

Soviet agents who could not be traced beyond their code-names. Suspicion that there were traitors at large, fed hope among the RCMP that they would eventually be able to achieve further arrests and amend the rather sorry record of the Gouzenko-related trials, where a full fifty percent of the suspects were ultimately acquitted.

This was the milieu Bennett entered in 1954 when he joined the RCMP Security Service (the CBNRC had no position open for him). Measured against the Gouzenko windfall, the subsequent operations of Bennett's Russian desk provided mediocre returns indeed and some cases went sour. The Gouzenko model was, of course, absurd and RCMP expectations were pitched far too high. The RCMP Security Service did not have anything like the resources available to the KGB and GRU, operating from the Russian Embassy in Ottawa. But the Western powers were keen on finding more Gouzenkos and alarmed about the possibilities of moles within their midst. The United States counter-intelligence community was under the influence of, first, McCarthyism, and then the tenacious mole hunting of James Jesus Angleton.² With British traitors popping up almost annually, and with the United States urging vigilance by example, it was hard for the Mounties not to take the cue. Frustration inside the Security Service about its anti-Soviet operations led to suspicion, and as soon as suspicion hit on Bennett the outsider, the certainty of guilt followed.

While Sawatsky's account lacks much historical or analytical weight, he has performed a service for those interested in the debate over the role and future of Canada's counter-intelligence agency. The narration of this unflattering tale of RCMP operations lends impetus to the case for a separate, civilian-run security service, which the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau moved ever so slowly to create. Whether this new service will be sufficiently different from the old, only time will tell.

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Footnotes

1. John Sawatsky, *Men in the Shadows: The RCMP Security Service* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1980).
2. David E. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980).

Newman, Peter C. *True North: Not Strong and Free*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983.

In September 1984 Robert Coates, the new Conservative Minister of National Defence, announced that one of his first priorities was to

put the Canadian Forces back into distinctive service uniforms.¹ While this might do something for morale, the serious observer of Canadian defence matters could be excused for dismissing this proposal as comparable to 'rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.' For more than a decade Canadian defence policy has been subjected to this kind of cosmetic surgery which attempts to maintain the illusion military power where the substance is lacking. Fortunately, this charade has not been tested by combat for it surely would have been found wanting. Now, the new government has promised a thorough defence review, and that is all to the good. Indeed, it is long overdue, for there is no national consensus on defence issues at all. There is a need to redefine, in Bernard Thillaye's words, which national things "have to be kept safe, or secure, and from whom and what."² Furthermore, by what means, and at what cost can and should this defence be undertaken? There are many questions to be answered in this review, and it is up to the government to set the agenda and to initiate the debate.

That said, it must not be a 'closed shop' affair. Clausewitz stressed the importance of engaging the population in the definition of national military policies.³ This has not happened in Canada for nearly two decades, and the Canadian public is intellectually ill-prepared to contribute to the debate. Brian Cuthbertson observed in 1977 that "Few Canadians in any period of their history have been prepared to examine the defence policies of their day in a comprehensive and objective manner."⁴ The situation has not improved radically since. The military professional and the 'defence academe' are able to draw upon specialist journals and a small number of full-length studies (many of these, ironically, by Americans).⁵ Yet, even much of this amounts to 'preaching to the converted.'

The interested layman, who does not have time for academic-style research, is much less well served. Canadian newspapers by and large do not maintain defence correspondents,⁶ and the electronic media do not appear to have any knowledgeable commentators on the subject of defence. Books on the subject for the general reader are few and inadequate.⁷ Granted, defence has not had a high public profile or priority for a considerable length of time. Even so, Canada's news media appear to be almost perversely ill-informed about even the most rudimentary aspects of military affairs. Consequently, discussion of defence matters has tended to focus on the economic benefits to be gained from a particular program or piece of equipment, to the exclusion of the larger issues — whether the item is appropriate for the role it is intended to fulfill or, indeed, whether that role itself serves Canada's defence requirements. Clearly, there is a need for a solid work of well documented research, analysis and criticism, well-written to satisfy the specialist and the interested general reader alike. Peter Newman's book fails to fulfill those criteria in virtually every respect.

On the face of it, it is curious that Peter Newman should have chosen to tackle this subject at all. He seems to have no particular qualifications for doing so. Moreover, during his tenure at *Macleans* that magazine covered defence sporadically and with no more skill or insight

than the rest of the Canadian media.⁸ This probably explains the book's rather careless approach to the subject. It stands as a telling testament to the old adage that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.

He gets it wrong from the very start by insisting, in the foreword, that problems of Canada's defence posture are military.⁹ They are, in fact, political problems first and foremost, and cannot be addressed outside the political context. Any discussion of defence policy, posture, organizations, roles and missions, must be founded on a clear understanding of national goals, national assets, foreign policy objectives, and the nature of the threats to them. Only then can one assess the manner in which military forces can further national aims by coping with the threats. Newman has not done this. His explanation of the historical context of Canada's defence efforts, moreover, is wholly inadequate.

Not surprisingly, too, he is wrong on the meaning of the term 'strategy' which, by prefacing it with the word defence, he defines as "findings ways to avoid conflict."¹⁰ Strategy is something rather different and much more all-encompassing than this: "The art of developing and using military and other resources in order to achieve objectives defined by national policy."¹¹ This definition of strategy provides a clear link between national aims and assets and military policy, but such a connection is not made in Newman's book. Thus, it produces such curious anomalies as the conclusion that Canada must tilt the 'center of gravity' of its defence structure westward "in the recognition of our growing status as a Pacific Rim nation."¹² Nowhere prior to this has he described Canada's national interests and objectives on the Pacific Rim, what constitutes threats to them and how Canada's military forces could further and protect Canada's position in that area.

Starting from such a poor foundation it is hardly surprising that the book is seriously flawed. The chapter entitled "Threats and Counter-threats" is concerned almost totally with the nuclear threat. Nowhere does Newman address the proposition that Canada — as both a NATO front-line state and rear area — might be subjected to conventional military incursions in preparation for or prior to a war in Europe. He dismisses out of hand any threat to the North.¹³ Like so many others, his eyes are firmly fixed on the nuclear threat to Canada and can scarcely conceive of any other.

In his prescription for defence in the 1980s, the author's suggestion that 85,000 people could be persuaded to flock to the reserve forces in anticipation of a few tax-free dollars¹⁴ is as gross as it is ludicrous. The hard, sad truth is that the investment needed to make the existing reserve forces operationally effective. Further, an expanded reserve would be a financial burden that no Canadian government in the foreseeable future could afford to bear given Canada's current economic problems. The chapter on defence spending, "Bucks for Bangs" is in any case, a once over very lightly. Only 3½ pages long, it makes little attempt to place spending within the framework of defence policy objectives, force commitments and requirements, and the problems posed by the escalating costs of military technology. Indeed, none of the costly recent capital

programs is discussed at all. The financial/political dimension of Canada's defence dilemma is significant and deserves more considered treatment than it receives in this book.

The author accepts uncritically a view quite prevalent in the West which suggests that Russian history has given the Soviet leadership a heritage of defensiveness. Richard Pipes, a noted Russian historian, recently drew attention to a study undertaken by Russian military historians at the turn of the century. In it they noted, with some satisfaction, that of the thirty-eight wars in which Russia had been involved since 1700, only two had been defensive.¹⁵ So much for myth of Russian defensiveness.

Newman's figures for the strategic balance in 1962 seem to be in error. He gives the missile totals as sixty-four for the Soviet Union, and 1600 for the United States.¹⁶ In fact, the two forces were much closer in size: as of 1963 the USSR had 200 ICBMs and SLBMs, the United States, 648.¹⁷ Thus, Newman was off by about a thousand in his American calculations.

This is not to suggest the book is entirely without merit. The idea that Canada should replace its naval vessels on the basis of one per year in order to avoid block obsolescence, is perfectly sound, if hardly novel. The acquisition of a Canadian AWACS capability is a good idea. And the author has dealt realistically with the problem of Canada's commitment to NATO's northern flank.¹⁸

Unfortunately, this amounts to very little grain among a great deal of chaff. Furthermore, the author's writing style leaves much to be desired. Absent are the measured tones that marked much of Newman's earlier work; in its place the reader finds a breathless style that borders on the polemic. The pedantic critic will take note of an apparent contradiction over strength/readiness percentages,¹⁹ the result of careless editing. Scholars will be completely frustrated by constant quoting of sources without adequate documentation. No bibliography is provided.

The subject of Canada's defence deserves better treatment than it has been given here. It may be that war is too important to be left to generals, but this book is likely to lend support to the proposition that defence is too important to be left to journalists.

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Footnotes

1. *Globe and Mail*, 21 September 1984.
2. Bernard Thillaye, "The Global Strategic Setting: the Risks to the West," in *Canadian Defence Policies for the Future: Proceedings — Spring Seminar 1980* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 6.
3. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 89, 589-93; for a study of the

- relevance of this concept to modern war, see Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), pp. 5, 11-19, 33-35.
4. Brian Cuthbertson, *Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers* (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1977), p. xiii.
 5. In addition to Cuthbertson's commendable work, there is a growing body of specialist literature: James Eayrs *In Defence of Canada* series offers a scholarly and thorough examination of the historical development of Canada's national security policies. C.P. Stacey's *Arms, Men and Governments* covered the war years (1939-45). Two studies by Americans, Jon B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defence Policy*, and Melvin Conant's *The Long Polar Watch*, examined the emerging Canadian-American defence partnership in the 1950s. Colin Gray, who is British, produced *Canadian Defence Priorities: a Question of Relevance* in 1972, a paean to the 1971 White Paper. The *Canadian Defence Quarterly* examines the broad issues of Canadian defence from time to time. The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies has published the proceedings of its conferences and seminars, and now produces the annual *Canadian Strategic Review*. The Centre for International Relations at Queen's University publishes studies on Canada's defence relations with Scandinavia. The Senate Sub-committee on National Defence has released two valuable studies on manpower and naval requirements. The Department of National Defence's Operational Research Analysis Establishment commissions and publishes lengthy studies on a variety of defence-related subjects from centres of expertise in Canada's academic community.
 6. Ron Lowman of the *Toronto Star* is one of the few exceptions.
 7. For example, Gerald Porter, *In Retreat: the Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years* (Ottawa: Deneau and Greenberg, 1979).
 8. See, for example, Roy MacGregor, "The Armed Forces: In From the Cold," *Macleans*, 6 November 1978.
 9. Peter C. Newman, *True North: Not Strong and Free* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983), p. 9.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
 11. Edward Luttwak, *A Dictionary of Modern War* (London: Allen Lane, 1971), p. 183.
 12. Newman, p. 168.
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
 14. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
 15. Richard Pipes, "How to Cope with the Soviet Threat: a Long Term Strategy for the West," *Commentary* (August 1984), p. 13.
 16. Newman, p. 105.
 17. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1973-1974* (London: IISS, 1973), p. 71, Table 1 (iii), 'Nuclear Delivery Vehicles: Comparative Strengths and Characteristics: Historical Changes of Strength, 1963-73.'
 18. Newman, pp. 50, 68-69, 145-49.
 19. *Ibid.*, pp. 56, 61. On the former page the author says Canada's army contingent in Germany is maintained at 58%. On the latter he says the air element is maintained at 58%, "unlike its army counterpart."

Ollivant, Simon. "Canada: How Powerful An Ally?" *Conflict Studies*, no. 159. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.

Working from the premise that "Canadian affairs do not receive a great deal of attention" on the European side of the Atlantic and that "selective coverage inevitably produces an unbalanced picture," Dr. Simon Ollivant proceeds, in a short monograph, to deliver an even