

# **Countering Terrorism: The Development of an Instructional Model for Appropriate Military Involvement**

*by*

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Terrorism has received considerable media and law enforcement attention during the past decade. However, part of the concern over terrorism by the general public and police officials may have been the result of sensationalist media practices.<sup>1</sup> Although research indicates that international terrorism in the United States has not increased significantly in recent years<sup>2</sup>, terrorism remains a dominant social and political concern of the American public. Much of this concern focuses upon (and rightfully so) the impact of an ambiguously defined concept — “terrorism” — and its implications for the maintenance of democratic society. Consequently, although the actual harm from terrorism has not reached proportions comparable to the harm from other criminal acts, the implications for its prevention and appropriate response to actual terrorist incidents pose significant problems for criminal justice officials. Public fear regarding terrorism and the lack of clearly defined preventive and response measures may produce “inordinate overreactions which may bring about stricter laws to combat terrorism and even repressive measures that threaten democratic institutions”.<sup>3</sup> This paper describes the development of the United States Army Military Police School’s Counterterrorism Course, its primary foci, and implications for criminal justice educators faced with the problem of developing appropriate plans for prevention and response to acts of terrorism.

The U.S. Army Counterterrorism program began as a far-reaching mission requirement of the Army of the 1980’s and was conceptualized in the mid-1970’s. The mission to develop a program was officially given to the U.S. Army Military Police School in Army Regulation 190-52, dated 15 June 1978. The regulation and later supplements require the Military Police School to develop appropriate training programs, as directed, which address those facets of the terrorist threat that require specialized training beyond that normally conducted for contingency planning, and to establish or modify courses as required.

The Military Police School is a subordinate command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and as such is responsible for the development and training of law enforcement and related personnel at all levels. Terrorism within the TRADOC community is divided into two separate and distinct areas. Countering terrorism directed against a U.S. military installation is a military police mission and function. Responding to terrorism outside military installations is a mission and function of the Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, which has total responsibility for the development of all the doctrine and tactics relating to low

intensity conflict. Consequently, the course described below is applicable only for incidents occurring on U.S. Army military installations.

### **Conceptual and Theoretical Problems**

During the initial stages of course development, two recurring theoretical and conceptual problems surfaced which had to be addressed. First, the conceptual ambiguity regarding a precise definition of terrorism becomes a major obstacle for practitioners attempting to develop appropriate response techniques. Despite the increasing attention paid to terrorism, there has been little success in reaching a definition acceptable to either theorists or members of the international political community.<sup>4</sup> Secondly, course developers were faced with developing a systematic attempt at predicting and preventing terrorism when much terrorist activity appears to defy rationality. Although these two conceptual issues are quite distinct, the implications for practitioners are highly related.

The difficulties in defining terrorism have led to an everbroadening category of violent (and in some cases, nonviolent) behavior labeled as terrorism, with little regard for considerations of the salient characteristics of what should (or should not) be considered terroristic in nature. Subsequently, terrorism has been considered synonymous with the "urban guerrilla," "freedom fighter," and has in many cases been limited to violence for political purposes.<sup>5</sup> These ambiguities have led many to categorize varieties of terrorist activity. For example, Paul Wilkinson identifies epiphenomenal terror and three subcategories of political terror: repressive, sub-revolutionary, and revolutionary.<sup>6</sup> Other typologies have focused upon geographical and national relationships in distinguishing among international, transnational, and domestic terrorism.<sup>7</sup> Other researchers maintain that any definition of terrorism must consider the outcome, victims, violence utilized, motivation and goals of the "terrorists," as well as other criteria in the process of terrorism to adequately define the concept.<sup>8</sup>

These conceptual difficulties have resulted in what Nicholas Kittrie has referred to as a "shotgun approach" by law enforcement agencies in dealing with the problem.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the definition adopted by the Military Police School remains broad and non-specific: "the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, often political in nature, through instilling fear, intimidation, or coercion. . . a criminal act. . . intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims".<sup>10</sup> Although such a definition does not resolve the need for greater precision in conceptually defining terrorism, it does limit military utilization of the term to acts which are identified as criminal, and therefore subject to legal constraints and due process. The implications for utilization of this definition will be discussed later.

Secondly, the issue of rationality inevitably arises when discussing efforts at prevention and deterrence. The problem is particularly acute when efforts at prediction are aimed at terroristic violence, which according to Wilkinson is "inherently indiscriminate in its effects."<sup>11</sup> Wilkinson further identifies the "essentially arbitrary and unpredictable" nature of

terrorism as one of its salient characteristics. This issue became critically important to course developers who envisioned a “threat analysis” instructional package as a primary focus of the course.

The extent to which human conduct is rational remains a controversial issue. Theorists in the social sciences differ markedly in their explanations of the motivations for human behavior: from the behaviorist’s focus upon rewards and punishments to the psychoanalytic preoccupation with unconscious sexual drives.<sup>12</sup> To the extent that much human behavior is goal-directed, this issue need not prevent attempts at prediction of terrorist activity, nor does it require that one theoretical perspective dominate efforts at prediction. Rather, positivistic efforts may proceed from an examination of the teleological nature of terrorist organization. Wilkinson acknowledges that when terrorists select individual targets “they do so, of necessity, clandestinely and according to their own idiosyncratic codes.”<sup>13</sup> An examination of such codes reveals that much terrorist activity is indeed goal-directed, however “irrational” it may appear from our perspectives. For example, Carlos Marighella identified two major goals for the urban guerrilla: (1) the liquidation of the chiefs of the armed forces and police and (2) the expropriation of government resources. Terrorism was, according to Marighella, a weapon the urban guerrilla should never reject.<sup>14</sup> An examination of the clandestine writings of other organizations supporting the use of terrorism reveals similar evidence of teleological activity which provides potential for scientific prediction.<sup>15</sup>

Although the two conceptual problems discussed above have not been completely resolved, they are not seen as so debilitating as to preclude advances in developing strategies for predicting and intervening in terrorist activities. Because efforts at preventing terrorism on military installations are subsumed under the broader crime prevention programs at most installations and additional designated personnel are not forthcoming, the personnel limitations of these law enforcement agencies *require* the “shot-gun” approach described by Kittrie. Second, because the response techniques developed for handling a variety of criminal activities (e.g., bomb threats, kidnappings, hostage-takings) are conceptually similar to the responses to be utilized by commanders in the event of terrorist activity, the definitional problem regarding terrorism is not of such magnitude as to preclude instruction regarding legally acceptable responses to a variety of offenses that may be subsumed under the label of terrorism.

### **Course Development**

The Military Police School, as a subordinate to TRADOC, subscribes to and utilizes the TRADOC Instructional Systems Development (ISD). The developmental process includes five interactive stages beginning with Phase I (analysis) and proceeding through phases in design, development, implementation, and evaluation. In conjunction with the ISD process the Military Police School Commandant requires that each new course of instruction have a complete job and task analysis performed which will provide the basis for the Commandant’s training strategy. This analysis must contain as a minimum:

1. A list of the critical tasks by skill level and duty position.
2. The conditions, standards and key elements (if available) for each task.
3. The recommended location (unit or institutional) where each task will be taught.

Since TRADOC believed that a need existed for the development of a counterterrorism training program on a near-term basis, a modified ISD process was required. The modification was based on the extensive time required to fully implement Phases I, II and III of the ISD process. TRADOC gave approval to modify the process in the spring of 1979 and development work officially began. A Management Plan with milestones was developed initially. This plan identified the first major activity as the development of a list of the instructional tasks. Subject matter experts at the Military Police School as well as other Federal and civilian institutions having counterterrorism expertise were consulted for input and guidance. The task list was validated by a jury of experts from various resources and the critical tasks for training were selected (See Table 1). From the critical tasks, job performance measures were constructed and validated. During the analysis phase an evaluation of existing courses within the federal government and civilian community was conducted to insure that a need for this course existed that was not fulfilled by another course; and secondly, to see what already available course material could be used to teach/identify tasks should this course be required. The next step involved grouping the tasks into clusters and where appropriate, identification of the instructional setting. Approval for all material compiled to date would complete Phase I of the ISD process and Phase II (design proposals) could then be developed. Approval of the task list was accomplished in May 1979 and design work began.

In Phase II the objectives were developed, testing methodology was selected, target population was described, and sequence and course structure was proposed. The target population for the course included all installation commanders and their staffs with an operational and planning role in countering terrorism. The grade structure includes majors through colonels or civilian equivalents. The course is primarily for members of the Emergency Operations Center and Crisis Management Teams as opposed to Hostage Negotiators of the Army's Special Reaction Teams. A number of specialized courses had been identified during Phase I which provide quality instruction for these functional areas; conversely, there were no courses that dealt with the command issues involved in threat analysis, prevention, and crisis management of terrorist activity.

The staff of the M.P. School's Directorate of Training Development were responsible for the development of a model for counterterrorism planning, training and evaluation that was to become the basis for sequencing and course structure (See Figure 1). Testing in the course became a key issue. What is the most appropriate testing vehicle to insure that senior officers are capable of performing satisfactorily the job performance measures? The final decision regarding student evaluation provided for the use of practical exercises in conjunction with each major


**Table 1**

**Selected Tasks For  
Counterterrorism Course**

1. 191-4102 Disseminate Intelligence Information
2. 191-4107 Use Agencies for Info/Intell Gathering
3. 191-4111 Enforce and Comply with Legal Restrictions on Information Gathering — OCONUS (Continental United States)
4. 191-4201 Evaluate Threat Analysis Capability
5. 191-4204 Describe the Transnational Threat
6. 191-4301 Evaluate Physical Security Measures in Light of Potential Terrorist Threat
7. 191-4302 Designate the Duties/Responsibilities of the Physical Security Officer
8. 191-4303 Determine the Legal Basis of Access to a Military Installation
9. 191-4401 Identify Personnel Protective Measures
10. 191-4403 Evaluate Measures for the Protection of VIP's
11. 191-4405 Determine Legal Basis of Military Protection of Potential Targets
12. 191-4501 Use OPSEC (Operational Security)
13. 191-4601 Determine Legal Sufficiency of a Crisis Management Plan
14. 191-4603 Determine Legal Basis for Command Responsiveness to FBI/State Department
15. 191-4604 Describe Negotiations Policy/Techniques
16. 191-4605 Evaluate Current Local Authority and Jurisdiction Status
17. 191-4701 Evaluate Crisis Management Capability
18. 191-4702 Designate Responsibilities for Counterterrorism Planning/Action
19. 191-4703 Evaluate Installation Counterterrorism Training Programs
20. 191-4706 Coordinate Counterterrorism Planning with Local Law Agencies, FBI, State Department and Host Nation Officials as Appropriate
21. 191-4707 Supervise Actions of the Crisis Management Team
22. 191-4709 Plan for Contingencies
23. 191-4801 Determine When to Activate the Crisis Management Team
24. 191-4803 Implement Use of Force

**Figure 1**

**USAMPS COUNTERTERRORISM MODEL**



block of instruction and a final simulation that would evaluate the student's capability to perform as a member of an installation crisis management team. Course flow and practical exercises, as currently taught, vary little from the original design.

Phase III involves identification of specific learning events and activities. By utilizing the counterterrorism planning and training model with primary focus on the target population, students are placed in a role-playing situation as a member of a mythical military installation. Since the projected target population would come from worldwide military installations, with varied jurisdictional problems, it was imperative that the instruction have a central theme. This mechanism and the utilization of a mythical installation provided standardization of instruction. To enhance role-playing, a scale model of this installation was developed and named "Fort Otan." Fort Otan has all the facilities associated with a military installation and the students are seated around it as members of the installation staff. Because effective utilization of such an instructional technique requires maximum "staff" (student) interaction, the student

population was set at a minimum of twenty, optimum size of twenty-five, and maximum of thirty. Students are divided into three staffs: red, blue and green. Each staff is commanded by one of the three senior officers in the class (usually a Colonel). This strategy has proven to be an excellent methodology to accomplish the desired results and has been a highly successful teaching strategy.

Other activities accomplished in Phase III included development of instructional management plans, review of existing materials appropriate to the course, development of instructional outlines and media, validation of instruction and development of a detailed Program of Instruction. The Program of Instruction must be approved by TRADOC and represents formal authorization to initiate the course.

The first three phases of the developmental process are formally directed by the Directorate of Training Development. Although interaction is maintained among developmental components, formal responsibility for course development shifts to the Directorate of Training and Doctrine when Phases IV and V of the ISD process are initiated. This shift represents a change in primary responsibility from the training developer to the instructional department. The major tasks the instructional department must manage include lesson plan development, instructor and media selection, practical exercise development, classroom selection and enhancement, and refinement and validation of the instruction on a representative target population. The target date for the first "local" iteration was set and a sample of students was selected. This first validation was extremely useful and from it the course flow and instruction were modified. The course was first taught to an actual audience in June of 1980. Although there have been numerous changes since then, all have been relatively minor in nature.

### **Current Course Implementation**

Figure 2 provides information regarding the currently adopted U.S. Army Military Police School's counterterrorism course. Instruction is provided in the seven categories identified earlier in the model. Although the course could be expanded to a longer format, the availability of the target population is limited. Senior military officials would be unable to attend an extended version of the course and the subsequent effectiveness of the course would diminish through representation by surrogates.

The simulation exercise provides an opportunity for school officials to determine the extent and effectiveness of staff coordination, the appropriateness and legality of decision-making, and the ability of commanders to maintain control during crisis management. Although the precise alternatives and decisions evaluated are not discussed in this article due to military classification requirements, a more general understanding of the utility of simulation gaming has been provided by Stephen Sloan.<sup>16</sup>

### **Discussion**

Although the model discussed above does not resolve many of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to develop appropriate enforcement

**Figure 2****COUNTERTERRORISM COURSE FLOW**

Day One	Intro and Admin	Intro to Terrorism	Intro to Fort Otan	Sources of Information Current Terrorist Threat
Day Two	Authority and Jurisdiction	Legal Aspects	Installation Vulnerability Determination System	Practical Exercise
Day Three	Operations Security (OPSEC)	Personal Security (PERSEC)	Physical Security Seminar (Phys Secty)	OPSEC, PERSEC Physical Security PE
Day Four	Crisis Management	Hostage Negotiations for Supervisors	Special Reaction Team Training and Tactics	Command Post Exercise
Day Five	Guest Speakers	Critique Graduation		

techniques in a democratic society, it does provide a medium for developing a greater understanding of the complexity of this issue. Although this course is limited to an examination of terrorist activity which may occur on a military installation, one of the course's most important contributions is that it reinforces that basic limitation: installation commanders face significant restrictions on the utilization of military personnel to assist civilian law enforcement activities or on the collection of information about U.S. citizens. In the absence of a substantial Army interest in, for example, the major problem of protecting off-post military equipment, such utilization of military personnel or collection of intelligence would represent a violation of the *Posse Comitatus* Act (18 U.S. Code 1385). In the absence of sufficient "Army interest," off-post acquisition of information or use of military personnel must be based solely on presidential directives under civil disturbance guidelines (Army Regulation 380-13, paragraph 7) or it represents a violation of *Posse Comitatus*.



Secondly, the development of such a course requires instructors and students (in this case, high-ranking military officials) to engage in continuous dialogue regarding the impact of various decision-making alternatives. Although the utilization of simulation exercises fails to establish fully the severe consequences of faulty crisis management, it does provide an opportunity to examine the abilities of military staff personnel to arrive at decisions that reflect a rational attempt to address both the political and humanitarian consequences of their actions.

The difficulties inherent in the selection and adoption of acceptable response strategies are formidable tasks facing western democratic societies. Most of these attempts will develop in a dialectical process where modification in existing policies is the result of conflict in the political arena. Efforts are ongoing in several theoretical areas regarding the identification of acceptable tactics of liberal nations to the threat of terrorism. Bassiouni's attempts to identify the proper role of the media in their coverage of terrorist activity represents one such attempt. Although the military in most western nations may play an important role in responding to terrorism, little has been written which identifies the *specific* activities of military agencies with regard to contemporary efforts at preventing and responding to terrorism. Since the limits of military involvement in activities of domestic concern will ultimately be set by a variety of factors, only one of which is public opinion, it is vitally important that the public, and academicians in particular, be made aware of military activities which may have a profound effect upon public policy. Although most military activities are not restricted from the public formally, considerable military involvement traditionally had been cloaked in bureaucratic secrecy, perhaps due to adverse reviews from longstanding academicians critical of western foreign policy. By identifying contemporary military activities concerned with the terrorist phenomenon, dialogue may develop between various military components and the academic community which will lead to the development of standards of military conduct acceptable in western industrialized societies.

#### Footnotes

1. M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and the Mass Media: Perspectives, Problems, Proposals", *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, vol. 72, no. 1 (1981), pp. 1-51. Witness the recent flap over suspected Libyan "hit teams".
2. National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, *International Terrorism in 1979* (Washington, D.C., 1980); John M. Gleason, "A Poisson Model of Incidents of International Terrorism in the United States", *Terrorism: an International Journal*, vol. 4, no. 1-4 (1980), pp. 259-65.
3. Bassiouni, p. 8.
4. Ernest H. Evans, "American Policy Response to International Terrorism: Problems of Deterrence", in Marius H. Livingston et al., ed., *International Terrorism in the Contemporary World* (Westport, Conn., 1978), pp. 376-88; Nicholas N. Kittrie, "A New Look at Political Offenses and Terrorism", in Livingston et al., pp. 354-75.

5. See Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (London, 1977) for a thorough discussion of these issues.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
7. Edward Mickolus, "Trends in International Terrorism", in Livingston et al., pp. 44-73.
8. Jordan J. Paust, "Terrorism: a Definitional Focus", in Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger, eds., *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (New York, 1977), p. 18-29.
9. Kittrie, comments as formal discussant of "Terrorism: Prospects for the Future", panel at the 1981 meeting, American Society of Criminology, Washington, D.C.
10. United States Department of the Army, *Training Circular 19-16 (Draft) Counterterrorism* (Washington, D.C., 1980) p. 1.
11. Wilkinson, p. 52.
12. See for example, Albert Bandura, *Aggression: a Social Learning Analysis* (New York, 1973); Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1920); David Abrahamsen, *The Psychology of Crime* (New York, 1960).
13. Wilkinson, p. 52.
14. Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, repr. in Jay Mallin, ed., *Terror and Urban Guerrillas* (Coral Gables, Fla., 1971), p. 74.
15. See for example *TUG (The Urban Guerrilla)*, a publication of the New World Liberation Front.
16. See Stephen Sloan, *Simulating Terrorism* (Norman, Okla., 1981), reviewed in *Conflict Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1981), pp. 46-47.