

5. The British used the term "Political Warfare" as a cover for their propaganda to the enemy during World War II.
6. See Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes* (New York, 1965), pp. 256-257.
7. T. N. Ramaswamy, *Essentials of Indian Statecraft: Kautilya's Arthashastra for Contemporary Readers* (London, 1962), pp. 58-59.
8. Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (London, 1946), pp. 130-131.
9. Sun Tzu, trans. Samuel B. Griffiths, *The Art of War* (Oxford, 1963), p. 77.
10. Bruce Lannes Smith, "Propaganda" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th Ed., vol. 15.
11. Ellul, pp. 193-202.
12. "Harmony Between Life and Nature", editorial in *The Democratic Journalist*, (Prague, July-Aug. 1980), p. 1.
13. See, for instance, Kistner and Kleinwachter, "Non-Aligned Countries and a New International Information Order" in *The Democratic Journalist*, op cit, pp. 13-16.
14. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Mass Media and the Climate of Opinion", paper before 10th General Assembly, International Association for Mass Communication Research, University of Leicester, 1976.
15. Deputy Director, CIA, *CIA Study: Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda*, presented to the Oversight Subcommittee, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 6 February 1980.
16. Readers may feel that America's inability to react to Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa in 1976-77 arose out of such a climate of opinion.
17. "Carter Anti-Khomeini Letter Cited" in *Citizen* (Ottawa), 3 June 1980. The success of this disinformation exercise can be measured by this newspaper report. Apart from a solitary "alleged" at the first mention of the letter, the report accepts the authenticity of the document at face value. The White House denouncement of the letter as an "utter fabrication" is nowhere mentioned.
18. See Sefton Delmer, *Black Boomerang* (London, 1962).
19. William Greider, "The New Wave of Fright", *Washington Post*, Oct. 1980.
20. James Callaghan, Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Commons, November 1st, 1976. *Hansard*, Vol. 918, no. 176, colm. 976. (According to the 1948 edition of *Benham's Book of Quotations*, the truism was originated by the Rev. C. H. Spurgeon.)

PROBLEMS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENCE

by

Reginald H. Roy and Paul Moorcraft

"The dark clouds rolling towards South Africa pose a threat that makes essential the transition from a prosperous society to one that is geared for survival." So spoke General Magnus Malan, the recently retired head of the South African Defence Force in February, 1977. Other senior officers have echoed these words, but the Republic's military men are less dramatic than their political leaders who promise, if provoked, to fight "until the blood rises to the

horses' bits."²

What are the dark clouds that Malan sees filling the northern skies of South Africa, and what is the potential of the South Africans to defend their borders from the enemy without while keeping control of the various native populations within the state? Much is written in Canadian and American newspapers about the problems of that country, often from a somewhat emotional angle. This paper will attempt to lift at least part of the veil and look at the problem from both the Western and South African points of view.

A few facts and figures will help to set the stage. The Republic of South Africa (RSA) occupies 456,007 square miles on the southern tip of Africa. In size, if one includes the homelands area, it would exceed the combined areas of West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. The total population is 28,800,000. The RSA government divides the people into four major groups: Asians, Blacks, Coloureds and Whites. Although they form only 18 percent of the population, the Whites play the dominant role in the government and commerce of the country. The black population, which constitutes the majority in South Africa, has been given the franchise to elect their own leaders in their own homelands, but does not have a "one man - one vote" status in relation to the population as a whole. Recently South Africa has been involved in a constitutional restructuring which promises to give a larger — though still subservient — role to all the non-White people.³

Industrially and commercially, the country considers itself to be the powerhouse of the African continent. It produces and consumes more steel and electricity than all the other 50 countries in Africa. It produces in seventeen assembly plants about 15,000 new cars every month, and it is estimated that of all the motor vehicles on the continent, about three-quarters of them are registered in South Africa. Although occupying only five percent of Africa's land area, South Africa is responsible for well over 40 percent of the continent's industrial production and 25 percent of its agricultural output.⁴ She consumes more than 50 percent of the total energy used in Africa and produces three-quarters of the primary energy needs within her own borders while imported oil provides only 25 percent. Sitting on vast deposits of minerals ranging from coal to gold and uranium, blessed with a favourable climate, sound currency, a high technology, and cheap labour, South Africa should be able to look to the future with confidence. But security problems cloud this picture.

Since 1945, two major movements have played a significant role in shaping the Republic's present international position. The first came about with political changes after 1948 when Jan Smuts lost power to the National Party led by Dr. Malan. This party, which remains in power today, had presented a policy "for political and social 'separateness' or apartheid for the White nation, the Coloured, Indian and mutually disparate Black population groups, to ensure the preservation, protection and consolidation of the White nation as the bearer of Christian civilization in South Africa, acting as (the) responsible trustee to guide the other groups towards complete independence in a peaceful manner."⁵

This movement toward apartheid — or multinational development as it is now called — is a complex story and one which has seen considerable modification in recent years. Aside from implementing their racial policy (which included

plans for improving the economic and educational status of the Blacks), the new government moved steadily towards a full measure of sovereignty. South Africa adopted a new flag, dropped the term "British subject" for its citizens, and appointed a South African as its governor-general. In 1961 it went a stage further by becoming a republic and withdrawing from the British Commonwealth.

The movement towards legalizing paternalism or multinational development within the country conflicted with the surging demands of Black nationalism in the rest of Africa and the rejection of "racism" by Western public opinion outside Africa. This "wind of change" constitutes the second major factor in post-war South African affairs. Before the Second World War there were only four or five independent states on the continent. After the war the African colonies of Britain, France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal claimed or were offered independence. Some gained their freedom after a bitter struggle; in other cases the transfer of power was peaceful. There are now some fifty states on the continent, and most of them have not chosen — or were not given the choice — to be democratic. All but about six are controlled by dictators, presidents-for-life, military juntas or one-party rule. Nevertheless, all are ruled by the native majority, which by today's judgments is generally regarded as more important. Almost all look upon South Africa as the last bastion of colonialism and "fascism" on the continent and since each has a voice and vote in the United Nations, South Africa has been condemned time and again in that international body for her reluctance to accept the principle of majority rule. The examples of decolonization to the north are not seen as an attractive option by the South African White population, however. The original White settlers on the Cape arrived only a few decades after Champlain founded Quebec, and Afrikaaners can trace their families back over three hundred years. British settlers came later, but again they too have lived and flourished in their adopted homeland for some 150 years. Their roots are deep. They are not recent immigrants. Their homeland is South Africa.

For many years the decolonization of the African states could be regarded by South Africa without undue alarm. Each year, however, the tide of black nationalism spread southward. White-dominated Rhodesia, for a time, stemmed the flow by declaring its independence, and from 1967 to 1975 South African Police detachments participated with Rhodesian security forces guarding the Zambesi. Of particular importance to South Africa was the comparatively recent decision of Portugal to withdraw from Angola and Mozambique. This created two more independent states, both of which have Marxist-leaning governments, and both of which are situated on the border of South Africa or South West Africa (Namibia). Both of these new states are supported by the Soviet Union. In Angola, thousands of Cuban troops give additional security to its Marxist government following the brief civil war after its liberation from Portugal. Angola's southern boundary is the old colonial line which cuts like a knife across native tribal homelands. Its southern neighbour is South West Africa, a former German colony seized by the South Africans during the Great War, and controlled by South Africa under a League of Nations mandate until quite recently. Recent political changes there are seen as part of the final phases of Namibia's transition to complete self-government,⁶ but the government in Pretoria is most

unwilling to see Namibia go the way of Angola and Mozambique. The claims by SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) to represent the Black majority in Namibia, and the terrorist raids by members of that group over the border from Angola to enhance their claim, have resulted in South Africa sending several thousand soldiers to the border area to maintain peace and quiet while the political problem is being settled. Part of this force is composed of seven Black infantry battalions, some locally recruited.

South Africa is keenly aware of its isolation — geographic, diplomatic and military — from the Western democracies. She has a proud history of support for the Western effort. South Africans fought with distinction in both World Wars. They also contributed men and material to the Berlin airlift and the Korean War. Since the Republic's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961, a decision forced on her by the Afro-Asian Commonwealth members, South Africa's alliances and understandings with the West have dwindled. During the sixties, as her economic power increased and as Britain released her colonial control in Africa, Pretoria did give some military assistance to Rhodesia and the Portuguese, anticipating the creation of a *cordon sanitaire* to the north while bringing into its economic orbit the former British protectorates (the renamed Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). At the same time Malawi, Zambia, Zaire and Kenya engaged in trade with South Africa, but the latter's growing economic strength was still based on her exports beyond the African continent.

When the Portuguese colonies were taken over by radical Black governments certain aspects of trade remained unchanged. The Soviet Union might provide the guns but it could not provide alternative jobs for the 100,000 Mozambiquans who worked in South Africa. Without South Africa the giant Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme was nonviable. Without South African trade and exports, Mozambique's harbours and railways would cease to function. This is the predicament that has confronted Mozambique's Marxist leadership since 1975.

Unlike Mozambique where one party — FRELIMO — was dominant in the nationalist struggle, Angola spawned at least three major Black guerrilla factions. Simply put, France and the United States backed FNLA and UNITA (the latter also supported by China). Russia and the radical Black states backed the MPLA. South Africa claims that she did not want to involve herself in an invasion of Angola, but SWAPO guerrilla camps just over the border were both irritating and potentially dangerous. Pretoria wanted to get out of Namibia. Invading Angola would only antagonize Black opinion and encourage the Marxist guerrillas. Much mystery still clouds any attempt to judge fully Pretoria's abortive invasion of Angola but what evidence exists points to considerable duplicity — or to be generous, a massive misunderstanding — on the part of Washington. As the then Minister of Defence and present Prime Minister said of Angola, "We were ruthlessly left in the lurch by an undertaking that was broken." The old strategy of alliance-based action far beyond the Republic's shores had changed. The lack of the anticipated support from the United States, the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Simonstown Naval agreement in 1975, and more recent action of France in curbing the supply of arms to South Africa has led to a feeling of frustration and betrayal.

Shunned by its former allies, South Africa has reached out to improve its relations with certain other countries such as Taiwan and Israel. The latter is a most important link. Although defence understandings go back as far as the early sixties, the visit of General Meir Amit (former head of Israeli intelligence) to South Africa in 1975 and the trip of South Africa's Prime Minister to Israel in the following year led to increasingly harmonious military cooperation. Discussions on the Mirage jet fighter (and Kfir adaptations) were small fry compared to the weightier matter of a nuclear accord.⁸

The informal links with Israel, whilst helping to provide Pretoria with the nuclear option, could do little to stem the dangerous "wars of the flea" in Namibia and Rhodesia. On the Angolan border the South African Defence Force continued to give far more than it received. In Rhodesia, Pretoria's chief aim was to assist in the transition of Rhodesia to a pro-Western Zimbabwe eager to join in South Africa's co-prosperity sphere. Pressed by the United States, Prime Minister Vorster exerted considerable influence on Ian Smith to change his attitude towards majority rule. South African control of the main trade routes into Rhodesia persuaded the formerly unyielding Smith to announce his conversion.⁹

In 1977 political leaders in both Rhodesia and Namibia were prepared to negotiate the transition to Black rule but the guerrilla armies cried "Too little, too late". Both SWAPO and Rhodesia's Patriotic Front were only prepared to discuss what were in effect surrender terms. The present government in Zimbabwe is being carefully monitored south of the border and what happens there will certainly have an impact on Namibia. Considering the potential danger of the dark clouds mentioned by General Malan, can the South African Defence Force cope with the situation on their borders?

The total strength of the three services is approximately 400,000 men. The length of military service is now two years. The standing army, about 71,000, is composed of 17,000 regulars with the remainder consisting of conscripts and reservists on duty from the Citizen Force.¹⁰ Augmenting the structure is the Commando, a hallowed symbol of Afrikaner resistance. After their two-year army service, soldiers are transferred for eight years part-time service in the Citizen Force or Commandos. The Commando, roughly of battalion size and including both volunteers and reservists, has an important rural and urban counter-insurgency role.¹¹ This largely White militia operates on home ground and is mainly active in the border areas.

South Africa's army is divided into the usual proportion of infantry, armoured, motorized, paratroop, engineer and other units and formations. It has the heavy and medium tanks, armoured cars and troop carriers and other weapons and equipment¹² one might expect to find a modern modest-sized army.

Although most of the armed forces are composed of White South Africans, there are some Indian, Black and Coloured units. Near Cape Town is the Cape Coloured Corps Training Centre. The volunteers of this Corps have already seen action in the operational area along the Angolan border. Most of the Indian volunteers tend to go into the South African Navy, and some say there is a good possibility that both these groups may have to accept conscription as they gain additional political power. At Lenz, near Johannesburg, there

is a large training area for Black volunteers. Companies from the 21st Black Battalion, led by White officers and N.C.O.s, have already proven themselves in anti-terrorist operations on the Angolan border and it is anticipated that, on their next tour of duty, more Black officers and N.C.O.s will be in command. Black military units in the homeland areas receive instruction from South Africans, and over half a dozen native infantry units in the Caprivi Strip are proving very useful.¹³

The country's interest in the Cape Sea Route is reflected in the role and composition of its naval and maritime forces. An anti-submarine frigate squadron and several general support squadrons are available to protect the nation's 3,000 mile coast line and sea routes. Long range patrol aircraft (Shackleton Mark III) carrying anti-submarine torpedoes, depth charges and means for submarine detection assist the surface ships of the navy. At Silvermine, a naval intelligence nerve centre, all information about shipping movement is collated, analyzed and acted upon by Maritime Command. Simons-town is the major naval base and one of the most modern on the continent. It has been developed recently so that it can fully support the South African navy and, if necessary, large modern warships of other countries. There are also advanced naval bases at Durban and Walvis Bay, the latter being in Namibia.

South Africa wants to expand her navy. The weak link in her navy is her dependence on foreign nations to provide her with some of the sophisticated detection and weapons systems she needs. Before the recent arms embargo two more submarines were on order from France. The Shackleton aircraft, for example, need to be replaced. The reluctance of the major Western nations to sell her such items as submarines and L.R.P.A. aircraft make surveillance of the busy Cape Sea Route more difficult.

The South African Air Force, with approximately 200 combat aircraft, is among the largest in Africa. The main operational elements of the S.A.A.F. are an air defence system comprising control and reporting radar (both fixed and mobile); interceptor fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and light anti-aircraft guns; strike aircraft; reconnaissance aircraft; and ground attack aircraft, helicopters and transports to assist the army.¹⁴ These aircraft vary in age from the thirty-year old Sabre jets, used primarily as trainers but still suitable for ground support roles, to the more modern French Mirage III and F-1AZ jet fighters, some of which are being produced in South Africa under licence.

The lengthening of the conscription period from one-and-a-half to two years as well as the growing number of volunteers among all races has led to the Defence Force becoming one of the Republic's largest employers. In the past three years applications to join the permanent forces have almost doubled. Some 60,000 civilians were called for military duty in 1978. The annual intake of women has increased and the government recently announced the number of school cadets would be doubled to well over 250,000. Civil defence organizations have almost reached the 700 mark.

Defence expenditure has increased steadily. South Africa is spending about double the amount on defence she did four years ago. The 1977/1978 defence budget was 1,711 million Rand (in 1978, 0.81 Rand = U.S. \$1) representing 19

percent of all public expenditure or well over 5% of the G.N.P. Defence costs in 1980 are estimated as high as 2.07 billion Rand.¹⁵ Besides the manpower increases in the Defence Force, the escalation of the war in Namibia, the drive for self-sufficiency in arms and the black market premiums paid in order to circumvent the U.N. embargo have all contributed to the higher costs of security.

During the past decade, South Africa has developed and expanded her armaments industry to the extent that she is entirely self-sufficient in the manufacture of small arms and ammunition necessary for internal production and security. She produces Mirage and Impala jet fighters under licence as well as other aircraft. She also manufactures items such as "Panhard" armoured cars, "Ratel" infantry combat vehicles, anti-tank and short-range ground-to-air missiles, heavy ordnance artillery and Uzi submachine guns. South Africa is determined to reach the greatest measure of military self-sufficiency attainable. As one South African commentator wrote: "One lesson South Africa has learned from its Angola involvement is . . . that it will have to depend upon its own military and civil preparedness in the future. There can be no guarantee of United States or West European protection against any threat to the Republic's security."¹⁶

While striving for self-sufficiency in armaments, the South African government is aware that defence ". . . is the responsibility of the entire population of the nation and (of) every population group."¹⁷ Moreover, it is realized that, in their particular circumstances, the nation must be prepared to face opposition on more than one front. "Because the economy is such a strong weapon in the survival process," General Malan has said, "we must use it to its full potential. Wherever possible we must be self-sufficient, we must produce more, and we must develop our technology further." The Chief of the South Africa Defence Force elaborated later by saying he felt that the soldier was no longer playing the main role. Rather it was the politician, the industrialist, the economist and the psychologist.¹⁸

The costs of war are pushing South Africa in the direction of a warfare state such as Israel, but South Africa does not, like Israel, have the direct financial backing of a superpower. Much has been written on the relationship between economic factors and the ability of White South Africa to defend itself, but no conclusive synthesis is available.¹⁹ In Rhodesia, as the war escalated, most industrialists pooled their ingenuity to support the state. Despite the harsh economic conditions there in the final two years of the war, the morale of the regular army (which contained 80% Black volunteers) remained high. In the much more powerful White state in South Africa, the morale and determination of the highly motivated Defence Force is likely to remain constant for a considerable period of time.

One should not underestimate the determination of White South Africans — both English and Afrikaans — to maintain control over their own destiny and that of their country. The need for closer and broader relations with the non-White population is appreciated by many, and much depends not only on the direction but the time available to the government to improve relations among the various groups which make up the population of South Africa.

Pretoria speaks of setting the pace for these political and economic changes. Giving everyone the franchise on a one-man-one-vote basis would result, according to most White South Africans, in political and economic chaos. As proof they point north to the other African states where one-party rule is the norm, military dictatorship is common and democratic government is a rarity. But in making these points, White South Africans also demonstrate, in a way that citizens of that country find difficult to understand, the gulf between their own perception of the problem and that held by the majority of outsiders, even those who are sympathetic to their case.

The outcome of the transition in Zimbabwe and Namibia will have a profound impact on Pretoria's political and military strategies. The Patriotic Front victory in Zimbabwe is a fact and an eventual assumption of power by SWAPO in South West Africa is a possibility. If it is to have a ring of radical Marxist states on its borders, the South African Defence Force may have to contend with an external conventional/guerrilla threat and the rise of urban terrorism within. Swaziland and the emerging homelands may become increasingly radicalized. The recent independence of Bophuthatswana and Transkei have doubled the land perimeter to be defended (from 4,500 kilometers to over 8,000 kilometers). The truculent independence of another five or six homelands will create near-impossible logistical defence problems, particularly if they should invite foreign troops in, as Transkei is reported to have done.²⁰

The number of options left open to Pretoria depends upon events over which the government has only partial control. One course suggested is for it to "sue for peace" with the West and become dependent upon the United States.²¹ Adopting this option would carry with it the probability of having to accept majority rule. In the writer's opinion, the future would have to look very dark indeed before this step was taken, and by that stage it would probably be too late anyway. Internal reform and change are becoming an obvious option, but here the elements of pace and time become essential. In the United States slavery was abolished over a century ago, but only in the past few decades have Black Americans begun to have a place in the sun — and at that in a country which is overwhelmingly White in racial composition. Whether South Africa will be granted both the time and the peace she needs to bring about the reforms the *verligtes* (moderates) in the present government are willing to concede is a vital question. Change may arrive too late, and the *verkrampies* (hardliners) within parliament may swing the electorate towards a siege mentality which could see them opt for defending a smaller, and militarily defensible portion of the country.²²

Extreme pressure on South Africa could bring about extreme counter-measures. Some writers feel that, despite its protestations, Pretoria has to all intents and purposes already adopted, like Israel, the ambiguous nuclear weapons option. "Pretoria has the wherewithall thanks to her tacit allies: the U.S., Israel, West Germany, France and Britain, all have helped to provide the hardware, the fissile materials, the technology and the finance which have enabled South Africa to build a nuclear weapon."²³ South Africa may have the means to develop an atomic bomb and the systems to deliver it, but she would have difficulty in finding suitable targets in Africa. Nevertheless, under extreme

duress, and especially if other states such as Brazil, Taiwan, or Pakistan have openly adopted nuclear weapons policies, Pretoria may attempt to signal to the world her readiness to use nuclear weapons if she is faced by a Soviet-supported invasion.

The situation in Southern Africa is very complicated from a military, political and economic point of view. There is no simple, obvious course of action which will satisfy everyone. That South Africa is of strategic value to the Western States is obvious, both in a military and economic sense. White South Africans fear that they may be sacrificed, as they see it, on the altar of "political expedience", in the contest between Communist and democratic states seeking to win the approval of the African Black nations. South Africa, however, is unlikely to lie down like a lamb and permit its throat to be cut. Whites are determined to seek their own solution to a problem with which they are more familiar than any other nation. Armed aggression they can deal with under normal circumstances, but this coupled with internal disorder on a large scale presents the major danger. Perhaps the most hopeful sign is the statement by General Malan when he said: "The best weapon against political agitation is the contentment of all our people."²⁴ To the extent that the South African government is willing and able to move steadily towards achieving the contentment of *all* the South African people, to that extent will its real defence be attained. But the dark clouds roll, even as the present government works to relax many of its outdated apartheid laws and seeks to achieve some sort of economic and political confederation to replace the "homelands" concept which appears to be losing support.

Footnotes

1. Quoted in *Sunday Times*, (Johannesburg), 13 Feb. 1977.
2. J. Fouche, Minister of Defence, quoted in J. Spence, *Republic Under Stress* (London, 1965), p. 62.
3. See Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options", *Adelphi Papers*, no. 159 (1980), pp. 2-3.
4. See David Rees, "Soviet Strategic Penetration of Africa", *Conflict Studies*, no. 77 (1976), p. 3.
5. R.S.A., Department of Information, *Official Year Book 1976* (Pretoria, 1977), p. 59.
6. See United Nations Security Council, *Letter*, from the representatives of Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council, dated 10 April 1978, no. S/12636.
7. R.S.A., *House of Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, 4852, (1978).
8. See Z. Cervenka and B. Rogers, *The Nuclear Axis* (London, 1978), for a wide-ranging and highly speculative account of Israeli-South African relations.
9. See R. W. Johnson, *How Long will South Africa Survive?* (London, 1977), pp. 121-128.
10. See IISS, *Military Balance, 1980-81* (London, 1980). This publication provides detailed estimates, but some analysts have suggested that certain figures relating to armoured vehicles are too low.
11. See R.S.A., *Paratus, Newspaper of the S.A. Defence Force*, (Pretoria), Aug. 1978.

12. Israel is reported to have sold South Africa such items as complete radar stations, electronic fences, anti-guerrilla infiltration and alarm systems, communications systems, computers and night-vision devices. "Israel's military industry is also providing South Africa with 105 mm. self-propelled howitzers, air-to-air rockets and anti-tank missiles for infantrymen". *Economist*, Nov. 1977, p. 68.
13. It is interesting to note that the South African Army Dog Training Battalion has provided so valuable a product that the 500 dogs and handlers currently trained are to be supplemented by greater numbers.
14. *Military Balance 1980-81*, op cit.
15. In comparison to the 5.98% GNP devoted to defence by South Africa, Canada pays 1.84%.
16. Denis Venter, "South Africa as an African Power: The Need for a Purposeful Detente Policy in Southern Africa", S. A. Institute of International Affairs, *Newsletter*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1976).
17. R.S.A., Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence 1977* (Cape Town, 1977), p.6
18. R.S.A. Department of Information, *South African News*, 16 Sept. 1977, p. 9
19. See, for instance, Jaster, op cit.
20. See *Cape Times*, 27 Oct 1978.
21. Johnson, op cit, p. 320.
22. See Paul Moorcraft, "Towards the Garrison State", in F. Clifford-Vaughan, ed., *International Pressure and Political Change in South Africa*, (Oxford, 1978).
23. Gervenka and Rogers, p. 348.
24. *South African Digest*, (Pretoria), 8 Apr. 1977, p. 3.

ORGANIZATION, SELECTION AND TRAINING OF NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAMS — A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

by

David Charters

In the aftermath of the skilful and dramatic hostage rescue operation at the Iranian embassy in London in May 1980, questions were raised concerning Canada's ability to respond in similar situations. It was pointed out that Canada does not at present possess any force equivalent to the Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment, the British unit that effected the London rescue. Government spokesmen expressed confidence that the general military training of the armed forces would provide "the capability to cope with most contingencies".¹ This writer is concerned that Canada should be able to cope with *all* contingencies, and is on record in urging our government to consider the creation of a National Response Team to deal with incidents of politically-motivated violence which exceed the response capabilities of ordinary police forces.² In an earlier article in this journal³ it was noted that rescue operations on the London model were the products of constant individual and unit training to