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 11. Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, 1973), pp. 249-50, 755; Robert Fisk, reporting from Kabul, CBC Radio "Sunday Morning", 17 Feb. 1980; *The Economist*, 2 Feb. 1980; *Time*, 28 Jan. 1980; *Toronto Star*, 21 Jan. 1980.
 12. Dupree, pp. 1, 5, 12, 118-119; Fisk, CBC, 17 Feb. 1980; Liz Thurgood, "All Quiet on the Kabul Front", *Guardian Weekly*, 3 Feb. 1980; *Newsweek*, 26 May 1980.
 13. *Time*, 28 Jan. 1980.
 14. Fisk, CBC, 17 Feb. 1980.
 15. *Newsweek*, 25 Feb. 1980.
 16. *Guardian Weekly*, 24 Feb. 1980; *Gazette* (Montreal), 12 April 1980.
 17. *Newsweek*, 14 Jan. 1980.
 18. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 28 Jan. 1980; *Time*, 4 Feb. 1980; *Boston Globe*, 28 April 1980; *Newsweek*, 26 May 1980.
 19. *Time*, 5, 26 May 1980; *Newsweek*, 26 May 1980.
 20. See for example, Robert Lasch, "Lessons of Korea and Vietnam", *Newsweek*, 18 Feb. 1980; Cliff Kincaid, "Anti-Draft Rally Report", *Human Events*, 12 April 1980; "Special Report — A Foreign Policy in Disarray", *Newsweek*, 12 May 1980.
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 22. Letter to William Smith, 9 Jan. 1795.

POST-REFERENDUM QUEBEC — THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT

by

Micheal J. Kelly and Thomas H. Mitchell

For more than 20 years now English Canada has been anxiously following the progress of political change in the province of Quebec. By nearly every

observable criterion, Quebec has undergone a profound social and political transformation, which at times has both fascinated and alarmed the rest of the country. While the *growing linguistic pride and self-confidence* of Québécois is an undeniable political fact, the ultimate destination of this nationalist awakening remains unclear. Throughout the 1960s, successive Quebec provincial governments helped to lead the challenge to what was generally perceived as an arrogant and unsympathetic federal government in Ottawa. During this period a tiny conspiratorial group known as the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) undertook a limited campaign of random terror aimed primarily at symbols of English Canadian domination. Disavowed by the vast majority of Québécois who sought social and political change through the electoral process, the FLQ lost virtually all credibility as a result of the October Crisis of 1970. It was obvious that if change was to take place in Quebec, it would have to occur through the ballot box.¹ After two defeats in 1970 and 1973, the nationalist Parti Québécois led by René Lévesque came to power on a reformist platform in November, 1976. The Parti Québécois pledged to hold a referendum in order to give the Quebec electorate an opportunity to choose whether to remain as part of Canada or to move in the direction of separatism. After nearly four years of speculation and uncertainty as to what kind of referendum question would be asked and what an affirmative vote would mean, on May 20, 1980, some 60% of the Quebec electorate chose to deny the Parti Québécois a mandate to negotiate its policy of "sovereignty-association".

No one can, of course, predict with any certainty what lies ahead for post-referendum Quebec. It is, however, possible to draw upon a knowledge of recent political developments and a general understanding of theories of political conflict to outline some factors which might determine whether Quebec continues to evolve peacefully, or drifts towards destabilizing conflict and violence.

Voting analysts are likely to continue to pore over the electoral statistics from the May 20th referendum for some time. What is clear, however, is that the referendum result will not put an end to the separatist movement. Whether or not the relatively tranquil situation that has followed the referendum continues in the future is probably contingent on two important factors. The first, is the leadership of René Lévesque. The Parti Québécois remains an uneasy coalition of divergent political factions which, without Lévesque's unifying influence, might well disintegrate as a political force.² There is no heir apparent in the Parti Québécois and should Lévesque retire from the scene, whatever chance the party has of broadening its electoral base would probably vanish. While to English Canada Lévesque may appear a radical and a rabble-rouser, he has in fact been a moderating influence on the policies and programs of the Parti Québécois. If Lévesque's successor is an individual with a narrower political base, and if the party's fortunes begin to decline he might be less capable of restraining some of the militant extremists in the party.

The second factor which may influence Quebec's prospects of remaining free of organized political violence is the response of the federal government and the rest of the provinces to the challenge of constitutional reform. There appears to be almost universal agreement that the present constitution should be

repatriated and that an amendment formula acceptable to all the provinces is urgently needed. Beyond these generalities, however, there are vigorous disagreements between the provinces and the federal government on such matters as natural resources, equalization grants, and language rights. Whether Lévesque or Liberal leader, Claude Ryan, is Premier of Quebec, this leader would seek to maximize the province's position within the Canadian federal system. He would be a tough negotiator with Ottawa and the rest of the provinces. The drafting of a new constitution for Canada will be an exceedingly complex task of balancing the various regional, ethnic, and linguistic interests of the country. The prospects for developing a constitutional arrangement acceptable to all the provinces should be viewed with guarded optimism. A failure might cause some French Canadians to feel betrayed and isolated.

A number of divergent political figures in Quebec have warned of the possibility of violence resulting from the failure of the referendum and a continuation of the status-quo.³ When discussing the potential for political violence in Quebec it is necessary to make a distinction between collective violence and terrorism. By the term collective violence is meant mass-based actions such as some of the violent nationalist demonstrations of the 1960s. The potential for this type of protest is probably far less now than it was 15 or 20 years ago, partly because the vogue of "fun revolution" has passed, and partly because, in a very real sense, French-speaking Québécois have in those years become masters in their own house.

The kind of violence, however, that is on most people's minds when they ponder the future of Quebec concerns the resurgence of separatist terrorism. McGill University Sociologist Maurice Pinard recently put the probability of such a resurgence at less than 50%.⁴ It is difficult to say, of course, exactly how one calculates such a probability, but even if the probability is set at 45%, this is an alarming situation within a liberal democracy which takes pride in a peaceful tradition. While recent social changes and the political skills of Lévesque may have had a neutralizing effect on the potential for collective violence in the province, there is no certainty that this will prevent small group élitist terrorism, possibly supported from outside Canada. There are undoubtedly elements in Quebec society for whom the only acceptable option is independence. If faith in the electoral road to independence is lost, these people may see terrorism as a viable alternative.⁵

There have been several reports concerning the continued existence of a terrorist organization in Quebec. While there has been no terrorist activity in Quebec in almost a decade, a number of potential terrorists are reported to have received training in Algeria, Cuba, and most recently in East Germany. It has also been suggested that these individuals have received money and weapons from several foreign sources.⁶ If one attributes any credibility to such reports the anticipation might be that were terrorism to resurface in Quebec, it would in all likelihood be better organized (i.e., more professional) and quite possibly more deadly than that perpetrated by the "romantic revolutionaries" of the 1960s. The terrorism that occurred in Quebec in the 1960s was, to a large extent, what students of the phenomenon refer to as symbolic terrorism. The objective of FLQ terrorism during this period was to publicize the cause; to sensitize

Québécois to their "colonial subjugation" at the hands of English Canadians. Terrorism was to serve as a catalyst in the crusade for independence. The ultimate strategic objective was to mobilize the recalcitrant masses — to accelerate the historical process. The publicity or propaganda focus of FLQ terrorism was evident in the selection of targets. For the most part FLQ attacks were directed at symbols of English Canadian domination and federal authority (eg. mail boxes, the Wolfe Monument, military establishments, etc.). In comparison with later terrorist campaigns elsewhere in the world, both casualties and property damage were insignificant.

Were political failures to engender a resurgence of terrorism, it would probably be qualitatively and quantitatively different from that of the 1960s. *The political circumstances of the 1980s differ markedly from those of the 1960s.* The intervening decade, particularly the rise of the Parti Québécois, has done much to heighten the political and ethnic consciousness of almost all Québécois. It is interesting to note, however, that increased political consciousness has not necessarily been associated with increased support for the independence option. While there might be overwhelming support in Quebec for constitutional change, support for outright independence has increased only slightly over the last two decades.⁷ It would therefore appear that a return to low-intensity symbolic or consciousness-building terrorism would be doomed to failure from the outset. Hence, if terrorism were to resurface in Quebec it is likely that both the tactical and strategic foci would be greatly different than that of the 1960s. It could well be more intense and more indiscriminate than that previously experienced.

It could be speculated that a resurgence of terrorism in Quebec would consist of a highly disciplined and well-orchestrated campaign by those rumoured terrorist cadres. Such a campaign moreover might not be limited to Quebec. As a matter of fact, the strategic objectives of such a campaign might be facilitated by taking the struggle to other parts of Canada. The goal of such terrorism would be to create a backlash in the rest of Canada, to polarize intercommunal relations and displace the moderates and compromisers, and force the federal government to panic and overreact. As has frequently been suggested, a major goal of terrorism in an ethnically divided society is to try to discredit the existing government by forcing it to concentrate its coercive power on a particular segment of the population with which the terrorists have attempted to identify. This is what Carlos Marighela referred to as militarizing the political situation.⁸ Strategically the terrorist would attempt to lure the federal government into reacting in a repressive manner, eroding its base of support in Quebec. In this regard it is important to note that just as the constituency has changed for the terrorist, so has it changed for the federal government. The Québécois' tolerance of federally-controlled counter-insurgency operations within their province has surely been eroded to some extent over the last decade. It is unlikely that a majority of Québécois would today countenance the same kind of government intervention that occurred in 1970. A heavy-handed, indiscriminate response to terrorism on the part of the federal government could today have disastrous political consequences.

Making predictions about Quebec's future in the context of so many indeter-

minate factors and influences is a hazardous pursuit. The decade of the 1970s was relatively peaceful but it remains to be seen if the degree of ethnic tension and polarization has recently decreased or increased in Quebec. Much of what happens will be contingent on the PQ's leadership and the outcome of efforts at constitutional change. The outlook is not black, but there are no grounds for complacency.

Footnotes

1. In a letter to *Le Devoir* (Montreal, December 13, 1972), Vallières called for separatists to abandon violence and join the democratic Parti Québécois. Independence, he suggested, was to be won at the polling booth.
2. For a discussion of the various groups and ideological strains that have been subsumed by the Parti Québécois, see James W. Hagy, "Quebec Separatists: The First Twelve Years", *Queen's Quarterly*, 75 (Summer 1969), pp. 229-238; Howard L. Singer, "Internal Conflicts within the Parti Québécois", *Dalhousie Review*, 57 (Spring 1977), pp. 5-17; Henry Milner, *Politics in The New Quebec* (Toronto, 1978); and Vera Murray, *Le Parti Québécois* (Montreal, 1976).
3. This suggestion was recently made by Quebec Education Minister Jacques-Yvan Morin, "PQ Minister sees Violence after 'No' Vote", *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, January 15, 1980), and was echoed in several speeches by Claude Ryan during the referendum campaign.
4. *The Ottawa Citizen*, May 22, 1980.
5. See Pierre Vallières, *L'Urgence de Choisir* (Montreal, 1971), p. 113.
6. See "Quebec: The Challenge From Within", *Conflict Studies*, no. 20 (February 1972), pp. 1-16; and Rowland Mans, "Canada's Constitutional Crisis", *Conflict Studies*, no. 98, (August 1978).
7. Recent polls indicate that approximately 17% of Québécois support outright independence, an increase of about 6% over the last two decades.
8. See Carlos Marighela, *For the Liberation of Brazil*, trans. by John Butt and Rosemary Sheed (London, 1971).

IRAN'S RIVAL GROUPS

by Maurice Tugwell

The success of the fundamentalist Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in Iran's second-round parliamentary elections seems likely to strengthen the power of the religious zealots who have been the driving force inside the Revolutionary Council, the country's interim government. The likely losers will be the relative moderates, notably President Bani Sadr. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini will remain as holy figurehead, providing the semblance of unity within the nation, but after his death we may witness a power struggle both within the IRP, between such figures as Hossein-Ali Montazeri and Mohammed Beheshti, and between the IRP and rival political groups in Tehran and breakaway sects on Iran's periphery. This article attempts to list these alternative regimes and to