From the beginning of modern times in the Western world, when states emerged out of the welter of the late medieval period, standing armies had two functions—to assure internal stability against outlaws, marauders, and rebellious subjects, and to insure security against the incursions of foreign armies. The former was a police function, and the subsequent creation of constabularies, gendarmerie, state troopers, and policemen permitted armies to concentrate on their latter role, making war against external enemies. Armies fought enemy armies in conventional war, that is, in accordance with certain mutually recognized and respected conventions.

The conventions included the legitimacy of warfare as an instrument of statecraft, the sovereign right of states to wage war, the use of regularly constituted and organized armed forces in warfare, or certain obligations concerning combatants and non-combatants, as well as prisoners of war. In other words, only states could wage war, and they could do so only with regular, uniformed forces.

The rise of nationalism eroded the conventions and spawned irregular forces: guerrillas in Spain against Napoleon's army of occupation, partisans in France against the occupying Prussians in 1870 and 1871, and similar groups elsewhere. Operating outside the conventions, they lacked the rights of regular forces. If captured, members were not treated as prisoners of war and were usually summarily executed as criminals.

The Boer War altered matters. Irregular forces, if properly identified by a distinctive badge, armband, or article of clothing, gained legitimacy. They were given, for example, the right to be treated, if captured, as prisoners of war and all the rights such consideration implied. With the extension of the concept of armed forces beyond the direct control and sanction of the state, came the extension of the notion of legitimate targets. In World War I the defeat of the army of the enemy state was no longer regarded as the sole object of operations. Rather, the entire enemy population could be attacked in an effort to undermine the will to resist.

Patriotism and total war further eroded the older conventions and prompted unconventional warfare by partisans in Yugoslavia, and the Maquis in France during the Second World War. The United States joined Britain by dropping paratroops, known as Jedburgh teams, trained to direct the underground Resistance efforts in sabotage and ambush. The U.S. armed forces also engaged in psychological warfare.

Following the war, the prospect of nuclear war and the need to prevent it led to a consideration of the conduct of low-intensity conflicts, below the level of conventional war between states. Toward this end, the U.S. Army established the 10th Special Forces Group at the
Psychological Warfare Center in 1952, the Special Warfare Center in 1956 and the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance in 1969. They dealt with special warfare, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency and psychological warfare.

Special warfare was defined as "all military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare." These are the three key elements of special warfare: the capability to fight as guerrillas, the ability to fight against guerrillas, and the acquisition and subsequent employment of psychological devices to undermine the enemy's will to resist.

Unconventional warfare included guerrilla operations and subversion carried out within enemy-controlled territory by indigenous personnel supported and directed by U.S. forces. Counterinsurgency consisted of all actions, military and political, taken by the United States alone or in conjunction with a legal government to prevent or eliminate subversive insurgency. Psychological warfare comprised all activities designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of the enemy, indigenous population, and neutral and friendly foreign groups to support U.S. objectives.

Colonel Paddock, who holds a Ph.D. in history from Duke University and served three combat tours with Special Forces Units in Southeast Asia, examines the first part of the story, how two separate entities, psychological and unconventional warfare, came together as special warfare during the Korean War. This was not an easy process as the Army was "hesitantly and reluctantly groping with concepts of an 'unconventional' nature" and only with difficulty finally managed to coordinate "the techniques of attacking both the minds and the bodies of our enemies."

Unfortunately, Paddock tells little of operational techniques and successes and failures in the field. Instead, his account focusses on the bureaucratic infighting that accompanied the process, the struggles for power and for clarification among G-2, the OSS (later the CIA), the War Department General Staff, and the like. Following papers, letters, and memoranda passing from one headquarters to another, detailing the evolving missions, employing far too many initials to denote installations and commands, he has written a bureaucratic history that will interest dedicated specialists but will be heavy-going for the general reader.

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