Sir Maurice Oldfield and British Intelligence: Some Lessons for Canada?

by

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Some time in the next twelve months the Canadian Government is expected to establish formally a new Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to replace that currently run by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). A senior civil servant, Mr. Fred Gibson, has been appointed to oversee the “transition task force” and to head the new agency itself. One of the major tasks facing both the transition team and the new service will be the recruitment of intelligence officers. The CSIS will not be able to afford the luxury of a “work up” period to break in new personnel. Consequently, the initial draft will come from the existing RCMP Security Service — which apparently will be seconded en masse to the new service for up to two years, after which time individuals will either become full members of the new agency or will return to the RCMP. For the long term, however, the McDonald Royal Commission has recommended that the CSIS recruit from a wider pool of expertise, including the public service, the business community and the universities. In respect of this last group it is quite likely that four years of public and, at times, sensational “trial by commission and media” has done nothing to make intelligence work a desirable or respectable career for young graduates. Nonetheless, it would be unfortunate and detrimental to the future of the service if young scholars and academics with good minds and analytical skills were to refuse to serve — or conversely, were denied the opportunity to do so. Rigorous training in the humanities and the social sciences can provide an excellent preparation for intelligence work, which depends on analysis for accuracy. Perhaps nowhere is this better illustrated than in the life of Sir Maurice Oldfield, late head of DI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).

The purpose of this essay is not merely to recount the career of a man who went to his grave “a gleaming legend” in the annals of British intelligence. Rather, it will attempt to shed some light on the nature and demands of intelligence work through the profile of one of its most experienced practitioners. The portrait is necessarily incomplete: documentary evidence concerning the British intelligence services rarely sees the light of day; hard facts are equally hard to come by. And Sir Maurice himself, the very model of discretion, cultivated “the gift of anonymity” so treasured by his profession. So, replete with unanswered questions, the shadows remain. The profile will have served its purpose, however, if it demonstrates that “a life of intelligence” can combine personal probity with a job well done.
Biographical Sketch

It is his birthright which immediately sets Sir Maurice apart from the sons of the aristocracy who had long inherited the positions of power in Britain's public and secret services. He was, in fact, the first chief of the SIS who had been promoted through the ranks — and solely on merit and ability. He was born 16 November 1915 on the family farm in Derbyshire. He was the eldest of eleven children. Supported by scholarships, he attended the local grammar school, Lady Manners, at Bakewell and continued to Manchester University. There he studied history under the eminent Lewis Namier and the latterly famous A.J.P. Taylor, taking an Honours First in 1937. The following year he was awarded the M.A. for his research into the position of the clergy in Parliament in the late Middle Ages, and was made Jones Fellow and Tutor in history at Hulme Hall, Manchester. But for the Second World War he might have become a renowned medieval scholar.

Enlisting in the army, Oldfield volunteered for the Intelligence Corps, which was formed in July 1940. He thus joined the ranks of British scholars and literary figures — Graham Greene, Malcolm Muggeridge and Hugh Trevor-Roper among them — who lent their brains and wits to the secret war effort. He would have received his initial training at the corps depot, followed by specialised training in field intelligence and security and interrogation at the Intelligence Training Centre at Matlock. He started his intelligence career inauspiciously, as a Lance Corporal (in charge of stores) in Field Security, in Egypt. Field Security Sections, consisting usually of a Captain and 13 other ranks, were responsible for security of military formations and installations. Capable of operating independently or attached to a larger unit, Field Security were often called upon for operational or special intelligence work. Several sections would operate in a given sector of a theatre of operations at any one time, where they were also supposed to act as a liaison between army commanders and staffs in the field and GSI (Military Intelligence) and Security at the headquarters level, as well as working in cooperation with the military and civilian police. Oldfield clearly impressed his superiors: on 13 April 1943 he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant. At about the same time he was transferred to Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), where he remained until he left the army after the end of the war. SIME, established in 1939, was a joint-service body responsible for coordinating the collection, evaluation and distribution of security intelligence throughout the theatre. As such it's role corresponded approximately to that of the Security Service (MI5) in Britain: counter-espionage and counter-subversion on British-held territory throughout the Middle East.

At the end of 1946 Oldfield, now a Major with the temporary rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, left the army, his war service recognised by the award of an MBE — the first of many honours he was to receive during his career. His talents were not to go to waste; he went straight into the SIS (then also known as M16), which was to remain his calling for the next thirty-two years. It is at this point that Oldfield's activities begin to
become somewhat murky. Officially, the British Government does not acknowledge the peacetime existence of the SIS. Consequently, Oldfield’s career from this point on consisted for the public record of a series of diplomatic appointments. The positions were genuine, of course, but they also provided a legal cover for his intelligence responsibilities. From 1947 to 1949 Oldfield served as the deputy head of R-5, the Soviet “desk”, which was responsible not only for “offensive operations” against Soviet intelligence assets world-wide, but also for internal counter-espionage, to prevent Soviet penetration of SIS itself. It is highly likely that during this period he attended a refresher course at the “tradecraft” training school at Fort Monckton, near Gosport, Devon. He may have received, as well, foreign language training through courses arranged in Britain and abroad by the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{11}

In 1950 Maurice Oldfield was posted to Singapore, where he served on the staff of the UK Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia. In fact, he was deputy head of the SIS station there.\textsuperscript{12} By virtue of its location Singapore was ideally suited to be a “listening post” and Oldfield’s responsibilities would have included running British-controlled agents throughout the region and the drafting of intelligence estimates on the extent of Soviet and Chinese communist influence in Southeast Asian nations. It was during this and a subsequent two-year tour (1956-58 under the cover of First Secretary at the British Embassy in Singapore) that Oldfield earned his reputation as “the best all-round intelligence officer in the Foreign Service, with a remarkable memory and an outstanding knowledge of Southeast Asia”.\textsuperscript{13} Intervening periods, noted only as “Foreign Office” in the biographical sketches, undoubtedly included stints as a desk officer at M16 headquarters in London.

His last foreign posting was to Washington in 1960, as SIS liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This was, undoubtedly, the most significant move in his career thus far, for several reasons. First, Washington was, and remains to this day, the largest British diplomatic post, indicative of the importance both countries place on the “special relationship” between them. Secondly, the two intelligence services had developed a close and mutually beneficial working relationship since the early 1950’s; indeed, the CIA owed a great deal to the British service in getting established in the intelligence world. With British power on the wane worldwide as America gained in stature, it was essential for Britain to continue to nurture the links between the CIA and MI6. This was not a one-way street; even with the decline of empire Britain still had valuable residual “assets” and influence in certain parts of the world, notably the Middle and Far East, that could be traded against useful information and assistance provided by the CIA. It was, therefore, a mark of the esteem with which Oldfield was held in the SIS that he was appointed to this sensitive position: with the official title of Counsellor, he was one of the most important men on the embassy establishment.\textsuperscript{14}

Oldfield returned to London in 1964, to a CMG from the Queen and a new Labour government. He might have expected to be appointed as “C”
— the Director-General of the SIS — but the Foreign Secretary (now Lord) George Brown, found him donnish and severe. He was passed over in favour of Sir John Rennie, and was appointed Deputy Director-General in 1968. The ultimate promotion did not come until 1973, under Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, but apparently was greeted with considerable satisfaction within the service. As “C”, with the rank of Deputy Under Secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), he had direct access to the prime minister (and vice versa) and represented his service on the Defence Intelligence Committee (D.I.C.), the government’s intelligence co-ordination body. Knighted in 1975, he was awarded the GCMG upon retirement 1978, the highest recognition ever accorded to a head of the SIS.

He repaired to Oxford where, as a Visiting Fellow at All Souls’, he commenced research into the papers of the first head of the SIS. He later dropped the project to return to his early scholastic interest, the medieval clergy. In any case, the respite in academe was brief. Following the assassination of Lord Mountbatten in August 1979, he was called from retirement and appointed Security Coordinator in Northern Ireland. After eight months, he stepped down owing to poor health and was succeeded by Sir Brooks Richards, also ex-SIS.

Oldfield, the private man, was a loner. He never married and family affections were bestowed on brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews. He was reserved, although apparently not shy, and had a reputation as a great story-teller and something of a wit. His London flat was stuffed with antiquarian books about Derbyshire, and for relaxation he visited the family farm and played classical music on the organ. A modest man, he left no memoirs. Undoubtedly, he would have been puzzled, perhaps even embarrassed, by the fact that he was considered, by readers if not the author, the model for John Le Carre’s now famous fictional spy master, George Smiley.

Sir Maurice Oldfield’s career clearly touched on many aspects of intelligence work. It is proposed here to discuss only a few, which were highlighted by events and activities in which he was involved.

Organisation, Control and Oversight

The intelligence service that Oldfield directed for five years is only a fraction of the size of the CIA — one estimate puts the total number of DI6 officers at 5-700, exclusive of administrative and support staff. From their headquarters, alleged to be in Century House on Westminster Bridge Road in southeast London, they operate principally but not exclusively overseas; DI6 has, for example, been involved in intelligence collection in Northern Ireland. Under Oldfield DI6 was streamlined and made more effective with tighter security and a lower profile. Greater use was made of “deep cover” agents. In the opinion of Frank Snepp, former CIA officer, British intelligence officers “man for man” are much better than their American “cousins”. The fact that they are so few in number forces them to be more skilled in intelligence “tradecraft” — codes and cyphers, tracking, radio communications, special photography and the use
of firearms. Americans also give the British high marks for political analysis. Dr. David Owen, Foreign Secretary in the Labour Government from 1977 to 1979 said recently that not only were DI6 reports valuable for policy-making but he found as well that the secret service was very broad-minded on delicate political questions such as South Africa. Much of this may be attributed to Oldfield’s example — his talent for the intelligence calling and his sense of humanity and personal dedication to democratic ideals.19

This is not to say that the service has been without its difficulties or its critics. DI6 (and its Security Service counter-part DI5) are frequently and perhaps justifiably criticized for their obsession with secrecy. In all fairness, blame for this tendency cannot be laid entirely at the door of the services themselves, which have good operational reasons for secrecy. It is a tradition which has come to encompass the entire British intelligence community:

"Those branches of government most concerned with intelligence services — the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Defence Ministry — do not like British intelligence work, past or present, general or particular, to be debated in parliament, discussed in the press, or researched in the universities. Debate in the Commons is more or less prevented by the conventions of the House; discussion in the press is discouraged by the D notice system; research in the universities, even on the past record of the intelligence services, is made as difficult as possible by denying access to even their earliest files. The official British view is that the past and present functions of intelligence services do not form a proper subject either for polite patriotic discussion, or for parliamentary debate or for academic research."20

It goes without saying that the British intelligence community were — and undoubtedly continue to be — appalled by the public airing of America’s secret “dirty laundry”. But the British penchant for secrecy has produced problems of its own: when the likes of an Anthony Blunt surfaces, the secret service is accused of protecting its own to the point of covering up treason. The “D Notice” system amounts to a form of censorship, a practice increasingly difficult to defend in a liberal democracy in the 1980’s. More important, the lack of information and, hence, of informed discussion — even in Parliament — raises serious questions about control and oversight of secret activities.

Constitutionally, both DI5 and DI6 come nominally under the Ministry of Defence (hence the DI — Defence Intelligence — designation), while in fact it is held that they are the responsibility of the Home and Foreign offices respectively. Ultimately, the Prime Minister is the senior government official responsible for the secret services, but he or she does not have time for details. Consequently, responsibility is shared with the Cabinet Committee on Intelligence, consisting of the Home, Foreign, Defence and Northern Ireland Secretaries, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with
the PM in the chair. But it meets only two or three times per year and the application of the “need to know” principle, keeps a great deal of information from it. Detailed information concerning day to day activities is unlikely to get farther than the Defence Intelligence Committee, which consists of representatives from the intelligence services and senior civil servants from their Whitehall “customers” — Home, Defence, Northern Ireland and Foreign ministries. The chairman invariably comes from the latter and two Foreign Office departments, Defence and Permanent Under-Secretary’s, work closely with the D.I.C. The Cabinet is not powerless to deal with its secret mandarins. Ministerial approval is required for any intelligence operation of significant political importance and the Cabinet Security and Intelligence Secretariat controls the secret service budget (now estimated at over £250 million), thus ensuring a degree of control over operations. Nonetheless, the intelligence services remain almost totally self-regulating and, given the scope for overlap of the duties of the two services and consequent conflict, confusion and duplication of effort, a modicum of parliamentary or judicial oversight would appear to be desirable.

Counter-Intelligence

Counter-intelligence, sometimes referred to as counter-espionage, is a broad area of security intelligence activity which defies easy and concise definition: at a minimum it may be described as “the identification and neutralization of the threat posed by foreign intelligence services, and the manipulation of these services for the manipulator’s benefit.” It involves preventing spies from penetrating government, military and intelligence agencies, protection of strategic industrial secrets, and investigation and pre-emption of terrorist activity. As another analyst has noted, counter-intelligence activities range widely in nature and purpose: “from aggressive to strictly defensive, from the collection of information to its protection, and are carried out in both the home territory and abroad, even within the ranks of an adversary state’s intelligence and security service.” The importance of these tasks need not be overstressed; suffice to say that a government department or intelligence agency which has been penetrated, deceived and manipulated ceases to serve the interests of the citizens it is supposed to represent and becomes instead a threat to their political system and to those rights and liberties they may enjoy.

Maurice Oldfield knew this only too well. Much of his career involved counter-intelligence work, and the field was his great strength. The most telling tribute to his ability in this area came from Brigadier Douglas Roberts, his superior in wartime SIME, who wrote of Oldfield: “He is the best counter-intelligence officer, both from the theoretical and practical point of view, that it has been my privilege to meet. He is quite outstanding.” Upon following Roberts into SIS to serve as his deputy he quickly earned the nickname “Brig’s Brains”. But, unknown either to him or his boss at the time, SIS had been already seriously penetrated and compromised: the first head of the Soviet desk, who preceded Roberts in that position, was none other than Kim Philby, later exposed as a Soviet
The double agent. It was neither the first nor the last time Philby would hoodwink Oldfield. Towards the end of the war, Alexander Rado, head of the highly successful Soviet “Lucy” spy ring recently shut down by the Swiss after German protests, had arrived in Cairo en route to Moscow. Concerned that he might be punished for closure of the ring rather than rewarded for its successes Rado flirted with the idea of defecting to Britain. He was questioned by Oldfield, who wired SIS for guidance. As head of the Soviet desk Philby handled the matter and, after consulting his Russian controller, instructed Oldfield to send Rado on to Moscow. There, after a secret trial, Rado was sentenced to ten years in prison. Some believe he was executed later. Then, in 1949, Oldfield briefed Philby before the latter’s posting to Washington as SIS liaison with the CIA. He brought Philby up to date on Anglo-American investigation of security leaks in the United States. One of these, originating within the British embassy there, was later to be identified as Donald Maclean, a close associate of Philby serving as a First Secretary and later identified as a Soviet spy.

It has been suggested that Oldfield, whom Philby later described as “formidable”, already suspected Philby’s duplicity at the time of the 1949 briefing. If so, he did nothing to stand in the way of Philby’s promotion to a position of extreme sensitivity, ironically the same position he was to hold a decade later. It should not, in any case, be held against him. Philby and his cohorts, who — it has recently been revealed — may have included even the head of the Security Service’s Soviet desk, betrayed and misled an entire generation of intelligence chiefs. But the evidence which finally pointed the finger at Philby — the defections of Burgess and Maclean and the failure of the Anglo-American covert campaign to overthrow the Communist regime in Albania — did not surface until after Oldfield had left for the far east. Nonetheless, he had to live with the consequences of Philby’s betrayal and that of others. Much of his time in Washington was taken up with trying to maintain an effective and trusting relationship with the CIA during a series of British espionage scandals: the exposure of Gordon Lonsdale, George Blake, William Vassall, and Anthony Blunt, and the Profumo affair. All of these pointed to a massive counter-intelligence failure — principally on the part of the Security Service — which had rendered much of Britain’s intelligence efforts completely futile and did incalculable damage to relations with allied secret services, especially the Americans. According to Joseph B. Smith, a former CIA officer, Philby’s defection in 1963 gave weight to the arguments of those in the Agency who believed that liaison with the SIS was a waste of time, that British intelligence officers were “a bunch of supercilious snobs worthy only of disdain”. The diplomatic wounds caused by the Philby affair would take a long time to heal. Nothing is known of the personal wounds: conveying the news of Philby’s final betrayal to the CIA must have been a humiliating experience for Oldfield, yet if he was embittered at having been several times out-maneuvered and embarrassed by that treacherous poseur, it is not recorded.

It is likely that he took the lessons of these security intelligence failures
to heart and it is known that as deputy director and later Director-General of DI6, he worked hard to make the service more secure. Nor were these efforts in vain — the credibility of DI6 and the trust of the Americans were largely restored under his direction.

Special Operations

Special Operations, or in the American jargon — “covert action” — constitute another controversial gray area of secret activity. They may be defined as “the attempt by a government to influence events in another state or territory without revealing its involvement.” This field of action encompasses a wide range of activities, from the clandestine purchasing or influencing of “friendly assets” in a target country, through assistance to underground or rebel forces, to manipulation, subversion or violent overthrow of a hostile government. Special operations are problematic for several reasons: first, there is the moral dimension. By their very nature special operations involve the violation of the sovereignty of nation states. They are underhanded, usually illegal, and frequently involve the use of violence or the threat of violence. Those concerned with the niceties of international relations can justifiably question both the need for such activities and whether or not states which profess to be liberal democratic should be involved in them at all. For proponents and practitioners to say that “we” must engage in them because the other side does is not enough. But it simply may not be possible to reconcile morality with national interest if normal overt political means fail to achieve results.

The second problem area is equally fundamental. If a government decides that some covert action capability is necessary, should it reside in the intelligence service? This has been the case in both the CIA and its Soviet counter-part, the KGB. The British practice, since the beginning of the Second World War, has been to separate the intelligence collection and covert action functions: the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was established in 1940 to “set Europe ablaze”, leaving the SIS free to concentrate on collecting intelligence.

When in the post-war period the SIS ventured into the special operations field, SOE having been disbanded, its first major action — the Albanian subversion — ended in disaster. A more successful operation — the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran in 1953 — also undertaken jointly with the Americans, found the SIS confining its role almost solely to intelligence tasks: providing intelligence estimates, recruiting agents and maintaining communications.

These two aspects point to a third important consideration — the element of risk and the political consequences of failure and/or exposure. Any special operation carries with it the risk of being “blown” — the operation would not have been undertaken if the political situation were not risky at the very minimum. The reputation of the United States in the third world has been damaged almost beyond repair at least in part by revelations of covert action by the CIA in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile and elsewhere. Not without some justification the CIA has become synonymous with torture, subversion, assassination, right-wing coups and
imperialism. It is very likely that the American experience impressed itself on Maurice Oldfield. During his second stint in Southeast Asia the British allowed the CIA to use Singapore as a staging base for a “destabilization” operation — ultimately unsuccessful and embarrassing — against President Sukarno of Indonesia. Later, in Washington, he had an opportunity to watch first hand as the CIA-directed invasion of Cuba floundered in the Bay of Pigs — after he supplied the Agency with British intelligence estimates which concluded that there was no hope for a popular insurrection against Castro. Consequently, as secret service director he discouraged initiatives of the “special operations” type, insisting that if an intelligence service was to be respected it should never confuse the collection of information with sabotage and assassination.

Terrorism, Intelligence and Security

When, upon being appointed Security Coordinator for Northern Ireland, Oldfield was asked whether he would also be concerned with intelligence, he replied, “The two are inseparable.” He was stating a truism of counter-insurgency theory and practice: effective security force operations against terrorists require, above all, accurate and timely intelligence. He was also speaking from experience. His wartime service with SIME involved him in the interrogation and screening of Arab nationalists in Syria, and possibly Egypt as well. As the war drew to a close Jewish insurgents began a terrorist campaign against the British administration in Palestine and the insurgency soon overwhelmed the capacity of the Palestine Police to deal with it. Lacking safe, secure facilities in which to interrogate captured terrorists, the Police turned for assistance to the armed forces. In 1946 Oldfield was involved in discussions which eventually gave the Police permission to use the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (located in the Suez Canal Zone) for the in-depth interrogation of a number of captured terrorists. Later, from his vantage point in Singapore where his position on the Commissioner-General’s staff brought him into direct contact with the Malayan Emergency, he undoubtedly learned a great deal about terrorism, counter-insurgency and especially the role of intelligence in these campaigns. Nor was his experience gained entirely by professional practice and observation. In 1975, he narrowly missed death when the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombed Lockets restaurant in Westminster. He lived in an apartment above the restaurant; the bomb was apparently intended for him.

The assassination of Lord Mountbatten and the multiple bomb deaths of the soldiers at Warrenpoint the same day demonstrated graphically the need for good intelligence. The PIRA, reorganized in 1977-78, was smaller, tightly organised in a cell structure. Army intelligence reckoned it to be a formidable force. To break the new organization would require better cooperation between the army and the police, and Oldfield was brought in to facilitate this. By all accounts he achieved a measure of success. Although he had no executive powers he nonetheless exerted a positive influence during his brief stint as Security Coordinator. Being
independent, he made the security committees more effective by allowing the army and the police to make their cases without one or the other dominant in the chair. This proved to be a catalyst to better cooperation between the two forces. Of course, the battle against the PIRA is far from over; it regained a degree of popular support during the 1981 hunger strike. But recent British success in using “deep cover” informers to identify gunmen — leading to their arrest — suggests that the security forces have benefited from Maurice Oldfield’s expertise and guidance.38

Closing Thoughts

The Canadian security service is unlikely in the foreseeable future to confront the myriad of security intelligence problems which consumed the life and career of Sir Maurice Oldfield. Canada has no empire to defend against internal and external threats and a major war does not loom on the horizon. Yet, there is no reason for complacency. We live in an unstable world. The political, social, cultural and economic ingredients of conflict are everywhere to be found. The tools and the practitioners of violence, subversion and espionage coexist in equal measure. They cannot be wished away. Canada’s democratic institutions, its considerable wealth, its proximity to the United States and its internal tensions make it a tempting and vulnerable target, a convenient sanctuary or staging base. But we need not be defenseless, and an effective, efficient, properly controlled and accountable security service will provide the best insurance against hostile surprise attack — from within or without. Much will depend on those who serve in it; the people of Canada have the right to expect that the CSIS will be staffed by persons of the highest quality and integrity. Canada will indeed be well served if the security intelligence service can attract men and women of the calibre of Sir Maurice Oldfield.

Footnotes

18. Le Carré, who had a brief career in British intelligence, insists that Oldfield is not the model.
27. See Pincher, pp. 30-37 and passim for details concerning the case against the late Sir Roger Hollis, one time head of the Security Service.
28. Boyle, Chapter 10 passim; see also Page, Leitch, Knightley, pp. 193-203.
31. M.R.D. Foot, *Resistance* (London, 1978), p. 8; see also Hinsley et al., I, p. 278, II (1981), pp. 14-17, which indicate that despite the clear separation of tasks there was a degree of competition and friction among these organisations because SOE, in the course of its activities, unavoidably become involved in intelligence gathering.


34. Pincher, p. 227.


