This collection of essays represents little more than an extended “shop talk” conducted between members of the American intelligence community (the CIA, the Defence Department, RAND corporation, Washington, and a smattering of academics). As shop-talk, the volume exhibits some dismaying traits — among them a far from convincing political consensus about the security problems of the United States and a relaxed and annoying use of jargon. More serious yet is the failure of the volume to address itself to fundamental intelligence problems. It would be a reasonable expectation on the part of any reader that a series of essays on “clandestine collection” would address itself to some debate regarding: the best mixture of human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence SIGINT); the problems associated with an excess of information (problems now faced by the vast bureaucracies of the CIA and, no doubt, the KGB); the limitations of the spy and undercover operative as a source; perception as a determining feature of the collection and analysis of intelligence; or, to close the catalogue, even a discussion of the role of “clandestine collection” in a democratic society. Nowhere are such problems dealt with in this volume.

Such expectations are created not only by the nature of the subject matter but by the overt aim of the volume. In a preface, contributed by Frank Barnett, President of the National Strategy Information Center, we read: “a prudently permissive exchange of ideas between officials and former officials of the Executive and Legislative branches responsible for the US collection system on the one hand — and knowledgeable private individuals on the other, may help to improve that system, at least that’s the premise of this endeavour.” An attempt to open the intelligence community to outside observation, criticism and reform is surely admirable and long over-due. It is extremely unlikely that anything published in this volume of essays would serve as a sufficient starting point for such a dialogue.

Frank Barnett prepares the reader for what is to come with a ladling of Cold War rhetoric and some fantastic scenarios, suitably designed to chill the blood — “nerve gas or chemical poisons insinuated by human agents into the White House, Pentagon and the command posts of our early warning systems.” Barnett is completely outstripped by Robert Chapman (identified as Former Chief of Station and Former Chief of Collection, Latin America, CIA), who contributes a piece on “Collection in More Open Regions” — that is, Latin America. After opening his essay with the relatively interesting suggestion that the United States should shift its focus of intelligence concern from the European scene to the “critical challenge in the Third World,” Chapman rolls up his sleeves and treats the reader to repeated talk
of the ‘ENEMY’ and such ludicrous identifications as those of organized labour as a mass movement of the communist party and the Catholic Church as essentially marxist in outlook. Indeed, one of the more startling suggestions made by Mr. Chapman is that the Catholic Church in Latin America should be made a priority target for collection efforts on the part of American intelligence. Readers who come into possession of this book should turn to page 46 for a really classic expression of “Reds under the beds” sentiment.

While none of the other contributors quite approach Barnett and Chapman in their use of Cold War rhetoric, there is a pervasive consensus on the nature of the Soviet Union as aggressive and expansionistic. This is, of course, a problem which has been much debated in both academic and policy-making circles. What is worrying here is less the consensus than the complete lack of critical examination accorded it. An allied problem appears in the discussion of “Wartime Collection Requirements,” contributed by Angelo Codevilla (Professional Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence).

Codevilla begins his piece with the argument that the United States devotes its attention too exclusively to intelligence activities associated with the exercise of deterrence, detente and warning against surprise. Some resources, the author urges, should be assigned to intelligence needs in wartime. It soon becomes clear that Codevilla is talking about the conduct of intelligence in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Yet the picture which he paints of a nuclear war scenario is absurdly unrealistic and marred by an extremely unfelicitous use of language. Here is what passes for Mr. Codevilla’s nuclear war scenario — “The writer herein assumes that any war against the Soviet Union could produce an operating environment for our intelligence agencies with many of the features such as loss of peacetime national technical means [?], vulnerability of headquarters, and reduced access [!] on the part of our official representatives to the rest of the world, which would attend a nuclear war,” [my italics and emphasis].

While the potential survivability of intelligence networks (as also with communications systems) may provide an essential element in the continuing operation of deterrence, the dangers of perceived insecurity are just as great in this area as in every other aspect of the nuclear confrontation. It will not do simply to shirk the issue of the essential distinction between nuclear wars and conventional conflicts. Nevertheless, a consensus does seem to operate among the contributors to this volume, that a nuclear war is both imaginable and in some way survivable (winnable?).

The final essay in the collection wanders off in a different direction. Mr. William Harris (The RAND Corporation) suggests the rather offbeat idea that American intelligence could be improved if only a “marketplace” could be introduced to regulate the buying and selling of intelligence products. Perhaps the marketplace is working better in sunny Santa Monica than it is in the rest of the world. In any case, Mr. Harris’ very un-Keynesian suggestion is nowhere accompanied
by any analysis of how such a marketplace would function (quality of intelligence seems irrelevant to the scheme) nor of possible shortcomings which might be expected.

*Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Clandestine Collection*, offers little in the way of reassurance about the quality of analysis tendered in official and semi-official intelligence circles in the United States. In some respects its political language is downright frightening in its crudity of images about the international system. If any wind of change is to blow through the CIA, it is unlikely to come from this quarter.

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**Footnotes**

2. Ibid., p. vii.


The acts of terrorism directed at businessmen and their organizations in recent years have created a heightened concern in the boardrooms of many corporations regarding the security of their personnel and facilities. Further, this violence, the kidnappings, bombings, etc., has stimulated publication of numerous articles and manuals aimed at preparing potential victims to cope with the acknowledged threat.

Following in the tradition of Yonah Alexander and Robert Kilmarx’s work, *Political Terrorism and Business*, Patrick Montana and George Roukis present, in *Managing Terrorism*, a series of articles directed at the corporate world. Taking on the ambitious task of providing a collection of readings which “. . . would be more than a guide or a perfunctory how-to-do-it manual, but . . . not . . . a pedantic treatise,” the individual authors essentially achieve their self-appointed task of reconciling operational concerns with academic