Industrialized countries around the world have seen a marked rise in populism in the last decade. The rise of populism has been explained through both cultural factors—rejection of cosmopolitanism/multiculturalism, gender equality, and alternative lifestyles (Norris & Inglehart, 2019)— and economic factors—loss of jobs, rising inequality, and financial insecurity (Rodrik, 2019). Populism has been manifested in various forms: increased barriers to foreign trade and investment, a renewed focus on neo-industrial policies, the rise of overtly populist political parties and politicians, and an increasing emphasis on cultural and identity issues. One issue that unites most forms of populism in this century is the often-emotive issue of immigration. Anti-immigrant sentiment has played a major part in the rise of right-wing populism (discussed in a later section) (Kapelner, 2024). Right-wing populists in industrialized countries almost unanimously favor greater restrictions on immigration. Elections across the industrialized world in 2024, ranging from the United States (US), Germany, the UK, France, Austria, Portugal, and Romania, demonstrated the enduring appeal of right-wing populism (Wike et al., 2024). Calls for restricting immigration are often more strident when dealing with culturally distant migrants from the Global South. Interestingly, this comes at a time when the Global South is rising in terms of commonly used economic measures such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, percentage of global GDP, and the number of companies in the Global 500 (Tung, 2024). In this perspective piece, we discuss some ways in which global businesses can more effectively navigate the controversial issue of migration in an era of rising populism.

We focus on the US and the European Union (EU) as the setting for this paper and use the theoretical lens of populism to help understand anti-immigrant sentiment better. Together, the US and the EU comprise almost half the world’s GDP and nearly 90% of the GDP of the Global North. They also house a large number of migrants: in 2023, six of the top 10 destinations for migrants were in the US or the EU (OECD, 2024). In the next part of our paper, we examine major immigration trends for the last decade, focusing on countries in these regions. We next briefly study the rise of populism in these countries during that time, looking at some explanations of what populism is and distinguishing between right- and left-wing populism. We then list some key events that pointed to its rise during this time. In our final section, we discuss how global businesses and managers can navigate in an era of rising populism and how they can effectively engage with policymakers.

The US has more immigrants than any other country, housing nearly 1 in 5 of all global migrants. In 2023, its foreign-born population was nearly 48 million. This was an increase of 1.6 million over the previous year—the largest annual increase in over 20 years (Gramlich & Passel, 2024). The US has seen a rapid increase in its immigrant population over the last few decades. This was prompted partly by the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act that replaced national origin quotas that favored Northern and Western Europe, opening immigration to most countries and giving priority to close relatives of US citizens (Pew Research Center, 2015). The proportion of immigrants in the US tripled from less than 5% in 1970 to almost 15% by 2023. Immigrants from most countries were present, with the highest proportions being from Mexico (23%), India (6%), China (5%), the Philippines (4%), and El Salvador (3%). It is estimated that about a fourth were in the country illegally (Gramlich & Passel, 2024).

There were about 27 million non-EU migrants living in the EU in 2023, representing about 6% of the total population. This number represented a 3.5 million increase since 2022. Germany hosted the largest number of non-EU migrants at 12 million, followed by Spain (6 million), France (5.6 million), and Italy (5.1 million). Collectively, these four countries accounted for over 70% of all non-EU nationals in the EU. EU member states with the highest share of non-nationals included Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Latvia, and Estonia (all over 10% of the population), while the lowest share of non-nationals was found in the eastern European countries of Romania, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Hungary (all below 3%) (Eurostat, 2024). Over 4 million Ukrainian refugees fleeing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are currently living in the EU. In 2023, it was estimated that about 385,000 migrants entered the EU illegally, with the largest share being from Syria, Guinea, Senegal, and Afghanistan (Robinson et al., 2024). The largest non-EU nationalities that were given temporary residence permits in the EU were Ukraine, Belarus, India, Morocco, and Syria. Over a million asylum applications were filed in 2023, with nearly half for nationals of the following countries: Syria, Afghanistan, Venezuela, Türkiye, and Colombia (European Commission, 2024). Between 2013 and 2023, the proportion of third-country nationals from Asia and Africa nearly doubled in the EU (OECD, 2023).

It should also be noted that in some EU countries, there are millions of long-term residents who are not citizens but have lived there for decades, sometimes generations. An example is Estonia, where there is a substantial population of non-nationals of Russian origin who were born during Soviet times and carry the ‘stateless’ passports rather than Estonian passports. Another example is Germany, where hundreds of thousands of Turks came in as part of the ‘guest worker’ programs in the 1950s and 1960s who were not eligible for citizenship. This extended to their German-born children. While German citizenship laws were liberalized in the early 2000s, giving people born there the opportunity to naturalize, it was estimated that in 2024, there were over 1.5 million people of Turkish origin living in Germany who did not have German citizenship (DW, 2004). This is less of an issue in the United States because of its tradition of birthright citizenship (though this is being litigated in courts as of 2025).

The rising levels of immigration in the US and the EU, especially from the Global South, have often led to concerns about immigrants being a drain on resources and cultural erosion in host countries. Populist parties and movements have thrived on these concerns, calling for restricting immigration and promoting nationalist values. Before proceeding with a discussion of the populist anti-immigrant measures in the last decade, we look briefly at what populism is and its different types.

Populism is a loose term that can include a wide variety of movements. These movements typically share an antiestablishment orientation, a claim to speak for the people against the powerful (or elites), oppose open markets and globalization, and often have a tendency toward authoritarian governance (Rodrik, 2018). Populism entails ‘a mutually reinforcing set of beliefs, institutional processes, and policymaking logics featuring an anti-establishment ideology, de-institutionalization, and short-term policy bias’ (Blake et al., 2022, p. 7). It uses personalized politics that can create the appearance of a direct relationship between ‘the people’ and their political leaders (Hartwell & Devinney, 2021; Raskovic et al., 2024).

Globalization in industrialized countries in the era of hyper-globalization (1990 to early 2000s) led to industrial restructuring, which boosted the service sector, often at the expense of more unionized manufacturing. These globalization-induced shifts created fertile ground for ethno-nationalistic right-wing populism (Rodrik, 2021). During the era of hyper-globalization, more culturally and technologically adept multinational corporations (MNCs) entered new markets and created more wealth for internationally oriented, technologically savvy firms and individuals. However, this simultaneously disadvantaged domestic businesses and workers previously insulated from global competition. Over time, this led to greater inequalities between globalization’s winning and losing constituencies, causing growing resentment among the losing domestic constituencies (Hartwell et al., 2024).

In most European countries, right-wing populist politicians have utilized ethno-national/cultural cleavages, often focusing on the arrival of a large number of refugees and asylum seekers. These movements often emphasize a cultural dichotomy between the ethnic, religious, or cultural identity of the ‘people’ against outsiders, often new migrants. This also partly explains Donald Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, though it attracts a growing number of ethnic minorities, including about 40% of Hispanics and Asian Americans (Sommerlad & Hagopian, 2024). In contrast, left wing populism typically mobilizes across economic lines against wealthy groups who are perceived to control the economy for their own interests against low-income groups. This form of populism is prevalent in Latin America; in recent years its success in the EU and the US has been more limited (Podemos in Spain being a possible exception). It is usually easier to mobilize along ethnic or cultural lines when society is experiencing a large influx of refugees or asylum seekers with different cultural and religious identities. This can often blend with economic anxieties—fears about large numbers of culturally distant foreigners moving into the country can be mobilized for economic concerns about the viability of the welfare state (Rodrik, 2018). Cultural distance across countries can further magnify the effects of nationalist sentiment on tariffs and protectionist behaviors (Dow & Cuypers, 2024). There have also been concerns that increasing social media disinformation has contributed to declining trust in institutions and political polarization, further facilitating the rise of populism (Livingston, 2023).

We have seen a rise of anti-immigrant populist parties in the decade of the 2010s in the US and the EU. For example, the rise of Germany’s anti-immigrant Alternative for Deutschland (AfD), the primacy of Donald Trump’s MAGA agenda with overtones of nativist populism, and the rise to highest vote-getter status of Marine Le Pen’s Nationalist Rally in France all speak to the increased prominence of populist anti-immigrant attitudes in industrialized countries. Even politicians who do not typically express anti-immigrant views moved right on the issue in the last decade. Hillary Clinton, while winning 2 million more votes than Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election, argued that Europe needed to do more to curb immigration. In France, Emmanuel Macron, who defeated Marine Le Pen in the 2017 election, hardened his stance on immigration, calling for more and accelerated deportations (Mudde, 2020).

Populism of the right-wing variety has a large element of restricting Muslim immigration. President Trump, in his first presidency, imposed the ‘Muslim ban’ for travelers from seven Muslim-majority countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (though after initially being struck down by courts, it was changed to include North Korea and Venezuelan officials and remove Iraq and Sudan) (Totenberg & Montanaro, 2018). The challenge of Muslim immigration might be even greater in Europe, where immigration and integration issues are often tied to questions of Islam and its political role. While controversial, it is important to recognize that many European countries have not been successful in integrating Muslim populations, especially from the Middle East. Many Middle Eastern migrants have viewpoints incompatible with liberal Western societies—grievances against ‘the West,’ patriarchal values hostile to gender equality, and entrenched antisemitism. While many Muslim immigrants integrate successfully, many others have cultural values that make integration difficult (Berman, 2024).

It is also important to note that there are anti-Muslim prejudices prevalent in many European countries that make Muslim integration difficult (Adida et al., 2016). Anti-Muslim sentiment is often based on perceptions—some backed by public surveys—that Muslims are less assimilated, particularly in terms of prevailing norms around secularism and the privacy of religious practice. Examples of public Muslim religiosity include workplace prayer accommodations, abstention from alcohol, discomfort with gender mixing, conservative dress codes, and demands for halal food options. These practices, while part of private faith commitments, can have public and legal implications. The rise of liberal norms in Europe has often coincided with the rapid decline of public religiosity, which makes these differences particularly poignant. While anti-Muslim sentiments are sometimes seen in the secularized countries of Western Europe, they are even more apparent in countries like Poland or Hungary, which tend to be higher in religious observance. This points to the complicated nature of the issue of right-wing populism: increasingly, some right-wing populists have become outspoken advocates of women’s rights, gay rights, liberal family laws, and Enlightenment values, while mainstream parties on the center left and center right call for more accommodation of diverse cultures (Hamid, 2019). We see this dichotomy across parties that are considered right-wing populist; for example, populists such as Viktor Orban in Hungary often position themselves as defenders of Christian, traditional, and conservative values, while others such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands adopt liberal attitudes on social issues, focusing on protecting the people from the ‘Muslim threat’ (Lazar, 2023). This sort of division on social issues can often be seen within individual political parties as well.

Countries experiencing a rapid influx of migrants can have legitimate concerns about their ability to host them in the long run. These include the costs of providing housing and essential services (especially if they are not skill-/employment-based immigrants), straining the existing immigration system, and societal tensions brought about by migrants with conflicting cultural values. Some of these issues are further exacerbated if large numbers of migrants are not in productive employment, often leading to concerns about their draining the resources of the host country or living off welfare. Over time, these issues can provide fertile grounds for the rise of right-wing populism.

We now look at some of the key events in the last decade that signaled the rise of anti-immigrant populism. These are not meant to be exhaustive; rather, they are, to our understanding, some of the most important events that pointed to the rise of populism.

The rise of populism in industrialized countries makes it important for businesses to work with policymakers to ensure that their voices are part of the discussion on immigration and its importance to national competitiveness. Skilled migrants in particular are essential in the global battle for talent, and populist rhetoric that demonizes or scapegoats all immigrants could lead them to choose more welcoming locations. This is particularly important since we are also seeing a rapid rise of the Global South. Skilled immigrants now have more choices—not only in the Global North but also in the rapidly growing economies of the Global South—of where to take their human and social capital, which is crucial to ensuring national competitiveness.

There seems to be growing intolerance to illegal immigration, with some indications that skilled migrants are still being sought after. In the US, President Trump, in his second term, has emphasized the deportation of illegal immigrants while simultaneously talking about the benefits of some legal immigration and defending the H1-B skilled visa program. Similarly, Germany, while tightening immigration laws for most asylum and refugee seekers, is in the process of making it easier for skilled workers to move to Germany to work in industries facing labor shortages (Symons, 2023).

We see EU countries becoming more focused on the integration of migrants into the host communities. This emphasis on integration has been coupled with more stringent requirements for asylum and family reunification and accelerated deportation procedures. There is an increased emphasis on migrants adopting the values of their host countries. We also see a process of having more EU-wide policies on immigration. Overall, assimilation rather than multiculturalism seems to have become ascendant as part of immigration policy.

Future researchers should investigate how populist policies and rhetoric affect the likelihood of skilled immigrants moving to a given country and the extent to which this is moderated by factors such as cultural distance, presence of diasporas, cross-border trade and investment, and existing political ties. Another important research direction is studying differences across diasporas within the same country: for example, are migrants from some cultures more likely to successfully integrate than from other cultures? If so, what cultural factors could help explain their success? Simultaneously, are there any cultural factors that make success in a host society less likely? Furthermore, researchers should study the extent to which migrant integration in host societies can influence the rise of populism and anti-immigrant attitudes. Another fertile research direction is the extent to which the rise of populism can affect the propensity for skilled immigrants to engage in brain circulation. The degree to which cross-national ventures and cross-border trade are affected by populism is another important research direction, along with the extent to which the effects vary between right-wing and left-wing populism. A further avenue for research is investigating the different types of integration programs across countries and comparing their outcomes in terms of migrant economic and social mobility.

The role of skilled immigrants in providing talent, social networks, knowledge flows, and entrepreneurial know-how needs to be highlighted, especially in this populist era. At the same time, it is important for businesses to work with policymakers on areas of common interest. While skilled migration can indeed be beneficial, large-scale migration that does not focus on required skills can be a challenge. This can be even more controversial when migrants have vastly different cultural norms and values, making integration both challenging and controversial. This makes it all the more important for businesses to work with policymakers to design and implement integration programs that help immigrants integrate into their host societies while simultaneously creating a pipeline for required talent. Businesses should strive to be key stakeholders in discussions around overall immigration policy. In an era characterized by a rising Global South, higher levels of populism, and a stagnation of globalization, it is important for businesses to constantly engage with policymakers and voice the importance of skilled immigration in driving national competitiveness and helping win the war for talent.

Masud Chand is a Professor of International Business at the W. Frank Barton School of Business at Wichita State University. His research interests include the role of immigration and diasporas in driving cross-border trade and investment and the aging of populations and its effects on the global business environment. His work has been published in numerous journals including the Academy of Management Perspectives, International Business Review, Journal of Business Ethics, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, and the Journal of International Business Policy. In 2024, he was recognized with the Academy of Management International Management Division Best Reviewer Award as well as the Wichita State University Excellence in Online Teaching Award.