the prohibition era affect popular attitudes towards the law and law enforce­ment? Simply unravelling the complicated system of overlapping federal and provincial responsibility would be a substantial contribution. Biographies of Donald Fraser, President of the New Brunswick Temperance Alliance, H.R. Grant, Secretary of the Nova Scotia Social Service Council, D.K. Grant, Chief Provincial Temperance Inspector and A.T. Logan, Chief Federal Preventive Officer, would shed considerable light on the frustration of dealing with rum running.

Essentially, despite the wealth of entertaining accounts, very little is known about Atlantic Canada’s rum running past. Information on Nova Scotia, St. Pierre, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick is steadily surfacing, but the Newfoundland experience and the French participation have hardly been scratched. Considering that participants in the traffic are rapidly aging it seems urgent that evidence should be collected quickly. But if rum running is going to be fully understood, it will be necessary to situate the industry more firmly within the broader analytical context of regional history.

C. MARK DAVIS


Canada in the American Century

ONCE UPON A TIME, CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY seemed so simple. The Conservatives, rarely in power from the Great Depression on, were the party of the old empire, their view of the world coloured by Toryism, Loyalism, and British imperialism. The Liberals, Canada’s governing party after 1935, were the party of the new empire, the United States, sharing with their American mentors a faith in anti-communism, internationalism NATO-style, and moralism of a secular Presbyterian sort. Then came the Trudeau years, years during which American power was temporarily weakened and a Liberal government, riding the crest of a resurgent Canadian nationalism, adopted a more independent policy vis-à-vis the United States. Now we have the Mulroney government, more neo-conservative than Tory in character, pledged to refurbishing the continental relationship at all cost and to playing the role of faithful supporter to Reagan’s America on most foreign policy issues of the day. It is as though John A. Macdonald and Wilfrid Laurier had traded places, or more correctly, as though the old divide between Union Jack and Stars and Stripes had given way to a re-alignment between supporters and opponents of Uncle Sam.

Several recent books on Canadian foreign policy may help us to understand
something of the shift that has occurred. They are predominantly concerned with the period before the 1960s and, in the case of two volumes, with the long decades stretching from Confederation to the end of the Second World War. One series of lectures originally given at the University of Toronto in 1980-81 does bring the story reasonably up to date, though it already has a curiously dated ring. On the other hand, a recent monograph formally limited to the years following the Geneva Accords and the establishment of the International Control Commissions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, reads remarkably like a guide to the mind-set of the Reagan farm-team now ensconced in Ottawa.

Let us begin by separating the chaff from the wheat. Considerable attention has been paid in the media to the diaries of Charles Ritchie, long-time Canadian diplomat and sometime adviser on foreign policy to Canadian governments. The most recent of these is *Diplomatic Passport: More Undiplomatic Diaries, 1946-1962* (Toronto, Macmillan, 1981). What are we to make of a man whose life seems a perpetual round of dinner parties and luncheons, whose major fear is to be judged “a Bore after one was dead — an immortal Bore” (p. 47), whose world is one from which “cruelty, violence and coarseness were altogether excluded (and) pain, and even discomfort, fended off wherever possible” (p. 51). With men like this in charge of our diplomatic missions from Paris to Bonn to New York, is it any wonder that the cry of the wretched of this earth seldom penetrated the muffled corridors of power? There are a few snippets of interest in Ritchie’s book, Mackenzie King’s gorging on lobster at the Crillon while keeping his expense account “recorded at a derisory figure” (p. 11), or the honest confession “I feel quite free to criticize the Americans, but when other people do it I instinctively rally to their defence” (p. 67), that should be inscribed on the portals of the Lester Pearson Building in Ottawa. Still, what a prig Ritchie proves himself to be, what a shallow and foolish companion to a post-war world with all its artistic, intellectual and political currents. Nor is it any defence for him to argue on his own behalf that he has purposely omitted any political and diplomatic record from his diaries (p. 127). This only reinforces one’s image of the diplomat as a lightweight, living for chit-chat and *foie gras*, evoking what Napoleon, in a cruel but penetrating commentary, once called Talleyrand, “a turd in a silk stocking”. These diaries serve only to expose the biases of a scion of the old Canadian upper class. Beyond that, they have all the sophistication and permanent value of a series of Zena Cherry gossip columns placed between covers.

Charles Stacey, by comparison, is a serious historian. Perhaps a trifle too serious for most readers, who will find the almost 800 pages of text in his two volumes on *Canada and the Age of Conflict* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981, 1984) hard slogging. For the first 50 years after Confederation, Stacey suggests, Canada was not really “a fact of international life” (I, p. 29), not even for the United States. At best, the Dominion was able to achieve some grudging recognition of its existence from south of the border on strictly con-
tinental affairs, such as the International Joint Commission. More typically, Canadian interests were sacrificed on the altar of Anglo-American concord as in the Alaska Boundary Dispute of 1903, while Canadian foreign policy from the Boer War to the First World War was encompassed within the larger rubric of Imperial policy. For all the reluctance of Laurier to give Great Britain a blank cheque on naval policy, in practice Canada found herself at war at the same moment as Britain on 4 August 1914.

It is here that Stacey's study comes alive and that his major theme is presented. For if there is a hero to his two volumes it is Robert Borden, at whose doorstep Stacey lays the credit for Canada's achieving international status in the aftermath of the First World War: "Borden was not a man of penetrating intellect or an original political thinker; but in his dour Nova Scotia fashion he had a firm grasp of first principles. He was prepared to see Canada make great sacrifices for imperial causes in which the majority of the Canadian people believed, but he was determined that those sacrifices should purchase a share in imperial decision-making...The fighting men and the statesmen of 1914-19 were a new generation of Canadian founding fathers. If Borden's name is to be blazoned on the roll of Canada's great prime ministers, it is because of what he did to achieve a new position for her in the Empire and the world" (I, p. 287). For Stacey, Borden was the architect of Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of April 1917, which recognized the autonomous character of the Dominions and their right to an adequate voice in foreign policy and all important matters of Imperial concern. He also played a key role during the peace negotiations that followed on the German surrender in ensuring that Canada and the other Dominions achieved full membership in the League of Nations in recognition of the significant military and economic contributions they had made towards the Allied victory.

The second volume of Stacey's study is, by comparison, dominated by the personality of William Lyon Mackenzie King. King, unlike Borden, had little interest in Canadian participation within British Imperial Councils. On the contrary, the drift in Canada between the wars was towards greater isolationism, with the Chanak Crisis of 1922 heralding the disengagement of Canada from British concerns. The Halibut Treaty of 1925 and the opening of a Canadian mission in Washington suggested a re-orientation from the British to an American pole. The subsequent failure of the Imperial Economic Conference in 1932 to stem the Great Depression suggested the futility of looking to the Empire for solutions. Stacey correctly pays much attention to Quebec as a key factor in explaining Canada's disengagement from British foreign policy throughout these years. He also, correctly in my opinion, suggests that when the chips were down in September 1939, it was the call of the blood for English Canadians that determined Canada's involvement alongside Britain in the Second World War. King skilfully avoided repeating Borden's mistake over conscription. He also cultivated a close personal relationship with Roosevelt which was to help cement
the post-war Canadian-American continental relationship. The establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence at Ogdensburg in August 1940, the Hyde Park Agreement on wartime economic cooperation, the February 1947 announcement on post-war defence collaboration are all given careful attention. Stacey has no illusion about Canada's actual role in determining Allied policy during the Second World War, though King made sure he extracted whatever mileage he could from his personal contacts with the two charismatic figures, Roosevelt and Churchill. Interestingly enough, in light of the current revival of support for free trade between Canada and the United States, it is King who receives full credit for having scotched an earlier version in the fall of 1948, at the moment of his own retirement. Yet of King, Stacey has less good to say than of Borden: "It is interesting that no serious student of King's career, and virtually no Canadian of any sort, has ventured to call him a great man. Norman Robertson is recorded as saying, "I never saw a touch of greatness in him" (II, p. 425). This of the man who presided over our foreign affairs for a quarter of a century.

There is much of value in Stacey's study, and there are a variety of other themes that I cannot touch on in the space of a review. Still, there are also some weaknesses in his approach and interpretation. One weakness is a tendency to see Canadian foreign policy from the top down, since his sources are almost entirely Archives, diaries and State Papers, with but passing attention to newspapers and public opinion at large. Admittedly, the latter is a difficult thing to chart in the period before 1945, yet it seems to me that the pronouncements of the Orange Order or the organs of nationalist opinion in Quebec such as Le Devoir deserved greater attention. Neither Borden nor King were entirely free agents nor was Canadian foreign policy hatched in a vacuum.

My major reservation regarding the Stacey volumes, however, stems from the question of interpretation. Stacey is a traditional historian, for whom ideology and ideological motivation take the relatively familiar by-ways of Conservative and Liberal, with scarce anything else to describe them. The word capitalism does not come easily to him, and one looks in vain for recognition of the role that economic forces, class interest or international economic position might play in shaping Canadian foreign policy. True, there are some figures in the Appendix to Volume II that show the realignment of Canadian trade and investment from Great Britain to the United States. But to what extent was Canada's involvement in the First World War, for example, a direct result of our dependent position vis-à-vis Great Britain and of the lack of an authentic, indigenous capitalist economy? And to what degree was our intervention in Russia at the end of the First World War not just a passing aberration, as Stacey suggests (II, pp. 276-282), but deeply rooted in a Canadian counter-revolutionary tradition that in a transformed version was to carry over into the Cold War period as well? Seen in this light, Borden is more a minor character than a hero. King, though a more mawkish person, is simply the instrument of
the changeover from the British to the American empire, all his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. True, Canada achieved membership in the League of Nations in 1919 and in the United Nations after 1945. But did this country ever rise above junior partnership? There is nothing in the Stacey volumes to suggest that this was ever a real preoccupation of our policy-makers. Yet this issue, which is never addressed by Stacey, is the crucial one arising from the 80 years of history that he has canvassed in so much detail.

With John Holmes, we enter directly into the postwar period, the so-called golden age of Canadian diplomacy, but simultaneously the period of the American alliance. Holmes, a long-time career diplomat and former Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, is uniquely qualified to write what one might call an official history of those years and of a policy with which he was intimately associated. *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Vol. II* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1982) is, on the whole, a quite readable study, which covers such major themes as the coming of the cold war, the creation of NATO, the Korean War, Canada’s involvement in Indo-China, our relationship to the Commonwealth and our role in the United Nations down to Suez. Holmes, who has been characterized by Doug Ross as a “liberal-moderate”, is prepared to be reflective and analytical in his approach, which in the relatively sterile world of Canadian policymakers, sets him off as something of an intellectual.

On the Cold War, Holmes argues that there was not one uniform attitude, and that Canadian foreign policy makers were by and large less strident in their attitudes towards the Soviet Union than the majority view that came to prevail in the United States. The Canadians, in fact, tended to side with those in the American foreign policy community who sought opportunities for negotiation with the Soviets but were at the losing end. Holmes suggests that Canadian attitudes towards the Soviet Union were shaped by our own diplomats, men such as Dana Wilgress, and that our hostility to the Soviet system was influenced less by a commitment to capitalist values than by one to liberalism and fair play. He recognizes some possible validity to the Marxist argument that would relate American and Canadian foreign policy in the post-1945 period to the dynamics of capitalism. But this does not make him any more friendly to revisionist writers who would hold the United States primarily responsible for the Cold War. Nor does it make him any the less committed to the road of alignment with the United States which Canada adopted, “the product of heredity and environment which actually emerged from that particular war in 1945” (p. 88). Where critics of Canadian foreign policy would argue junior partnership, Holmes would claim, as he does in his short collection of lectures, *Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981), “The policy of a small power is no less independent because it decides to be an ally rather than an abstainer” (p. 39).

Many pages of *The Shaping of the Peace* are spent trying to document
Canada's role as a middle power, in framing the North Atlantic alliance, in trying to modify American attitudes during the Korean War, in playing a useful bridge role between the U.K. and Europe and the United States, occasionally between east and west, and increasingly between the first and third worlds at the United Nations. How convincing an argument does he make? By and large, a weak one when it comes to direct Canadian influence on American policy or on NATO, or to our ability to take bold departures during the Cold War years. Our relationship to China helps illuminate this. While Canada was moving towards formal recognition of the People's Republic in the spring of 1950, the Korean War interrupted the process for two decades. At the United Nations, Canada subsequently voted the American line condemning China as an aggressor, despite behind-the-scenes dissent from the American position. As Holmes himself admits in *The Shaping of Peace*, "It is a very serious thing for a Canadian foreign minister to jeopardize his chances of a hearing in Washington, especially if he does so on a subject not specifically related to (a) kind of Canadian national interest" (p. 155). Nor was our position in NATO any different. "Internationalism was almost a religion in the decade after the Second World War...A new body of Canadian professionals...were feeling their oats, aspiring to a place nearer the seats of power. For them, NATO was a good club to belong to...(The members) included the inner directorate of the world balance of power, and the advantages of dining with them were considerably more than social" (pp. 119-120). The parallel that comes to mind here is Borden's attempt to win Canada a place within the Imperial War Council. It is very much the foreign policy of a junior partner. The difference between Canada's position after the Second World War and that after the First World War, I would argue, was three-fold. In the first place, the enemy after 1945 was the Soviet Union, against which it was easier to forge common ideological bonds — between French and English Canada, between the policy-making establishment and big business — than against fascism during the inter-war period. Moreover, the spearhead of this alliance was the United States, with whom Canada's economic and cultural ties were overwhelming, and which our political elites, especially the Liberal Party, were prepared to support with little reservation. Also, there was little in the Canadian past, other than the abortive rebellions of 1837, that suggested a pattern of independence, and thus little reason for our foreign policy makers to discover such a motivation after 1945, once the switchover from Britain to the United States had occurred.

Holmes is somewhat more convincing when he turns from east-west questions to the Commonwealth or the United Nations. Here, the absence of a history of Canadian imperialism made us more receptive to the New Commonwealth and indeed to the Third World than was true for the older colonial powers. At the same time, as Holmes shrewdly observes, our orientation to Asia came principally through such Commonwealth states as India, Pakistan and Ceylon, rather than the Phillipines, Formosa or South Korea. Yet one should not go too
far here either. Canada’s middle role during this period had a lot to do with the relative weakness of a yet-emerging Third World bloc at the UN, and with the particular conflict between British/French and American interests during the Suez Crisis. The UN and the Commonwealth of the 1960s and beyond would prove another story.

Before leaving *The Shaping of the Peace*, let me highlight a few claims that cannot pass unchallenged. In describing official Ottawa’s increasing hostility towards the Soviet Union after 1945, Holmes tells us “it was the brutal treatment by the Russians of social democrats, workers in the resistance, and especially of Jews which alienated the policy-makers in Ottawa whose political philosophy was deeply liberal” (p. 23). In light of the well-documented evidence of official Ottawa’s unconcern for the plight of Jews in Nazi Germany and occupied Europe during the Second World War, this statement seems hard to swallow. Regarding Canada’s willingness to waive the rules and admit some 36,000 refugees in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution, among the reasons cited are a greater openness to immigrants in general and the greater sensitivity to human rights that exposure to the UN had given Canadians. But the crucial fact that these were white refugees from Communism is not given the pride of place which it deserves, one which can be contrasted with Canadian acceptance of refugees from right-wing regimes such as Chile or Guatemala. In another area too, some of Holmes’ judgements appear altogether too jejune. For instance, Holmes scoffs at the exultation of U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Ray Atherton, in the fall of 1947, over the prospects of economic union between the two countries. Yet Stacey argues that this was no idle prospect, that key Canadian opinion-makers from C.D. Howe to Douglas Abbott, Lester Pearson and Hume Wrong, John Deutsch and Graham Towers favoured a free trade scheme. In another instance, discussing the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and citing R.A. MacKay, Holmes tells us that Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, Canadian co-chairman in the late 1940s, “had tremendous influence over the American military thinking in Washington in general” (p. 276). One awaits the evidence from American sources to back this up.

*Life with Uncle* gives us a more concise version of Holmes’ reflections on the Canadian-American relationship. Some observations it is difficult to disagree with: “As a neighbour it is certainly better to be a Canadian than a Pole” (p. 2), or “The trouble with talking about the United States in confident generalities is that it is a kind of Jekyll and Hyde phenomenon, except that it is rarely as Jekyllian as Americans like to think and very rarely as Hydian as its critics allege” (p. 41). But Holmes is on particularly thin ice when he generalizes from the time of these lectures (1980-81) into the future. He writes: “Nationalism is now more widely based in both the Canadian and American communities — for better and for worse” (p. 3). Yet Canadian nationalism has weakened in the past few years, thanks to the international economic down-turn, free trade is being pushed actively by key business and government figures in Canada, and the new Prime
Minister has become a positive puppy-dog in his relations with the White House. The failure of Holmes' vision here is ideological and structural in character. Ideologically, he ignores his own acknowledgement of "trends and cycles" in political affairs (p. 113), assuming that the 1980-81 reality will persist indefinitely. Structurally, he underestimates the economic and political constraints under which Canadian foreign policy operated throughout the postwar period, including the decade which he celebrates so fullsomely in The Shaping of the Peace. Canadian foreign policy was never independent of the United States, no more than was the Canadian political economy independent of the American. The Trudeau years may have seen some modest moves towards economic nationalism and some new rhetoric in the talk of third options and north-south dialogue, but the substance of a nation's foreign policy is not so quickly altered.

James Eayrs, in the latest volume of In Defence of Canada: Indochina: Roots of Complicity (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1983) goes some way towards elucidating the failures of the diplomacy which Holmes celebrates and which the Mulroney government, echoing that of St. Laurent, would have us relive. In approaching the tangled history of Indochina and Canada's involvement in the International Control Commission set up pursuant to the Geneva Convention of 1954, Eayrs has set aside the ideological blinkers of Cold War liberalism. To be sure, the North Vietnamese were Communists, but they were also patriots, and it was this patriotism which was violated, first through the forcible return of the French after 1945, second through the splitting of Vietnam along the 17th parallel, and the attempt by the United States to promote an anti-communist regime dependent on them in the south. Communism, in other words, was not the abhorrent and unnatural phenomenon it would appear to be to Charles Ritchie with his upper class mannerisms, nor the strident doctrine associated with a Third World that Holmes latterly denounces. In this respect Eayrs follows the interpretations of the better American and Western historians of Indochina, and the views which Nehru and Menon advanced, identifying communism in Indochina with nationalism, and therefore associating the victory of the former with the later.

Canada's role on the ICC, as a representative of the western powers, was a flawed one from the beginning, one which would place us increasingly side-by-side with the Americans in what was ultimately a losing cause, the preservation of a divided Vietnam. To give Canadian policy-makers their due, they had never sought membership alongside India and Poland on the Commission, and it was the vicissitudes of the Geneva negotiations in 1954 that led them to accept "a thankless position" that was to extend over 20 years. Out of this thankless position, the Canadians made themselves the effective accomplices of a power which had never signed the Geneva Accords — the United States. Eayrs shows how the initial Canadian concern, as articulated by Sherwood Lett, for a quasi-judicial role for the Commission, gave way under the pressure of events to a more partisan and political interpretation of the Canadian position. Other Canadian
diplomatic personnel, such as Arnold Smith or Rudolphe Duder saw themselves as representatives of "the free world" in the finest Cold War sense of the term. They countered the partisanship of the Poles with a partisanship of their own. The violations of the cease-fire that offended the Canadians, such as freedom of movement of North Vietnamese wishing to move south, were quite different from the violations in the south, such as the refusal to hold all-Vietnamese elections as promised in the Geneva Accords. The Canadian attempt to win the Indian ear during the Commission investigations was the counter-part to the attempt to maintain the Americans' ear throughout the Canadian stay in Indo-China.

This is the crucial part of Eayrs' account. Almost from the beginning, External Affairs was engaged in transmitting information which its commissioners acquired to the United States: "Information we have been passing to...Washington...under no circumstances should be...referred to in public. Should it become generally known that we are passing information to the United States Government concerning the activities of the International Commission it would have very serious repercussions" (p. 219). These words from Lester Pearson set the tone for Chapter 8, "Helping our Friends". Whatever the original intention of Lett to remain faithful to the spirit of the Geneva Accords, after 1955 the Canadian role became one of turning a blind eye to the activities of the U.S. protegés in the south and of energetically passing on information to the United States. Reports from the field, commission activities, conditions in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, intelligence on military preparations or activities in Viet Minh territory were all grist for this reporting process. Nor was Canada innocent of complicity with the larger purposes of American involvement in Vietnam. Blair Seaborn, Canada's Commissioner in the middle 1960s, was used as a go-between from Washington to Hanoi in the period preceding the full-scale bombing of the north in 1965. Pearson, Prime Minister by now, seemed to go along with the "sticks" as well as "carrots" approach which Washington had adopted. And while men like Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, could wrap themselves in the mantle of impartiality that the ICC ostensibly represented, Canada had clearly become a collaborator of the United States.

Much of Eayrs' account traces the frustration of the Canadian team in the field with their impossible mission, the various contacts that developed with the Indians and the Poles, with the Vietnamese, both North and South, and with headquarters back home. The descriptions are at points unnecessarily detailed, leading the reader to lose sight of the larger picture. But overall, Eayrs has written a convincing account of this chapter in Canadian foreign policy-making, and has shown a much greater sensitivity to the reality of Southeast Asia than most of our diplomats in the field were willing or able to do.

What lessons can we draw from this complicity? That all other Canadian ventures, where American interests are deeply involved, would be of the same kind? That a Canadian role in a peace force in Central America, for example,
should one ever be created, might lead down the same twisted path followed by
the Commissioners in Indochina? Such would seem to be a possible inference
from this study. More crucially, it places in doubt the easy assumptions about
independence and alliances that underlay the diplomacy of the "golden age", or
the supposition that the Canadian view of the Cold War was so fundamentally
different from the American. Has Canadian foreign policy with respect to the
Cruise, or Central America, or the southern part of Africa been all that different
from the American? Have Canadian foreign policy-makers learned the lessons
about nationalism and communism, or begun to digest the fact that Marxism-
Leninism comes in different forms, and that regimes that bear this name are no
more static and unchanging than any others?

And that brings us, by way of conclusion, back to the essential theme of Can­
adian foreign policy in the American century. In moving from the British to the
American sphere, we also moved ideologically from Toryism to liberalism. This
liberalism, rooted as it was in a branch-plant capitalism, took succour from the
Cold War and flourished with it. The 1960s, however, began to break down the
comfortable synthesis between Cold War orthodoxy, Canadian liberalism and
the American empire. American policy in Indochina ultimately proved a failure
and led to a weakening of American influence for at least a decade. The coming
doctor, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the evolving character of communism in
China and elsewhere did much to alter the Manichean view of good and evil
which long characterized the western and Canadian attitude towards com­
munism and revolutions of the left. Domestically, the greater nationalism of the
late 1960s and early 1970s, based particularly in the new middle class and the
state sector, seemed to put paid to the old pattern of junior partnership, opening
the door to a realignment of Canadian opinion on a left-right, rather than Amer­
ican-British axis. Broadly speaking, the left of the Liberal Party and the NDP
were most forward in their opposition to a one-sidedly American pole in our
national and international life.

It was far from evident, however, that other sections of society were of the
same mind. Various provinces registered their opposition to economic nation­
alism; big business and small were far from enthusiastic at the inroads which
state enterprise was making into their domain; the welfare state was coming
under attack in a period of shrinking pies. Re-grouping on the right was only a
matter of time. Internationally, it has brought Thatcher to power in the U.K.
and Reagan in the U.S., and with them a renewal of Cold War postures. The
ideology of neo-conservatism goes hand in hand with a stress on military power,
especially in the United States. Now Canada has elected a Conservative govern­
ment with a massive parliamentary majority. What does this portend for our
foreign policy?

The answer that we could cull from a reading of Stacey and Holmes and
Eayrs is that we may expect a greater congruence with the prevailing policies of
the United States. The public statements of the Mulroney government to date
suggest a return to fashion of ideas such as free trade, the North American partnership, and the Western Alliance. It is only a matter of time until the phrase “free world” is rehabilitated. Yet Canadian foreign policy cannot throw off the pretence of internationalism which has been its mainstay since 1945. Hence, the rhetoric of disarmament to match a policy of greater military spending, a renewed emphasis on the United Nations while the important moves take place in NATO or the economic summits, an element of public charity towards the Third World, while our ties with the one power that really matters to the Conservatives are consolidated.

We are still living in the American century. The Canadian right has given up its nostalgia for Great Britain and come to embrace an increasingly neo-conservative United States. Others cast about for ways to hold back a continental tide which could sweep away the moorings of an independent Canadian identity. Dependence vs. autonomy, complicity vs. independence — these are the poles within which Canadian foreign policy continues to operate. The pendulum, in the mid-1980s, has swung in a pro-American direction, after a decade and a half of the opposite. It is the left-right cleavage within Canadian public opinion that will determine for just how long it will remain there.

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