minate factors and influences is a hazardous pursuit. The decade of the 1970s was relatively peaceful but it remains to be seen if the degree of ethnic tension and polarization has recently decreased or increased in Quebec. Much of what happens will be contingent on the PQ’s leadership and the outcome of efforts at constitutional change. The outlook is not black, but there are no grounds for complacency.

Footnotes

1. In a letter to Le Devoir (Montreal, December 13, 1972), Vallières called for separatists to abandon violence and join the democratic Parti Québécois. Independence, he suggested, was to be won at the polling booth.

2. For a discussion of the various groups and ideological strains that have been subsumed by the Parti Québécois, see James W. Hagy, “Quebec Separatists: The First Twelve Years”, Queen’s Quarterly, 75 (Summer 1969), pp. 229-238; Howard L. Singer, “Internal Conflicts within the Parti Québécois”, Dalhousie Review, 57 (Spring 1977), pp. 5-17; Henry Milner, Politics in The New Quebec (Toronto, 1978); and Vera Murray, Le Parti Québécois (Montreal, 1976).

3. This suggestion was recently made by Quebec Education Minister Jacques-Yvan Morin, “PQ Minister sees Violence after ‘No’ Vote”, The Globe and Mail (Toronto, January 15, 1980), and was echoed in several speeches by Claude Ryan during the referendum campaign.


7. Recent polls indicate that approximately 17% of Québécois support outright independence, an increase of about 6% over the last two decades.


IRAN’S RIVAL GROUPS

by Maurice Tugwell

The success of the fundamentalist Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in Iran’s second-round parliamentary elections seems likely to strengthen the power of the religious zealots who have been the driving force inside the Revolutionary Council, the country’s interim government. The likely losers will be the relative moderates, notably President Bani Sadr. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini will remain as holy figurehead, providing the semblance of unity within the nation, but after his death we may witness a power struggle both within the IRP, between such figures as Hossein-Ali Montazeri and Mohammed Beheshti, and between the IRP and rival political groups in Tehran and breakaway sects on Iran’s periphery. This article attempts to list these alternative regimes and to
provide the background necessary if tomorrow's events in Iran are to be comprehensible.

The Communist “Tudeh” (Masses) Party

Founded in 1941, banned after 1949, the Tudeh succeeded in the early 1950s in infiltrating the Iranian Armed Forces and played a significant part in the brief overthrow of the Shah in 1953. Indeed it was the communist power behind Dr. Mossadegh’s government that probably caused the United States and Britain to back Royalist elements in the Army in their successful bid to unseat the new regime and reinstate the monarchy. SAVAK was formed to root out communists within the armed forces, government and society, and afterwards became the Shah’s instrument for the detection and suppression of all forms of political dissent.

After the rapprochement between Iran and USSR in the mid-1960s, Tudeh lost Moscow’s overt support. Based in East Germany, the party forfeited the leadership of anti-Shah protest within Iran, and its continued dependence on an atheist USSR which cooperated with the Shah further alienated it from radicals. Possibly the Tudeh’s greatest value to the USSR during the 1960s and ’70s arose out of its conversions during the heady days of the early 1950s.

When in December 1977 Major General Ahmad Mogharrabi, chief of army planning and logistics, was executed by firing squad, an 11-year career as a Soviet agent was ended. Mogharrabi had first been compromised as an army major in the early 1950’s when, under the Mossadegh government, Tudeh was made legal. He was persuaded by a party member to hand classified material to Soviet intelligence. He escaped SAVAK’s dragnet and continued his military career, being “reactivated” as a Soviet agent in 1966 while attending a training course at Fort Bragg, USA. An American agent blackmailed him through his earlier compromising behaviour and he was forced to hand over his country’s secrets or be betrayed to SAVAK. Until his activities were uncovered 11 years later, the General’s importance to Soviet intelligence was great. Several similar cases came to light, and it may be safe to assume that certain key Soviet agents remained undetected in high places until the Islamic revolution cleansed Iran of both the Shah and SAVAK, and the spies who had infiltrated the system.

The Tudeh’s present leader, Nourredin Khianouri, has attempted to identify his party with the mass movements that swept the imperial regime from power. However its close ties to a foreign country and its atheist ideology continue to limit its popular appeal. It would, however, be dangerous to dismiss the Iranian communists as a spent force. During the revolution of 1978 and ’79, Tudeh succeeded in penetrating the oil workers’ unions in Khuzestan in southern Iran. Always strong on organization, the orthodox communist finds the union particularly well suited to his needs, since the materialistic objectives of union business can be developed into political action. Although the Revolutionary Council’s komites have attempted to re-establish Islamic control of the oilfields and refineries, it is unlikely that communist influence there has been removed. The second area of significant Tudeh power is the north-western province of Azerbaijan, which will be discussed later. Finally it should be remembered that in any bid by the Soviet Union to set up a puppet government in Tehran, only the Tudeh party can be relied upon as being fully subordinate to Moscow’s
command. With an estimated active membership of only 1,000, the *Tudeh's* main power lies outside Iran, in the Soviet Army.

**The “Fedayin-e-Khalq” (People’s Fighters)**

The so-called Islamic-Marxists of the 1970s, the Fedayin were responsible for most of the terrorist attacks during the Shah’s rule, which were often directed against American servicemen or technicians. They played an active role in the revolution and are well-armed and militant. In March 1980 the Revolutionary Council ordered its *komites* to eject left-wing students from Iran’s university campuses. At least 26 people were killed in the subsequent rioting at the universities in Tehran, Meshed, Shiraz and Isfahan. Six more died in Rasht, on the Caspian Sea, in an area where the left has a powerful appeal. Most victims were from the *Fedayin*. This group has assumed much of the glamour and status that once belonged to *Tudeh*, being seen as independent of Soviet control and an active force in protest. So long as Khomeini lives, the *Fedayin’s* challenge is likely to be covert. But once the central figure has departed, the opportunity to exploit an unstable situation may lead to an overt bid for power.

**The “Mujaheddin-e-Khalq” (People’s Crusaders)**

While the *Fedayin* are Marxist-Secularist the *Mujaheddin* are a radical Islamic grouping claiming to be “Marxist” in programme but without atheism. They too are well armed guerrillas who fought the Shah, and they outnumber both the *Tudeh* and the *Fedayin*. Their platform allows them to pay homage to Khomeini while pursuing an independent political line, and they tended to stand aside during the crack-down on the *Fedayin*. The *Mujaheddin* are influenced by the late Dr. Ali Shariati, an Iranian radical intellectual who sought to return to the roots of Islam and often accused the clergy of corrupting the religion’s social message. The danger to the west of a *Mujaheddin* Iranian government might lie in possible coalitions with the *Fedayin* and *Tudeh*, which could be exploited by Moscow towards orthodox communist alignments. If, however, this problem could be avoided, the *Mujaheddin* might provide a rational and socially progressive government. “Marxist” theories which are free of Soviet control have in some Third World countries been translated into a form of democratic socialism, and the West can make a fool of itself by running scared from a word. The *Mujaheddin’s* leader, Masud Rajavi, insists: “We are progressive, not anarchists”.

**The Embassy Militants**

No analyst has succeeded in describing the political philosophy of the so-called students who have been holding the American hostages in Tehran. They probably contain elements of the IRP and all three leftist groups. Those who accuse the KGB of attempting to manipulate the militants are probably correct, but the rumours that followed the unsuccessful rescue attempt suggested that the CIA had not been slow getting into this act. The revolutionary propaganda that rallied the Iranian masses against the Shah relied entirely on hatred and could not, therefore, be converted into integration or nation-building propaganda once the rebellion had succeeded. The Islamic regime has consequently been forced to continue to rely on hatred, which is a dangerous emotion rather easily turned inwards against the rulers. Khomeini and his henchmen have used the American
hostages as a visible symbol of a supposed external threat, a substitute focus for hatred in the absence of the Shah. The hostages' importance to Iran is a measure of that country's internal weakness. The militants are neither a political party nor foreign agents: they are a symptom of national xenophobia.

Conservatives, Liberals, Monarchists et al

The New York Times reported in April that at a recent gathering of Tehran's artists, the painters and sculptors in bohemian garb agreed that they were all longing for a military coup. Certainly there are many intellectuals, writers, teachers, technocrats and others who supported the overthrow of the Shah only to find themselves isolated and ignored in an Iran gone mad with Islamic excess. Islamic militants have accused the former premier Mehdi Bazargan of allowing his Freedom Movement to be controlled by the United States. Meanwhile, Bazargan's predecessor, Shapour Bakhtiar issues statements from his Paris exile, and the Crown Prince, whose new home is in America, refrains from public comment. No one who worked in Iran during the Shah's period of greatness, before he abandoned internal politics for international posturing, can forget the passionate loyalty of the nation's masses. Whether bought, inspired by propaganda, or enforced, Iranian devotion to monarchy is a very old and deep emotion, which may at some future date again become a political force. Indeed, the lengths to which the present regime finds it necessary to go to blacken monarchy's reputation may be seen as a back-handed tribute to the past. The missing ingredient in any conservative coup would seem to be the army. The failure of the Shah during his last year on the throne to provide the leadership expected of him left the army powerless to act decisively, yet committed to tactics that broke its morale. The Revolutionary Council purged senior military ranks and, by failing to disarm the revolutionary guards or the left-wing groups, have further diminished the army's standing and power. The Iranian middle class has no tradition of political responsibility. Without an effective army to back them, they pose no credible challenge. Any return to monarchy, or the establishment of a moderate centre government, seems unlikely at present.

The Periphery

The Caspian provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran were occupied by Russian Bolsheviks between 1920 and 1921, and the north-western province of Azerbaijan was retained under Soviet control after the end of World War II. In the same period, Stalinist Russia sponsored secessionist movements both in occupied Azerbaijan and in adjacent Kurdistan. The Shah, and before him his father, put an end to these invasions, but the threat of centrifugal forces pulling the country apart still remains and is made greater by weak and unpopular central government. Whether or not the Soviet Union is still prepared to sponsor such movements remains to be seen. One effect of earlier attempts was to lower Russia's esteem, and hence its influence, in Tehran.

With or without external help, we have already seen signs of a revival of tribalism and demands for provincial autonomy, or even secession, from Iran's periphery. Azerbaijani unrest centred on Tabriz, where in December 1979 Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari encouraged the formation of the Moslem
People’s Party. Riots and bloodshed ensued, although for the time-being the province seems quieter. The Tudeh have strength here, and with the Soviet army less than four hours motoring away, Azerbaijan must be seen as a particularly vulnerable region. Kurdistan erupted earlier, in August 1979. Promised an autonomous state by the Treaty of Serres in 1921, the Kurdish tribesmen who inhabit sections of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and the Soviet Union regard their struggle as a nationalist crusade. After the fall of the monarchy the Kurds established a de facto autonomy and asked the new Tehran authorities for recognition. However Islamic rigidity combined with Persian chauvinism and the Revolutionary Council despatched troops, tanks and fighter aircraft to crush this uprising, and murdered their prisoners in an effort to terrorize the Kurds into submission.  

Further south, in Khuzestan, neighbouring Iraq seems willing to “play the Arab card” by stirring up unrest in a province where Arab Iranians are the majority ethnic community, and where most of Iran’s oil wealth is situated. After crack-downs by the Revolutionary Council, Arabs seized the London Iranian embassy demanding the release of 91 prisoners, but this tactic was defeated by the British. It is unclear what role, if any, Tudeh is playing in the oil industry at this time. Like the Kurds to the north, the Arabian Iranians are mainly Sunni Moslems, not Shias, and are therefore unimpressed by the charismatic claims of the Ayatollah.

Baluchistan straddles the Iranian, Afghani and Pakistani borders, countries with respective Baluchi populations of 1, 0.3 and 1.25 millions. A rebellion inside the Pakistani section between 1973 and 1977 cost the lives of an estimated 3,300 Pakistani soldiers and 5,300 Baluchi guerrillas, yet the urge for autonomy has not been crushed. Now that the Soviets have control of the Afghani section, they might win friends locally by supporting a Baluchi state, sending arms and advisors to the Iranian and Pakistani “occupied zones”, and hope to end up with control over the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar (in Pakistan) and the new naval and air facility at Char Bahar (in Iran). This type of action would involve small risk of war, and could be explained internationally as a moral necessity. Finally, in Iran’s north-east, there are some 500,000 Mongol-stock Turkomans, bordering Soviet Russia. Their call for autonomy was quickly suppressed by federal militia, but their existence may provide another opportunity for meddling should the USSR be so inclined. The writer thinks it likely that the Soviet leaders are presently too concerned to improve relations at the centre to wish to stir up trouble on the edges. If, however, a stable regime were to arise in Tehran that was unwilling to grant the Soviet Union the special status that she desires, the indirect route might be chosen.

Footnotes

1. See J.C. Hurewitz. Middle East Politics (New York, 1969): Chapter 15 deals with “The military Dimension in Recent Iranian Politics”.  
2. Ibid.  
ZIMBABWE JOINS THE COMMONWEALTH

by Dominick Graham

At one minute after midnight on the 18th April an independent Republic of Zimbabwe joined the Commonwealth. The birth of the Republic was a diplomatic and political miracle wrought by Britain, an act of faith by the men who were recently destroying each other in a civil war, and, not least, a reminder to the cynics that our Commonwealth is the only international organization that could have played midwife and did so.

Lord Carrington, Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and Dr. Mudawarara signed the agreement to end the war on 21 December 1979. They undertook to return Rhodesia to colonial status under British authority and to hold elections. Lord Soames, the interim governor, had been in Salisbury since 10th December. A Commonwealth Observer Group from eleven nations — Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Jamaica, Papua-New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka — would observe the British administered elections for the whites on 14 February and for the blacks on 27-9 February 1980. In the meanwhile a Commonwealth cease-fire monitoring force would see that the two armies of the Patriotic Front, Zipra and Zanla, moved to 16 assembly points throughout the country and remained there until the elections were over. This force was drawn from the U.K., Kenya, Fiji, Australia and New Zealand. Less than 2000 in number and lightly armed, it would be thinly spread across the country in isolated stations in the heart of the PF bush.

The monitors had been on standby for weeks and moved to Rhodesia over Christmas in order to be ready when the cease-fire came into force. "Good luck