The Theory of Guerrilla Warfare

The acceptance of guerrilla warfare as 'sui generis' can be traced to the remarkable use by Mao's Communist Party of guerrilla tactics to wrestle power from the Kuomintang and impose on China a new socio-political structure. Hitherto, guerrilla warfare was treated in theoretical writings on war and strategy as mere adjuncts of conventional warfare. In pre-Mao writings on small wars, guerrilla warfare was perceived as standing no chance of success when fought independently of regular warfare. As Laqueur reported, Jomini, the famous French military thinker of the nineteenth century, saw no prospect of success for wars fought by partisans alone: "popular uprising without the support of a disciplined and regular army would always be suppressed".

It is not surprising, therefore, that writings relating to guerrilla tactics were, for the most part, concerned with the amount of scope to be given to small roving bands of irregular soldiers or partisans in a war or wars involving engagements between massed armies. The use of guerrilla tactics was also, significantly, thought appropriate only for small units of professional soldiers operating to undermine the enemy's war capabilities by selective acts of sabotage or for bands of partisans, that is, civilians committed to the defence of their values, institutions or beliefs.

Paradoxically, Karl Marx and Engels, whose works have formed the legitimising creed of nearly all of the major guerrilla movements in the 20th century and have become essential reading for guerrilla activists, shared the general scepticism about the utility of guerrilla action, although for different reasons. For Marx, guerrilla training and practices were ill-suited to the attainment of the discipline and uniformity of purpose essential for a successful revolution. Guerrillas, having been conditioned to free-roving habits, looting and revenge raids were likely to transform, in peace time, into thugs and lawless bands which can be easily attracted to banditry, intimidation, blackmail and such other lawless acts which are bound to defeat the purpose of a revolution — the liberation of oppressed peoples from domination and exploitation.

Although Engels was less sanguine than Marx in his assessment of the utility of guerrilla tactics, he was, nonetheless circumspect in his estimation of its value. Engels believed that guerrilla war was essential for bringing about revolutionary change for he saw guerrilla warfare as the only means by which a small or weak people can defeat a bigger or more powerful people. Engels, however, believed that there was very little prospect of success for guerrilla warfare in Europe, his reason being that "the fanaticism and national..."
enthusiasm" needed for a sustained programme of guerrilla action are not
customarily exhibited by "civilized people". Besides, Europe with its developed
interior, well-spread urban conurbations and efficient communication systems
offered little or none of the inaccessible terrain which guerrillas require as
sanctuaries. Guerrilla warfare was, consequently, in Engel's view best suited for
those areas of the world in which the terrain, the forest and jungle offer excellent
sanctuaries to guerrilla fighters. As far as the European theatre was concerned,
Engels shared the popular view that guerrilla tactics could only be meaningfully
employed in conjunction with the action of regular forces.

Although Engels perceived guerrilla warfare as a veritable instrument of
revolution and social change in those areas which offer excellent sanctuaries to
guerrilla fighters, in the form of large expanses of jungle and inaccessible
terrain, he was rather sceptical about the prospects of guerrilla warfare in these
"backwaters" of the world. His scepticism was informed by the total absence in
these areas of an industrial proletariat which, in the Marx-Engels dynamics of
revolutionary process, only can provide the leadership and organizational
opportunities required for a successful revolution. The abundance of a placid
and traditionally conservative peasantry did not, in Engels' view, provide the
best context for generating revolutionary zeal and prosecuting a guerrilla war
against an oppressive and exploitative ruling class.

The history of guerrilla warfare since the second world war has had the
paradoxical consequence of proving pre-Mao assessments of the relative utility
of guerrilla warfare both right and wrong. It has shown quite clearly that in the
European theatre, from which the factual framework for the evaluation of
guerrilla warfare in pre-Mao writings was derived, guerrilla warfare has very
limited utility. The general disposition of the civil population to accept the rule
of law, the democratization of affluence,4 the efficiency of communicative
systems, the existence and efficacy of complex and highly developed intelligence
networks, the presence of well-organized, well-armed and adaptable armed
services, and the de-ruralization of the interior have combined with other factors
to rob the guerrilla activist in Europe and North America of both the physical
and popular support which are crucial to his survival and the success of his
mission. The experience of the Basque separatists of Spain, the Red Army
Faction of Germany (better known as the Baader-Meinhof Group), the Red
Brigades of Italy, the Quebec Liberation Front of Canada and various groups
in the United States of America have shown that in the developed parts of the
world the value of guerrilla activities resides in keeping issues alive rather than
in effecting the restructuring of society which most guerrilla movements see as
their primary objective. Carlos Marighella's urban slums5 are yet to prove
impregnable and resilient enough in these parts of the world to provide the
sanctuary in which urban guerrillas could weather the sustained and superior
counter-attacks of the forces of the establishment and move on from a state of
strategic defensive or tactical defence to that of strategic offensive.

In Asia, Latin America and Africa the gap between pre-Mao theories of
guerrilla warfare and practice has been considerably wide. The victories of the
Communist Party in China, the Fidelistas in Cuba, the Viet Cong in Vietnam
through the success of liberation movements in Southern Africa to the triumph
of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua have repeatedly undermined the general premise that guerrilla warfare can only be meaningfully prosecuted within a war or wars involving regular armies. Rather than being a dependent variable in the context of conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare has in the last three and a half decades become a major instrument of structural change outside the geographical reaches of the NATO and Warsaw Pact sub-systems.

The credit for extending the role of guerrilla warfare in political and social change and establishing it as a unique and comprehensive mode of warfare goes to Mao Tse Tung and the Communist Party of China. Under Mao's leadership the Communist Party shifted from the orthodox Marxist-Leninist dependence on the urban proletariat and the strategy of attaining political power and structural changes in socio-economic relations through urban uprisings and popular revolt to a policy of retreat (tactical mutation) from the urban centres to the rural areas and reliance on the peasantry. Consequently, Mao and his men acquired, between 1927 and 1934, bases in various parts of Central China and sought to mobilize the peasantry against the oppressive feudal system in which they lived. Mao, indeed, considered the peasantry as appropriate instruments for revolutionary change principally because of their large numbers; but the all-powerful tide of peasantry which he predicted would sweep away the exploitative feudal system in China failed to materialize in the 1930s.

However, Mao's faith in the usefulness of the peasantry did not diminish nor did circumstances enable him and the Communist Party to dispense with the support of the peasantry. Between 1933-34 the Communist policy of fighting an "open war" against the Kuomintang was clearly shown to be unwise for the Communists were defeated in successive battles. The Kuomintang decimated their numbers and alienated their support by evacuating the rural population in large numbers and training a vast army of anti-Communist militias. Consequently the Communists were forced to move their army and the core of their support to a safer part of China, hence the legendary Long March in which about one hundred thousand men and women embarked on a journey from the South-West of China to the Northern Province of Shensi.

The remote, barren and inaccessible terrain of Shensi provided for Mao and his men a safe base from which they built up a formidable army and expanded the Communist Party's political base. In these tasks they were helped by the Japanese invasion of China. The Communist Party identified itself with the nationalistic fervour and general antipathy against the Japanese and, indeed, signed an agreement with the Kuomintang to co-operate in expelling the Japanese from Chinese soil. But while the KMT dissipated its resources on fighting the Japanese, the Communist Party steadily built up its forces and support as well as expanding the area under its control in preparation for the confrontation with the Kuomintang which they as well as the KMT knew would eventually come. Mao perceived the Japanese invasion as a transitory stage in Chinese history for he saw no prospect for Japanese imperialism. Japan was, in his view, simply too small to impose its hegemony successfully on China and all of South-East Asia and cope with British, American and Russian military power at the same time.
While the Japanese invasion gave the Communist Party the opportunity to consolidate its gains and demonstrate its administrative and political skills in the areas in which it controlled, it exposed the inadequacies and decadence of the Kuomintang's administrative and military machineries. Thus, when the confrontation finally came, after the Japanese surrender, the Communist Party had established itself as a better alternative to the KMT. In the civil war, Mao and his men dug themselves into the countryside in readiness for a protracted war. The Communist Party gradually gained control of the rural areas and the support of the rural population. The KMT retreated and concentrated their forces in the urban centres where they were gradually surrounded and systematically overpowered by Mao's revolutionary army. The revolutionary tide of peasantry which had failed to evolve in the '30s finally sprung into life and swept away the KMT from power in China.

The success of the Communist Party in China undermined some assumptions about the nature and utility of guerrilla warfare. In the first place it showed that guerrilla warfare can have a life of its own and be used independently to attain specific political/socio-economic objectives. Mao and his men conducted their struggle first against the Japanese and then against the Kuomintang mostly through guerrilla tactics particularly after the failure of the policy of “open war” against the KMT. The Red Army was only progressively transformed into regular formations in the final stages of the civil war when it became necessary to meet the enemy on his own territory — the urban centres — and demolish his last resistance in a decisive way. The transformation of the Red Army from a guerrilla force into a regular army later formed the basis of Mao's prescription that all guerrilla armies must be transformed into regular armies in the final stages of the revolution not only for the purposes of eliminating the enemy in a final and decisive assault but also for the purposes of preparing the ground for effective control of the state after a successful revolution.

The transformation of the Red Army into a regular army demonstrated that guerrilla bands can be organized and managed in the post-revolution period in such a way that the tendency towards individualism and lawlessness which Marx saw as a major flaw in the use of guerrilla warfare for revolutionary purposes is, for the most part, eliminated or effectively controlled.

Besides, the success of Mao and the Communist Party in China showed that the peasantry can be mobilized for revolution. Although it is true, following Marx, that peasants being generally gullible and conservative are usually resistant to change, the experience of China's revolution pointed to the possibility of harnessing the stability, sturdiness and the numerical strength of the peasantry for revolutionary change.

Finally, the revolution in China showed, in contradiction to Engels' assessment, that people outside the "civilized world" — in Asia, Africa and Latin America — were capable of taking advantages which their environment offered to overthrow oppressive and unwanted socio-economic structures. This has been demonstrated in Cuba, in Vietnam, in Algeria, in Portuguese Africa and more recently in Nicaragua.
Guerrilla Warfare in Africa

The African continent has proved a very fertile ground for guerrilla warfare. There have been no less than ten attempts, since the second world war, to force political or socio-economic changes in various parts of Africa through guerrilla warfare. The attraction of guerrilla warfare to African liberation and nationalist movements is not altogether surprising. Most of Africa offers excellent sanctuaries — either in the form of inhospitable desert or inaccessible jungle — to guerrilla fighters. The demographic distribution of population and the pattern of development in Africa also favour the guerrilla activist. With most of the population of Africa residing in primitive rural conditions the guerrilla is presented with both a deprived, alienated population and a deprived environment, both of which are excellent conditions for revolution.

There is, indeed, a general acceptance on the African sub-continent of the selective utility of guerrilla war as a means for achieving political and socio-economic changes. This acceptance is institutionalized in the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity, a committee charged with the duty of co-ordinating and supporting revolutionary wars directed against colonial powers and white-dominated minority regimes on the African continent.

It must be pointed out that the acceptance of the idea of guerrilla war in the highest levels of African politics is much less the result of mere enchantment with and admiration for the ideas and successes of men like Mao Tse Tung, Vo Giap or Che Guevara than it is of the failure of non-violent means in the attempt to achieve desired political and socio-economic changes in some parts of Africa. Put differently, the setting up of the “African Liberation Committee” in 1963 meant the rejection of Gandhi’s idea of passive resistance which had dominated the thinking of African nationalists in the forties, fifties and early sixties in favour of Frantz Fanon’s call for revolutionary violence. The presence of an intransigent colonial power (Portugal) and the existence of defiant white minority regimes (South Africa; Rhodesia) were the obvious catalysts for such a conversion.

This is by no means to suggest that guerrilla struggle only began in sub-Saharan Africa with the establishment of the African Liberation Committee. On the contrary, as early as 1952 the Kikuyu tribe of Kenya in East Africa had found in guerrilla war a very useful weapon for ending British colonial rule in Kenya and for creating a political vacuum which they sought to fill. The “Mau Mau” Movement as the Kikuyu rebellion came to be known dented the myth of the invincibility of the colonial military machinery and pointed to the possibility of achieving political change in Black Africa through violence. But rapid decolonization in the late fifties and early sixties meant that the great majority of sub-Saharan colonies did not have the need nor the opportunity to follow the example of Kenya.

If the Mau Mau movement in Kenya was the first dramatization of guerrilla war in sub-Saharan Africa it was also the least sophisticated, in ideological terms that is, of such wars. It was fought for very limited objectives; simply, the replacement of a British-controlled political structure with that of a Kikuyu-controlled structure; it was, in other words, a war to change the materials which
made up the structure rather than the structure itself. Hence the "Mau Mau" movement was more in the tradition of inter-tribal competition for control of distributive power (political power). The movement's strategy was, consequently, very simple; it was to kill as many of the settlers as would not only make continued settlement in Kenya a dangerous gamble but also create antipathy, in the Mother country, towards continued imperial relations with Kenya. Besides, the locus of recruitment of fighting men was primordial; the Mau Mau Movement was essentially a Kikuyu Movement hence the Kikuyu, awakened to the chance of pre-eminence in post-colonial Kenya, provided the support and sanctuary as well as the fighting men for the movement. "Mau Mau" recruiters administered an "oath of unity" based upon Kikuyu solidarity and demanding strict secrecy and total commitment.9

Although it can be suggested that the "Mau Mau" rebellion was inspired by the example of Mao Tse Tung in China, it is doubtful whether Mao's thoughts had any significant influence on the organization and mode of operation of the movement. Any manifestation of Mao's prescriptions in the operation of the movement, such as reliance on the peasantry (Kikuyu peasants, for the most part) and the use of sanctuaries (remote Kikuyu villages), must have come through accidental approximation rather than design. This cannot be said for the subsequent guerrilla struggles which the sub-continent has witnessed or is currently witnessing.

The many guerrilla struggles that have taken or are taking place in Africa can be classified into four main categories. The first category is that with which the "Mau Mau" movement in Kenya has already been identified, that is, Wars against colonial Powers. This specie of guerrilla war has been the most successful on the African continent as witnessed by the dramatic victories of revolutionary movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau against a Portugal reluctant to relinquish its Imperial status. The second category embraces Wars against white-dominated minority regimes: this is the specie of guerrilla war which currently pre-occupies the African Liberation Committee and such wars have been or are being fought out in Rhodesia and in Namibia (South West Africa). The third category may be described as Wars for National self-determination: this specie of guerrilla war has been dramatized in Southern Sudan and is currently being fought out in Eritrea (Ethiopia). The fourth and last category encompasses Wars to overthrow Indigenous governments or Indigenously-controlled socio-economic or political structures; the Republic of Chad, Zaire and Angola are the three most obvious arenas where this kind of guerrilla war has been or is being dramatized. It is possible to reduce the categories to two in which case the variant which has been described above as wars against white-dominated minority regimes may be subsumed under the category of Wars against colonial Powers. In the same way, the variant which we describe as Wars for National self-determination may be included in the category of Wars to overthrow Indigenous Governments or Indigenously-controlled socio-economic/political structures.

Wars in these two categories have common antecedents in the colonial history of Africa and borrow considerably from the pool of guerrilla experience, tactics and doctrine. However, there is a noticeable disparity in the pattern of results.
attending wars in the two categories. Whereas, *Wars against colonial Powers* have been attended by almost total success, the efforts of revolutionary and nationalist groups to enforce new political arrangements or overthrow existing socio-economic structures have met with little or no success.

**The Pattern of Resistance to Indigenous Governments**

The various wars which emanate from attempts by groups to alter existing political arrangements in Africa and create new states, as in Eritrea, or overthrow indigenous governments in pursuit of a new vision of socio-political order have certain features in common:

1. they have tended to occur in multi-ethnic or multi-racial states;
2. they have tended to occur in states where race or tribe is a major instrument in the control and distribution of political and economic power as well as a decisive element in the exclusion of certain groups from the economic and political process;
3. these wars have tended to represent the attempts by a racial or ethnic group to alter what is perceived as the monopoly of political and economic power by another racial or ethnic group;
4. these wars have generally been motivated by primarily nationalistic as distinguished from revolutionary objectives.

These general propositions are more or less true of the sixteen-year civil war in the Sudan, the Eritrean War of Secession in Ethiopia, the Civil War in Chad, the invasions of Zaire and the guerrilla war being waged by UNITA against the MPLA-controlled government of Angola.

In the Sudan, Eritrea and Chad racial differences have combined with cultural and religious differences to produce disaffection and violent revolt against the state whilst in Zaire and Angola tribalism is the principal source of political instability and insurrection. In the Sudan the domination of political and economic power by the North and its Arabic elements and the exclusion of the Negroid population of the three Southern provinces prepared the grounds for communal distrust and the outbreak of civil violence in 1955. The revolt in the South which lasted for sixteen years represented the rejection of the structure of power and privileges in the Sudan by the South and the attempt to redress the imbalance inherent in this structure. Significantly, the civil war in Chad was catalysed by the same phenomenon with the exception that the imbalance in the structure of power and privileges was in favour of the Negroid South. The Negroid tribes of Southern Chad by virtue of their education and assimilation of French culture dominated the apparatus of state power and the economy much to the exclusion of the larger Nilotic tribes of the Sahel and Tibesti Mountains with their Arabic antecedents and Islamic orientation. In Ethiopia, as well, racism and religion have been potent factors in social disequilibrium and communal violence. The Eritreans with their claim to Arabic antecedents and their Islamic religion have been ill at ease in an Ethiopia whose political and economic institutions are dominated by Christians of the Coptic faith.

In Zaire and Angola the pattern of tribal or racial domination and exclusion is not so clear-cut. In Zaire, Mobutu’s reliance on men from his home province
of Equateur and the formidable presence of elements from this province in the bureaucracy and the business circle have given rise to resentment on the part of other tribes. It is doubtful, however, whether there has been an organised and systematic attempt to exclude men from other tribes from political power and the economy as Albert Ndele, a former Governor of Zaire’s Central Bank, would like the world to believe:

“Men from Kasai, Katanga and Bakongo have been systematically put aside in the new state system, systematically deprived of positions and maltreated. Young officers, even those trained overseas, come back to find that if they are not from Equateur there is no possibility of advancement. The most influential people in the administration are now also from this region . . . Beyond that the whole of commerce, at least in consumer goods, is in the hands of the President’s own family. What Mobutu has done is to tribalise and regionalise all the key posts in public administration.”

The presence of men like Karl i Bond in the top hierarchy of power and of Ndele himself before his disenchantment and retreat from Zaire suggests a conscious, if not successful, attempt to encourage national representation in the hierarchy of political, bureaucratic and economic power. This is by no means to suggest that tribalism is not an important element in the calculus of power in Zaire. The suggestion here is that Zaire’s problems cannot be explained simply in terms of the resentment on the part of other tribal groups at the dominance of the President’s tribesmen in the economy and the apparatus of state power. Tribalism in the absence of nationally accepted channels for articulating interests remains the most important form of social organisation in Zaire and the most important source of social disequilibrium. The invasions of Shaba province in 1977 and 1978 represent this articulation of interests through tribal groupings.

In Angola, UNITA’s continuing guerrilla war against the force of the MPLA-controlled government is motivated by both the reluctance of UNITA to accept the sovereignty of the MPLA-controlled state over the largest ethnic group in Angola — the Ovimbundu — which it represents and from which it draws its support, as well as the desire to enforce Ovimbundu participation, on equal terms with other tribal groups (the Bakongo and the Mbundu), in the political and economic processes in Angola.

The Roots of Failure

Whatever their causes and tactics guerrilla groups have not been too successful in altering the structure of power in indigenously controlled systems. The reason for this general lack of success lies basically in the factor of racism and tribalism. The success of guerrilla or nationalist groups in uprooting colonial regimes derives essentially not from actual military defeats but in psychological victory over the Imperial power. Most colonial wars have ended in favour of the nationalist movements principally because the nationalists succeeded in making the territory in dispute “too unprofitable and politically difficult for the colonial power”.12 In the case of indigenous regimes there is little prospect for such a
psychological victory because the regime or the tribe which it represents is often psychologically committed to the territory in dispute. The race or tribe under siege often has nowhere to go and must fight to the bitter end. In Chad, where the forces of Goukoni Waddaye and Hissen Habré succeeded in forcing Félix Malloum to hand over power, their achievement was due essentially to the collapse of Malloum’s military support rather than any attenuation in the psychological resolve of Malloum and the tribal groupings whose interests he represented and protected.

Another major factor responsible for the relative lack of success of guerrilla wars directed against indigenous governments is that in Africa the advantage is always on the side of incumbent governments. The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity disavows interference in the internal affairs of fellow member states. Consequently, the African Liberation Committee has no place within its statutory responsibilities for revolutionary or nationalist movements aiming to overthrow African regimes, however morally justified their case may be. This reluctance on the part of African states to get involved in domestic wars in African states has tended to detract from the legitimacy of insurrectionist movements. Indeed, the OAU is more often inclined to encourage national reconciliation with its implication of restoring the status quo which the insurrectionists would like to overthrow in the first place.

African apathy to domestic insurrections has also tended to affect the volume and intensity of external support for insurrectionist movements. The big powers have generally been reluctant to give overt support to anti-government forces. More often than not, the incumbent governments have been more successful in attracting foreign support in the proportion required to swing the balance of war in their favour. The Government of Sudan at one time or another received support from the Soviet Union and the United States in its efforts to suppress the insurrection in the South. In Ethiopia, American support for Haile Selassie’s government and the massive airlift of Russian arms to the government of Mengitsu have helped successive Ethiopian governments to withstand the pressure of the Liberation groups in Eritrea. In Zaire, Moroccan, French and Belgian support proved helpful in Mobutu’s counter-attacks against the invaders of Shaba, as did the support of the Pan-African Security Force constituted after the second Shaba invasion.

The power play between the two major ideological blocs in the world has also tended to act as a stumbling block in the way of attempts to change domestic governments or structures. Where the super-powers have pitched their support with opposing domestic groups, as in Ethiopia-Eritrea, the tendency has been for the insurrection to slide into a stalemate which is often broken in favour of the incumbent government with its greater access to support and resilience.

A final cause of failure of guerrilla wars directed against indigenous governments is disunity among liberation movements. In Chad, Eritrea and Zaire, the liberation efforts have been handicapped by the failure of the various groups to unite their efforts and concentrate their energies against a common foe. This lack of unity is most clearly demonstrated in Chad where in spite of their apparent success in achieving the goal of ending Southern domination of power in Chad both the Waddaye and Habré’s factions of FROLINAT are engaged in
a fratricidal struggle to the detriment of their primary objective.

Footnotes

4. In the case of Eastern Europe the democratization of access to the basic elements of the good life.
10. By 1955 only about 6 out of a total of 800 senior government posts went to Southerners during the Sudanisation of posts vacated by the British.
12. John Baylis, “Revolutionary War” in John Baylis et al *Contemporary Strategy* (London, 1975). South Africa presents a major problem for our typology (i.e. the two main categories) of guerrilla warfare in Africa. A guerrilla war against the white minority regime in Pretoria can be seen simultaneously as an instance of *Wars to overthrow Indigenously-Controlled Socio-economic/political structures*, if one accepts the thesis that Afrikaaners are Africans, and as an instance of *Wars against Colonial Powers* if one shares the popular African perception of the Afrikaaners as colonizers. (I owe this point to Professor Seth Singleton of Rippon College, Wisconsin.)

**COUP AND CONSOLIDATION: THE SOVIET SEIZURE OF POWER IN AFGHANISTAN**

by

David Charters

Question: “What is the Soviet Army doing in Afghanistan?”
Answer: “Looking for the government that invited it in.”

Overheard in a Moscow taxi

In his foreword to Edward Luttwaks’ classic study of the art and science of the coup d’état, S.E. Finer noted that more governments are changed by coup