

4. Robert Moss, "The Campaign to Destabilize Iran", *Conflict Studies*, no. 101 (November, 1978), pp. 5-6.
5. *Gazette* (Montreal), January 16, 1980.
6. Chubin, op cit: Ned Temko in *Christian Science Monitor*, May, 1980: John Kifner in *New York Times*, April 27, 1980.
7. Ibid.
8. Quoted Temko, op cit.
9. Kifner, op cit. See also Amir Taheri, "Cultivate the Mullahs", *Guardian Weekly* (Manchester), May 18, 1980.
10. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), December 31, 1979; *Economist*, June 7, 1980.
11. The author worked in Tehran 1973-1975.
12. Hurewitz, op cit.
13. *Globe and Mail*, December 31, 1979.
14. *Newsweek*, September 10, 1979; *Montreal Star*, August 30, 1979.
15. *Associated Press report* (London), April 30, 1980.
16. *Time*, March 10, 1980.
17. Haroon Siddiqui in *Toronto Star*, December 22, 1979.

ZIMBABWE JOINS THE COMMONWEALTH

by *Dominick Graham*

At one minute after midnight on the 18th April an independent Republic of Zimbabwe joined the Commonwealth.¹ The birth of the Republic was a diplomatic and political miracle wrought by Britain, an act of faith by the men who were recently destroying each other in a civil war, and, not least, a reminder to the cynics that our Commonwealth is the only international organization that could have played midwife and did so.

Lord Carrington, Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and Dr. Mudawarara signed the agreement to end the war on 21 December 1979. They undertook to return Rhodesia to colonial status under British authority and to hold elections. Lord Soames, the interim governor, had been in Salisbury since 10th December. A Commonwealth Observer Group from eleven nations — Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Jamaica, Papua-New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka — would observe the British administered elections for the whites on 14 February and for the blacks on 27-9 February 1980. In the meanwhile a Commonwealth cease-fire monitoring force would see that the two armies of the Patriotic Front, Zipra and Zanla, moved to 16 assembly points throughout the country and remained there until the elections were over. This force was drawn from the U.K., Kenya, Fiji, Australia and New Zealand. Less than 2000 in number and lightly armed, it would be thinly spread across the country in isolated stations in the heart of the PF bush.²

The monitors had been on standby for weeks and moved to Rhodesia over Christmas in order to be ready when the cease-fire came into force. "Good luck

Brits, rather you than me”, was the parting remark of one Rhodesian escort as he left a unit of 14 men to await the arrival of heavily armed Zipra soldiers. A Union Jack over some tents and a huddle of “white cross” Landrovers identified their camp in the bush. Soon, heralded by a Puma helicopter bearing liaison officers, small groups of PF appeared. Some were under senior officers in their early twenties. Numbers gradually built up to 750 and brought the administrative problems of watering and feeding. There were casualties, too. Vehicles drove over mines and a water truck rolled off a treacherous bush road. Firing at night tried the nerves. Were Zipra men killing each other? No. It was simply “negligent discharges” of AK Rifles or RPG 7 Rocket Launchers. Soon the PF were learning drill and map reading. The former activity was ensured by a reinforcement from “that warlike tribe from the Western Isles” which was responsible for guarding the Queen — the Irish Guards.³ In turn, the monitors learned how the PF had lived and operated in the bush.

Slowly, rapport was built between monitors and PF who were ferried over the bush roads to the Assembly Points. Members of the Observer Group arrived towards the end of January after being briefed in London. They established small offices in Bulawayo, Gwelo, Umtali, Fort Victoria and a headquarters in Salisbury. In the seven weeks they were in the country, observer teams rotated so that each covered all the 55 administrative districts in the country and visited 409 out of the 657 polling stations.

Did they find that the elections were fair? As it was important that no observer should say that the election had been unfair after he had seen the election result, the group submitted a unanimous interim report to London two days before the results were announced. Had the report been negative the results would not have been announced and the election could have been annulled. However, their report was that although there had been widespread intimidation it had not undermined the validity of the election. Indeed, unfair methods had been practised by the government, which had denied phones to PF candidates and had shamelessly used television to influence voters against “terrorists”. On the other hand Mugabe’s men were the champion intimidators although Muzorewa’s Auxiliaries, an armed rabble, were almost as bad. The Governor sorted out these problems by ordering the government to behave and by threatening to disfranchise some Mugabe supporters. The Observers believed that had Mugabe arrived in Rhodesia earlier he would have cooled the ardour of his men. They were able to represent to the Governor the strong wish of Zambia and Mozambique that the elections succeed and allowed him to use this argument to restrain all the participants.

The British Election Commission, men with great experience, educated the electorate through pamphlets and the media to trust in the secrecy of the ballot. They encouraged voters to assure bullies that they would vote for them but actually follow their consciences. Even Mugabe had not realised that there would be but a single ballot box at each polling station and that the ballots would be sent to central places before being counted. There would be no means of tracing the way a village had voted and no danger of collective or individual retaliation. To prevent that happening all the ballots were sent to England where they will be destroyed after six months.

The result of the work of the Election Commission was a 93% poll of the eligible voters. 63% were cast for Mugabe who won 57 seats; 24% for Nkomo who got 20; 8% for Muzorewa who won only 3 seats. The Rhodesia Front had previously won all the 20 White seats.⁴ The voters chose peace, believing that Mugabe would provide it. Muzorewa, the Methodist Bishop, was the "fall guy". He had promised peace and equal pay for Black and White but had not been able to deliver either.

The presence of Gordon Fairweather, the distinguished New Brunswicker who had contested nine Canadian elections, ensured that at least one of the Commonwealth Observers had practical political experience. He remarked to me that he was much moved by the success of this Commonwealth undertaking; in particular, by his realization at the London briefing, that all his colleagues understood election procedure on the Westminster model, whether they were from Papua-New Guinea, Nigeria or Australia. They well-understood the powers of governors, councils, courts and the police and they had a common language.⁵ The election had been a demonstration that the sun may have set on the British Empire but that the Commonwealth that lives on is a force for peace, reconciliation and good government.

Footnotes

1. *Time*, 28 April 1980.
2. *Gazette* (Montreal), 19 Dec. 1979; *Globe & Mail*, 21 Dec. 1979; *Newsweek*, 31 Dec. 1979.
3. *Gunner Magazine*, no. 112 (March 1980), p. 5.
4. *Time*, 17 March 1980.
5. The author thanks Mr. Gordon Fairweather for granting him the interview from which much of the information in this article was derived.

SWIFT AND BOLD: AN APPRAISAL OF HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS

by David Charters

In the rush to judgement and print during the next few months the armchair strategists and instant historians of the American hostage rescue operation in Iran will find much to criticize. This is unavoidable; the story released thus far leaves many questions unanswered. Since, however, the operation was not carried through to conclusion and the complete plan has not been explained, it is worth introducing a note of caution; any analysis at this early stage is likely to be highly speculative. Above all, facile comparisons with obviously "successful" operations, such as Entebbe, are to be avoided. Nothing emerges more clearly from the historical record than the fact that in all hostage rescue operations, the