

The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict and Inter-American Peacekeeping

by
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Anglo-Argentine South Atlantic conflict of 1982 was the first serious outbreak of interstate fighting in the hemisphere in many years. One of the reasons the area has been relatively free of interstate conflict is the elaborate and reasonably effective system which has been able to avoid or ameliorate tension through a combination of *peacekeeping and peacemaking techniques*. In the aftermath of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, serious questions are being raised regarding the damage done to the system's ability to defuse or limit future conflicts.

Although the Falklands/Malvinas war was in many ways unique, there are a number of potential interstate conflicts in the hemisphere which offer parallels of one sort or another with the Anglo-Argentine dispute, and there is concern that this type of conflict may occur again if the system's ability to deal with it is weakened. This article will examine the fundamentals of peacekeeping, the institutions and procedures of hemisphere peacekeeping, the history of peacekeeping efforts in the inter-American system, the potential applicability to the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, and the impact of the crisis on future inter-American peacekeeping.

II. FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACEKEEPING¹

Nature of Peacekeeping

Because of the extraordinary sensitivity regarding intervention and sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere, it is necessary from the outset to dispel some possible misunderstandings and apprehensions regarding peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is not the imposition of an outside solution by a single nation or group of nations, and a military unit engaged in a peacekeeping mission is not a supranational force with a mandate to impose unilateral action. Nor does peacekeeping stem from collective security concepts under which an alliance's military action or politico-economic sanctions are triggered by acts of aggression.

Rather, *peacekeeping is based on the theoretical approach that certain types of conflict can be controlled or dampened by means of a neutral third-party presence*. The major weapons employed by the peacekeepers are their presence, their neutrality and their moral authority.

Rather than enforcement, the mission of the peacekeeper is to create the conditions leading to dialogue and resolution of the conflict between the disputants. Peacekeeping is thus not an end in itself, but a means toward permitting conflict resolution. By and of itself, peacekeeping cannot resolve the conditions that led to the conflict, and, if peacekeeping is not supported by effective efforts to solve the conflict, the peacekeeping mission may only serve to prolong the dispute by relieving the immediate pressures to find a solution.

Semantics of Peacekeeping

In view of political sensitivities involved, it is important to clearly define peacekeeping. While there is no universally accepted or UN-approved definition, the IPA's definition is in general use among both theoreticians and practitioners of peacekeeping: ". . . the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."²

Thus defined, peacekeeping can be distinguished from:

Peace-enforcing which is the imposition of peace by an outside force, either unilaterally or multilaterally. Such enforcement is, in fact, provided for in the UN Charter (Articles 41 to 43), but the veto system of the UN Security Council makes this type of action extremely unlikely. The only example of this type of peace-enforcing (and an imperfect one at that) was the UN Command in Korea which was made possible by the temporary walkout of the Soviet Union from the Security Council.

Peacemaking (sometimes called "peaceful settlement") which is that body of techniques employed to solve the causes of conflict through negotiations, mediation, arbitration and conciliation. As we shall see below, the inter-American system has a complex, deeply rooted and fairly successful set of institutions involved in peacemaking.

Peacebuilding which is the development effort in social and economic dimensions aimed at reducing the likelihood of violence.

The term "peaceobserving" is sometimes used interchangeably with "peacekeeping," but some differences in size as well as function of the effort involved should be noted. Peacekeeping contingents have historically been fairly large, ranging from hundreds to thousands of men. Peaceobserving missions have usually been far smaller, sometimes including only one or two individuals. Peaceobserving functions are more modest since the main task is to act as the eyes and ears of the international organization that sent them to the scene of conflict. In this capacity, their responsibilities can also include investigating, reporting and supervising armistice or cease-fire agreements.

Basic Peacekeeping Principles

With the accumulation of peacekeeping experience, especially at the UN level, there has been an attempt to extract and state a series

of "peacekeeping principles" which then can be used to analyze the relative success or failure of peacekeeping missions.³ Among the more significant of these principles with relevance to the inter-American system, we should consider:

—*Consent* of the principal parties to the dispute.

—*Impartiality and neutrality* of the peacekeeping contingent.

—*Balance* in the national and the political makeup of the force.

—*Approval by major powers*. In the United Nations, this means no veto in the Security Council; at the regional level, this implies support (at least tacit) by the single strongest nation or group of nations.

—*Freedom of movement* within the area of conflict.

—*Nonuse of force* except in extreme cases of self-defense.

—*Voluntary participation* by a broad representation of member states.

—*Simultaneous peacekeeping and peacemaking* so that the time gained by the peacekeepers can be employed by the peacemakers to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict.

—*Centralized Management* of the administrative and logistical side of the peacekeeping mission by a single element of the international organization's secretariat.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES OF HEMISPHERIC PEACEKEEPING⁴

At first glance, the inter-American system possesses a highly complex, comprehensive and integrated set of institutions and procedures for peaceful settlement, peacemaking and peacekeeping. There is, after all, a collective security treaty (the Rio Treaty of 1947), a detailed treaty on Pacific Settlement (Bogotá, 1947), and a charter (Bogotá, 1948) with a strong commitment to finding peaceful solutions to disputes.

However, a series of special circumstances peculiar to the inter-American system limit this imposing juridical structure and make its operating reality considerably less than meets the eye. In terms of a national power, the 30 sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere consist of a single global superpower, a half-dozen mid-level nations and a number of small states with limited resources. Moreover, the single superpower has historically not hesitated to intervene unilaterally in its own strategic, economic or political interests, especially in the sensitive Caribbean-Central American area.

Given these realities, it is understandable that the Latin nations in the system have sought juridical and legal means to limit intervention by the United States. Further, they view with great suspicion the establishment of peacekeeping forces or arrangements which might serve as a "fig leaf cover" for unilateral US interests. Thus, the inter-American system has an overriding commitment to nonintervention

and state sovereignty which frequently has blocked or severely restricted effective peacekeeping efforts.

The emphasis has, therefore, been on *peacemaking* and not *peacekeeping*. Peaceobserving has been employed effectively, but usually on a mixed military-civilian basis and with clear subordination to the politico-diplomatic organs.

The permanent military organs of the inter-American system have been deliberately kept weak and isolated from the diplomatic and decisionmaking elements. Attempts to involve the permanent military organs in preparations or support of peacekeeping or peaceobserving missions have been consistently blocked. Yet the inter-American system has not hesitated to tap military resources (men, equipment, expertise) on an *ad hoc* basis when required for peacekeeping or peaceobserving purposes.

The most successful peacekeeping efforts in the inter-American system have thus been at the lower end of the scale. They have usually involved limited peaceobserving with a strong peacemaking component in terms of mediation and arbitration on the part of the peaceobservers.

The most effective efforts have been those involving small-state border conflicts. The limited military resources preclude extended combat, and the nature of the disputes are usually territorial, non-ideological and, therefore, more conducive to neutral third-party dampening. The large nations tend to settle their differences through direct negotiations or outside arbitration, and their more sophisticated diplomatic experience seems to require less help from the system's peacemaking or peacekeeping assets.

Pacific Settlement and the 1948 Bogotá Pact

The inter-American system has a long history of impressive treaties and conventions dealing with arbitration, mediation, good offices, investigation, conciliation and other measures for peaceful settlement of disputes. These various treaties were consolidated into the American Treaty of Pacific Settlement drafted at the 1948 Bogotá Conference along with the basic Charter of the Organization of American States.⁵ It was envisioned that these two documents (the charter and the Treaty of Pacific Settlement) along with the collective security agreement (the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or Rio Treaty), signed the year before in Rio de Janeiro, would be the three fundamental pillars of the inter-American system.

Unfortunately, the Treaty of Pacific Settlement, while an impressive legal document, was politically unrealistic. It involved compulsory arbitration and a set of rigid and precise settlement procedures which few states could accept without fear of losing a measure of national sovereignty. The treaty shows excessive reliance on legal procedures and fails to provide for any third-party peacekeeping or peaceobserving mechanism in case differences should lead to conflict rather than peaceful settlement.

As a result of this emphasis on impractical juridical perfectionism, the treaty was not ratified by the necessary number of nations (including the United States). In addition, many of those states which ratified did so with extensive reservations. The treaty thus is not in effect.

Rio Treaty and Peacekeeping

Because of the failure of the 1948 Bogotá Pact, the system has had to employ instruments not specifically designed to permit peacekeeping or peaceobserving. Chief among these has been the Rio Treaty. Fortunately, the treaty, while drafted as a collective security arrangement, is sufficiently flexible to permit such employment. In point of fact, the Rio Treaty has three different functions:

- In the face of an external threat, it becomes the framework for a defensive alliance (Article 3.1).
- In the case of an intrahemispheric dispute, it can act as a collective security system, imposing sanctions against the aggressor (Article 7 & 8).
- For a broad range of other circumstances affecting peace, it provides for the calling of a Meeting of Consultation to consider *measures to maintain peace and security* (Article 6). It is this provision which has compensated for the failure of the Bogotá Pact and which has permitted a wide variety of peacemaking and peaceobserving efforts.

As a defensive alliance or a collective security system, the Rio Treaty is incomplete and vague since it does not provide the military infrastructure to make the alliance work and established no military organs. In fact, the use of armed force is only mentioned as a possible sanction measure (last clause of Article 8), and no nation can be required to use armed force without its consent (Article 20). The Article 8 provision for armed force has been employed only once (in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis) although other sanctions under this article were imposed on the Dominican Republic in 1960 and Cuba in 1962, 1964 and 1967.

An analysis⁶ of the 17 invocations of the Rio Treaty since its signature indicates that it has never been employed as a defensive alliance against an outside threat (except very marginally in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis) and that the majority of the cases were set in the Caribbean-Central American area.

OAS Permanent Council and Peacekeeping

The Permanent Council of the OAS has, like the Rio Treaty, been used to fill the gap left by the failure of the Treaty of Pacific Settlement. The Permanent Council is empowered to act as a provisional Organ of the Consultation (Article 81 of the OAS Charter) and has numerous attributes related to peaceful settlement (Articles 82 to 90). It also has available to it the services of the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement (successor to the Inter-American Peace Com-

mittee). Under these provisions, the OAS Permanent Council has launched a number of peaceobserving missions to investigate, and sometimes mediate, a series of conflict situations.

The Inter-American Peace Committee and now the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement have been relatively successful in the peacekeeping/peaceobserving area. They owe their success to the fact that their procedures are far more flexible than those of the Treaty of Pacific Settlement and especially to the fact that they can function in a conflict situation only if both parties consent to their action.

Permanent Military Organs of the Inter-American System

The historical resistance to powerful permanent military organs in the inter-American system has been noted previously. There are two such organs in the system. Both are weak, however, and neither has been permitted a role in peacekeeping or peaceobserving.

One of these military organs, the IADB, has existed since 1942. But it has been kept isolated from the OAS Permanent Council and has only the limited mission of making recommendations and planning for collective self-defense. It has no operational or logistic function. Further, attempts to give it an active role in peacekeeping or peaceobserving have been politely resisted by the OAS even though the OAS has employed individual IADB officers in peaceobserving functions.

The board does, however, have an important educational role. It oversees the operation of the Inter-American Defense College, a senior service school providing an annual high-level course of studies for senior officers of hemisphere nations. It should be noted that the IADB is not mentioned in the Rio Treaty, the Bogotá Pact or the OAS Charter, and its existence stems from resolutions taken at Meetings of Consultation.

The second permanent military organ is the Advisory Defense Committee. It has clearer juridical roots inasmuch as it is mentioned in the OAS Charter (Articles 64 to 67), but it is a hypothetical entity since it has never been convoked. Were it to come into existence, it would function for only a limited period of time since its sole purpose is to give military advice to the temporary Organ of Consultation. Nevertheless, it could, at least theoretically, be involved in peacekeeping if the Organ of Consultation so decided.

IV. HISTORY OF PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

Table 1 summarizes the inter-American system's peacekeeping efforts over the years. It indicates the peacemaking and peacekeeping institutions involved in each case, as well as an assessment of how well the peacekeeping effort met the nine principles for effective peacekeeping outlined previously.

Peacekeeping and Peaceobserving Efforts in the Inter-American System*

Dates	1932-34	1948-49	1954	1955	1955	1957	1959
Location	Leticia Trapezium	Border	Guatemala	Border	Border	Border	Panama North Coast
Parties	Colombia, Peru	Costa Rica, Nicaragua	Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua	Costa Rica, Nicaragua	Ecuador, Peru	Honduras, Nicaragua	Panama, Cuba
Peacemaking Institutions Involved	League of Nations	Rio Treaty; OASPC and POC; Ad hoc Committee of Information (9 individuals from 4 countries)	IAPC, ² which created a Subcommittee of Information which was not permitted to enter area	Rio Treaty; OASPC as POC; Investigating Committee with military experts	Rio Treaty; 1942 Treaty Guarantors	Rio Treaty; OASPC as POC; Investigating Committee with military advisers	Rio Treaty; OASPC as POC; Investigating Committee with military advisers
Peacekeeping and Peaceobserving Activities	75 Colombian soldiers served under the League of Nations' Administrative Commission	Ad hoc Inter-American Commission of Military Experts (5 officers) worked with Committee of Information for 2 months	Military advisers accompanied the Information Subcommittee to Mexico City	Committee of Military Experts; observation posts; aerial surveillance of butter security zone	Ad hoc observation team of military attachés from guarantor nations; aerial reconnaissance	Committee of Military Advisers (17 officers) supervised cease-fire and troop withdrawal	Military advisers; international naval and air peaceobserving patrol in Caribbean
Principles							
1. Consent	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial
2. Impartiality	No	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
3. Balance	No	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. Big Power Approval	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5. Free Movement	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
6. No Force	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
7. Voluntary	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
8. Peacemaking	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
9. Central Management	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	No

*OAS Permanent Council as Provisional Organ of Consultation

²Inter-American Peace Committee

*Data from these summaries came from David W. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 1973; *passim*, and *International Peace Observation*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 1966; Mary Jean Reid Martz, *The Central American Soccer War*, Ohio University Center for International Studies, Athens, Ohio, 1978; J. Lloyd Mecham, *The U.S. and Inter-American Security*, University of Texas Press, Austin, Texas, 1961; and James R. Jose, *An Inter-American Peace Force Within the Framework of the OAS*, Scarecrow Press Inc., Metuchen, N.J., 1970.

Dates	1959-60	1962	1963-64	1965-66	1969-71	1972	1976-
Location	Dominican Republic	Cuba, Caribbean	Caribbean	Dominican Republic	Border	Belize	Border
Parties	Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Cuba	US, USSR, Cuba	Cuba, Venezuela	Dominican Republic, U.S. Brazil, 5 other nations	Honduras, El Salvador	Great Britain, Guatemala	Honduras, El Salvador
Peacemaking Institutions Involved	Rio Treaty; OASPC as POC; IAPC; 5th and 6th MCFM ³	Rio Treaty; OASPC and POC; United Nations	Rio Treaty; OASPC as POC; 9th MCFM; IADB; ⁴ Investigating Committee with military advisers	10th MCFM; U.N. Papal Nuncio	Rio Treaty; OASPC as POC; 13th MCFM; Committee of Seven	OAS General Assembly	Rio Treaty; OASPC as POC; 13th MCFM; Commission of Guarantors
Peacekeeping and Peaceobserving Activities	No military involvement, but Rio Treaty sanctions (Article 8) were applied for the first time	Collective security, not peacekeeping; a combined Inter-American Naval Quarantine Force was set up under Rio Treaty (Article 8)	Military advisers; included 2 from IADB; collective security, not peacekeeping	Inter-American Peace Force (approximately 14,000 men, of which 12,000 were U.S., 1,200 Brazilian); IADB provided 1 adviser to OAS secretary general	33 military observers supervised cease-fire and demilitarized zone; US logistical support; IADB personnel used	Ad hoc military observer (1 officer from IADB) to verify British troop strength	28 military observers; IADB offer of assistance ignored, personnel used
Principles 1. Consent 2. Impartiality 3. Balance 4. Big Power Approval 5. Free Movement 6. No Force 7. Voluntary 8. Peacemaking 9. Central Management	No military peacekeeping involvement	This case was collective security, not peacekeeping	This case was collective security, not peacekeeping	Partial Questionable No Yes No No Yes Yes No	Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

³Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers.⁴Inter-American Defense Board

Leticia, 1932-34

A brief armed clash between Colombia and Peru over the Leticia Trapezium in 1932 led to an unprecedented situation. For the first time in the history of international organization, soldiers served under the flag of that organization, thus becoming international peacekeepers. The international organization was the League of Nations which administered the Amazonian town of Leticia for about a year through a multinational Administrative Commission.

In the process, about 75 Colombian soldiers served under the League of Nations' flag and wore international armbands. However, they retained their national military identity, and thus, the situation hardly meets the criteria of "impartiality" or "balance." Rather than peacekeeping, this must be viewed as a face-saving device to permit the other side to withdraw without losing prestige.

Costa Rica-Nicaragua, 1948-49

The first valid example of inter-American peacekeeping occurred in connection with the first invocation of the Rio Treaty in 1948 in response to violations of the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. The OAS Permanent Council, acting as the Rio Treaty's Provisional Organ of Consultation, established an *ad hoc* Committee of Information which, in turn, created a five-man Inter-American Commission of Military Experts. For about two months, they functioned as peaceobservers along the border, effectively advising, investigating and reporting on the situation to the Committee of Information.

Guatemalan Crisis, 1954

A similar group of military advisers was established to assist a Subcommittee of Information (created by the Inter-American Peace Commission) when the Guatemalan crisis reached a peak in 1954. However, the Arbenz government in Guatemala preferred to keep the matter in UN and not OAS channels, and it refused to permit the group entry. As the advisers waited for instructions in Mexico City, the Arbenz regime fell, making their labour unnecessary.

Costa Rica-Nicaragua, 1955

Accusations of Costa Rican-Nicaragua border violations in 1955 created a situation parallel to that of 1948-49. The Rio Treaty was again invoked, resulting in the creation of a buffer security zone (approximately 20 personnel were involved). The peaceobserving function also involved aerial surveillance of the area using six aircraft from three countries. The precedent of a buffer zone manned by neutral OAS observers was to prove useful in subsequent border tensions between El Salvador and Honduras.

Ecuador-Peru, 1955

Dissatisfaction over the terms of the 1942 treaty between these two countries led to increasing tensions. In 1955, Ecuador accused Peru of massing troops along the border and invoked the Rio Treaty.

However, the request for Rio Treaty action was withdrawn after a military observation team provided by the 1942 Treaty Guarantors reconnoitered the area and found nothing unusual. It is interesting to note that the observers were military attaches of the guarantor states stationed in Lima.

Honduras-Nicaragua, 1957

As was the case in previous Central American border violation cases, Rio Treaty invocation led to an OAS Investigating Committee that included military advisers. These 17 officers efficiently supervised the cease-fire and troop withdrawal called for by the Rio Treaty's Provisional Organ of Consultation.

Panama, 1959

A similar group of military advisers was established in connection with the aborted invasion effort by a group of Panamanian exiles in 1959. Rumours of additional boatloads of exiles on the way from Cuba led to the establishment of an international air and sea peace-observing patrol. No further landings occurred.

Dominican Republic, 1959-60

Acts of aggression committed by the government of Trujillo against Venezuela led to the first imposition of Rio Treaty sanctions under Article 8 in 1960. However, the sanctions chosen were economic and diplomatic, not military. Had the "use of armed force" provision of Article 8 been employed (an unlikely possibility), the resulting action would have to be considered "peace-enforcing" rather than "peace-keeping."

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

The US-USSR confrontation over missiles in Cuba was essentially a clash between superpowers, but the United States was able to get important hemisphere support by invoking the Rio Treaty as a collective security arrangement. Under the provisions of the last clause of Article 8 ("use of armed force"), a combined Inter-American Naval Quarantine Force was established with four nations participating. Others offered the support of ports and facilities. Because of the collective security aspects, this situation cannot be classed as peacekeeping. Nevertheless, it can be considered a notable example of solidarity in the face of a clear outside threat.

Cuban Arms in Venezuela, 1963

The discovery of a cache of Cuban arms in Venezuela in 1963 caused this country to call for Rio Treaty action. The provisional Organ of Consultation formed an Investigating Committee which included military advisers. The committee also specifically requested that the IADB provide two military experts to assist in identifying these weapons. This was the first time the OAS had requested assistance from the board. The situation must be classed as "collective security," however, and thus does not qualify as peacekeeping.

Dominican Republic, 1965-66

The inter-American system's only experience with a peace force was in the Dominican crisis of 1965-66. But the circumstances and nature of the force's creation cast severe doubts as to whether it can truly be considered as "peacekeeping." It should be recalled that the United States initially acted unilaterally by landing substantial numbers of troops before obtaining OAS support. Further, this support was obtained only with the narrowest of voting margins.

Under the terms of our criteria for effective peacekeeping, it should be noted that:

- *Consent* was only partial since the rebel group was opposed to the inter-American Peace Force (IAPF).
- *Impartiality* was highly questionable since the IAPE appears to have favoured the "loyalist" side.
- *Balance* did not exist inasmuch as the United States provided the bulk (12,000) of the 14,000-man force. Brazil's contingent was around 1,200, and five other countries provided token units of three to 180 men each.
- *Free movement* was limited by rebel opposition.
- "*No force*" criteria were discarded as soon as resistance was met.
- *Management* was divided between the OAS and each nation's command structure.

The net long-range result of the 1965 Dominican Republic experience was to increase Latin distrust of large peacekeeping forces under US aegis. To the Latins, it seemed clear that in such circumstances the OAS multilateral contribution would mainly be a "fig leaf" for unilateral US interests.

Honduras-El Salvador, 1969-71 and 1976

Serious armed clashes between these two states erupted in 1969, with an increase in tension in 1976. In both cases, the Rio Treaty was invoked, a Meeting of Consultation held and military observer groups created to supervise and cease-fire and associated demilitarized zone. The military observer groups in both cases were modest (under 35 men) and received considerable US logistical support in the form of helicopters, aircraft, communications and supplies. In both cases, the IADB offered the OAS its assistance, and, in both cases, the offer was formally ignored although the OAS employed IADB officers in the military observation teams.

Belize, 1972

In 1972, Guatemala charged that the United Kingdom was reinforcing its garrison in Belize and requested verification by the OAS. Acting under a Resolution of the General Assembly (a novel procedure), the OAS authorized the sending of a two-man team to check the size and equipment of the British garrison. The team was made up of a lawyer from the OAS secretariat and the Colombian delegate

to the IADB (a general officer) although the IADB was not officially consulted in the matter.

V. THE APPLICABILITY OF PEACEKEEPING TO THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CRISIS

On the surface, the unique nature of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis would seem to place it outside of the scope of traditional hemisphere peacekeeping experience as illustrated by the above examples. However, a look at the three principal efforts to mediate the crisis does show that a peacekeeping component was present in each of them, although their details were ill-defined. The three initiatives considered below were the 27 April United States proposal, the 5 May Peru-U.S. proposal, and the United Nations negotiations of late May 1982.⁷

The United States proposal of 27 April 1982, made to the Organization of American States during a period of intense debate, represented the culmination of Secretary of State Haig's exhausting shuttle diplomacy of mid-April. It was the more detailed and specific of the three initiatives, and presented the inter-related concepts of cease-fire, mutual withdrawal of forces, tripartite interim administration, and a framework for negotiation. Of particular interest to our analysis was the peacekeeping and peacemaking implications of the "Special Interim Authority" to be made up of representatives of Argentina, the United Kingdom and the United States, with flags of all three flying on the Islands. The basic mission of this Authority would be to verify compliance with the terms of the agreement; the Authority would be made up of a principal representative and staff of not more than ten persons from each country. The U.S. proposal collapsed on 29 April when Argentina refused to accept any initiative which did not assure them of obtaining eventual sovereignty.

The 5 May Peru-U.S. proposal was launched under increasingly tense circumstances following major losses on both sides (the cruiser ARA Belgrano and the destroyer HMS Sheffield). In essence, the framework of the 27 April proposal was maintained, but with a more limited geographic scope and with fewer references to implementation. Instead of a tripartite Interim Authority, there would be a "contact group" composed of representatives of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. This contact group was to supervise and verify the military provisions of the agreement and take over the interim administration of the Islands. Although the 5 May proposal was more ambiguous and, therefore, it was hoped more acceptable to all concerned, Argentina did not agree to the scheme and preferred instead, to stress the continuing negotiations at the United Nations as the best path to solution of the conflict.

The United Nations negotiations of late May 1982 attempted to provide a cease-fire and a climate for further negotiations to resolve the basic issues. The responsibilities for interim administration and verification would rest with a United Nations group rather than with a tripartite Authority or four-nation contact group as in the two pre-

vious proposals. No real agreement beyond this point emerged before the talks collapsed in late May in the face of increased combat, intensifying nationalism and emotion, and a sharp hardening of positions on the part of both Argentina and Great Britain.

Had agreement been reached on any one of these proposals, there would have been a requirement for a mixed, civilian-military, peacekeeping-peace-making element to be present in and around the Islands. In some respects it would have been a relatively easy peacekeeping operation; the islanders themselves (only 1800 of them) would not have been an obstacle and the withdrawal provisions of the various proposals would have meant that Argentine and British forces would no longer be in tactical contact. The distances and severe weather conditions would have complicated the logistics of such a peacekeeping operation, but these problems could have been overcome with support from the key nations involved (especially Brazil and the United States).

Taking the Peru-U.S. contact group as a test case, the application of our nine peacekeeping criteria to the hypothetical employment of such a contingent would yield the following results:

— *Consent* of the principal parties: yes (explicit in the approval of the proposal).

— *Impartiality and neutrality* of the peacekeeping contingent: no. The United States and the German contingent would be perceived as pro-British, the Peruvian as pro-Argentine, and the Brazilian as reluctantly tilting towards Argentina.

— *Balance*: yes. The lack of impartiality would be compensated by the fact that both sides had their supporters in the contact group. The balance would be more stable if at least one more neutral country had also been represented.

— *Approval of the major powers*: presumably yes. The Soviet Union kept a relatively low profile during the crisis, and could presumably be counted on to support the proposal if Argentina accepted it.

— *Freedom of movement*: yes, within the logistical restrictions imposed by distances and weather.

— *Non-use of force*: probably yes, given the withdrawal provisions, the low population densities and cooperative local inhabitants.

— *Voluntary participation by a broad representation of states*: less than desirable in light of the national positions of the four countries involved in the contact group.

— *Simultaneous peacekeeping and peace-making*: yes, the agreement's basic premise was that this would happen.

— *Centralized management*: not clear—the proposal did not address this nor did it specifically place the contact group under the authority of the United Nations Secretary General. In practice the United States would probably have assumed most of the logistical and administrative burden, with cooperation from Argentina, to include use of bases on the Argentine mainland.

In summary, this contact group would probably have been a successful peacekeeping and peacemaking experience had Argentina and Great Britain approved the basic proposal. Of particular interest is the fact that the two Latin American nations involved in the contact group (Peru and Brazil) are the Latin American nations which, along with Colombia and Panama, have had the most extensive United Nations peacekeeping experience; Brazil maintained a battalion in UNEF I (United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East) from 1956 to 1967 and Peru a battalion in UNEF II in 1973.

Included in the present analysis must be a brief consideration of a false, and perhaps, twisted, application of peacekeeping to the Falklands/Malvinas crisis: the possibility of a joint United Kingdom-United States (or NATO) defense effort to block any future attempts at an invasion by Argentina. Proposals of this type have surfaced, especially as the considerable costs of a long term, unilateral British defense effort became evident. Some of these proposals have carried the label of "peacekeeping," but it should be manifestly clear that any U.S. (or NATO) involvement in such a scheme would fly in the face of all of the peacekeeping principles previously developed. The presence of U.S. troops on the Islands would pose the danger of a U.S.-Argentine military confrontation and would create grave suspicion in Latin America that the U.S. had supported Great Britain for cynical, geo-political reasons in order to obtain a South Atlantic base from which to project power to the oil sea lanes, the Straits of Magellan, and the Antarctic.

VI. THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON FUTURE INTER-AMERICAN PEACEKEEPING

The full impact of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis on future inter-American peacekeeping efforts is only now beginning to emerge as passions cool and as a more careful analysis of the consequences is made possible. This section examines the impact in terms of two considerations: the effect on the inter-American system's peacekeeping institutions, and the relevance of the experience to other interstate conflicts in the hemisphere.

The Effect on the Inter-American System

Despite some dire predictions of doom, the Falklands/Malvinas crisis has not meant the end of the inter-American system with its peacekeeping and peacemaking functions. Angry Latin American proposals made in May and June to the effect that the Organization of American States should be abolished, or moved out of the United States to a Latin American capital, or that the United States should be expelled from the organization, have not endured beyond the emotional days of the fighting. There is, however, real and valid concern that the crisis caused a break within the inter-American system that may last well beyond the immediate tensions of the Summer of 1982. In late April 1982 when the U.S. abandoned its "evenhanded

mediation” and came down strongly in favour of Great Britain, many Latin nations interpreted this as proof that the United States had sold out and betrayed its commitment to the inter-American system in favour of its fellow Anglo-Saxon (and Northern, developed nation) NATO ally. This sentiment tapped the ever-present roots of anti-U.S. feelings in the hemisphere. Bitter speeches made by several Latin delegations in the late May OAS sessions vividly reflected the wounds inflicted by the crisis and the divergent positions taken by the U.S. and many of the Latin American nations.

In a broader dimension, the crisis exacerbated the basic tensions between the seventeen Spanish-speaking nations and the ten English-speaking countries in the Organization of American States. The latter ten nations are made up of the U.S. and nine ex-British colonies; eight of these supported Great Britain, Grenada being the exception.

The early proposals to abolish or to move the OAS are now being replaced by more carefully thought-out schemes which argue that the inter-American system has, for too long, served the U.S. purposes, and that the Latin American nations need to utilize the OAS in order to further their own interests more effectively than in the past. This requires a greater amount of “Latin-only” coordination outside of the OAS, and there are early indications that this is indeed occurring. This “Latin-only” thrust can be positive if the net effect is a more rational and systematic presentation of Latin American views within the system. However, it also has the strong potential for being a highly disruptive force if it pits the Latin Americans against the U.S. in a bipolar arrangement.

These considerations suggest that yet one more price exacted by this unhappy conflict in the South Atlantic will be a weakening in the effectiveness of the inter-American system, the Organization of American States, and associated peacekeeping and peacemaking institutions and procedures.

The Relevance of the Falklands/Malvinas Experience to Other Conflicts

One of the points frequently made by Great Britain (and echoed by the U.S.) was that Argentina could not be allowed to succeed in its aggression on 2 April because such success might be seen as a useful precedent for other nations with analogous territorial claims. Proponents of this position argued that firm British resolve, and U.S. backing, taught the lesson that aggression does not pay and that force does not solve international issues.

Others, more pessimistic, argued that the lesson really learned was that before using force to resolve a territorial dispute a nation had better prepare itself more adequately on both the military and diplomatic fronts. There is, in fact, among some Latin American sectors (especially in the military) a feeling of admiration for the way Argentina stood up to Great Britain and inflicted major damage on significant numbers of modern British ships. These analysts argue that Argentina did not go far enough, and that her defeat was due

to a lack of military preparedness (mainly in logistics, training and high-technology weapons) and a lack of prior diplomatic coordination to insure early support for her actions. This position further suggests that several Latin American nations (including Argentina) with unresolved territorial claims may now be considering the necessity of embarking on major arms purchases and of jockeying for diplomatic support in their territorial disputes. If this view is correct, the future may see a number of dangerous and expensive arms races, accompanied by a greater use of power-politics and alliances in the inter-American system that were evident in the past.

Some of the territorial disputes in Latin American which could become involved in this process include:

- the Beagle Channel Islands dispute between Argentina and Chile.
- the century-old tensions between Chile, Bolivia and Peru over the territories taken by Chile in the War of the Pacific.
- the tensions between Peru and Ecuador over the Amazonian area of Ecuador, lost to Peru in 1941.
- Venezuela's claim to two-thirds of Guyana.
- the Venezuelan-Colombian dispute over the Gulf of Venezuela.
- Nicaragua's claim to a series of islands (San Andrés, Providencia, and a number of smaller keys) which lie close to Nicaragua but are administered by Colombia.
- Guatemala's claim to all of Belize (formally British Honduras), where Great Britain has a commitment to defend her old colony.
- possible Panamanian-U.S. tensions over the process of implementing the 1977 Panama Canal treaties.
- competing claims to Antarctica.

Should the wrong and dangerous "lesson" of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute be learned by the nations involved in these disputes, and should the peacekeeping and peacemaking institutions of the inter-American system be severely weakened by the South Atlantic conflict, the hemisphere could be entering a period of tension and uncertainty.

Footnotes

1. The following three sections of this article appeared in *Military Review*, vol. LX, no. 10, October, 1980, and are published here with permission.
2. *Peacekeeper's Handbook* (New York: International Peace Academy, 1977), pages I/6 and III/3.
3. See, for example, Major General Indarjit Rikhye, *The Thin Blue Line* (New Haven: Yale University Press), especially page 3.
4. For a comprehensive treatment, see M. Margaret Ball, *The OAS in Transition* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969).
5. G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System* (Riverside, N.J.: Free Press, 1977), pp. 330-331.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Detailed documentation on these three initiatives can be found in U.S. Department of State, *The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Consequences, Documentation*, Selected Document no. 21, August 1982.