in Promotions," *An-Nahār*, September 3, 1979, pp. 1, 16. The newspaper published the names of all promoted officers.
45. "Military Promotion Policy Criticized," *L'Orient-Le Jour*, September 6, 1979, p. 10.
46. *An-Nahār*, September 3, 1979, p. 16.
47. *L'Orient-Le Jour*, September 6, 1979, p. 10.
48. Presumably, the army could move freely in areas under the control of Christian militias.
49. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the critical developments of the year 1982 in Lebanon which will be marked in history books as the year of chaos and terror, perpetrated against and by the Lebanese.
50. Claude Houry, "The Rebirth of the Lebanese Army," *Monday Morning*, vol. 12, no. 570 (June 13-19, 1983), p. 49.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 49-50.

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52. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
59. Don Oberdorfer, "U.S.-Lebanon Decisions Temporarily on 'Hold'," *Washington Post*, February 26, 1984, p. A1; see also, David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Military Program in Beirut Grinding to Halt," *Washington Post*, May 8, 1984, p. A15.
60. Khoury, *Rebirth*, p. 56.
61. Herbert H. Denton, "Lebanese Forces Attack Druze in Strategic Heights," *Washington Post*, September 17, 1983, p. A1.
62. Khoury, *Rebirth*, p. 57.
63. *Ibid.*
64. The discussion which follows focuses on the challenges that the groups have manifested towards the central government in Beirut. For a discussion of the militias, see John P. Entelis, *Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al-Kata'ib* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), and Augustus Richard Norton, "Political Violence and Shi'a Factionalism in Lebanon," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 3, no. 2 (August-October 1983), pp. 9-16, and *Idem*, "Making Enemies in South Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF, and South Lebanon," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 3, no. 3 (January/February 1984), pp. 13-20.
65. Jonathan C. Randall, *Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon* (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), pp. 215-216.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-24.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
69. Lewis S. Snider, "The Lebanese Forces: Their Origins and Role in Lebanon's Politics," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 38, no. 1 (Winter 1984), pp. 1-33.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
72. A discussion on the merits of the May 17, 1983 Accord is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that its provisions were not acceptable to Syria, Lebanon's "other" strong neighbor.
73. "Lebanon Offers to Promote Druze Who Deserted Army," *Washington Post*, January 27, 1984, p. A28.
74. "Civilians Leaving: Shiite and Druze Leaders Call for a Cease-Fire — Marine Wounded," *New York Times*, February 8, 1984, p. A1.
75. Daniel Pipes, "U.S., Pressure Gemayel," *New York Times*, January 23, 1984, p. A21.
76. Paul Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, "Army and State in Lebanon," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 3, no. 2 (August-October 1983), p. 32.
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
79. For a discussion of these important points, see G.F.G. Stanley, "Obedience to Whom? To What?," in Edgar Denton, III, (ed.), *Limits to Loyalty* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980), pp. 3-22. Stanley relates the views of Pierre Alexandre Joseph Chateau-Jobert, who distinguished himself during World War II with the Forces Françaises Libres (FFL), and subsequently with the French Forces in Indochina, Port Sa'id (1956 Franco-British Expedition against Egypt), and Algeria. Chateau-Jobert's experiences in Indochina and Egypt led him to write "that there were certain basic values which should govern human conduct...: Justice; Charity, in the sense of love of one's neighbour; Consideration for the rights of others; Respect for

human dignity." He rejected the politics of democratic and communist countries alike and refused to bend to the hypocritical views of world leaders, writing: "J'étais en train de découvrir le bluff des hommes politiques qui, une fois au pouvoir, font passer d'admirables agissements sur la *raison d'état*, pour se donner une justification de bafouer certains principes de simple morale." see P.A.J. Chateau-Jobert, *Feux et Lumière sur ma Trace* (Paris, 1978), p. 114, as cited in Stanley, *Ibid.*, p. 20. Eventually, Chateau-Jobert sided with Salan in Algeria and was tried in absentia and sentenced to death, only to be pardoned in 1968. The relevance of this episode to the Lebanese general command defections is quite evident.

80. Freiha, *L'Armée*, pp. 43-45.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
82. The United States planned to transfer \$150 million in ESF supplemental funds for fiscal year 1983 and requested from Congress \$100 million in FMS guarantees for 1984. An additional \$1 million was requested for IMET programs; see U.S. Congress, Senate, *Security and Development Assistance*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Congress, 1st Session, February 17-March 4, 1983, p. 301.
83. E.J. Dionne, Jr., "U.S. Instructors Again Training Lebanon Troops," *New York Times*, February 29, 1984, p. A1.
84. "Partial Text of Accord on Israeli Pullout From Lebanon," *Washington Post*, May 17, 1983, p. A9.
85. "Lebanese Army Gets New Chief," *New York Times*, June 26, 1984, p. A3.
86. Ihsan A. Hijazi, "Druse Start to Pull Guns out of Beirut," *New York Times*, July 1, 1984, p. 3; and, *Idem*, "Lebanese Militias Withdraw Armor," *New York Times*, July 4, 1984, p. A2.
87. John Kifner, "Lebanese Destroy More Barricades to Reunify Beirut," *New York Times*, July 29, 1984, p. 1.
88. Ihsan Hijazi, "Lebanese Appoint Panel on Missing," *New York Times*, July 12, 1984, p. A3.
89. *An-Nahār*, no. 15708, July 13, 1984, p. 4.