1 THE 1960s AND EARLY 1970s was a dramatic era for Saint John, New Brunswick. The  city  was  transformed  by  an  ambitious  urban  renewal  program  as  well  as amalgamation and large-scale infrastructure projects. This research note, part of the author’s ongoing examination of 20th-century Saint John, examines the promotion of development in the metropolitan area from 1960, the year of the election of the Robichaud  government,  to  1976,  when  the  Hatfield  government  consolidated  its economic  development  agencies  and  appeared  to  end  its  support  for  large manufacturing  enterprises.1 The  urban  agenda  in  Saint  John  included  slum clearance,  urban  renewal,  and  public  housing,  but  the  main  goals  of  urban development in this period were attracting industry and creating jobs. A coalition of business and political elites, backed by organized labour and the media, and despite a  North  American  shift  towards  a  service  economy,  promoted  infrastructure development, heavy industry, and energy projects for a variety of reasons, including job creation, population growth, and a more positive city image. Social welfare or humanitarian arguments influenced the growth coalition, but they were secondary to economic justifications. The coalition was aided by planners and consultants, who predicted massive industrialization and port growth that would supposedly double the  population  and  necessitate  considerable  investment  in  urban  and  regional planning, housing, and services such as health and education. Business was the key force in this ongoing campaign, but the provincial and federal governments were also  complicit  in  promoting  exaggerated  and  overly  optimistic  development projections that I have labelled “growth fantasies.”2

2 The coalition mounted an active propaganda campaign to convince the public of the logic of its agenda. In the words of Harvey Molotch, urban growth coalitions “not only strive to create the material conditions for growth but also to convince people  of  the  importance  of  growth  to  their  well  being.”  These  coalitions  also promote a more positive city image, often in the face of less than positive realities such as urban blight, poverty, crime, and outmigration. Urban boosterism includes positive portrayals of a city as well as a negative role, where certain issues, groups, or  organizations  are  “contained,  controlled  or  ignored.”  In  some  cases  specific groups,  such  as  unions  or  slow-growth  movements  or  opinions  such  as environmentalism, are blamed for retarding growth and killing jobs.3

3 The state was fundamental to the politics of development in this period. Most big projects required support from senior levels of government, and by the 1970s the federal treasury was an important source of funding for infrastructure such as roads.4 As John Reid had written, optimism was in the air by the late 1960s with many in the Atlantic region anticipating major spending by the Trudeau government under the  guise  of  regional  development.5 Interest  groups  in  New  Brunswick  tended  to lobby  not  the  bureaucracy  but  MPs  and  MLAs,  especially  cabinet  members  and regional  ministers.  The  1920s  Maritime  Rights  protest,  although  a  coalition involving farmers, organized labour, and other groups, had been driven by business; as  Nerbas  has  detailed,  the  Saint  John  bourgeoisie  has  never  been  shy  about lobbying government.6 Since the 1950s, if not earlier, the Saint John area, in terms of provincial politics, had been Progressive Conservative (PC) territory and usually represented in Ottawa by a Tory MP. Except for the Diefenbaker years (1957-1963), this meant that the city was represented by the opposition. In Louis Robichaud’s 1960  Liberal  victory,  greater  Saint  John’s  six  seats  in  the  provincial  assembly returned  Conservatives.  During  the  Hatfield  era  (1970  onwards)  Saint  John  was largely Tory blue, but Liberal support was not absent. Opposition leader Robert J. Higgins  (1971-1978),  for  example,  was  a  Saint  John  MLA. Aside  from  electoral politics,  partisanship,  and  patronage,  Saint  John,  like  other  New  Brunswick communities,  was  affected  by  economic  development,  environmental,  and  other policies  at  the  provincial  and  national  levels. At  times,  specific  policies  such  as federal foreign investment controls or environmental levies were viewed as working to the detriment of the growth coalition.7

4 Economic development in Saint John was important on the provincial level for two reasons: it was the largest municipality in New Brunswick and a driver of the provincial  economy.  On  the  provincial  level  a  non-elected  authority,  the  New Brunswick Electric Power Commission (NBEPC), which continued its established growth agenda based on the “power for industry” argument, was the most important public sector actor influencing development. During the Hatfield years, as explained below, the public utility would be major player in the Saint John region, with two large energy projects that provided thousands of construction and related jobs. The area also contained the utility’s largest industrial customers. The NBEPC, beginning in the 1950s, also exported power to other jurisdictions, which created a precedent for future debates about energy policy.8

5 The coalition also interacted with and was shaped by a new force – federal and provincial  economic  agencies  such  as  the  Department  of  Regional  Economic Expansion (DREE) – which were tasked with attracting investment, creating jobs, and improving the provincial per capita income. Saint John would be designated a special area under DREE, and deserving of special funding for industrialization and infrastructure. Although DREE abandoned its growth centre focus after the 1972 federal election, the coalition continued to insist that investment, population growth, and increased value-added manufacturing in the Saint John region would benefit the entire province.

6 Saint John central business interests worked to raise the value of downtown real estate, but the coalition also promoted manufacturing, retail, the service sector, and cultural and tourism initiatives as well as construction projects to provide business and  employment  for  suppliers,  construction  companies,  the  building  trades,  and engineering  firms.9 The  key  organization,  which  functioned  almost  as  a  fourth branch of government, was the Saint John Board of Trade (SJBT); it maintained an active planning, lobbying, and propaganda campaign to boost the Saint John area. Briefs and statements from the SJBT reflected an abiding faith that it spoke for the citizenry and knew what was best for the community, in contrast to the allegedly shortsighted or ill-informed opponents of various development projects and private sector  investments.  It  exerted  major  pressures  on  the  municipal  government, maintained  a  system  of  specialized  committees,  issued  briefs  and  reports,  and lobbied the provincial and federal governments. And its concerns were not restricted to economic issues. Most well-known entrepreneurs were involved with the Board of Trade and ancillary organizations. One of the most prominent was Philip Oland, owner of Moosehead Breweries. Capitalists like Oland also supported the arts and charitable organizations, part of the non-economic superstructure of the post-war city.  Others  were  developers  like  Pat  Rocca,  who  built  Market  Square,  the  Saint John Regional Hospital, and a number of shopping malls. Interestingly, though, most growth  activists  came  from  non-elite  backgrounds.  Malcom  Somerville  (1921-2012), for example, worked in the insurance sector. He chaired the Saint John Urban Renewal Commission during the 1960s and was involved with the local planning commission  and  other  boards,  agencies,  and  committees,  including  the  Unity Committee of the early 1970s that lobbied the federal government for economic aid and infrastructure investment.10

7 The business community, which included professionals such as lawyers, was also linked to the provincial and federal governments – and opposition parties – through key  operatives  active  in  the  Liberal  and  PC  parties.  These  individuals  and  their networks not only took part in election campaigns and worked to advance the party, they also were heavily involved in community boards, agencies, service clubs, and charities and often launched their public careers by being elected to the Saint John Common Council. These interconnecting webs gave legitimacy to both the political operatives  and  the  growth  coalition.  One  important  example  was  the  Port  and Industrial  Development  Commission,  an  early  manifestation  of  a  regional development agency.

8 A major player in the politics of growth was the business empire of K.C. Irving. Irving  began  in  the  fuel  supply  business  and  branched  out  into  gas  stations, transportation,  saw  milling,  pulp  and  paper,  newspapers,  radio,  television,  oil refining,  shipbuilding,  and  shipping.  His  first  expansion  into  industry  was  his acquisition of Canada Veneers in the late 1930. During the Second World War the company became “the largest supplier of aircraft veneer on the planet.”11 In the years prior to municipal amalgamation, Irving purchased the Saint John Shipyard and Dry Dock and opened a modern oil refinery in Simonds parish adjacent to Saint John. In the following years he bought a large share in Brunswick Mining and Smelting, a new venture at Bathurst in northern New Brunswick. Irving failed to have a smelter built  in  the  Saint  John  area,  but  his  companies  were  major  beneficiaries  of  the construction of the smelter. Although Irving moved to Bermuda in 1972 to escape Canada’s  tax  laws,  his  enterprises,  managed  by  his  three  sons,  continued  (and continue) to cast a large shadow over the province.12

9 One of the strengths of this expanding network of companies was the strategy of vertical  integration.  Irving  also  employed  his  considerable  influence  to  extract favourable  tax  deals,  water  rates,  and  other  concessions  such  as  protection  from nuisance prosecutions by municipal governments, which was a major reason why the  Robichaud  government  during  the  1960s  attempted  to  abolish  municipal bonusing in favour of a province-wide economic development strategy. The Irving group  of  companies,  headquartered  in  Saint  John  by  the  middle  of  the  1970s, numbered roughly one hundred separate enterprises. Although Irving was a vocal advocate of private enterprise and a sometimes critic of government, his companies benefited from what social democrats called “corporate welfare.” The expansion of the Saint John Oil Refinery in the 1970s, for example, was partly facilitated by a contract to supply the new NBEPC thermal plant at Lorneville. Similarly, Canaport, Irving’s  offshore  crude  oil  unloading  facility  at  Mispec,  supplied  the  utility’s Courtenay Bay generating station that had been commissioned during the late 1950s and expanded during the 1960s.13

10 Urban studies literature often explains that the media plays an important role in boosterism by supporting the politics of growth in general and specific initiatives and  portraying  coalition  activists  and  organizations  as  “community  leaders.” The flip  side  is  that  opponents  or  critics  of  development  are  ignored,  criticized,  and neutralized.  And  despite  the  rise  of  radio  and  television  broadcasting,  the metropolitan newspaper remained a powerful influence on urban affairs; at this time Saint John was home to two Irving-owned dailies, The Telegraph Journal and The Evening Times-Globe, which  were  consistent  promoters  of  pro-growth  messages. This  was  accomplished  through  news  reporting  and  editorials  that  promoted  the growth agenda, although these dailies did not always agree with every project or every component of proposed and actual public and private sector developments.14

11 Although  the  influence  of  organized  labour  has  partly  waned,  Saint  John  was known  as  a  union  town.  The  presence  of  rail  yards,  the  port,  processing  and manufacturing  industries  such  as  two  breweries  and  two  pulp  and  paper  mills,  a shipyard and dry dock, a sugar refinery, foundries, and other unionized enterprises added to the city’s blue-collar image. At its height, the winter port employed up to 1,500  members  of  the  International  Longshoremen’s  Association.  One  sign  of labour’s political clout was the presence of labour or pro-labour representatives on the  Common  Council  and  various  civic  boards  and  commissions.  And  labour organizations  lobbied  for  public  housing,  better  public  transit,  and  other  social amenities. At times local labour, notably the Saint John District Labour Council, was a  formal  part  of  growth  coalition  proposals  or  demands,  although  business  and labour (particularly public sector unions) were also in conflict. Saint John unions were particularly active in the 1976 national day of action against federal wage and price  controls.15 The  building  trades  unions  were  reliable  supporters  of  any infrastructure project, although this did not always translate into a lack of militancy as  happened,  for  example,  during  the  1970s  when  the  NBEPC  was  building  two major power plants near Saint John. The ambitious plans for port expansion and heavy industry and for major NBEPC projects in the late 1960s and early 1970s assumed the expansion of the largely male, blue-collar, and unionized workforce. And so did the expansion of any Irving processing or manufacturing enterprises. Overall,  labour  in  Saint  John  was  an  embedded  pro-growth  constituency.  The increased levels of provincial government activity associated with the Robichaud and  Hatfield  eras,  in  health  care,  education,  and  social  welfare,  resulted  in  more public sector workers.16

12 One example of how supposedly non-economic developments could be promoted by  the  growth  coalition  was  the  Saint  John  branch  of  the  University  of  New Brunswick.  The  main  argument  from  local  boosters  was  that  students  in  the province’s largest city should be able to attend university in their own community. But a university is many things to many people, and while the fledgling campus filled a cultural role, helped improve access to higher education, and improved the city’s image it also was thought to advance economic development.17 Although the educational  mission  was  not  as  directly  tied  to  the  job  market  (and  the  needs  of employers) as much as that of the local branch of the New Brunswick Community College, a university was considered essential to creating a modern workforce in postwar  Canada.  UNB  Saint  John  was  launched  in  1964;  the  following  year  the municipal  government  ceded  land  for  the  Tucker  Park  campus,  which  formally opened in 1969. Like urban renewal, post-secondary education was supported as an investment in productivity as much as a social reform.18

13 Despite the city’s reputation for slums, poverty, and pollution, average incomes in the Saint John area by the 1970s were higher than the provincial average and trades  and  production  workers  and  their  families  shared  in  this  prosperity.  Blue-collar  workers  largely  voted  for  the  Liberals  and  Conservatives  in  provincial elections – not the New Democratic Party. The middle-class incomes of the 1960s and  1970s  permitted  many  blue-collar  workers  and  their  families  to  relocate  to single-family,  owner-occupied  neighbourhoods,  a  number  of  them  in  outlying municipalities where land was cheaper and taxes lower. In addition, because of a significant expansion of construction, the 1970s were a relatively prosperous time in the Saint John area, with low rates of unemployment. Workers did face the problem of inflation, and government anti-inflation measures, cutting into their incomes. In the future, most population and residential growth would be in the outer ring and not within Saint John city limits.19

14 The growth coalition’s general agreement on the necessity of big projects and government  support  and  funding  did  not  bring  unanimity  on  the  details  of development.  In  1967,  for  example,  a  number  of  Irving  enterprises  and  other companies criticized the route of a new harbour bridge and its interchanges.20 And the  coalition  did  not  win  all  of  its  campaigns.  In  1969,  when  the  Robichaud government decided to support a new pulp mill in economically depressed Charlotte County and not the Saint John area, the decision created dissension in Liberal ranks. These  tensions  echoed  the  findings  of  a  study  of  community  leadership  and corporate power in industrial Michigan, which uncovered “a considerable amount of political conflict, of negotiating among interests, of symbolic appeal, of incomplete information, and of snap decisions.”21

15 1967, Canada’s centennial, was a year of both controversy and optimism for Saint John. The city annexed the parish of Lancaster, the city of Lancaster, and the parish of Simonds (the latter two were home to a number of industries). Efficiency and economic growth, the core goals of the coalition, which shaped public affairs in the Saint  John  area,  were  central  to  the  amalgamation  debate.22 Support  for amalgamation by the early 1960s was strong within the SJBT, which stood for a greater  Saint  John  economic  region.  Complicating  the  issue  by  1965  was  the Robichaud  government’s  introduction  of  its  Equal  Opportunity  legislation.  The Saint  John  County  Council  in  the  mid-1960s  endorsed  a  metropolitan  focus  by authorizing a detailed community survey of the greater Saint John area. In 1967 the four municipalities in the region were merged, creating a new City of Saint John with a population of 89,000 and an area of 103 square miles. The acquisition of population and territory, combined with the good will of Canada’s centennial year, created  a  new  optimism  among  the  public  –  one  fuelled  by  the  media,  public officials, and community organizations such as the SJBT.23

16 That same year voters in Saint John took part in a provincial election that was a reaction to Robichaud’s program of Equal Opportunity. The Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation, chaired by Edward Bryne and which reported in 1963, advocated centralization and equal provision of services across the province in the areas of education, social welfare, health, and justice. The Bryne report also recommended  solving  New  Brunswick’s  chronic  problems  of  poverty  and unemployment  by  modernizing  provincial  services,  municipal  governance,  and infrastructure in order to foster full employment. For the most part this was to be achieved by the private sector in resource and manufacturing industries. The report rejected  municipal  tax  concessions  to  industry,  arguing  that  provincial  agencies should support the private sector through grants, loans, and other instruments.24

17 Bonusing,  the  provision  of  favourable  tax  and  municipal  services  deals  to corporations that provided manufacturing jobs and added to the tax base, was at the heart  of  industrial  promotion  for  North  American  cities.  It  paralleled  tactics employed by provincial governments to attract or retain fixed-cost industries such as paper mills or smelters. In theory, tax abatements for industry either placed a greater burden on small business and residential ratepayers or degraded municipal services. The Irving paper mill’s 1956 water deal with Lancaster, for example, was a superb bargain compared to the rates charged to the Atlantic Sugar Refinery, the NBEPC, or homeowners. In the early 1950s K.C. Irving, who was planning an expansion of the paper mill at Reversing Falls in Lancaster, secured a freeze on the value of the property for purposes of assessment, the right to discharge effluent directly into the Saint John river (and harbour), the right to expropriate nearby land, and immunity from prosecution under the law of nuisances. Similarly, during the 1950s, Irving convinced Kimberly-Clark to build a tissue plant at Lancaster, near his pulp mill, and  sold  35  per  cent  of  his  mill  to  the  “outsider”  investor.  This  was  on  the understanding  that  Kimberly-Clark  would  purchase  its  paper  from  Irving.  K.C. Irving personally secured long-term tax and water deals for the new tissue plant. In 1961 the water dispute took a new twist when Saint John temporarily cancelled its water agreement with Irving. Other Irving industries, such as the oil refinery and Ocean Steel, a metal fabrication site developed on prime harbour front land in the early 1960s, also benefited from favourable tax deals.25

18 The taxation recommendations of the Equal Opportunity Program (EOP) and the centralization of power under the province at the expense of the municipalities were direct threats to both the political clout and bottom line of manufacturing enterprises. Irving  newspapers,  aided  by  Michael  Wardell’s  Fredericton’s  Daily Gleaner, mounted  a  vociferous  attack  on  Robichaud’s  modernization  and  centralization policies.  Yet  the  actual  response  in  Saint  John  was  more  mixed  and  nuanced. Although  there  were  concerns  in  the  Saint  John  area  that  equalization  and centralization  would  lower  the  quality  of  specific  services  such  as  education,  the social welfare aspects of the EOP were not as intensely opposed as its taxation and municipal reform provisions. In the end, standing municipal property tax deals were not touched. Another factor was that businesses and business organizations sensed that both the provincial and federal governments, in name of job creation and regional development, were about to turn on the tap of state funding to the private sector.26

19 One paradox in discussing Saint John’s connections with the EOP was that the urban area was viewed as a “have” region that supposedly stood to lose so much under  Robichaud’s  plan,  which  was  itself  identified  with  poverty,  substandard housing,  and  social  exclusion. When  the  Saint  John  area  experienced  prosperity, such  as  during  the  1970s,  the  benefits  were  not  evenly  distributed  to  vulnerable neighbourhoods and the unskilled working class. Class divisions were most clearly evident in residential neighbourhoods, where a large percentage of the working class lived in substandard, tenement rental housing.27

20 Not surprisingly, urban renewal initially focused on slum clearance. The 1956 Potvin  Report  recommended  the  demolition  of  4,000  out  of  13,000  residential buildings  in  the  city.  In  1962  the  director  of  social  welfare  reported  that  many residents  were  living  in  substandard  properties  and  that  landlords  were  charging exorbitant rents. By this time urban renewal had displaced hundreds of people from Saint John’s east end and, despite the efforts of the Saint John Housing Authority, the  crisis  had  not  abated.28 The  city  adopted  a  master  plan  in  1947,  based  on  an earlier report, which although not given full legal authority served as a useful guide for  various  projects  in  the  1950s  and  early  1960s. These  included  the  city’s  first urban  renewal  project,  a  new  viaduct  carrying  automobile  traffic  over  railroad tracks, and a causeway across Courtney Bay.29 The Courtenay Place Urban Renewal Project, in Saint John’s east end tenement district, redeveloped 57 acres of land near Courtenay Bay during the early 1960s. It aimed to balance residential, commercial, and industrial uses and to improve transportation routes. The $4.5 million cost was covered by three levels of government, with Ottawa providing half of the funding.30

21 In  1966  work  began  on  a  Comprehensive  Community  Plan  (CCP)  to  guide urbanization of the cities of Saint John and Lancaster and the parishes of Simonds and Lancaster. Although social conditions were an important part of the argument in favour of urban renewal in Saint John in the 1950s and 1960s, the broader goal was to  remove  urban  blight  and  engineer  a  more  efficient  city  that  would  attract investment and jobs. As the CCP evolved it dovetailed with the ambitious plans for industrial expansion, and planners and politicians spoke of Saint John doubling its population by 1980.31 The CCP, by the late 1960s, was superseded by and merged with the Urban Impact study and plan for the Saint John region, which was initiated in 1969. Much of the focus of these studies was on the built environment, traffic and parking, and municipal services; but, as with much urban or regional planning in this era, housing and other social welfare issues were also explored.32

22 Saint  John’s  second  major  urban  renewal  initiative,  the  North  End  project, focused on Main Street and the neigbourhood to the south, another tenement district. In this case, the provincial government covered 25 per cent of the cost. Together with land clearances required for a new harbour bridge, an urban expressway, and a new viaduct connecting the north end and the central business district, this project displaced several hundred families. The municipality was responsible for 30 per cent of project costs.33 By 1969, when the federal minister responsible for housing was criticizing  urban  renewal  as  expensive  and  misguided,  Ottawa  had  spent  or committed more than $13 million to renewal projects in Saint John and there was more to come.34 One of the factors behind amalgamation had been a shortage of land for residential development; although Millidgeville in Saint John’s north end had been opened for residential construction in the early 1960s, the pace of building was slow  compared  to  outlying  subdivisions  such  as  Forest  Hills  and  Greendale. Housing  remained  a  problem  in  Saint  John  following  amalgamation;  a  CMHC official in 1975 informed the Board of Trade that “the housing situation . . . is a deterrent to the setting of industry in the city.”35

23 The Saint John area had a manufacturing base by the mid-Victorian era, and new industries, such as a sugar refinery and a shipyard and dry dock, were added and existing industries expanded during the early 20th century; but until the 1960s, the city  was  regarded  more  as  a  port  and  railway  centre  than  an  industrial  city.  A boosterist article in The Atlantic Advocate in 1960 announced that the industrial age had dawned, principally because of the energies of capitalist K.C. Irving. By 1961 one-third of the workforce was employed in manufacturing and transportation. At this  time  Irving  and  his  business  and  political  supporters  were  promoting  “the Atlantic  Seaway,”  a  defensive  counter  to  the  St.  Lawrence  Seaway  that  would include a canal connecting the Northumberland Straight and the Bay of Fundy, tidal power projects, and a corridor highway connecting Sydney, Cape Breton, to Quebec via the state of Maine.36 This megaproject, generally opposed by Nova Scotia as a threat to the port of Halifax, was supported by Robichaud in his first years in office and gained some federal government interest. The high cost and uncertain utility of the Atlantic Seaway made its actual completion highly unlikely, which suggests that it was more of a political symbol than a tangible project.37

24 Much of the investment by government and the private sector into infrastructure improvements in the 1960s was justified in the name of attracting industry and other investments. In Saint John this included the new harbour bridge (1968), an urban expressway  (which  opened  in  the  late  1970s),  and  modernized  port  and  railway facilities,  including  expanded  rail  yards  and  a  container  terminal.  Many  of  these initiatives  originated  with  the  SJBT,  which  advocated  for  certain  projects  for decades. Although elements of the business community objected to centralization and “interference” from Fredericton, the growth coalition in Saint John expected much  from  Robichaud’s  New  Brunswick  Development  Corporation  (NBDC), especially when federal dollars were on the table. The role of the NBDC was to support new secondary manufacturing or new products – not processing industries such as oil refineries or pulp and paper mills. 38

25 In  addition  to  internal  battles  over  the  direction  of  public  policy  within  the province, politicians, interest groups, and the press were involved in the ongoing politics of regional equalization and development that, in most cases, translated into how much federal spending could be attracted to a city or a region of the province. The emphasis of local elites, provincial politicians, and the Irving media on the use of public funds and authority to create jobs was not simply mindless boosterism; it reflected then-current thinking on regional economic planning as represented by the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC), which in 1967 advocated a five-year plan to boost productivity in the primary sector and employment in manufacturing and the service sector. Economist W.Y. Smith of UNB in 1971 was optimistic that growth  centre  designation  and  federal  incentives  would  allow  the  region  to maximize  its  locational  advantages.  In  the  context  of  the  day,  promoting  value-added  and  export-oriented  secondary  manufacturing  in  order  offset  a  traditional reliance on primary industries made perfect sense.39

26 Much has been made of the social justice aspects of Robichaud’s modernization policies. Della Stanley has suggested that Robichaud at heart was a social reformer, who viewed industrial promotion as a “political asset.”40 But economic arguments were  at  the  core  of  the  EOP. The  ultimate  goal  of  the  program  was  to  put  more Brunswickers to work within a modern, industrial economy. The Liberals believed that  their  program  of  modernizing  and  equalizing  municipal,  social,  health,  and educational services, combined with close ties with the federal government, would lead to New Brunswick’s economic salvation. The average income in the province at this time was 80 per cent that of the Canadian average. In keeping with the spirit of the age, business organizations and groups such as the APEC advocated federal government spending in the region as a contribution to national unity.

27 Saint John had begun the 1960s by being described by the Globe and Mail as a “boomtown”  fuelled  largely  by  the  private  sector. Although  a  number  of  smaller industries started or expanded in the area in the early 1960s, the only major new investment between Robichaud’s first victory in 1960 and the 1967 election was the Rothesay  Paper  Co.  Ltd.  newsprint  plant;  it  opened  in  Simonds  parish  near  the Irving refinery in 1965. With a capital investment of $34 million and a workforce of 300, this was not an insignificant addition to the local economy. The Rothesay mill, owned by an international consortium, asked for provincial land on Courtenay Bay that Irving had coveted for industrial expansion. After the Liberal victory, Irving was given the 90-acre site and the Rothesay Paper Co. mill, despite Irving’s opposition, was built on land nearby.41

28 The expansive mentality of the late 1960s encouraged the SJBT to push for the city’s  designation  by  the  federal  government  as  a  special  development  area. The provincial PCs made this a plank in their 1967 election campaign. The Saint John Port and Industrial Commission also supported federal and provincial government aid  to  industrialize  the  urban  region.  Although  endorsing  regional  development spending, the business community did not surrender policy formulation to the public sector. As  the  SJBT  federal  and  provincial  affairs  committee  noted  in  1970,  the organization remained cognizant of the importance of developing “informed” (pro-development) public opinion and influencing government actions.42

29 Opposition  to  the  Liberal  government’s  program  of  Equal  Opportunity  was associated  with  anglophone  New  Brunswick,  the  business  community,  and  the municipalities and the county councils that stood to be shorn of their powers or, in the case of the later, abolished. The taxpayers of Saint John, a relatively prosperous community, would be forced to subsidize provincial services in less developed, rural areas,  most  of  which  were  heavily  francophone.  New  Brunswick’s  larger municipalities, with the support of the anglophone press, defended local autonomy against feared provincial centralization.43 Irving, who had considerable investments in the Saint John area and who owned the local press, one radio station, and one television station, led the business counterattack against Robichaud’s policies. And, as detailed by Stanley and other authors, much of the dispute between Irving and the Robichaud  government  was  rooted  not  in  Saint  John  issues,  but  controversies surrounding Noranda Mines Ltd. gaining control of Brunswick Mining by 1967.44

30 The Official Opposition spoke in abstract terms of freedom and local autonomy, but PC electioneering in 1967 promised to secure federal development funding, stop outmigration,  boost  employment,  assist  rural  families,  and  undo  aspects  of centralization  –  notably  by  restoring  county  councils  and  municipal  control  over property assessments and taxation. The Liberal campaign in greater Saint John was a preview of Robichaud’s general approach in his final campaign in 1970, where social reform took a back seat to economic development. Robichaud won the hard-fought 1967 contest with just under 53 per cent of the popular vote. In the Saint John region, the Liberal share was only 31 per cent.45 Despite the intensity of opposition to Equal Opportunity prior to the election, the issues in Saint John, from the point of view of the PCs, were all related to economic development and financial burdens. The Tories criticized tolls on the new federally owned Saint John Harbour Bridge, the unwillingness of the provincial government to establish a medical school in Saint John,  and  city’s  failure  to  be  acknowledged  as  a  designated  area  under  federal regional  assistance  programing.46 The  Saint  John  area,  aside  from  one  riding, remained Tory blue.47 The Evening Times-Globe immediately announced the newest critical policies necessary for enhancing Saint John’s economy: federal government action on freight rates, port modernization, the expansion of the municipal airport, and an upgrade to the Bay of Fundy ferry service connecting the city to Digby, Nova Scotia.48 In the weeks following the election, much was made of Saint John’s new city hall project; a private company was given the green light to build a modern, multi-story office tower in the central business district. The city hall, in the words of an Irving newspaper, was “a bold step into the future” that would “lift civic spirits and civic pride” despite the fact that the municipality did not own it.49 Another bricks and mortar goal of the local growth coalition was a civic complex, by then a basic amenity of a modern city. Two downtown malls were built in the 1970s, which lifted community morale and helped slow down central business district decline, but the civic complex, an arena capable of hosting large concerts, would not open until the 1990s.50

31 Government aid to infrastructure and manufacturing investments continued to be given priority by the growth coalition, which welcomed the federal government’s awarding, in 1967, of a large naval construction contract to the Irving shipyard. In 1968 the SJBT submitted a brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transportation and Communications explaining that industrial growth in southern New Brunswick “and perhaps the whole province” was dependent on “a modern transportation network or infrastructure.” The brief mentioned pet projects of the local business community, such as the Chignecto Canal, as well as new proposals such  as  a  new  deep  water  port  capable  of  handling  modern  “super”  ships  and offshore mooring capabilities that would allow tankers to discharge crude oil via submarine pipelines. The latter was put in place in 1970 when Irving Oil opened its offshore Canaport terminal at Mispec, east of Saint John.51 Yet Mispec was not the first  choice  for  the  deep  water  terminal.  In  1968  Irving  Oil  and  the  provincial government had announced that Lorneville, a site to the west of the city and home to  a  small  fishing  community,  had  been  selected  as  the  site  of  a  major  port development.52

32 The  provincial  government  ended  up  expropriating  several  thousand  acres  at Lorneville,  and  the  site  became  the  focus  of  shifting  and  ever-expanding development schemes. In 1968 the NBDC announced that the site was suitable for handling both liquid and dry cargoes and Robichaud was confident that Lorneville, where  the  water  approaches  were  one  hundred  feet  deep,  would  be  looked  upon favourably by the Atlantic Development Board, which was seeking to recommend a location for an east coast “super port.” At that point in time few ports on the Atlantic seaboard were capable of accommodating the newest generation of dry and liquid bulk  carriers,  which  ranged  between  150,000  and  300,000  deadweight  tons. Proximity to the United States by water, rail, and road as well as access to global shipping routes were touted as other advantages.53 Although the port of Saint John remained  viable  for  bulk  cargo  and  there  were  plans  to  develop  the  capacity  to handle  containers,  physically  it  was  too  narrow  to  accommodate  the  newest generation of large freighters. That same year the NBDC began to promote the area as  ideal  for  a  “multiple  industry  complex”  that  could  attract  up  to  50  different enterprises. The media reported that Lorneville-based operations would produce up to 20,000 jobs in 10 years, which would more than double the size of the wage-earning  labour  force  in  the  Saint  John  area.54 A  1969  report  by  the  provincial Department  of  Economic  Growth  revealed  that  it  had  been  in  discussions  with several enterprises on specific projects, such as an aluminum smelter and an iron ore and sulphuric acid plant, to locate at “Canport” (the working name of what soon was called Saint John Deep). Yet the report also listed several complicating factors, such as the cost of electrical power and uncertain commodity prices and did not oversell the projects.55

33 In  1969  the  provincial  government  announced  preliminary  approval  of classifying Saint John as a growth centre. Although the Robichaud government had promised to develop Lorneville with its own resources if necessary, it was not in a fiscal position to do so. The president of the NBDC expressed the hope that any future  facility  would  be  taken  over  by  the  National  Harbours  Board,  which  also operated the port of Saint John.56 With support from the newly organized DREE, the province committed to broadening the industrial base, improving infrastructure, and supporting  a  new  comprehensive  plan  to  guide  the  anticipated  megacity  of  the future. Saint John (along with Moncton) was designated one of 22 growth centres eligible  for  federal  assistance  for  infrastructure  and  it  also  benefitted  from  the Regional  Development  Incentives  Act,  which mandated  assistance  for  new industries. Specific projects were eligible for 50 per cent federal funding; highway projects qualified for up to 100 per cent. Companies were eligible for up to $30,000 for  each  new  job  created.57 In  1970  construction  began  on  the  new  urban expressway, funded by DREE. Despite a growing list of construction projects, many of the benefits were not trickling down to the community, population growth was slow,  and  new  housing  starts  modest.  Fed  by  the  optimism  of  officials  and politicians, who promoted massive industrialization in the urban region, planners were predicting that the metropolitan area would grow to more than 270,000 and the labour  force  to  more  than  100,000  by  the  middle  of  the  1980s.  According  to planners,  as  a  growth  centre  Saint  John  would  require  water  and  sewage improvements,  new  residential  neighbourhoods,  parks,  schools,  and  other community  facilities  as  well  as  more  than  2,000  new  student  places  at  the  local campuses of the University of New Brunswick and the community college.58

34 With  the  value  of  hindsight,  the  glowing  statements  of  business  and  political leaders in the late 1960s seem like naïve boosterism. But a broader political and economic agenda, rooted in an outdated development model and partly motivated by partisan considerations, was at work, as the Robichaud government was linking the industrialization  of  Saint  John  with  an  emphasis  on  a  cluster  of  metal-working industries  and  a  “fundamental  alteration  in  the  structure  of  the  provincial economy.”59 This was also to be the site of the multiplex, whose planners added possible chemical plants to the mix. Two years later, though, the political dynamics had changed. Although Saint John was still represented on the opposition benches at the federal level, Richard Hatfield’s PCs defeated Robichaud and held on to six of seven  ridings  in  greater  Saint  John.60 Like  Robichaud,  Hatfield  made  economic diversification and value-added processing and manufacturing a priority. Yet there was  evidence  of  tensions  between  the  provincial  government’s  economic development priorities and those of communities and business organizations. One challenge for Hatfield was the need to promote growth in all regions of the province, including  the  economically  depressed  northeast  (which  in  the  Hatfield  era  was largely Liberal territory).61

35 The  multiplex  concept  was  championed  by  the  New  Brunswick  Multiplex Corporation (NBMC), a federal-provincial agency created in 1971 and funded by DREE. Consultants referred to successful European models, but appeared to ignore indications that the metal fabrication industry in many parts of North America was in decline. At this time the resource sector accounted for half of provincial GNP, and most manufacturing by value was actually processing (refining oil and making pulp and paper). The NBMC was headquartered in Saint John in contrast to the NBDC, which  was  based  in  Fredericton  (along  with  agencies  or  departments  such  as Economic  Growth,  the  NB  Industrial  Finance  Board,  and  Provincial  Holdings, Limited). The Saint John office had a staff of 18 at its peak, including experts in heavy  industry  and  metal  fabrication.  The  corporation  was  tasked  with  not  only recruiting  heavy  industry,  but  also  assembling  and  leasing  land,  investing  in enterprises,  and  contracting  with  companies  to  manage  specific  businesses.62 Its 1975 guide for potential investors and corporate executives, The Saint John Region in Profile, confidently explained that Saint John was currently developing as a major seaport, was the leading manufacturing centre in Atlantic Canada, and aspired to be “a national oil and electrical energy base.”63 This would supposedly produce a total population for the greater Saint John region of 185,000-250,000.

36 The  estimated  cost  of  Saint  John  Deep  in  1970  was  $45-60  million,  and  its potential role included transshipping bulk products such as crude oil, coal, and iron ore from North America to Japan and other foreign markets. The NBDC reported that Norfolk and Western, the American rail corporation that shipped coal out of Appalachia, was interested in transporting coke to Lorneville for transshipment to Japan’s  steel  industries.  By  late  1970  the  federal  government  was  prepared  to contribute $10 million to Saint John Deep provided the sponsoring interests reached a deal. The coke would be sent in small bulk carriers via the port of Hampton Roads to Lorneville where it would loaded onto carriers of 100,000 tons or larger. A year later the provincial government had added Australian iron ore to the list of potential bulk cargoes. In time, however, the transshipment of non-petroleum cargo fell off the  agenda  for  Lorneville.64 In  1971  9,000  acres  of  expropriated  land  in  the Lorneville peninsula were rezoned from agricultural to heavy industry. By 1971 the potential industrial mix for the planned port had been limited to an asphalt plant and a  crude  oil  transshipment  facility  (the  latter  to  permit  super  tankers  to  transfer foreign  oil  to  smaller  carriers  destined  for  US  ports).  The  rezoning,  and  the NBEPC’s announcement that it planned to build a thermal generating station near Lorneville, was followed by a joint federal-provincial environmental impact study.65

37 The  crude  oil  transshipment  and  bulk  storage  facility  was  promoted  by  the American multinational Continental Oil Company (Conoco), and the forecast was that  500-850  vessels  a  year  would  visit  the  new  port  in  order  to  meet  North America’s growing demand for Middle Eastern crude. As of 1971 the plan for the $460  million  facility  included  three  berths,  with  the  provincial  government providing up to $14 million in support. Conoco also signaled its interest in building a 200,000 barrel-a-day oil refinery on the site, possibly in expectation of supplying the planned thermal generating plant. With the Irving bulk terminal at Canaport only 12 miles to the east, the logic of a deep water oil terminal and a new refinery at Lorneville was not apparent to some commentators.66

38 Despite the optimism of the growth coalition, the federal government was slow to promise funding for the new port and in 1972 the project received a setback when the  Ottawa  announced  a  levy  on  oil  cargoes  for  a  fund  to  clean  up  oil  spills. Although its actual impact was moderated after protests from the New Brunswick government, the announcement of the policy was the stated reason for Conoco to indefinitely postpone its investment and in the end no oil terminal was completed at Lorneville.  In  the  immediate  aftermath,  the  NBEPC  expressed  an  interest  in financially supporting an oil dock or even a refinery at the site. For a brief period Northeast Petroleum Industries Inc. of Boston indicated interest in partnering in the proposed deep-water terminal, the refinery, and storage terminal. Two Japanese oil companies were also involved in discussions. But by 1973 work on phase one, a loading dock for mid-sized tankers, had stalled. 67

39 In anticipation of massive industrialization, in 1971 the consulting company that produced the Comprehensive Community Plan released the Urban Region Impact Study – a blueprint for the economic and social development of the greater Saint John area extending from St. Stephen to the west to Sussex to the east. The updated plan,  according  to  City  of  Saint  John  staff,  was  a  requirement  of  the  federal government  for  any  community  seeking  major  funding  for  infrastructure  and industrial diversification.68 Given the building boom of 1973 there were grounds for optimism, yet Saint John’s population peaked at 89,000 in 1971 and in subsequent years the city continued to lose people to suburban municipalities.69 Still, the 1970s for the Saint John region, compared to other parts of the Maritimes, were relatively buoyant in terms of employment and vacancy rates were low. This was in part the result of construction and infrastructure projects, such as the expansion of the Irving refinery and shipyard and dry dock and new NBEPC facilities. By 1976 Irving Oil was preparing to activate its upgraded refinery in east Saint John, now the largest in Canada. The $200 million expansion was based on importing crude oil from Saudi Arabia, fulfilling the contract to supply Coleson Cove, and increasing exports of refined products to New England.70 The Irving shipyard began an expansion in the early  1970s  to  accommodate  the  repair  or  construction  of  250,000-ton  vessels. Aided  by  the  federal  Shipbuilding  Temporary  Assistance  program,  the  yard modernized its capabilities to incorporate new modular construction processes. In addition to conducting repairs, during the 1970s the Irving yard built oil tankers, tugs, barges, and other craft.71

40 Despite the prominence of Irving interests, foreign or outside investment was part of Saint John’s industrial mix; by the 1970s, for example, Standard Oil of British Columbia (controlled by Standard of California) owned nearly half of the shares of Irving Oil Ltd and more than half of the shares in the Irving Refinery Ltd. Kimberly Clark owned part of the Irving pulp and paper mill in west Saint John.72 By 1974 Premier Richard Hatfield, who in 1972 had committed to a $20 million expansion of  Saint  John  port  facilities,  was  blaming  the  failure  of  Saint  John  Deep  on nationalist federal government policies such as foreign investment review and the curtailment of oil exports to the United States. Three years earlier, in a speech in Saint John, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had been hopeful that Maritime exporters would benefit from liberalized trade policies in the United States. Yet protectionist policies in the United States, inflation, and exchange rates, according to the chair of the  NBMC  in  1972,  were  barriers  to  large-scale  capital  investment.  In  1971  the Nixon administration had shocked the Canadian federal and provincial governments and exporters by imposing a 10 per cent import surcharge.73

41 The energy crisis of the early 1970s appeared to present new opportunities for the NBEPC,  the  Hatfield  government,  and  the  growth  coalition.  Cheap  and  reliable power for industry had been a motherhood issue in politics since the 1950s, and this intensified  during  the  1970s  when  the  province’s  pulp  and  paper  industry  was struggling to remain competitive.74 Following the 1973 oil crisis, and in light of a new emphasis on energy security, the Maritime premiers were thinking big with several large energy projects being discussed, including the harnessing of Bay of Fundy tidal power  and  the  extension  of  an  oil  pipeline  from  Montreal  to  southern  New Brunswick.75 With the cost of crude oil on the rise (from $3 to $37 per barrel between 1972  and  1982),  the  electrical  utility  pointed  to  the  logic  of  diversifying  the province’s energy sources. In 1975 53 per cent of the NBEPC’s capacity was derived from hydro-electric dams and 47 per cent from thermal plants. The anchor of the Lorneville  industrial-port  complex,  a  new  oil-burning  thermal  plant  proposed  for Coleson Cove, had been planned before the 1973 energy crisis. In 1972, in order to minimize  labour  disruptions  at  Lorneville,  the  provincial  proposed  a  master  site agreement  and  a  Lorneville  Bargaining  Authority  to  cover  workers  building  the power plants and other facilities. The $184 million Coleson Cove generating station established a precedent in terms of Canadian energy policy as it was purpose-built to provide power for not only for industrial expansion in southern New Brunswick but also the New England grid. On the recommendation of the National Energy Board (NEB), in 1972 the federal government approved the export of 400,000 kilowatts of power from 1976 to 1986. The NEB expressed concerns about air pollution and noted that the hearing on the NBEPC’s application had not addressed the question of marine accidents and oil spills, by then an issue of growing public concern. At the time, the decision  was  viewed  as  a  boost  for  the  super  port  plan.  Coleson  Cove,  which consisted of three 355-megawatt units, was operational by 1976.76

42 Two years prior to this the Hatfield announced a more controversial megaproject for the region, a nuclear power plant at Point Lepreau to the west of Lorneville. Both projects  were  strongly  endorsed  by  the  growth  coalition,  despite  environmental concerns.  Hatfield  was  re-elected  in  1974  partly  on  the  promise  of  the  project. NBEPC’s  Point  Lepreau  generating  station  would  be  the  first  plant  in  Canada powered  by  CANDU-6  reactors  (with  a  total  capacity  of  1270  megawatts).  New Brunswick  became  only  the  second  province  in  Canada,  after  Ontario,  to  adopt nuclear power. The federal government provided loan guarantees for up to 50 per cent of capital costs. Construction began in 1975 and did much to take the sting out of the loss of Saint John Deep and Saint John Multiplex. At its peak in the late 1970s the project employed more than 3,000 workers and provided contracts to many local businesses. According  to  local  unions,  two-thirds  of  the  skilled  workers  at  both Coleson Cove and Lepreau were from outside the province. Hampered by delays, inflation, and labour disputes, the project was also characterized by cost overruns. By the time it was operational in 1983, Point Lepreau had cost $1.4 billion, triple the original amount forecasted. Up to a third of the power generated at Point Lepreau was exported to New England.77

43 The  Robichaud  era  coincided  with  the  beginning  of  significant  federal government spending in the region. This continued under Hatfield during the 1970s. Yet  federal  support  of  manufacturing  enterprise  was  not  automatic,  and  involved “ministerial  discretion.”78 In  1976  a  federal  official  reported  that  DREE  had committed to spend $100 million in the Saint John region on infrastructure projects such  as  industrial  parks,  sewage  treatment  plants,  two  schools,  residential  and industrial  land  banks,  marine  terminals,  the  local  community  college,  and  the throughway (a four-lane divided urban expressway that linked the harbour bridge with the provincial highway to Moncton). This urban expressway project alone had a  budget  of  $75  million. This  spending  did  not  include  incentives  to  industry  or support of transportation and industrial park studies. The official reported that Saint John,  on  a  per  capita  basis,  was  the  largest  or  second  largest  recipient  of  DREE funding.79 DREE spent three times as much in Saint John as in the economically depressed Miramichi area.80 In 1972 a DREE policy review supported an Atlantic Gateway concept, based on improving road, rail, air, and sea links for the established ports in Saint John and Halifax and potential superports such as Canso, Nova Scotia. Yet local business interests, represented by the SJBT, continued to push senior levels of government on a number of key issues, suggesting in 1974, for example, that the National Harbours Board turn over all its property in the port of Saint John to the provincial government. This bold assertion that the local business community knew better than provincial or federal planners, bureaucrats, and politicians what was best for  the  local  economy  suggests  that  the  growth  coalition  rejected  a  core recommendation of the Byrne report: that the provincial government should direct industrial promotion.81

44 In  1971  Hatfield  explained  to  Toronto  industrialists  and  bankers  that  New Brunswick  was  no  longer  interested  in  “buying”  jobs  by  financially  supporting outside firms that were not interested in long-term commitments to the province. He also  claimed  that  fostering  a  pro-investment  climate  did  not  compromise  the environment.82 The  Byrne  commission  in  1963  had  opined  that  attracting  new industry to New Brunswick, was “more difficult . . . than it is to any other province except Newfoundland and, perhaps, Prince Edward Island.”83 A decade later major capital  investment  generally  was  not  possible  without  substantial  government subsidies.  And  many  large  projects,  even  by  the  standards  of  the  era,  brought environmental  consequences  and  imperiled  other  traditional  economic  sectors. Irving’s  Canaport  project,  for  example,  damaged  the  Bay  of  Fundy  fishery,  and Coleson Cove was a major emitter of sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide.

45 The most dramatic example of the provincial government being attracted to high-profile,  capital  intensive,  and  somewhat  risky  ventures  promoted  by  outside entrepreneurs was the ill-fated plan to assemble luxury sports cars for the American market. The Saint John plant for assembling a gull-wing vehicle was located in one of the three new industrial parks in the city (a spin-off, second park was established at Spruce Lake, adjacent to Lorneville). American entrepreneur Malcolm Bricklin, rebuffed  by  the  government  of  Quebec  in  his  attempt  to  establish  a  Canadian operation, had approached the New Brunswick government through the NBMC in 1973. DREE refused to support the plan because of complications arising out of the Canada-US  Autopact  so  the  Hatfield  government  invested  directly  in  Bricklin Canada  Limited,  controlling  51  per  cent  of  the  shares. A  plant  for  the  vehicle’s acrylic fibreglass body was established in Minto and the main assembly operation located in Saint John. DREE later provided assistance with financing and Bricklin promised to construct up to 12,000 units for export.84 The Bricklin was a colorful symbol of Hatfield’s successful 1974 election campaign but in 1975 the company went into receivership, having produced less than three thousand cars. Six hundred people lost their jobs, most of them in Saint John. The province’s contributions to the company had exceeded $20 million.85

46 By the middle of the 1970s the Multiplex Corporation had failed to produce most of its anticipated benefits. The list of new projects in the planning stages by 1972 had included a steel mill and an asphalt plant. By the time the NBMC, along with the NBDC, was absorbed into a new Department of Commerce and Development in 1976,  it  had  supposedly  helped  to  create  1,000  jobs  (including  those  reported  as forthcoming when specific firms became operational) and attracted more than $17 million in investment. By 1976 the NBMC program claimed seven industries either functioning or under construction. Another 11 companies promising a total of 800 jobs had applications under review by DREE, and three of these fell by the wayside and went into receivership.86

47 The collapse of Saint John Deep, the absorption of Multiplex, and the spectacular failure  of  the  Bricklin  appeared  to  be  part  of  a  larger  pattern  of  failure  for government-aided enterprises in the Atlantic region. By 1976 elements within the growth coalition were blaming DREE for the region’s uneven growth and continued problem of unemployment.87 Despite these controversies, throughout this decade the SJBT continued to push for industrialization and energy-related projects, such as a liquefied natural gas regasification facility. A Board of Trade brief in 1977 endorsed the  development  of  export-dependent  industries,  such  as  “a  steel  mill,  cement production, petrochemicals and other heavy industry.”88 The newest megaproject on the horizon by that year was Lorneterm – a rebranded Saint John Deep – consisting of  a  marine  terminal  and  regasification  plant.  Promoted  by  Tenneco  of  Houston, Texas, the plant would have imported Algerian liquefied natural gas, reconverted it to gas and sent it by pipeline to New York and Pennsylvania. The terminal would have been  owned  by  Canadian  Pacific,  Trans  Canada  Pipelines,  and  other  companies. Discussion  of  the  merits  of  the  project,  which  also  would  have  made  natural  gas available for eastern Canada, raised nationalist arguments in favour of a pipeline to deliver Western Canadian gas to the Maritimes. The project, for a variety of reasons, most of them external to New Brunswick, was dead by the late 1970s.89

48 Saint John, like other cities, has been characterized by economic boosterism directed by a growth coalition. The long-term goal has been economic development, ideally in the form of private sector investment that produces employment, tax revenues, and value-added goods. As in other urban centres, one of the most important roles of  the  coalition  was  “maintaining  a  political  consensus  for  growth.”90 That consensus was challenged from time to time by private sector rivalries (notably the resistance by Irving interests to outside competition) as well as differences among levels  of  government,  and  specific  goals  were  not  always  achieved.  There  was occasional resistance by social forces, such land owners and environmentalists, to big development projects, but organized labour, a progressive force on social issues, was too wedded to development to question many of the non-economic implications of  growth.  In  1996,  for  example,  a  federal  scientist  called  Saint  John  “the  most polluted city in Canada.”91 Yet progress, as Della Stanley reminds us, was not simply an illusion in this period; during the 1960s most working families in New Brunswick experienced an improvement in their standard of living.92

49 Starting in the 1960s, the provincial and federal governments were expected to play an increasingly important role in infrastructure and other investments that could make Saint John more attractive for investment and productive for industry. This was part of the larger challenge of narrowing the gap in per capita income between New  Brunswick  and  the  Canadian  average,  a  goal  that  failed  to  be  realized.93 Robichaud’s EOP threatened traditional bonusing arrangements enjoyed by Irving and other enterprises in the Saint John area, and equalization’s redistributive policies evoked repeated complaints that Saint John’s property and income taxes supported the  rest  of  the  province.  Yet  the  growth  coalition  was  receptive  to  provincial government economic development policies and the increasing role of the federal government  in  promoting  the  modernization  of  the  city’s  infrastructure.  Industry was not the only focus of the coalition; other typical pro-growth concerns such as intensification  of  land  use  and  morale-building  initiatives  such  as  community facilities or festivals were also present.94

50 Despite the amalgamation of Saint John with the city of Lancaster and the parish of Simonds in 1967, the city’s designation as a federal growth centre, and special attention given to the region by the NBDC and DREE, the most dramatic “growth fantasies” of the era – Saint John Deep and the Saint John Multiplex – failed to materialize. By the 1980s, a grim period for many North American industrial cities, experts were predicting that the urban future would be based not on production but the service sector. Saint John, as part of its continued quest for an urban revival, devoted considerable resources in the 1980s to the livable city concept, instituting a heritage zone in and adjacent to the central business district and promoting Market Square (a festival marketplace).95 In the short term, the Hatfield government in the post-Bricklin era focused on supporting small- and medium-sized businesses.96 Yet the growth coalition, in tandem with provincial and federal governments, found it difficult to drop its fixation on state support of large-scale industry and infrastructure projects. As with the Strait of Canso area, the combination of super port and energy projects  remained  a  potent  mix  in  the  business  and  political  spheres.  The reorganization  of  provincial  economic  development  agencies  in  1976  into  the Department  of  Commerce  and  Development  appeared  to  signal  the  end  of  the promotion of risky manufacturing enterprises. Yet, largely through federal action, Saint John experienced another state-fuelled boom starting in the 1980s with the Canadian naval frigate patrol program, which temporarily revived the Irving-owned shipyard and dry dock. The contract awarded in 1983 was the single largest ever granted to a Canadian yard. Saint John Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., was tasked with designing and managing the construction of six patrol frigates. Three would be built  in  Saint  John  and  the  rest  in  a  Quebec  shipyard.  The  federal  government promised that the project would produce $2.4 billion in industrial benefits and that the  Atlantic  region  would  profit  from  several  thousand  person  years  of employment.97 The  contract  buoyed  the  Saint  John  region  for  several  years,  but eventually the shipbuilding work dried up and the yard closed permanently.

51 The  growth  coalition,  undeterred,  has  continued  to  promote  large,  capital-intensive projects, most of them energy-related such as the controversial and costly conversion of Coleson Cove to burn orimulsion, the refurbishment of Point Lepreau (which  was  $1  billion  above  budget  as  of  2012),  shale  gas  exploration,  and  the Energy  East  pipeline.  The  promise  of  environmentally  and  economically questionable big projects to bring prosperity to a variety of metropolitan interests, ranging from small business owners to blue-collar workers to real estate agents, was the most powerful legacy of Saint John’s urban development in the Robichaud and Hatfield eras.98

52 GREG MARQUIS