Islamic Revivalism and the Quest for Political Power

by Nasser Momayezi

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, the Middle East has witnessed the rising involvement and influence of Islamic movements (which is referred to as Islamic revivalism) in regional and domestic politics. Islamic revivalism¹is a distinct interpretive reading of Islam. It refers to those individuals and movements that want to strengthen Islamic influence in political, economic and social life. This movement, according to Lawrence G. Potter, appears to be a part of a broader worldwide movement in which people disaffected from their government and feeling threatened by the erosion of traditional values turn to religion as a source of identity.² In recent months, conservative religious parties in the Middle East have scored significant electoral victories, raising questions about the changing social nature of these countries and presenting the United States with new diplomatic challenges. Johnston argues that "it is clear there is a return to religion ... when secular governments fail to meet the needs of their populous, religious messages fill the vacuum."³

In general, Islamic revivalism is viewed as a revolutionary force whose aim is to topple the established order in the Muslim world, be that authoritarian or democratic. The usual response to the Islamic challenges to the privilege of the ruling elite has been the policy of inclusion or exclusion. Such policies have met with varying success. But, socioeconomic circumstances that are conducive to the growth of Islamic revivalism in the Middle East persist.

This article looks beyond familiar images of Islam and the Middle East, and attempts to achieve a better sense of proportion about Islamic movements. The first section demonstrates that, contrary to the view of alarmists, there is not a universal, monolithic movement of Muslims bent on Jihad (holy struggle) and determined to destroy the West. The second section examines the roots of Islamic revivalism and the nature of each individual Islamic organization in order to avoid characterizing all groups on the basis of the activities of a few. The third section demonstrates that the politics of inclusion tends to moderate the program of Islamic fundamentalist groups, while exclusion isolates and radicalizes them and forces governments into repression that merely reinforces extremism and demands for a zero-sum solution. The concluding section assesses the future prospects for Islamic movements in the Middle East.

WHAT ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IS NOT

This perception is shared by some Western scholars, who have also warned against the danger of "Islamic Fundamentalism." They have directed attention to a large-scale confrontation between Islam and the West, which they call a "clash of civilizations." For example, Samuel Huntington argues that "A west at the of peak of its power confronts non-wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and resources to shape the world in non-western ways."⁶ The conflict of the future, Huntington continues, will be "the west and the rest, the west and the Muslims, the west and a collection of other civilizations, including Hindu, Japanese, Latin American and Slavic orthodox."⁷

However, this perception of Islam has ignored the diversity within Islam and the groups within the Islamic movements. In fact, there are significant differences among the Islamist groups on many basic issues, and it would be a mistake to lump them together as one unitary group with a unidimentional and divinely inspired vision of politics. The Muslim world embraces a billion people, extending across Africa and Asia from Morocco and Senegal to China and Indonesia, as well as several million adherents in Europe and North America.⁸ Profound and explosive differences of ideology and policy can be found among Muslim states and movements that have led to little tangible integration beyond the rhetorical level, and profound disagreements exist as to what steps should be taken to improve the situation.

The catchall term Islam fails to convey the substantial differences among the many Islamic sects, races, nations and culture. The Islamic world is no more monolithic and homogeneous than the world of christianity. So different are the people of the Muslim world from one another that often their only connection is through a common faith, although that faith is usually differently interpreted.

Political differences within the Muslim world are deep and extensive, as shown by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. This war bitterly pitted one Muslim government against another. After the United States mobilized an international coalition against Iraq, Saddam Hussein -- an Iraqi leader not previously noted for his deference to Muslim sentiment -- attempted to define the war as a war between Islam and the West. But few believed it. Although certain radical Islamic elements considered the war a jihad, most of the Muslim Middle East states joined a US led coalition in a war against their fellow Muslim state.

Moreover, the geographic spread of the 44 Islamic countries has produced markedly different societies in each. The cultural and historical development of Indonesia, for example, is quite distinct from that of Morocco. In the Middle East, Iran, Turkey and Egypt are all Muslim Islamic countries, but they have little else in common. That is why Khommeini's dream of creating an Islamic republic that would be imitated by other nations and inspired oppressed people everywhere, has never been realized. Because Iran was ethnically Persian and dominated by the minority shi'it branch of Islam, its behavior was an unlikely model for sunni Arabs. The sunnis and shi'is are two principle groups in the Muslim world. Sunnis are those who follow the sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad. The shi'is are the partisans of Ali, the prophet's cousin and son-in-law. These two groups are bitterly divided over the question of the prophet's succession. Although Ali did become Islam's fourth caliph and the sunnis revere the first four rightly guided caliphs, the shi'is usually reject the legitimacy of the first three. This difference in belief is an obstacle to sunni and shi'is reconciliation and reunification.

On the theological level, Muslims also differ over the interpretation of the Koran and the teachings of the prophet Muhammad. Some seventy sects and offshoots of Islam have arisen because of these doctrinal differences, which in some cases have remained irreconcilable. In the phrase of the leading theoretician in Kuwait: "Although the shi'is do share some of our social and political goals, they have distorted Islam beyond imagination. We cannot and will not communicate and cooperate with them."⁹

With so much disunity, the Islamic world is not about to coalesce into a single force. It is difficult to visualize the emergence of a large-scale united Islamic revolutionary movement that transcends national boundaries. The recent Islamic revivalism in some parts of the Islamic world is a response primarily to political and economic crises rather than a spontaneous spiritual rebirth of a messianic nature. Islam has no powerful, organized central body or hierarchy that can coordinate, mobilize and regulate such a movement.

Despite the many shades and shapes of Islamic revivalism, it is wrongly treated as a single or monolithic force -- believing, feeling, thinking and acting as one. The Islamic movement is politically far more diverse. One can point to a number of different parts of the world where various forms of Islamic revivalism are challenging existing political regimes, and they have varying agendas. Indeed, many of the movements that speak in the name of Islam are often political groups with an Islamic facade. Every Islamic movement must be judged within the political context of its own country, its own agenda, and its own ideological orientation.

Richard Norton directly makes a distinction between moderate and radical Islamists (a term used by the Middle Eastern experts).¹⁰ Moderate Islamists are made up of moderate reformers (the majority) who are seeking to return to the basic or fundamental truths of the religion as a means of resolving contemporary political, social, economic and other problems. Its members advocate the use of democratic and electoral means: political organization, mobilization and participation to bring about a non-violent transfer of power within the nation. Reform of both the state and the society is at the heart of their political agenda. In fact, some of these groups have been able to capture dominant positions in their respective political systems. Moderates see no contradiction between Islam and Western philosophies and institutions. The moderates can bridge the East-West cultural gap, deny exclusivity of Islamic thought, and attribute East-West conflicts to historical political factors.

A second group, the Radical Islamists are radical hardliners (the minority) who consider violence central to the political cleansing necessary to establish a new social order. Its members engage in terrorism and assassination to bring about quick transfers of power. This small minority believes that it has a divine mandate to topple the rulers of its country and impose its own interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) on the society. It is to this group that the label "Islamic fundamentalism" best applies. This group, however, remains fragmented and small.¹¹ Included in this group would be a number of extremist groups, like Salvation from Hell, Hamas, Gamaa al-Islamiya; and Egypt's Al-jihad and Takfir.

THE ROOTS OF REVIVALISM

Islamic movements have some common roots. These movements in different Muslim countries are partly a reaction against indigenous corruption, the politics of tyranny and repression which -- in the minds of many citizens -- have reached intolerable level in their societies.¹² Despite great economic gains in many oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, the benefits have been unevenly distributed, making material inequities and social imbalances greater and more visible than ever before. The governments of the oil-rich countries are often run by small cliques of insiders, such as the military regime of Algeria or the family regimes of the Arabian peninsula, which benefit only a handful of people. In fact, the vast majority of the people in the Muslim countries are among the most impoverished people in the world.¹³ For example, the average salary of an Egyptian teacher is approximately $50 per month.¹⁴ Growing economic difficulties, including rising expectations, increased unemployment, and lack of educational and occupational opportunities, have embittered large numbers of people, particularly the young who constitute the vast majority of the population. Major Middle Eastern cities like Algiers are currently flooded with unemployed youth. In fact, about 59 percent of its population is less than 25 years old, and 58 percent of this category is currently unemployed. Meriem Verges notes that the "young adult who is barred from the productive sector and excluded from global society has become a generic feature of Algerian urban space and is the primary target of the Islamist campaign."¹⁵ The distressed and alienated have chosen Islam as a means to express their disenchantment with political leadership and the ideological alternatives over the past few decades.¹⁶ As the editors of the Middle East Report wrote in a recent special issue on democracy in the Middle East:

The high profile of Islamist groups owes more to the character of state repression in the past than to the exceptional religiosity of Muslim societies.¹⁷

The current Islamic revival is also the result of failed secular ideologies. A generation of Muslims have been numbed by a series of successive ideologies -- founded on Marxism and nationalism -- which inspired them to dream of unity, and strong and prosperous societies that never were realized. Experiments in Arab socialism were utter failures.¹⁸ Arab socialism produced state classes whose relatively privileged positions set them apart from the masses. The turning point for many was the Arab's crushing defeat in 1967 at the hands of Israel -- a nation that was perceived by many Muslims to have been victorious because it had not lost touch with its religious roots. As a result, Islamic reformists began to embark upon a new direction hewing closer to the religious norms and values of their societies to renovate the socio-political structure. Muslims participating in revivalist movements intend to reform the old socio-political system according to their understanding of the tenets of Islam. As John Esposito observes, "at the heart of the revivalist movements lies the quest for authenticity, identity and tradition."¹⁹

Despite the frequent comment that Islamic revivalism is a reaction to the technological advancement of the West and negative pressure of modernity, it is a mistake to call these movements reactionary.²⁰ The prime sources of support for the Islamist movements are students, college graduates, teachers, intellectuals, and young men and women from rural areas. As Olivier Roy contends, "Rather than a reaction against modernization of Muslim societies, Islamism is a product of it."²¹ In nearly all Middle Eastern countries, a process of modernization has occurred that brings with it both secularization and religious revivalism. However, despite the change introduced by transformations in productive forces, the step from traditional society to modern society is verified only in the most superficial layers of Middle Eastern cultural diversity, and primarily in the culture of the elite and of dominant groups.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

Despite the widespread use of Islamic symbols by most Middle Eastern governments, the ruling elites of these countries remained vulnerable to the Islamic critique of contemporary politics of society. The call of Islamic groups for reform and for justice through return to pure Islam has attracted many segments of the population. The usual response to the Islamic challenge to the privilege of the ruling elite has been the policy of inclusion or exclusion. These policies have met with varying success.

Countries like Jordan, Algeria, Turkey and Pakistan decided to follow the policy of inclusion and to allow Islamic groups to participate in local and national elections. In Jordan, with the democratization and political liberalization that took place in 1989, Islamist groups were given the opportunity to become part of the formal political structure. Subsequently, Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood made substantial gain in the national assembly, but not enough to challenge the ruling order. In the 1993 election, Islamic groups, including Muslim Brotherhood, lost some of their parliamentary gains, partly because of their lack of achievement in parliament and the consequent loss of protest votes they had received in the 1989 election.²² Once in parliament Islamists's performance was lack-luster at best. They tended to focus on moral issues, while ignoring bread and butter issues at a time when the Jordanian economy was in deep recession. Islamists who were given ministerial positions proved to be inept administrators, in many cases alienating the very people who had voted them into the office.²³

Algeria has functioned under a single-party system of government since its independence from France in 1962. However, plummeting oil prices in the 1980s combined with mismanagement of Algeria's highly centralized economy, notoriously inefficient bureaucracy and rampant corruption brought about the nation's most serious social and economic crisis since its independence. Unemployment went from 11 percent in 1984 to 25 percent in 1988, and family purchasing power declined drastically.²⁴ The socioeconomic crisis ultimately culminated in the bloodbath of October 1988.

Following the bloodbath and destruction, the government led by President Chadli Benjedid, launched major democratic reforms, among them separating the ruling party FLN (National Liberation Front) from the state and eliminating its monopoly on political power. On 23 February 1989, a new Algerian constitution was voted in by national referendum. It created unrestricted freedom of expression, association and organization, and the right to unionize and strike. As a consequence, numerous parties including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) were officially recognized and registered.²⁵ President Benjedid continued the process of political liberalization by holding local and regional elections in June 1990. FIS captured 55 percent of the popular vote compared to 31 percent for the ruling FLN. The June 1990 municipal and provincial elections resulted in a major defeat for FLN and massive victory for the Salvation Front.²⁶ As Entelis notes "although there were those who voted for the FIS in June 1990 simply to record their disgust with nearly three decades of FLN rule, many others were inspired by the message of moral rectification that Islamists communicated with vigor and conviction."²⁷ In the December 1991 parliamentary elections, FIS won 188 seats out of 430. Runoff elections were scheduled for January 1992, with the FIS expected to win a parliamentary majority. However, senior military officers decided that they had seen enough democratization, forced President Benjedid to resign and annulled elections, thus aborting a dramatic and nearly successful shift to Islamic government. The Algerian government was placed under an army-dominated High Council of State. The radicalizing effect of the coup was both predictable and tragic. Radical Islamic activists, the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA), have engaged in a traditional notion of Jihad to fight back. Bolstered by a FLN victory in the election of November 1995, Algeria's President Liamine Zeroula has chosen not to talk with the Islamists at the heart of the counry's crisis. Algeria's security forces took the election results as a mandate to annihilate the GIA and FIS which have been waging war against the government and its supporters. And, the violence continues at the rate of 100 deaths per week.²⁸

The meteoric rise of the Islamic Welfare party (or Refah) in Turkey, a NATO ally and devoutly secular for 73 years, may be a most significant, though ignored event. Amid a poor economy -- inflation is at 80 percent -- and corruption charges in the secular government, Refah has prospered with an anti-corruption message and by clamoring to be the voice of the dispossessed. Indeed, in the local elections of March 1994, the Welfare party doubled its popular vote from nine percent in 1989 to 19 percent of the national vote, catching up with the secular True Path party (led by then Prime Minister Tansue Ciller) and the Motherland party.²⁹ This electoral victory put Islamist mayors into office in 29 large cities, including Istanbul, Turky's most cosmopolitan city and Ankara, the capital of the republic.³⁰ In the December 1995 election for parliament the Welfare party emerged as the single strongest party, with about 20 percent of the national vote, complicating the efforts of other Turkish parties to form a secular coalition government. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Refah party, used his skills to negotiate an unlikely and even bizarre coalition with former Prime Minister Ciller, an outspoken secularist who had recently asserted that her guiding principle was "no coalition with the fundamentalist."³¹

Erbakan's foreign policy rhetoric was anti-Western, anti-NATO, and anti-Israel, and has opposed the US-led Operation Provide Comfort which uses Turkish military bases to protect Iraqi Kurds. He also pledged to impose Sharia -- Islamic law such as is practiced in Iran -- on Turkey's 61 million people. But the enigmatic Erbakan was hesitant to bring such radical changes to a country so valued by the West, particularly in light of the strong pro-Western military. The Turkish military has seized power three times since 1960 when it disapproved of the way civilians were running things, and that fact alone stood as implicit warning to Erbakan. In fact, under rising pressure from Turkey's secular military, Erbakan resigned last June as prime minister in a meeting with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, ending a one-year experiment in Islamist-led government. However, Refah's ascention to power was bound to have an impact, but not necessarily a radical one, on Turkish policy. The party attempted to develop close political and commercial ties with Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries. The $20 billion natural gas agreement between Turkey and Iran concluded in August 1996 bears testimony to this fact.³²

Pakistan's Jamaat-i Islami (the Islamic party) is one of the oldest revivalist movements. It was formed in 1941 in what was still India by Mawlana Mawdudi whose ideological interpretation of Islam and his prolific writings provided an interpretation of Islam that appealed to many educated Pakistanis, and indeed, many throughout the Muslim world.³³ Mawdudi was not a theologian but social thinker and political activist. In his six-volume commentary on the Koran, Tafhim al Qur'an, Mawdudi interprets the verses of the Koran that have political and legal implications. He gave a political language to Islamic discourse.³⁴ Jamaat's major goal has been to establish a state that would embody the spirit of Islamic law replacing the secular state with an Islamic one.³⁵

Although it has not captured the electorate, the Jamaat has demonstrated its bargaining power as a political force to be reckoned with in national and local politics. Jamaat-i-Islami's leadership cadre is well educated, committed, well organized, and well funded, and enjoys a following among lower-middle and middle classes, among students, trade unions, businessmen and middle-level civil and military bureaucrats.³⁶ The Jamaat-i-Islami has a highly structured, hierarchly organized, bureaucratic-type organization that has established a clear line of authority and a huge network of functional departments and nationwide branches.³⁷ An interesting aspect of Jamaat's political power has been its pivotal role in extending the much needed Islamic legitimacy to the state; by mobilizing Islamic symbolisms it made religion available to the state for political ends. Islam has proved an effective rallying cry not only in the past but also in the present Pakistan, a nation that suffers from an ongoing identity crisis.

However, after five decades of intense religio-political activity, the Jamaat has failed to gain control of the government. From 1970 to 1988, four national elections were held in Pakistan. The Jamaat participated in all of them but failed to obtain more than ten seats in any contest.³⁸ Most observers credit Pakistan's open political climate for the Jamaat's lack of electoral success.

It is argued that in an open political system, Islamic activists and parties divide rather than unite. Ever since Pakistan was established in 1947, it has maintained a relatively open political climate in which the Islamic revival party was able to participate.³⁹ Pakistan's government has never tried to exclude Jamaat from the political process and hence did not reverse the long-term impact of the party's involvement in the process. As a result, the government did not radicalize the party. Thus, in the 1993 elections, despite the Jamaat's attempt to provide a third option or an alternative with the formation of Pakistan's Islamic front, it and other religious parties were routed. The election demonstrated the inability of religious groups to unite and present their followers with a unified political agenda.

In contrast, Tunisia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have embarked on the policy of exclusion and denied Islamists any access to political system. In Tunisia, the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) has succeeded in disbanding the once-powerful Islamist Al-Nahda (Renaissance) movement and all but immobilized its supporters. In 1987, Al-Nahda was banned along with other opposition parties, including Tunisia's communist party, after President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali (former minister of the interior and ex-chief of security services) took power in a constitutional coup against Habbib Bourguiba. The new leader promised political reforms to secular opposition parties, but continued to deny legitimacy to the Islamist Al-Nahda party. The new law on political parties declared that "no party has the right to refer to itself in its principles, its objectives, its action or its program, to religion, language, race, or region."⁴⁰ The Al-Nahda party leader, Rashid al-Ghannoushi, has repeatedly declared his commitment to the democratic process, but has failed to convince Ben Ali's government to recognize Al-Nahda.⁴¹ Although Al-Nahda was forbidden from participating in the legislative elections of April 1989, its candidates took part in the elections as independents.

The legislative elections were a turning point in the relations between the Ben Ali regime and Al-Nahda party. Having succeeded in obtaining almost 15 percent of the votes, and up to 30 percent in some cities, including Tunis, Al-Nahda appeared to be the major opposition force in the country.⁴² The thousands of votes cast in April for Al-Nahda candidates did not all come from student groups; rather it included sympathizers from the socio-professional class who had more varied backgrounds. Nahda had manifestly and finally managed to capture the votes of many people who followed a traditional "orthodox" Islam and who had previously been apolitical. They confirmed to the regime the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of confronting the Islamists in regular elections, unless they were willing to alternate power with the Islamists.⁴³ Moreover, Algeria's recognition of Islamist political parties, and stunning victory of the FIS in the municipal and provincial elections made Ben Ali determined to suppress Al-Nahda and eliminate it as potential threat.

In recent years, the RCD has adopted a dual approach: repressive tactics along with Western style social and economic reforms to respond to the issues of social deprivation raised by the Islamic party.⁴⁴ These efforts have been aimed at stealing Al-Nahda's thunder as well as easing the plight of Tunisia's poor. The government launched an infrastructure improvement program to build schools, provide electricity and running water to isolated villages, and fund health centers.

Whether reforms have turned the tide of public opinion in favor of the ruling party remains to be seen. The government still maintains a tight grip on potential sources of support for the Islamists. The seven year campaign against Islamists which has been condemned by Amnesty International for its gross human rights violations, has made it difficult to ascertain the strength of support for the Al-Nahda party.⁴⁵ While these measures are eliminating any immediate threat of an Islamist takeover of power in Tunisia, in the long-run they will increase the level of polarization in society.

In Egypt, the government officially banned the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954. But the avowedly non-violent organization has long been tolerated and has even become a moderate fixture in Egyptian politics. However, today most extremist Islamic groups are stealing its thunder. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood has failed to gain power. And in that failure the most extreme Islamist groups, such as Jamaat-al Jihad and the Gamaa al-Islamiyah (whose spiritual leader is the blind cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who is now serving a life sentence in the United States for his role in planning the bombing of the World Trade Center) see a chance to gain political power by using violent confrontation and extreme anti-Western and anti-Israeli views. These two groups have been locked in a deadly battle with security forces and police. Their focus has become power rather than promotion of religious ideals.

In 1991, as Algeria was on the verge of an Islamic takeover, President Mubarak decided to follow the example of neighboring Tunisia: to eradicate violent extremism and also to counter and control the institutionalization of Islamic activism. For Egypt, Tunisia's example provides little solace. Suppression in Tunisia with a population of nine million comes easier, compared with Egypt's 60 million. Tunisia benefits from being a small country with a 70,000 strong security force that can comb the countryside -- a luxury Egypt does not have.⁴⁶ However, the Mubarak government has aggressively responded to the Islamic threat with a broad government crackdown and massive arrests of suspected extremists and sympathizers, which has included not only extremists but also moderate Islamists.⁴⁷ In autumn 1994, for example, the government began a purge of pro-Islamic teachers from Egypt's 25,000 schools, a venture that was doomed to failure before it began.⁴⁸ In the 1995 crackdown, during which 81 Muslim Brothers -- all of them former parliamentarians, leading civic activists, or parliamentary candidates -- were prosecuted in two trials before the Supreme Military Court. It is noteworthy that not one of the approximately 150 Muslim Brotherhood candidates who ran for the People's Assembly (majlis al-shura'b) as independents or under the Labor (al-Amal) Party name won a seat in a contest which local and international human rights groups saw as tainted by government interference and strong repression against Brotherhood candidates and campaign workers.⁴⁹ The government is attempting to crush the extremists with every instrument of brute force at its disposal. In 1993 alone, more than 230 fundamentalists were killed by government forces, with thousands more being locked in Egypt's prisons. With each round of repression, the government claims to have turned the corner in its war with fundamentalists, but few observers share its optimism.⁵⁰

At present, the situation in Egypt remains a low-level war of attrition between the regime and Islamists. Every day, in Cairo or in upper Egypt in the region around Assyut, some clerics or others denounce Mubarak as an infidel, and as a betrayer of his people.⁵¹ Meanwhile, the hostile tactics of harassment and imprisonment of Islamists have only marginalized moderates, strengthening the resolve of groups like the Gamaa and forcing the government to respond forcefully. The fear of fundamentalists has immobilized the Egyptian government, making it reluctant to proceed with the political and economic reforms essential to its long-term stability.

In Saudi Arabia, discontent has risen steadily since the Persian Gulf War ended five years ago. The royal family has been criticized by Islamist opposition, particularly by two leading Sheikhs, Safar al-Hawali and Salman-al-Audah, for its ineptitude in defending the country and its reliance on non-Muslims for the task, despite massive military spending over two previous decades.⁵²

Saudi Arabia also witnessed an increase in open political activity in the period after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A petition to the King was circulated in late 1990, which was signed by 43 so called "liberals" or "secularists." While emphasizing their loyalty to the government, the signers asserted that it is "the bounden duty of every citizen to give advice to the rulers ... and to participate with them by word and deed in everything that he believes is for the good of the country, which belongs to all." They urged that the proposed Majlis al-shura (consultative assembly) must have among its responsibilities the "study, development, and adoption of laws and rules related to all economic, political, educational, and other issues and should exercise effective scrutiny of all executive agencies." The petitioners also called for more independent and open media "to exercise their freedom in preaching good over evil, calling for virtue and shunning vice, and enriching dialogue in an open Muslim society."⁵³

In February 1991, some 400 Islamic intellectuals, among them scores of top religious leaders, including Shaikh Abdel-Aziz ibn Baz, the most eminent religious leader in the country, wrote their own petition addressed to King Fahd calling for a series of governmental reforms. The Islamic petition, like its liberal counterpart, supported the idea of the establishment of a Majlis al-Shura, emphasizing that it "must be totally independent and not subject to any pressure that may affect the authority of the council." The Islamic petition also addressed specific criticisms of government policy in a number of areas. It called for strengthening the system of accountability for all government officials, and "government agencies must be cleansed of anyone whose corruption or dereliction is proven regardless of any other consideration." This petition also urged that "the rights of individuals and society must be guaranteed. Every restriction on people's rights and their will must be removed, to ensure the enjoyment of human dignity, within the acceptable religious safeguards."⁵⁴ This petition was followed in September 1992 by an important 45-page document, which boldly attacked the clerical elders for endorsing the King's domestic and international politics and called for the establishment of a supreme religious court to review and purify all laws and assure their compatibility with Islam.⁵⁵

In a country where organized political activity is severely limited, the circulation of these petitions touched off a wave of political expression. Islamic activists began to be more vocal in their criticism of aspects of political life in the kingdom from the pulpit of a mosque, and in the cassette tapes circulated through Islamic bookstores and religious institutions.⁵⁶ In May 1993, in Ryadh, Ruhammad Massari, a practicing Muslim, announced the formation of the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), which he described as an association devoted to human rights and political reform within the context of Islam.

However, the Saudi government began to move swiftly to contain religious radicalism by calling on religious leaders to rein in the radicals, and by calling fundamentalist leaders for questioning and depriving them of their pulpits in mosques. Massari and his sympathizers, mostly university professors and intellectuals, were put in jail and expelled from their jobs. Some of the prisoners including Massari were later released and arrived in London in April 1994, where they established CDLR's headquarters.⁵⁷ CDLR communicates with its supporters inside Saudi Arabia by using the latest communication technology, such as fax machines.

Islamic extremist groups have begun to respond to the government with violence. On 13 November 1995, a 150-225 pound bomb was placed in a pickup truck outside the building housing the headquarters of the US Army Material Command's Office of the Program Manager (OPM) for the Saudi National Guard. (OPM is a program which provides training support to the National Guard.) The blast killed seven people, including five Americans, and wounded 60 others, of which 37 were Americans.⁵⁸

An extremist group called Movement for Islamic Change in the Arabian Peninsula-Jihad Wing claimed responsibility, as did two previously unknown groups calling themselves the Tigers of the Gulf and Combatant Partisans of God. All demanded immediate withdrawal of US troops from Saudi Arabia. The Combatant Partisans of God also demanded the release of Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman from US custody.⁵⁹

In general, Islamists in Saudi Arabia seem to be drawn from a non-tribal, urban middle-class background. Although there are divisions among Islamists, much of their message is the same; "the royal family is secular and corrupt and has betrayed the laws of Islam; the presence of infidel American troops is against Islam, and they must go."⁶⁰ However, the royal family denounces Islamists as fanatics who are degrading the faith for impious ends. And the terrorist bomb that struck US forces in Dharan in June 1996 will likely push the Saudi Arabian monarchy to intensify its fight against Islamists.

DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND ISLAMISTS

Many governments in the Middle East remain fearful of opening up the political system of their country too far. They fear that some opposition groups, particularly Islamists, could proclaim fealty to democratic principles merely for tactical purposes; once in power, it is feared that these groups would discard any semblance of democracy and seek to impose a religious order through the instrument of state. The 1992 elections in Algeria were aborted precisely because of this fear. In the same vein, Carrie Rosefsky-Wickham argues that

mainstream Islamist groups play by the rules of the present social and political order, yet their ultimate goal is to transform it from the bottom up. That is, they aim not to establish a civil sphere separate from and coexistent with the secular state, but gradually to extend the Islamic domain until it encompasses the state itself.⁶²

Farhad Kazemi and Richard Norton argue, however, that government strategies of inclusion are likely to have a moderating effect on political movements, and strategies of exclusion leave opposition groups with little choice but to adopt a radical or revolutionary stance. They further argue that inclusion enables the states to regulate and monitor all groups that are full players in civil society and tends to moderate the rhetoric and objectives of the groups that opt for participation.⁶³ For example, in Turkey, where the Islamists are allowed to participate in the political process, no party can reject the constitutional provision that Turkey is a secular state. As a result, the Islamic Refah party will have a difficult time over the issue of applying the sharia as the law of the land. Consequently, participation should be encouraged rather than shunned with suspicion.

The examples of Pakistan, Lebanon and Jordan suggest that revivalism's involvement in the political process does not necessarily translate into taking control of the state. Rather, an open political process that involves revivalism is far more likely to control religio-political activism than authoritarian regimes that exclude the revivalists from the political process. Despite revivalism's ostensibly imminent threat to the established order in the Muslim world, there are few cases in which revivalism has actually realized its aims.⁶⁴ In fact, in countries where the Islamists were allowed to openly engage in the political process, Islamists have actually lost some of their previous political gains. There is some evidence of this from Jordan in both municipal politics and the 1993 parliamentary election. In the November 1993 elections in Jordan, the second one in which the Muslim Brotherhood has participated openly, the party lost seats to other political forces. Even the dazzling victory of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front concealed the fact that the FIS lost one million votes between the municipal elections of 1990 and the parliamentary elections of December 1991.⁶⁵

Memories of the Iranian revolution have led many to believe that it is better for Muslim countries to languish under authoritarian rule than adopt an open political system susceptible to the revivalist takeover of political power. In contrast, S.V.R. Nasr agues that:

The most important factor in the success of revivalism has been surprise: It has capitalized on popular political discontent to take the political process unawares. Protracted involvement with the political process, as has been the case with the Jama'at in Pakistan, will elicit concessions from the ruling order in terms of new laws or distribution of political and economic power-Islamization. But it will also create barriers to further progress of revivalism and immunize the political process to its ultimate challenge. It will compel revivalism to turn to pragmatic politics in lieu of ideological posturing, will encourage other political forces to respond to the revivalist threat, and also provide them with sufficient time to do so.⁶⁶

In the long run establishing pluralistic civil society may check the progress of Islamic revivalism. The involvement of revivalist movements in the national political process have important consequences for those movements. As a result of their active participation in political life they, like other political parties, have to make compromises and sometimes revise their positions on several religio-political issues to accommodate political exigencies. For example, Jamaat in Pakistan in the process of its active participation in politics, has over the years changed its views on such issues as the Islamic character of the electoral process, and the Islamic legitimacy of a woman becoming the head of an Islamic government. In each case, "the Jamaat leadership has used 'reason of politics' to explain its ideological shift and to justify the reinterpretation of traditional Islamic doctrine."⁶⁷ On the other hand, the suppression of revivalism will lead to its strengthening and may convert a political movement into a revolutionary one. Egypt and Algeria are prime examples. Some believe that the lesson to be learned from Algeria was never allow the Islamists the right to form a party in the first place since they might win. If this is the lesson to be drawn, the result may be unfortunate.

CONCLUSION

Islamic revivalism is not theoretically and politically a unified movement. In fact, there are significant differences among the Islamist groups on many basic issues. Although revivalist movements seek to return to the basic or fundamental truths of their religion, revivalism is not a monolithic, unified and coherent movement, and there is no single strategy for the pursuit of its goals. There is no precedent for Muslims from different sects uniting under the banner of Islam, of Jihad, of anything, to form a political military phalanx.

However, Middle Eastern people are not content to live under growing poverty, unemployment and authoritarianism. Although many groups clamor for political reform, the prevailing ideology of the opposition is Islamism. Many of the region's Islamist movements espouse free elections and political reform, but some Islamists are contemptuous, even hostile toward democracy. Many thoughtful Middle Easterners justifiably fear Islamic populist authoritarianism. The hard-line policies adopted in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, are also seen as part of the problem, eliminating legitimate opposition, leaving the field to the most violent forces and permitting a general deterioration of human rights. Consequently, the moderates have been overshadowed by extremists who no longer heed their call for peaceful reform. The failure of governments to strengthen traditional Islamic moderates who enjoy huge support among Muslims has further isolated regimes from their people. Today, Islamic groups are the best organized non-governmental political movement in the Middle East and the loudest voice for pluralistic society and free elections. How governments continue to respond to these desires will set the political agenda in the Middle East for the next decade and perhaps beyond. Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Pakistan and Turkey all took steps in the direction of including Islamic groups in the electoral process. Consequently, Islamic groups in these countries have focused on more modest and incremental goals that place them squarely in the political mainstream. On the other hand, repressive regimes have squashed these groups and forced them underground, and in many cases to arm. Government repression has fostered extremism among Islamic groups and their supporters. However, the extremist Islamists have not been able to set a political agenda and so far have been blocked or beaten back.

In many cases, the militant branches of Islamist movements have so alienated potential supporters that even though much of the public may in principle favor an Islamic state, the public is reluctant to see militant Islamist movements in power.

In any case, the Islamic revival reminds us that the forces that have stimulated Islamist movements remain powerful. Given the fundamental economic, social and political problems in the Middle East, strategies of exclusion and repression will be increasingly difficult to sustain over the long run. The difficulty with the policy of repression is that it does not address the social and economic problems that underlie the Islamic revival. The plight of the poor is getting worse, not better. Furthermore, the erosion of legitimacy of many rulers in the Middle East implies that only a gradual program of reform is likely to be palatable to the present governments.

Endnotes

1. For an overview of this debate, see John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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2. Lawrence G. Potter, "Islam and Politics: Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia," Great Decisions (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1994), pp. 71-72.
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3. Robert Marquand, "Religious Right Elbows Way onto World's Political Stages," The Christian Science Monitor, 13 June 1996, p. 1.
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4. Elaine Sciolino, "Seeing Green; the Red Menace is Gone. But Here's Islam," New York Times, 21 January 1996.
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5. Leon T. Hadar, "What Green Peril?" Foreign Affairs, 72 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-28.
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6. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 26.
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7. Ibid, p. 39. Also see Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, 226 (September 1990), p. 60.
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8. John L. Esposito, Islam: The straight path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 3.
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9. James Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," Foreign Affairs, 63, no. 3 (Fall 1984), p. 110.
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10. Richard Augustus Norton, ed. Civil Society in the Middle East vols. 1 and 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill Publishers, 1994 and 1995).
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11. Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 140.
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12. R. Firth, "Spiritual Aroma: Religion and Politics," American Anthropology, 83(1981), pp. 582-601.
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13. Mansour Farhang, U.S. Imperialism: The Spanish-American War to the Iranian Revolution (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1981), p. 130.
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14. New York Times, October 1994, p. A4.
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15. Meriem Verges, "I am Living in a Foreign Country Here; A Conversation with an Algerian 'Hittiste'," Middle East Report, 25 no. 1(January-February 1995), p. 15.
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16. James Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," p. 112.
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17. The Editors, "The Democracy Agenda in the Middle East," Middle East Report, 22-174 (January/February 1992), p. 5.
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18. See Fouad Ajami, The Arabic Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
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19. Esposito, The Islamic Threat.
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20. Ira M. Lapidus, "A Sober Survey of the Islamic World," Orbis, 40, no. 3 (Summer 1996), p. 397.
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21. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 50.
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22. Mahmood Monshipouri and Christopher G. Kukla, "Islam, Democracy and Human Rights: The Continuing Debate in the West," Middle East Policy, II, no. 2 (1994), p. 34.
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23. Ben Wedeman, "Democracy in Jordan," Middle East Insight, X, no. 1 (November-December 1993), p. 10.
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24. John P. Entelis, "Islam, Democracy, and the State: The Reemergence of Authoritarian Politics in Algeria," in John Ruedy, ed., Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1994), p. 228.
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25. Ibid., pp. 228-29.
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26. Arun Kapil, "Algeria's Elections Show Islamist Strength," Middle East Report, (September-October 1990), pp. 31-36.
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27. Entelis, "Islam, Democracy, and the State: The Reemergence of Authoritarian Politics in Algeria," p. 239.
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28. Mark Huband, "Saudi Bomb Highlights How Arabs Remain Split on Curbing Islamic Foes," Christian Science Monitor, 1 July 1996, p. 8.
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29. "Alarm Bells Start to Ring," The Middle East, 234 (May 1994), p. 18.
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30. Jenny B. White, "Islam and Democracy: Turkish Experience," Current History, 94, no. 588 (January 1995), p. 7.
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31. Stephen Kinzer, "A Zealous Pragmatist: Necmettin Erbakan," New York Times, 30 June 1996, p. 1.
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32. For more information on this agreement, see "Defying U.S., Turkey to Sign an Iran Energy Deal," The New York Times, 11 August 1996, p. 6.
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33. On the Jamaat's history, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994).
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34. Momtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and Tablighi Jamaaat of South Asia," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalism Observed (Chicago: IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 457-524.
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35. Charles J. Adamd, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi," in Donald E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 371-97.
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36. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 122.
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37. Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and Tablighi Jamaaat of South Asia," p. 459.
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38. Ibid., p. 509.
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39. Momtaz Ahmad, "Pakistan," in Shireen T. Hunter, ed., The Politics of Islamic Revivalism; Diversity and Unity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 230-40.
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40. Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Texas, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas Austin, 1993), p. 233.
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41. For more details on Tunisia, see Mark Tessler, "Tunisia's New Beginning," Current History, 89, no. 546 (April 1990), pp. 169-72 and pp. 182-84.
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42. Emad Eldin Shahin, "Tunisia's Renaissance Party: The Rise and Repression of an Islamic Movement," Middle East Insight, XI, no. 2 (January-February 1995), p. 34.
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43. Burgat and Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa, p. 235.
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44. Michael C. Hudson, "Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in Middle East Politics," Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 22, no. 2 (December 1988), pp. 157-72.
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45. Mark Huband, "Tunisia Undercuts Militants with Reforms for the Poor," The Christian Science Monitor, 1 July 1996, p. 8.
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46. Mark Huband, "Saudi Bomb Highlights How Arabs Remain Split on Curbing Islamic Foes," The Christian Science Monitor, 1 July 1996, p. 8.
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47. Jane Freedman, "Democratic Winds Blow in Cairo," The Christian Science Monitor, 17 January 1990.
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48. New York Times, 4 October 1994, p. A4.
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49. For details on parliamentary elections of 1995, see The Center For Human Rights Legal Aid, "CHRLA'S Final Report on the Legislative Elections in Egypt 1995," December 1995.
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50. New York Times, 3 February 1994, p. A6.
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51. Zachary Karabell, "The Wrong Threat: The United States and Islamic Fundamentalism," in Helen E. Purkitt, ed. World Politics 96/97 (Sluice Dock, CN: Dushkin Publishing Group/Brown & Benchmark Publishers, 1996), p. 141.
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52. For details, see The Civil Society and the Democratic Transformation in the Arab World Newsletter, an Ibn Khaldon Center monthly publication (in English and Arabic), March 1992.
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53. English language version of this petition can be found in "Empty Reforms: Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws," Middle East Watch, May 1992, pp. 59-61.
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54. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
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55. R.Hrair Dekmejian, "The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia," The Middle East Journal, 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994).
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56. New York Times, 31 December 1992, pp. A1, A10, and 9 March 1992, pp. A1, A7.
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57. For details, see The Civil Society and Democratic Transformation in the Arab World Newsletter, May 1993 and November 1993.
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58. Los Angles Times, 15 November 1995, p. A-7; Washington Times, 15 November 1995, p. B11.
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59. Boston Globe, 15 November 1995, p. 2; Janes's Defense Weekly, 25 November 1995, p. 5.
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60. Elaine Sciolino, "Washington Fears Bombing Reveals Significant Cracks in Saudi Arabia," The New York Times, 30 June 1996, p. 6.
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61. Laurie A. Brand, "'In the Beginning was the State...': The Quest For Civil Society in Jordan," in Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, vol.1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill Publishers, 1994), pp. 148-85.
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62. Carrie Rosefsky-Wickham, "Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World," Political Science and Politics, (September 1994), p. 508.
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63. See Jillian Schwedler, Toward Civil Society In The Middle East? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 85-87.
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64. Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 125-38.
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65. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An Overview," in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, eds., Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, vol. 1 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 52.
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66. S.V.R. Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism," Political Science Quarterly, 110, no. 2 (Summer 1995), p. 271.
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67. Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and Tablighi Jamaaat of South Asia," p. 485.
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