American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process

by Roger MacGinty

INTRODUCTION

This article has three aims. First, it presents a narrative account of the American involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process. Second, it attempts to explain why the level and extent of American involvement, particularly from President Bill Clinton, has been so great. It is argued that part of the rationale for Clinton's involvement in the peace process can be located in the wider picture of Clinton's foreign policy and his linkage of foreign policy with the domestic economy. The third aim is to argue that for a number of reasons, mainly internal to Northern Ireland, the impact of the American involvement is likely to diminish.

Before Clinton

Traditionally, US government interest in Northern Ireland has been minimal, which makes the level and the extent of the interest shown during the peace process of the 1990s quite remarkable. This is not to say that there were no US interventions in Northern Ireland before the Clinton administration. Previous interventions were never as sustained or effective, however. A Cold War driven "special relationship" with Britain meant that successive US administrations were happy to regard Northern Ireland as an internal affair for the United Kingdom. This was a view which British governments, and Northern Ireland's unionists, whole-heartedly supported. Nor did the Republic of Ireland, a communist free zone, require much attention. Ireland had tried to encourage the United States to mediate on the Irish partition issue in return for neutral Ireland joining NATO in 1949. The United States flatly rejected the offer.\(^1\) An aside in US Secretary of State Dean Acheson's memoirs, reveals the unimportance of Ireland at the height of the Cold War:

> In August [1950] Secretary of the Navy Francis P Mathews in a speech in Boston called for preventive war. He was made Ambassador to Ireland. Then General Orville Anderson, Commandant of the Air War College, announced that the Air Force, equipped and ready, only awaited orders to drop its bombs on Moscow. He was retired.\(^2\)

Presidential visits by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan were restricted to genealogical excursions for domestic US audiences.\(^3\) President Jimmy Carter did make a statement on Northern Ireland in August 1977, which displayed an impatience at the lack of British political initiatives on Northern Ireland. His statement abandoned the principle of not becoming involved in Northern Ireland and made a promise of US investment in the event of a Northern Ireland settlement.\(^4\) The mobilization of the Four Horsemen group of senior Democrats in the late 1970s also led to significant criticism of Britain's role in Northern Ireland. The group was comprised of Congressional Speaker Tip O'Neill,
Congressmen Edward Kennedy and Pat Moynihan, and Governor Hugh Carey of New York. Pressure from the "Four Horsemen," and O'Neill in particular, is generally credited with prompting Humphrey Atkin's ill-fated attempt to establish a devolved assembly in Northern Ireland in 1979-80. For the Irish government and constitutional nationalists the mobilization of such a high-powered group of interested Irish-Americans was an achievement, and they encouraged the group, with a high degree of success, to steer Irish-American opinion away from militant republicanism. In general, however, formal US policy toward Ireland, north and south, has largely been one of non-intervention. The more general influence of the Irish-American community is difficult to gauge. Approximately 40 million Americans are of Irish descent, but as a mainly long-established immigrant group their interest in their erstwhile homeland has diminished. Perhaps only about two million of this number retain a strong Irish identity. Most interest in Northern Ireland from the Irish-American community has been in favor of Irish nationalism. While much of this interest tended toward the romantic and superficial, a number of organizations have been actively, and to a certain degree successfully, pressing the nationalist case since the onset of "the troubles" in the late 1960s. The Irish National Caucus has concentrated on lobbying Congress and has had some success in persuading legislators and investors to apply the MacBride principles (which advocate affirmative action employment programs) to US investments in Northern Ireland. The Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) has been more explicitly linked to the republican movement. It has raised considerable sums of money for republican causes, and has pulled off a number of propaganda triumphs against the British government. Its influence, however, has been in decline since the late 1980s. It is worth noting that Irish-American groups have spent considerable time in-fighting, and that successive Irish governments have regarded many of these groups as a hindrance rather than a help because of their support for violence.

Since the 1970s, Irish governments have had two aims in relation to Northern Ireland and the United States. The first has been to discourage Irish-Americans from contributing to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The second has been to interest US administrations in the Northern Ireland issue. British governments, regarding Northern Ireland as an internal matter, regarded the second activity as an unwelcome intrusion. Matters changed fundamentally in the run-up to the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, when President Ronald Reagan was persuaded to tell British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he viewed a developing Anglo-Irish relationship favorably. The Agreement itself, in which the British government ceded a consultative role to the Irish government in the running of Northern Ireland, was very much a British response to mounting international criticism of its record in Northern Ireland. The British government calculated that it may be able to share some of the "bad press" from Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. The United States bolstered the Agreement with the International Fund for Ireland, through which development funds for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland's border counties were channelled. It was interpreted as a US stamp of approval for co-operative Anglo-Irish relations, and encouraged Irish governments to keep the United States informed of developments in Anglo-Irish affairs. At the same time, the Irish government was establishing a wider network of working relationships with the United States, some of which by-passed the traditionally Anglophile State Department. The creation of the
"green card" visa scheme in the 1980s, aimed at giving legal status to thousands of immigrants (a disproportionately large number of them Irish), was one of the chief means of fostering these Dublin-Washington relationships.\(^\text{12}\)

**The Irish-American lobby, Bill Clinton and the origins of the peace process**

British and Irish government attempts to encourage Northern Ireland's constitutional parties to reach agreement on the governance of Northern Ireland have been on-going since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The main dynamism for the Northern Ireland peace process, however, probably came from within the republican movement. A debate had been in progress since the late 1980s between those who favored a continuation of the IRA's militant campaign to force a British withdrawal from Ireland, and those who believed that a suspension of the armed campaign, followed by negotiations, would be more fruitful.\(^\text{13}\) The debate was encouraged by secret talks between the republican movement and the British government which began in 1990. During these talks, the British government agreed to enter into "exploratory dialogue" with Sinn Féin, (the IRA's political wing), within three months of an end to violence.\(^\text{14}\) A number of factors led leading figures within the IRA and Sinn Féin to argue for the construction of a powerful coalition of nationalist interests, which could then engage the British government and Northern Ireland's unionist political parties in negotiations. In the December 1993 Downing Street Declaration, the British government, jointly with the Irish government, embraced the idea of self-determination for the people of Ireland, north and south, and re-iterated the statement that Britain had "no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland."\(^\text{15}\) A dialogue between the Sinn Féin leader, Gerry Adams, and John Hume, the leader of the larger, constitutionally nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), helped form one pillar of this putative nationalist consensus. Another opportunity presented itself when Albert Reynolds took over as Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach) in February 1992. Reynolds had no great ideological interest in Northern Ireland, but he was capable of taking risks to fix a deal. He was an unorthodox politician. In the words of a representative of one of Northern Ireland's loyalist (pro-British) parties: "Reynolds didn't seem to play by strict political rules, he did seem to take chances and to go out on a limb."\(^\text{16}\) In the preferred republican scenario, the alignment of pro-nationalist forces together within Ireland could then be augmented by powerful interests from the United States.

The republican movement, in its 1994 "Totally Unarmed Strategy" (TUAS) discussion document, was explicit about the pan-nationalist coalition-building strategy and the need to capitalize on links with North America.\(^\text{17}\) It noted that, "There is potentially a very powerful Irish-American lobby not in hock to any particular party in Ireland or Britain."\(^\text{18}\) By 1994, the republican movement had already forged a number of links with this lobby. The emerging Irish-American lobby was of a different character to the "Four Horsemen" group which had been influential in the late 1970s but was now something of a spent force.\(^\text{19}\) A number of Irish-American entrepreneurs had become significant players in corporate America.\(^\text{20}\) They were also allies of Bill Clinton, and had been active in his 1992 presidential election campaign. Like Adams, Hume and Reynolds, they were becoming increasingly aware that a unique set of conditions for an IRA ceasefire were
falling into place. They pressed Clinton to make a number of commitments on Ireland during his election campaign, and after his election, began briefing the White House on Ireland. In September 1993, the significance of this lobby was revealed when the IRA observed a seven day ceasefire to coincide with a fact finding visit made by a group of prominent Irish-Americans to Ireland. It was a clear message from the republican movement of their seriousness to engage in a peace process.

The TUAS document also recognized the potential which Clinton's election offered: "Clinton is perhaps the first US President in decades to be substantially influenced by such a [Irish-American] lobby." Certainly Clinton made a number of commitments on Ireland during his election campaign. In April 1992, when contesting the New York primaries, he promised he would grant a US entry-visa to Gerry Adams and appoint a peace envoy to Northern Ireland. It is easy to dismiss such claims as throw away campaign promises, particularly since the Democrats could no longer automatically rely on the increasingly wealthy Irish-American vote, which had been attracted by Reagan's economic policies. And initially, once elected, Clinton gave few indications that he would diverge significantly from traditional US indifference to Anglo-Irish affairs. While Clinton seemed anxious to consign the Cold War to the history books, he seemed unable, for at least the first twelve months of his first presidency, to construct a cogent overseas strategy. His election campaign had concentrated on domestic economic issues, ("It's the economy, stupid"), and it was in this field that he had to be seen to produce results. The foreign policy sphere, dominated by the difficult issues of Bosnia, Haiti and an unstable Russian Federation, seemed to offer few opportunities for successful American intervention. As a result, Clinton was heavily criticized for a fumbling and hesitant attitude to foreign policy. According to one view, "... Clinton's first year was symbolized by searing images of weakness -- a GI's corpse being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, and a US military transport ship being turned away from Haiti by a rent-a-mob on the docks of Port-au-Prince." Yet he was quietly formulating a distinctive neo-mercantilist foreign policy approach which concentrated on boosting American trading efforts, particularly with the Pacific Rim states. His most significant achievement was the explicit linkage of foreign policy oals with the protection of the American economy and jobs.

With regard to Northern Ireland, however, it seemed as though it was business as usual when Gerry Adams was refused a US entry visa in March 1993. Thereafter, events moved at an alarming pace. On St Patrick's Day of the same year, Albert Reynolds met and briefed Clinton about the cautious signs of a peace process, and requested that he refrain from sending a peace envoy to Northern Ireland in case this would jeopardize the on-going, behind-the-scenes contacts which Reynolds had established with the republican movement. At the same time, Irish-American interests continued to brief the White House and lobby for a visa for Gerry Adams. Their motivation was two-fold. First, they were anxious to engage, rather than confront, the Clinton White House on Ireland. They wanted to embrace Clinton into the nationalist coalition and were careful not to alienate him. For them, the visa issue was a litmus test of the presidency's future conduct on Ireland. Second, they were convinced that a visit by Adams to the United States would strengthen his standing, not just internationally, but also with the IRA. Put bluntly, it
would help him convince the hawks within the republican movement of the benefits which constitutional legitimacy offered. Bill Flynn, an influential Irish-American, was chairman of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and invited all of Northern Ireland's political leaders, including Adams, to come to the US and address the Committee. Thus, Adams had a legitimate reason to enter the United States. Albert Reynolds and John Hume, both now convinced that Adams could persuade the IRA to call an extended ceasefire, lobbied for the visa to be issued. Prominent US senators, including Edward Kennedy and Daniel Moynihan, publicly backed the granting of the visa. US Ambassador to Ireland, Jean Kennedy Smith, a key appointment, was particularly active in arguing that the visa should be granted. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh recommended that the request be denied, while a British diplomatic offensive attempted to diminish Adam's standing. In the end, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and National Security Council staff director Nancy Soderberg, (a former aide to Senator Kennedy), persuaded Clinton that Adams should be issued a forty-eight hour visa. Interestingly, Adams was allowed into the United States without first having to submit to the "Arafat test or a renunciation of violence. This marked a sea-change in American policy to Northern Ireland. The traditionally Anglophile State Department was overruled, and responsibility for Northern Ireland matters shifted to the White House; in other words, into Clinton's personal fiefdom. The visa decision angered the British government and unionists, but it was clear that the Clinton administration was now engaged on the Northern Ireland issue and could see (along with the SDLP and the Irish government) the benefits of drawing Sinn Féin into the democratic political process. President Clinton later justified the granting of a visa in terms of "a reward for the renunciation of violence and beginning to walk towards peace." Niall O'Dowd, an influential figure in the Irish-American lobby, quoted a senior republican as saying that the decision had advanced an IRA ceasefire by about a year. Albert Reynolds was more blunt. His press secretary quoted him thus:

. . . the Adams visa will advance the peace. Sinn Féin will pay a price for going to Capitol Hill. A lot of powerful people went out on a limb for Adams. If he doesn't deliver, they'll have him back in the house with the steel shutters (Sinn Féin headquarters, Falls Road, Belfast) so fast his feet won't touch the ground. We're slowly putting the squeeze on them, pulling them in, boxing them in, cutting off their lines of retreat.

Adam's visit to the United States attracted enormous media attention, and is credited with helping him convince the IRA leadership of the possible rewards to be gained from a ceasefire. By May 1994, the Irish government, which was anxious to keep the White House informed of developments in Northern Ireland, had secured five meetings with Clinton; an unprecedented level of access. In mid-August, former congressman Bruce Morrison led a group of six Irish-Americans to Belfast. The Irish government used them to relay a message to the IRA that anything less than a permanent ceasefire would not be enough to convince the Irish government, and others, of the viability of a peace process. By the end of the month, the IRA Army Council was apparently ready to call a ceasefire, but would not do so until veteran republican, Joe Cahill, be permitted to gain entry to the
United States to explain the republican position to IRA supporters there. Unlike Adams, Cahill had a serious criminal record, and it took the personal intervention of President Clinton to authorize the visa.  

**The peace process proper**

After the IRA ceasefire announcement (31 August 1994), most attention focused on Northern Ireland itself, as the British government sought assurances of the ceasefire's permanence. The peace process was reinforced by a ceasefire by loyalist paramilitary organizations in October 1994. The ceasefires meant that a range of issues, which had previously been overshadowed by security concerns, now became more visible and current. As a result, the US influence receded into the background. The issue of paramilitary weapons quickly came to dominate the peace process. The British government suggested that the IRA could demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to democratic politics by decommissioning some of its weaponry. This call was enthusiastically backed by Northern Ireland's unionist parties who argued that genuine political negotiations would be impossible if some of the parties had guns and bombs beneath the negotiating table. Sinn Féin countered that the decommissioning of weapons could only be dealt with as part of substantive negotiations for an overall settlement, and not isolated as a precondition. The British and Irish governments, (the latter now with John Bruton as Taoiseach), sought to seize the initiative through the publication of the Framework Document in February 1995, which they hoped could form the basis for all-party negotiations in Northern Ireland.

With the approach of St Patrick's Day in 1995, US interest in Northern Ireland increased. Gerry Adams had applied for another visa, and this time sought permission to engage in fund-raising activities. The British government lobbied hard to prevent this, with Northern Ireland Secretary Sir Patrick Mayhew and Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, travelling to America to present the British case. They argued that the IRA had yet to show any evidence of a willingness to begin decommissioning its arms, and that punishment attacks were continuing. When rumors spread that Adams was to be invited to the St Patrick's Day White House reception, Mayhew noted that, "If would be dismaying to see Mr Adams ... shaking hands with the President of the greatest democracy on earth." The fact that Sinn Féin was free to fund-raise in the United Kingdom diminished the British argument, and when it was announced that Adams was to be given permission to fund-raise in the US, John Major was reportedly so incensed that he refused to accept telephone calls from President Clinton for a week. Adams was duly received in the White House on St Patrick's Day, which provoked unionist protests that the Clinton administration was part of a pan-nationalist front. But access to the White House did not come cheap; Adams had to agree that he would place decommissioning on the agenda of any talks with the British. This revealed that the White House was playing an active role in the peace process, and was concerned at the slow pace of political developments. But the American role was pragmatic, helping where the opportunity arose, rather than intervening and banging heads together. According to Clinton, "... the United States had no ulterior motive, no particular political design in mind."
American interest in the economic dimension of the peace process was particularly visible. Within three months of the ceasefire declaration, Clinton appointed retiring senate majority leader George Mitchell as a special presidential adviser on economic initiatives for Northern Ireland. An inter-department committee chaired by Nancy Soderberg was established to consider economic initiatives and in December 1994 US Commerce Secretary, Ron Brown, led a delegation of US business interests to a Northern Ireland Investment Conference in Belfast. The White House followed this up by hosting another Investment Conference in May 1995 and organizing another in Pittsburgh in October 1996. It is argued later that significant parts of Clinton's foreign policy have been economics-driven; the Clinton White House has not been slow to recognize the possible economic benefits arising from a stable Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, this point should not obscure the high degree of presidential interest in Northern Ireland. Significantly, Clinton went out of his way to increase the annual US contribution to the International Fund for Ireland, albeit from the relatively small figure of $20m to $30m; no mean feat given the pressures on overseas aid budgets by congressional republicans. 42

The White House Investment Conference was perhaps most notable for providing the opportunity for the first meeting between Northern Ireland Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew and Gerry Adams. Bizarrely, the meeting was held in a hotel suite with a media scrum in the corridors outside, but once the taboo of a Secretary of State and Sinn Féin leader meeting was broken, they were able to meet subsequently in Northern Ireland. 43 The leaders of the mainstream unionist parties, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) pulled out of the conference when news of a possible Adams-Mayhew meeting emerged. 44 While the leaders of mainstream unionism stayed away, the smaller loyalist parties were becoming aware that the Clinton administration was anxious that it was not seen to be too closely identified with a nationalist coalition. 45 The fringe loyalists were also aware that considerable opportunities existed for them to spread their message in North America. According to Gary McMichael, leader of the Ulster Democratic Party:

> Americans are very romantic about Ireland and nationalists have taken advantage of that . . .. But people are willing to listen. If we put our case in a rational articulate manner, we can make friends. Sinn Féin is a big hit because it presents itself as a lively attractive party with a positive message. We can do the same. 46

President Clinton, in his Conference address, expressed the hope that all-party talks would begin shortly, and that the issue of decommissioning would be addressed. He also signalled his continued interest in the peace process by noting that, "People who take risks for peace will always be welcome in the White House." 47

The decommissioning impasse slowed down any movement in the peace process to glacial levels during 1995. It was noticeable, however, that the US input in the peace process had become regularized, though not institutionalized. Most of Northern Ireland's political leaders, as well as both governments, kept the White House well informed of their views of the peace process. Sinn Féin, now reportedly Ireland's richest political party thanks to its fund-raising activities in the US, 48 opened an office in Washington,
prompting one English journalist to ask if it was planning to have a military attaché. It became common for nationalists, frustrated at a lack of political movement, to plead for US intercession on their behalf; something the White House avoided doing. With the replacement as Taoiseach of Albert Reynolds by John Bruton, it was felt that the nationalist coalition had been weakened. The Sinn Féin leader commented that John Bruton lacked the necessary dynamic to break the impasse and instead looked toward President Clinton to nudge the process forward. It is also noticeable that Ulster Unionist Party policy changed abruptly with the election of David Trimble as leader in October 1995. Within weeks of his election he visited the White House to present the unionist case.

The Clinton visit and the collapse of the IRA ceasefire

The most tangible sign of US interest in the peace process came with President Clinton's visit to London, Belfast, Derry and Dublin in late November 1995. The visit was very much a celebration of the peace process. This was an important enough goal for two reasons. First, with no elections in Northern Ireland until May 1996, ordinary people had had few opportunities to publicly give the peace process their imprimatur. Second, many people, particularly within the republican movement, were becoming increasingly pessimistic at the slow pace of political developments. Anticipation of the visit had the effect of creating another horizon. Procrastination had perhaps been the dominant dynamic since the inception of the peace process. There was a sense in which every time that the process seemed close to collapse, then an artificial deadline or inviting opportunity appeared on the political agenda which energized the process once more.

The visit was choreographed with even-handedness in mind (visits to the Falls and Shankill Roads), and was something of a public and ceremonial reward for the people of Northern Ireland and the two governments for their involvement in the peace process. According to veteran unionist Roy Bradford, the visit "significantly changed the feeling among unionists that the American agenda is exclusively nationalist." A Belfast Telegraph poll subsequently showed that 73 percent of people in Northern Ireland thought that Clinton's contribution to the peace process had been helpful. The Ulster Unionist Party were also becoming increasingly aware of the efforts of the Clinton administration to encourage the joint efforts of both governments, and attempt to take all shades of opinion on board. The Democratic Unionist Party however, persisted in holding a negative view of American "interference," particularly from its "draft-dodging, IRA-loving" president.

The imminence of President Clinton's arrival was the spur needed to make the British and Irish governments reach a new intergovernmental accord, which they hoped would find a way out of the decommissioning impasse. They agreed to establish an international body "to provide an independent assessment on the decommissioning issue." The appointment of Senator George Mitchell as chairman of the body underscored the depth of American involvement in the peace process. By the standards of international relations or conflict resolution the arms decommissioning body was an unusual departure. Senator Mitchell was joined by former Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri and former Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, John de Chastelain, but it was Mitchell, with the backing of
the US President, who provided the body with its gravitas. The body was able to gain the confidence of all major political actors, except the DUP. Yet, when in January 1996 the Committee's report was effectively sidelined by John Major, the White House was strangely muted in response. It was also positive, when John Major proposed elections as an alternative route to all-party talks in the absence of decommissioning. In the weeks leading up to the breakdown of the IRA ceasefire, the Clinton White House played host to an increasing number of visitors from Northern Ireland. While it was reported that Clinton saw John Major as the main reason for the lack of movement in the peace process, there were also reports that Gerry Adam's failure to convince Clinton of the extent of the republican movement's despondency at the lack of political movement persuaded the IRA to return to violence. 

Minutes before the Canary Wharf explosion (9 February 1996), Gerry Adams telephoned Anthony Lake to tell him that he was hearing some "disturbing news." The White House and many Irish-Americans were at first inclined to see the bomb as a "one-off." When it became clear that this was not the case, the White House was careful to keep lines of communication with Sinn Féin open, albeit at an official level. The 1996 Presidential election campaign limited the amount of time Clinton was able to devote to foreign policy issues and the Oklahoma bombing allowed British commentators and diplomats to point out that the IRA planted similar bombs. There were also signs that some opinion formers in the US were losing patience with Gerry Adams. As Newsweek editorialized, "If Adams cannot deliver the IRA, he is of little use to anyone." Clinton has confirmed that Northern Ireland will remain a priority during his second term and has maintained a strong position that the IRA must reinstate its ceasefire before it can be admitted into talks. He has also repeatedly praised the loyalist paramilitaries for showing restraint. It is significant that George Mitchell has been appointed chair of the multi-party talks which began in Northern Ireland on 10 June 1996 and retained that role following Clinton's post-re-election change of personnel. The administration has said that its main role is to support the British and Irish governments in their attempts to nudge the parties in the centre-ground of Northern Ireland politics toward a settlement. This is significantly different from the early days of the peace process when the US administration often took its lead from the Irish government. For example, on the question of the length of time between a new IRA ceasefire and Sinn Féin's entry into talks, (a question which has divided the British and Irish governments), the United States, in public at least, has kept its views to itself. The change of personnel in the US government has yet to have had any significant impact on Clinton's policy toward Northern Ireland, although the departure of two key figures, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and staff director at the National Security Council Nancy Soderberg, may have eroded the White House's "institutional memory" on Ireland. Clinton is also much more comfortable with new British Prime Minister Tony Blair than he was with John Major, a factor which could minimize Anglo-American rifts over Northern Ireland.

**Rationalizing Clinton's interest**

Bill Clinton held true to his 1992 Presidential election campaign commitments and did take an interest in Northern Ireland. What could not have been anticipated, however, was
the exceptional level of this interest. A presidential visit, the president's personal
intervention at key stages throughout the peace process, a virtually open-door policy at
the White House, and the appointment of the president's special representative, George
Mitchell, as chair of both the International Body on Arms Decommissioning and the
multi-party talks have been extraordinary developments. The Irish government has
enjoyed disproportionate access to the White House. According to a senior adviser to
John Bruton's Irish government:

The Irish Foreign Minister (Dick Spring) has had more access to President
Clinton than any other foreign minister in the world with the possible exception of
the Russian one. He has literally been to maybe five times more meetings with
Bill Clinton than Klaus Kinkel or Malcolm Rifkind . . . it's a resource beyond
price. 71

Former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake was reported as spending a quarter of
his time on Ireland, and, at times, four or five members of the National Security Council
staff were engaged full-time on the Irish issue. 72 While the level of the Clinton
administration's interest in the peace process has been unprecedented, the mode of these
interventions has also been significant. The US has not engaged in shuttle diplomacy as
in the Middle East. Instead, it has sought to act as a facilitator. In the words of Clinton,
the US sees itself as, " . . . interested outsiders, not insiders." 73 Certainly as the peace
process developed, US involvement became much more sophisticated, particularly in
terms of its sensitivities toward unionists. This was perhaps best manifested during
Clinton's visit to Northern Ireland, when in a series of speeches, the president failed to
make any gaffes in front of one of the world's most political and sensitive audiences. 74
Much contact has been of a behind-the-scenes nature, and according to one key Irish
figure in the peace process, American intermediaries now wait until they are asked before
intervening. 75 The White House open-door policy has been another benignly passive
mode of US involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process, and may have acted as
something of a release mechanism, for political leaders frustrated at the lack of political
movement within Northern Ireland. American intervention has also been imaginative and
original, particularly in the case of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning,
which as an independent body, has few parallels in international relations. It is also worth
noting that economics has been a chief mode of US involvement. In the Clinton
catechism, peace, stability and prosperity are very much linked.

Clinton, and a number of his key advisers, have attempted to rationalize their
involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process. Clinton placed it in the wider context
of a changing philosophy of American foreign policy:

I think sometimes we are too reluctant to engage ourselves in a positive way
because of our long-standing special relationship with Great Britain and also
because it seemed such a thorny problem. In the aftermath of the Cold War we
need a governing rationale for our engagement in the whole world, not just in
Northern Ireland, with our European allies, but around the world. I think the
United States is now in a position to think about positive change. 76
Somewhat grandiosely, former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake placed Clinton's involvement in the peace process in terms of the "struggle for the soul of American foreign policy." It is perhaps more realistic to suggest that Clinton, as a presidential hopeful, was open to the notion of positive involvement on the Northern Ireland issue, but was relatively uncommitted and had few firm ideas on the methods of intervention. When the emergent peace process presented the opportunities for intervention, however, the Clinton administration, at the bidding of influential figures within Irish-America, did become involved. The extent of this involvement quickly developed and evolved. Any administration would be attracted by the "reflective glory" of a seemingly resolved long-running ethnic dispute, (it is no coincidence that the Rabin-Arafat handshake took place on the White House lawn) and keen to translate a "foreign policy success" into electoral popularity. But Clinton's interest in Ireland does seem to be genuine. He has been, according to a leading member of Sinn Féin, "more proactive than he needs to be."

Despite his halting start to foreign policy issues, Clinton has been an activist foreign policy president, presiding over the extension rather than the reduction of US global commitments. He has committed 20,000 troops to Bosnia, dispatched aircraft carriers to the Taiwanese coast and has launched cruise missiles at Iraq. The US retains an awesome military capability, with its defence budget currently larger than that of the combined totals of the world's next ten military powers. The US, under Bill Clinton, is the world's only superpower, and in many respects, the only military power that matters. As a global hegemon, albeit one which often favors economic rather than military means of censure and encouragement, the US still regards itself as having a role to play in the settlement of regional disputes. The foreign policy activism looks set to continue in Clinton's second term. Incoming Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "we are not a charity or a fire department. We must be selective and disciplined in what we do," but then went on to list a series of regional disputes (including Northern Ireland) in which the US had an interest in seeing resolved. US involvement in Northern Ireland has the advantage of being relatively inexpensive in comparison with other foreign policy ventures.

There has also been a significant economic dimension to Clinton's involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process, as there has been to many parts of Clinton's overall foreign policy agenda. In his first term, he has taken issue with China, not on human rights, but on matters of film and computer software piracy. He overruled Congress in 1994 to prop up the ailing Mexican economy, has taken tough negotiating stances with Japan and the European Union on trade, and the US IFOR commitment in the former Yugoslavia was followed by US business delegations. In his zeal to push through the NAFTA and GATT world trade agreements, he split his own party in Congress. For his second term, Clinton has put together an ambitious package of expanding NATO while maintaining friendly relations with Russia, staying involved in European affairs, and managing China's growth. If there is a grand design, however, it is that "the world should become a global market of fast trading democracies; with the giant (and fast-recovering) US economy as both linchpin and guarantor." The linkage between foreign policy and the domestic economy was made most explicit over the issue of the extension of China's Most Favoured Nation trading status in June 1997. The Clinton administration argued
that a failure to extend the trading status would cost American jobs and raise consumer prices.\textsuperscript{85} It is possible to locate Clinton's interest in Ireland in terms of an economic interest in a stable and economically co-operative Europe. The United States, after all, still regards itself as a European leader, and sees the need for stability and prosperity in the region as a whole. US investment in Ireland, north and south, is already significant, but a stable Ireland would offer even greater potential as a US economic toe-hold into the European Union. The Irish economy is English-speaking, has a young, highly-educated and American-friendly work force, and is committed to maintaining a corporation tax of only 10 percent for manufacturers until 2010.\textsuperscript{86} Over 430 US companies operate in the Republic of Ireland, employing 60,000 people, and since 1980, 40 percent of all US investment in electronics in Europe has been in Ireland.\textsuperscript{87} Fifty-one US companies employing 14,000 people operate in Northern Ireland, again mainly in the high-technology sector.\textsuperscript{88} Both George Mitchell and Jean Kennedy Smith have pointed out that there are profits to be made for Americans investing in Ireland.\textsuperscript{89} During his visit to Northern Ireland, the president was keen to stress the economic benefits of peace, and during the upsurge of violence in the summer of 1996 he warned that any return to violence could jeopardize new investment.\textsuperscript{90}

Another factor that may have motivated Clinton's involvement in the peace process, or more precisely his continued involvement despite clear British discomfiture at perceived outside interference, may have been his poor relationship with John Major. The Conservative Party had attempted to help the Bush re-election campaign by investigating Clinton's stay at Oxford as a Rhodes scholar. One senior adviser to the Irish government said that in all five times he has met President Clinton, the president has mentioned his loathing of British Toryism.\textsuperscript{91} On a number of occasions, and particularly by extending US fund-raising rights to Sinn Féin, the United States has ignored British pleas. In other words, it has overruled the judgement of a major strategic partner. According to a leading Sinn Féin figure, "Clinton is probably as much engaged by Britain's bad management than by our good management," and that, ". . . when the Dublin government is focused on a particular issue, and where they take a distinct position from the British government, then we have found that this administration will always give the call to Dublin."\textsuperscript{92} The Conservative government's discomfort at the level of American interest in Northern Ireland can be gauged by a speech on transatlantic relations by the former British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, made less than a month before the Clinton visit; while US involvement in the Middle East and African peace processes was welcomed, any mention of Northern Ireland was avoided.\textsuperscript{93} This contrasted sharply with the Labour government's welcome of US involvement.\textsuperscript{94}

**Future American Involvement**

Clinton has indicated that Northern Ireland will continue to be a priority during his second term and a number of actors, including the Irish-American lobby in the United States and the republican movement in Ireland are determined to keep Clinton involved.\textsuperscript{95} George Mitchell's position as chair of the multi-party talks also means that the White House has a direct line of communication at the heart of the Northern Ireland talks. A number of factors, however, all emanating from Northern Ireland, may limit the
opportunities for future US intervention. First, the multi-party talks which began in June 1996 have internalized much in the Northern Ireland peace process. They have been the primary focus of the British and Irish governments. In the words of the former Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Sir Patrick Mayhew, they are the "only game in town." So far, the talks have been entirely dominated by procedural wranglings and have yet to discuss substantive matters. In such a procedurally grid-locked atmosphere, it is difficult to see where the opportunities for dynamic external intervention lie. Furthermore, much emphasis has been placed on setting the ground-rules for the talks process, so as to build confidence among the participants; US intervention could be interpreted by some of the parties as a breaking of these ground-rules. Second, the British government has approached contentious issues connected with the peace process cautiously, through established procedural and legislative routes. The effect of dealing with contentious issues through review bodies and committees of experts has been to give the peace process an institutionalized character in which issues are dealt with slowly, in a compartmentalized fashion, and with a minimal risk of radicalism. In a sense, the British government has tried to make significant parts of the peace process as unexceptional as possible. These well tried legislative and institutional routes offer few opportunities for external intervention.

In the short- to medium-term, it is extremely unlikely that a definitive political settlement can be reached in Northern Ireland. Both the British and Irish governments will continue to reach joint accords and understandings. They will also attempt to nudge the centre-ground political parties in Northern Ireland together in order to seek some form of accommodation. But beyond an end to political violence in Northern Ireland, neither government has a preferred constitutional outcome. More precisely, neither government has a preferred constitutional outcome which it is prepared to force on the people of Northern Ireland. As leading academic commentator Adrian Guelke argued before the 1994 IRA ceasefire was declared, "In Northern Ireland what is being sought is an end to violence without a political settlement." While the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Majorie Mowlam, wants the multi-party talks to reach a conclusion within a year of September 1997, it is highly unlikely that the talks' outcome can amount to a definitive settlement. Furthermore, given the relatively even demographic split in Northern Ireland, the people there will have extreme difficulty in agreeing on a mutually acceptable constitutional outcome. As a result, Northern Ireland is likely to experience an extended, yet interminable, peace process, or a series of peace processes. This extended peace process will offer President Clinton, and very probably his successors, further opportunities for intervention, but a fatigue factor may set in. After all, Gerry Adams can only be granted his first US visa once.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is worth noting the difficulties associated with making a precise judgement on the American influence on the peace process. The fluidity, complexity and multi-dimensional character of the process means that it is rarely possible to connect specific inputs with specific outcomes. But it is clear that the American influence on the
peace process, both from influential Irish-Americans and the Clinton administration, has been profound.

This article had three aims. The first aim was to present an account of American influences on the Northern Ireland peace process. It was noted that US interest in Northern Ireland has been traditionally minimal but that a number of key Irish-American figures, together with nationalists within Ireland, set about to actively engage the Clinton White House on the Northern Ireland issue. The account of the American influences illustrated how the US made significant contributions to the origins, evolution and longevity of the process, and how its involvement became more sophisticated in the variety of modes of involvement employed and in terms of increased sensitivities toward unionist concerns. The White House has effectively moved from a position in 1994-95 when it was more likely to support Irish government attempts to draw the republican movement into constitutional politics to a position, post-John Major, that is supportive of any joint British and Irish government position on Northern Ireland. The second aim was to rationalize the American involvement, particularly given the unprecedented level of presidential interest. It was argued that Clinton did have a genuine interest in the issue, but that it could also be placed in the wider spectrum of his foreign policy goals. The linkage of US foreign policy with the domestic economic objectives, particularly employment, has been evident in President Clinton's approach to Northern Ireland. The third aim was to suggest that, although US involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process is likely to continue, the opportunities for future US involvement have become limited, mainly because of the internalized nature of the multi-party talks in Northern Ireland.

Endnotes


14. After initially denying any such contact, the British government admitted the contacts in November 1993. Sinn Féin and the British government, however, produced divergent accounts of these exchanges. The key difference was the British government claim that the IRA asked the British for help in ending the conflict. Most commentators found the Sinn Féin version more convincing. Sinn Féin published its own version of the exchanges in *Setting the Record Straight*. For the British version, see "Seeking a dialogue leading to peace," *The Irish Times*, 30 November 1993. See also, Paul Arthur, "Dialogue between Sinn Féin and the British Government," *Irish Political Studies*, 10 (1995), pp. 185-91.

15. Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, "The Peace Process in Northern Ireland," *International Affairs*, 71, no. 2 (1995), pp. 271-73. The Downing Street Declaration notes, albeit smothered in caveats, "That it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-
determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish."

16. Author interview with a senior member of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), which has links with the loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA).


18. Ibid., p. 383.


20. Niall O'Dowd, the founding editor of the *Irish Voice*, former Congressman Bruce Morrison, Bill Flynn, President of Mutual of America, and Charles Feeney, Chairman of the General Atlantic Corporation.


22. Steven Erlanger and David E. Sanger, "Clinton's perilous trip through the mine-field of foreign affairs," *International Herald Tribune*, 1 August 1996.


24. O'Clery, "Clinton's journey."

25. Interestingly, Senator George Mitchell signed a letter in support of granting the visa.


27. The then British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, labelled Gerry Adams "Mr. Ten Percent," alluding to Sinn Féin's electoral strength in Northern Ireland.

29. O'Clery, "Clinton's journey."


32. Seán Duignan's memoirs as Albert Reynolds's press secretary are particularly revealing. See *One Spin on the Merry-Go-Round* (Dublin: Blackwater Press, 1995), esp. pp. 139-40.


34. Duignan, *One Spin*, p. 143.

35. Author interview with a senior official from the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs.

36. Cahill had been sentenced to hang in 1942 for the murder of a policeman in Belfast but was reprieved. See Duignan, *One Spin*, pp. 147-49; and Conor O'Clery, *The Greening of the White House: The inside story of how America tried to bring peace to Ireland* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1996), pp. 150-58.

37. For a good summary of the British government position at this stage of the peace process, see remarks by Patrick Mayhew, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, *Official Report, House of Commons*, vol. 248 (27 October 1994), cols. 1018-1027.


39. Garret FitzGerald, "US input on North has been tough for British to swallow," *The Irish Times*, 9 December 1995.


43. For an account of the meeting, see Mallie and McKittrick, *Fight for Peace*, pp. 354-55. The Secretary of State also met the leaders of the fringe loyalist parties, David Irvine of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and Gary McMichael of the Ulster Democratic Party, in Washington.


51. Frank Millar, "Clinton visit will be confined to a celebration of the north's peace," *The Irish Times*, 28 November 1995.

52. "Present phase of the peace process is over, says Adams," 9 November 1995; "SF leader warns IRA ceasefire is 'unanchored,'" 6 November 1995; "SF may end talks in growing mood of pessimism," 2 November 1995, all from *The Irish Times*.

53. This point was made in a number of interviews conducted by the author with politicians, policy makers and commentators involved in the Northern Ireland peace process.


55. This figure comprises of 83 percent Catholics and 67 percent Protestants, *The Belfast Telegraph*, 18 January 1996.

56. Author interview with a senior member of the Ulster Unionist Party, (UUP).


60. Paragraph five, joint communiqué from the British and Irish governments, 28 November 1995.


63. Interview with a member of the British Labour Party front bench team on Northern Ireland.


66. "Clinton backs early entry to talks for SF after ceasefire," 18 December 1996; and "Clinton call for ceasefire and SF role is welcomed," 30 May 1997 both from *The Irish Times*.


68. "US interest in talks quickens," 22 May 1997; and "Clinton's support for peace efforts raises ceasefire hopes," 30 May 1997 both from *The Irish Times*.


71. Author interview with senior adviser to the Irish government.

72. Ibid. See also, O'Clery, "Clinton faces a new peace challenge," The Irish Times, 15 February 1996.

73. "Clinton reaffirms support for peace talks in North," The Irish Times, 14 June 1996.

74. Author interview with a member of the British Labour Party front bench team on Northern Ireland.

75. Author interview with senior adviser to the Irish government.


78. Author interview with a leading member of Sinn Féin.


81. One of the best accounts of Clinton's geo-economic strategy is provided by Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy, pp. 21-37.

82. See Erlanger and Sanger, "Clinton's perilous trip." US Commerce Secretary Ron Brown died on such a visit to Croatia in April 1996.


84. Ibid., p. 673.


86. "Lisburn bomb overshadows Pittsburgh," The Irish Times, 8 October 1996.

87. Jean Kennedy Smith, "US looks to Ireland as the transatlantic link with the EU," The Irish Times, 18 July 1996.


90. "Clinton 'concerned' as White House warns of risks to economic benefits," The Irish Times, 12 July 1996.

91. Author interview with senior adviser to Irish government.

92. Author interview with a leading member of Sinn Féin.

93. Speech by the British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, to the Atlantic Council of the UK, Bath, 2 November 1995. In another speech on transatlantic relations to the National Press Club, Washington, 29 May 1996, the British Foreign Secretary explicitly ties US and UK experiences of terrorism together, but makes no mention of Clinton's influence on Northern Ireland.


96. It is worth noting that Clinton's foreign and domestic policy agenda, possible lawsuits against him and his wife aside, looks to be extremely crowded.